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ST A TEMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this thesis is to isolate and investigate the importance of the 
'soft' state as a causal factor behind the disappointing record of development finance 
institutions in the furtherance of economic growth in developing countries, 
particularly those in Anglophone Africa. 
Subsidiary objectives were suggested by the progress of the investigation, and are 
important as supporting the main thrust of the work. They are:-
(i) to determine the relevance of standard ideas on financial intermediation on 
development - principally devised in relation to European industrialisation - to modern 
developing countries; 
(ii) to relate D.F.!. behaviour to standard theories of the firm; 
(iii) to investigate the question as to whether D.F.Ls can be viable in financing 
contexts that conventional intermediaries avoid; 
(iv) to devise a criterion for D.F.L financial solvency. 
Finally, an important last objective is to draw pertinent conclusions from the analysis, 
and make recommendations for development finance institutions in the future. 
(iii) 
ABSTRACT 
Development finance institutions put money into capital projects where conventional 
intermediaries are reluctant to get involved, and/or where there is a political 
preference for this channel of investment. In the last few decades D.F.l.s have 
especially proliferated in developing countries. Unfortunately experience has been 
disappointing. Most D.F .1.s have got into financial difficulties, and have not done 
much for economic growth. A number of factors can be postulated as responsible for 
this record. However, the concept of the 'soft' state as a causal factor has not been 
applied in a structured manner to the problem. The following pages isolate 'soft' state 
effects on D.F.1. experience via substantial Kenyan and Zimbabwean case studies. 
The first part of the thesis is largely theoretical. The concept of the soft state is 
discussed, and then a consideration of 
(i) the place of financial intermediation in development, 
(ii) the normative goals that often bias government policy and 
(iii) the nature of financial systems in developing countries, 
leads to a delineation of a role for development finance institutions. 
The second part investigates the major 'general' D.F.1.s in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 
order to test the deductions made and the hypothesis postulated in Part 1. As 
necessary background to the D.F.1. analysis the history, the ideological bases, the 
economics and the financial systems of the countries concerned are discussed. The 
work on the D. F. 1. s themselves leads to some preliminary conclusions as to the effect 
of the soft state on their operations. 
The third part synthesises the material from the previous chapters, and draws some 
conclusions as to how soft state features have affected the structures and work of 
D.F.1.s in Kenya and Zimbabwe. A number of recommendations related to the role 
and behaviour of D.F.1.s in developing countries are made at the end, and some 
suggestions for further research. 
There are three appendices after the final chapter. The first analyses the concept of 
rent generation by and rent extraction from companies in developing countries and 
the second formulates a rule as to when D.F.1.s should sell profitable investments. 
The third looks briefly at some other developing country D.F.1.s. 
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PART 1: 
ISSUES AND IDEAS 
Chapter 1 
THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about development finance institutions in developing countries. Though 
development finance institutions (I) proliferate throughout the world in countries at 
all levels or stages of economic development, in recent years it is in the poorer 
nations that enthusiasm for them has been most pronounced. As specialised 
intermediaries between providers of - generally - long-term funds and those who seek 
to obtain such money in the form of loans or equity, they ostensibly constitute a 
convenient and efficient way of channelling money into capital projects in contexts 
where the furtherance of economic growth is seen as a priority and where private 
capital markets are limited in scope, and/or unwilling to face the risks they perceive 
to exist in certain types of lending and equity investment. 
Kitchen elaborates on these latter points when he writes, "The raison d'etre of a DFC 
in a market (or mixed) economy is to provide long-term finance (debt or equity) 
which the capital market cannot (or will not) provide". (Kitchen 1986 p.125). In 
other words there are lacunae in the capital market - for whatever reasons - which are 
plugged by the deliberate creation of specialised financing intermediaries. This is an 
acceptable idea, and one does not have to travel out of the U.K. in order to find 
successful examples of such organisations, for example 3i (Investors in Industry) or 
the now defunct Scottish Development Agency. If therefore countries such as the 
U.K., with highly developed and sophisticated private sector capital markets, have 
seen the establishment of specialised state-sponsored financial intermediaries, how 
much more pertinent would such organisations seem to be in developing countries 
with their more limited financial systems. 
And indeed, the following lines indicate the importance that has become attached in 
real life to the concept of financing economic growth through tailor-made 
intermediaries. "In the last two decades, with considerable World Bank prompting, 
development finance institutions were established throughout much of the developing 
world in the belief that they would be the means for achieving a quantum leap in the 
3 
rate of economic development". (RBC Dominion Securities 1989 Component 3 Vol. I 
p.l) (2). 
THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
As noted above, a development finance institution is a financial intermediary 
principally concerned with directing capital funds on a long or medium term basis _ 
though occasionally they lend working capital - into the hands of those who aim to 
embark on real investment projects. The recipients may be private sector companies, 
cooperatives, small businessmen, farmers, nationalised industries, government 
departments, concerns owned wholly by the D.F.!., or concerns owned on a minority 
or majority basis by the D.F.!. jointly with other interests. 
A D.F.!. may be wholly owned by private sector interests, and in this context Kitchen 
(1986 p.126), referring to a 1983 World Bank paper by Gordon - quoted later -
observes, "Private sector D.F .C.s were found to be generally more vigorous, 
efficient, and profitable than their government-owned equivalents". Though the 
empirical work in Part 2 of this study does not show this to be unequivocally true, 
a simple explanation - that accords with Kitchen's assertion - is that governments in 
developing countries rarely leave such institutions alone, typically wanting to guide, 
pressurise and interfere in their business operations even when there are no state 
holdings in them. (See Ch.5 for further discussion of this issue). 
Nevertheless, as a result of considerable government concern with the achievement 
of economic growth, D.F.I.s in developing countries typically tend to be owned by 
governments and parastatal organisations, with or without the association of other 
shareholders such as banks, supranational, regional and foreign national development 
organisations, and miscellaneous others. D.F.!. grants, borrowing and lines of credit 
are obtained from governments, banks, the World Bank, the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation and many other analogous bodies. In theory bonds may 
be floated on domestic or international capital markets, though in recent years, in the 
light of the generally poor record of D.F.I.s (see later chapters), it is unlikely there 
would be any takers without watertight government guarantees. 
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In addition to actually providing money, D.F.!.s may take on a variety of other 
functions, such as providing management, extension and training services. Indeed, in 
relation to a wholly-owned subsidiary, a D.F.!. has little option but to organise 
management or to provide management itself, and sometimes a D.F.1. may actually 
initiate new projects. The term 'promotional agency' has been coined to identify 
institutions go in for this type of work (Levitsky 1986 p.21); however there seems 
little to be gained by using the term in the text that follows, as promotion differs only 
in degree but not in kind from less entrepreneurial D.F.1. behaviour. 
To classify D.F.l.s in relation to the type of finance they supply is also an 
unsatisfactory exercise, since a variety of terminology is used in naming them, and 
traditional nomenclature is often employed according to taste and without precision. 
Thus 'development corporation', strictly speaking, implies an organisation that 
provides equity capital but not loans, whereas a 'development bank' should mean the 
opposite. However in practice 'corporations' will be found that lend and 'banks' that 
invest. Also D. F. I. s termed 'investment banks', 'investment corporations', 'credit 
organisations' and so on, are commonplace. It is not sufficient, therefore, just to 
know what a D.F.1. is called to understand what it does. 
EXPERIENCE 
The experience of D.F.l.s in promoting economic growth has been disappointing. 
Their failure in this respect is mirrored in their own internal viability, and indeed 
throughout developing countries many have collapsed under mountains of bad debt, 
while others have limped on supported by open or covert government subsidies, or 
via taking advantage of the convenient blind eye of creditors.Some, though, have 
remained - or appear to have remained - viable. A continuation of the above quote 
makes the position depressing I y clear. "U nfortunatel y . .. their track record on the 
whole has not been encouraging: of the literally dozens of development finance 
institutions that were launched, perhaps a small handful have been able to make 
substantial progress towards becoming financial institutions which are making a 
measurable contribution to economic development without substantial and ongoing 
injections of public funds". (RBC op.cit. p.l). 
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The RBC suggests a number of reasons for what it describes as the "lacklustre 
performance of most development finance institutions" (Ibid. p.l), and to mention 
them at this point is not so much to anticipate more detailed later analysis as to be 
able to identify the missing ingredients in the listing. Firstly, the report assumes a 
measure of 'supply-leading' (see Pt.1 Ch.2) by D.F.l.s, since it stresses the 
contradictions between financial viability and the costs of promoting development. 
Secondly, and clearly related to the first point, is the labour-intensive - and hence 
more costly - nature of providing development finance. Thirdly, there is the greater 
possibility of making mistakes and misjudgements when operating in 'new' territory. 
Fourthly, the report castigates poor D.F.1. management and indifferent project 
appraisal, "an unfortunate, but necessary, routine that has to be followed to arrive at 
the ultimate goal: the dispersion of funds". (Ibid. p.l). Fifthly the poor record of 
recipients in servicing debt is noted. Sixthly it is apparent that governments may 
allow factors such as employment creation and regional development to come before 
the financial viability of projects, and hence of the D.F.I.s that support them. 
All of the above are likely and plausible factors behind the indifferent performance 
of D.F.I.s, and later pages will have more to say about them, both generally and in 
relation to the two countries on which the study is focussed. However it may be 
argued that to some extent they - and other factors not mentioned - are linked to, and 
indeed may be emanations of, phenomena hardly mentioned in the Report, other than 
indirectly and by implication. Such are, firstly, the political and ideological factors 
that often guide governments in their policies towards development finance. When 
such considerations are preeminent, viability can be undermined (3). Ch. 3 of Part 
I will explore this issue in depth. Secondly is the 'soft' state syndrome, whereby 
structural weaknesses (4) in society damage the ability of an economy to flourish. 
Properly to investigate the factors referred to in the above paragraph necessitates 
facing up to these politico/social conditions that affect them. Hence, the assertion, 
"The current World Bank thrust towards sustainability for development finance 
institutions involves a major rearrangement of priorities" (Ibid p.2) is rather to 
understate the problem. 
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THE 'SOFT' STATE 
The following passage from Gould and Amaro-Reyes in a World Bank publication 
(1986 p.18) explains the nature of a 'soft' state. "The soft state is characterised by 
social indiscipline that is manifest by deficiencies or willful neglect of rules and 
directives by public officials and civil servants, and the collusion of government 
officials and top civil servants with powerful individuals and groups whose conduct 
they are supposed to regulate". In the context of Africa, Ergas (1987 p.5) 
conceptualises this scenario into the idea of the 'patrimonial' state, which is "based 
on patron-client ties". The overt character of such a state may be - and normally is, 
since true democracy allows an electorate to overturn a government that presides over 
a disordered polity - some variety of dictatorship, but the apparent toughness of rule 
belies a network of weaknesses in political, social and economic structures and 
practices. Rothschild (in Ergas op.cit. p.118) puts it thus, "The African state appears 
centralised and bureaucratised ... Yet it is not always able to demonstrate an assured 
capacity to convert its preferences into policies and must, as a matter of political 
necessity, often negotiate with local strongmen or modernist interest group 
representatives for its survival". 
Gould and Amaro-Reyes go on to delineate specific aspects of this situation, such as 
"social indiscipline and disobedience to public authority". (op.cit. 1986 p.18). 
Related to this, (Ergas op.cit. p.5), "(ethnic, clan and extended family type of 
loyalties prevail)". In the context of D.F.I.s this can mean disregard by borrowers 
of the need to meet interest payments and capital repayments due to centralised 
institutions to which they feel no affinity, and of the obligation necessarily to use 
funds for the purpose for which they were obtained. D.F.I.s themselves may be 
complacent about their financial obligations to government and other providers of 
funds, and may expect automatic government help if they get into difficulties due to 
bad debts. 
On the other hand the 'soft' state can mean "overcentralised government, which 
undermines local initiatives". (Gould and Amaro-Reyes op.cit. p.18). Furthermore, 
as Ergas (op.cit. p.12) observes, "With a few exceptions ... African governments have 
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also a very dismal record as managers of the economy. African governments have 
often exhibited a perplexing tendency (5) to disregard basic economic principles ... " . 
For D.F.I.s this might imply that government interferes too readily in day-to-day 
business, requiring disbursement of funds not only on grounds congruent with some 
development plan or social goal, but also requiring finance to be handed out on the 
basis of political or personal criteria. This is in line with remarks made by Bates 
(1981 p.l02) when he observes, "Privileged access is used by the elites in charge of 
the programmes for direct personal gain and to create a political following". Lastly, 
Gould and Amaro-Reyes (op.cit. p.19) refer to the soft state as prone to "endemic 
corruption that hinders innovation, prevents change and inhibits eradication of corrupt 
behaviour". And, as Ergas (op.cit. p.S) puts it, "Corruption ... .is an important 
dimension of patrimonialism". This can cover a multitude of possibilities in relation 
to D.F.I.s, such as job creation for relatives, the maximisation of managerial utility 
irrespective of an institution's capacity to support such behaviour, the diversion of 
loans and equity capital to 'cronies', inadequate presentation of accounts to hide 
irregularities, and the filling of influential D. F.1. posts by officials who also hold 
powerful government positions (6). 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to explore the reasons behind the 'soft' 
state phenomenon, except in so far as such discussion occurs incidentally in the 
course of the analysis of other issues. A further quote, however, gives the essence 
of the problem. "The social indiscipline of the soft states has been attributed to 
political, social, and economic arrangements conditioned by historical circumstances". 
(Gould and Amaro-Reyes op.cit. p.19). For the above situation to impinge on the 
conception, establishment, administration and operations of development finance 
institutions must be (i) to severely damage their ability to remain solvent and (ii) to 
disable the development projects with which they are associated. Furthermore such 
lacunae as there are in the private capital market of a country for D.F.I.s to fill may 
increase in number and size when the state is 'soft', as business confidence in such 
an environment wastes away and the financial markets increasingly confine themselves 
to safe business. And of course the not infrequent desire of developing country 
governments to guide the finance of development in line with ideological goals can 
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only compound the problem. 
HYPOTHESIS 
In a low income developing country that wishes to experience sustained economic 
growth, the soundest and most uncontroversial justification for the establishment of 
development finance institutions is that they may compensate for certain forms of 
financial market failure. Without them, in other words, the flow of money capital, 
and hence of the real resources for which it is a proxy, into economic development 
may be hindered or dammed. However, it is the purpose of this study to show that, 
given the circumstances of a 'soft' state environment, D.F .I.s fail in this role. 
The second part of the hypothesis follows on from this. That is that D.F.l.s which 
are bound up with the disorder of a soft state contribute to the economic deficiencies 
that they are supposed to treat. A passage from the RBC Report (op.cit. p.4) 
supports this suggestion. "In recent years the D.F.l.s have been criticised, and with 
a degree of justification, for having failed in their intended mission. In fact, the term 
'negative development' was encountered ... on a number of occasions to indicate that 
the effect of some companies' involvement with one or other of the D. F. I. s (in 
Kenya) had been so detrimental financially and/or competitively that their normal 
development and expansion had been precluded". 
THE WAY FORWARD 
Earlier sections of this chapter constitute an impressionistic survey of the scenario to 
which the hypothesis relates. Concrete evidence and analysis must be supplied to 
justify or refute what is hypothesized. This the forthcoming chapters aim to do. 
The primary purpose of the remaining chapters in Part 1 is to seek to establish a role 
for D.F .I.s in developing countries. Firstly, this exercise requires some investigation 
of the significance of financial institutions in general in the business of economic 
development, so as to determine what should be the nature of the relationship between 
D. F. I. s - as constituting one specific grouping amongst intermediaries - and those 
who use the funds they provide. Introducing the conclusions into the context of the 
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developing country can come up against social and ideological agendas, which can 
obfuscate and weaken policies that attach to economic and commercial 
recommendations. Following this, an exploration of the scope of financial systems 
in developing countries, taking due account of the complications just referred to, 
reveals the areas in which D. F . I. s may be expected to operate. 
Part 2 looks at the experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe in the light of the analysis 
in Part 1. Part 3 synthesizes the analysis, draws conclusions and makes some 
recommendations on the future conduct of D.F.I.s in developing countries. 
NOTES PART 1 CHAPTER 1 
1. In general this designation will be used in the following pages even though 
'companies' or 'corporations' are frequently used as alternatives to 'institutions'. 
2. RBC Dominion Securities of Canada was commissioned in the late 1980s to 
write a report on Kenyan development finance institutions. However despite the 
locational focus of the project, the completed report has much useful comment on 
D.F .I.s in general. 
3. . .. unless of course ideological en th usiasm motivates people towards hard work 
and efficiency. 
4. The words are meant to indicate that though economic and social arrangements 
in a country may appear well-ordered and logical, the system is prone to inefficiency 
and disorder. 
5. Not so perplexing, perhaps, if one considers only the short term interests of 
the ruling elites. 
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6. A useful account of the subordination of commercial criteria to personal 
motivations in African economies is found in Goran Hyden - 'No Shortcuts to 
Progress: African Development Management in Perspective' - Heinemann 1983 
p.8-29. 
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Chapter 2 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND GROWTH 
BASIC IDEAS 
Economic development in a country cannot proceed very far without the assistance 
of a structured financial system. As Gurley and Shaw (1955 p.519) observe, 
"Economic development is retarded if only self-finance and direct finance are 
available, if financial intermediaries do not exist". In a system devoid of such 
intermediaries, even the basic matter of trade in goods and services may only take 
place via barter or the use of commodity money: the cumbersomeness of both these 
methods inevitably slows up business affairs. When it comes to capital accumulation, 
in a barter system saving and investment are not easily accomplished unless they be 
directly related, as when a person devotes time to producing real capital instead of 
making consumer goods or enjoying leisure. The separation of saving and investment 
is of course possible once a convenient commodity such as silver has become 
established as a generally accepted money medium, and such processes have 
historically given rise to and been associated with financial intermediation. However 
the growth of economic activity is held back if it rests on the physical moving around 
in quantity of metallic or other commodity money, and waits on the development by 
financial intermediaries of the 'token' money concept and, on the basis of this, cheque 
and allied systems, and depositing, saving, lending, borrowing and investing facilities. 
In the context of the modem developing country, what is at issue is not the necessity 
for a system of financial intermediaries, but how it should be structured, and how the 
various institutions within it should operate in order to have the optimal (1) impact 
on economic growth. In the past decades a number of theoretical contributions have 
been made on the nature of the importance of financial institutions in general on 
development, and the investigation begins by surveying these ideas. D.F.I.s, as a 
subset of intermediaries supposedly (2) specifically concerned with growth can very 
pertinently be associated with these ideas. 
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'BACKWARDNESS' AND THE PROVISION OF FINANCE 
Gerschenkron (1962) takes the importance of finance for development as self-evident, 
and relates the arrangements for the provision of finance at the outset of 
industrialisation (3) to the degree of 'backwardness' in an economy. Leaving aside 
the question as to how the 'degree of backwardness' is to be measured - a problem 
that is never really resolved - he suggests that the more 'backward' the country, the 
more it becomes necessary for capital funds and the impetus for development to be 
supplied, as it were, exogenously. Taking as his main illustrative examples England, 
Germany and Russia, he explains that in England, purportedly the least backward of 
the three when industrialisation got under way, budding industrialists mainly supplied 
their own capital funds, in Germany banks took the initiative, and in Russia, the most 
'backward', the state had to organise the provision of capital itself. 
Now it is interesting that almost by sleight of hand Gerschenkron smuggles another 
idea into this scenario. Conveniently for the theory Germany began to industrialise 
later than England, and Russia later than Germany, and it is supposed that as the 
years passed, technical progress made ever larger discrete amounts of capital 
necessary for setting up new industrial projects. Thus, given the state of technical 
knowledge in the late 18th century, it was feasible for English entrepreneurs to 
finance new productive methods from their own and their associates' savings, but by 
the time Russia got going a century later, nothing less than the resources of the state 
were sufficient to finance the innovations in industry and infrastructure then coming 
on stream. "The role of the state distinguishes rather clearly the type of Russian 
industrialisation from its German and Austrian counterparts". (Gerschenkron 1962 
p.19). Thus in this model the sources of finance for development are determined, not 
onl y by the overall 'degree of backwardness', but also by the state of technical 
knowledge. 
While not denying the important focus the ideas of Gerschenkron gave to the study 
of industrialisation and finance, there are several weaknesses in the analysis. One has 
been mentioned at the outset of this discussion, and that is the intractible problem of 
defining 'degree of backwardness'. Statistics to do with the proportion of the labour 
13 
force in agriculture, size of G. N. P., G. N. P. per capita and so on might be pressed 
into service to provide a plausible answer in any particular context. However, 
historical investigations come up against the problems of sparseness and unreliability 
of data, and although there might be a rough consensus as to which present day 
countries are, in a relative sense, backward, it would be impossible to determine how 
they align with Gerschenkron's 'degree of backwardness' concept. 
Secondly, it must be doubted whether the empirical backing for the hypothesis is 
altogether correct. As Cameron (1972 p.12) points out in relation to England, " .. there 
were numerous instances in which banks made long-term commitments to industrial 
enterprises .. " And again (p.12), far from banks taking the initiative, " ... many of the 
most notable German industrial enterprises antedated the German joint-stock banks 
by several years or decades". Finall y, Russia, according to Cameron, principal I y 
experienced a spurt in economic growth after 1880 due to the efforts of private 
entrepreneurs and private sector banks. (Ibid. p.13-14 passim). Though the 
importance of the state as a promoter and encourager of development may have been 
crucial, its direct role is less spectacular. For, despite Gerschenkron' s emphasis on 
the government's financial importance, the late 19th century State Bank, something 
of a hybrid central and commercial institution, only ever accounted for a minority of 
the discount and loan operations of the banking system (Crisp in Cameron 1967 
p.191-5). Indeed, as is pointed out (Ibid. p.212) " .. the State Bank did not develop 
its operations on the scale envisaged .. " There appears, therefore, to have been rather 
more similarity between the experiences of the three countries in the early days of 
industrialisation than Gerschenkron's theory suggests. All had a lot of native 
entrepreneurship, and financial intermediaries became established more as part of the 
process of growth than - as postulated in the cases of Germany and Russia - as 
leading sectors. 
The third main point of contention is the conceptual weakness of Gerschenkron' s 
coincidental parallel between the 'degree of backwardness' and the current state of 
technology. For neither need the degree of backwardness - if definable - at the outset 
of industrialisation be correlated with the state of technological knowledge, nor may 
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the advance in technical knowledge necessarily mean that ever-increasing inputs of 
capital funds are required for successful implementation of the new techniques. In the 
first place, for example, the modem nations termed 'newly-industrialised countries' 
or NICS have advanced economically at roughly the same time but from very 
differing economic and social starting points. In the second place, though 19th 
century technological developments might suggest that economic growth was 
dependent on inexorably rising discrete injections of capital, this is no longer 
inevitably true. The emphasis on and indeed the success of the small businessman, 
fragmented supply conditions, diversified markets and the techniques inherent in 
'alternative' technology may enable economic growth to proceed on the basis of small 
injections of capital. As Cameron (1967 p.320) observes, "The most successful 
historical cases of industrialisation .... show the prominence, if not the predominance 
of smaller scale enterprise in the earliest stages of industrialisation. If small 
enterprises are successful, it is because they have stood the test of the market, and 
they will inevitably grow larger". 
The verdict on Gerschenkron' s ideas must be that though they shed some light on the 
relationship between financial provisions and early industrialisation, the full reality 
is less easily conceptualised. If the history of the finance of development in Europe 
provides any lesson for modem developing countries it must be that nothing 
substitutes for sound entrepreneurship. Banks are necessary and the state may have 
a role, but it is unsafe to assume that they can can act as the main engines of growth. 
DEMAND-FOLLOWING AND SUPPLY-LEADING FINANCE 
(a) Introduction. 
As observed in the last section, Gerschenkron allowed financial intermediaries in 19th 
century Germany and financial intermediaries with strong state backing in 19th 
century Russia a much higher 'leading' profile in the process of economic 
development than banks in 18th century England. 
Despite the criticisms that can be directed against the case study conclusions, it is 
appropriate to look at the broad ideas contained therein in more depth: this exercise 
15 
provides a framework for the rest of the chapter. To begin with, the analysis is 
conducted in terms of the Patrick (1976) 'demand following/supply leading' 
hypothesis. Later, there is more specific discussion on the role of the state in relation 
to financial intermediation. 
(b) Demand-following intermediation. 
To consider the demand aspect first, Patrick explains (1976 p.74) "We may term as 
'demand-following' the phenomenon in which the creation of modern financial 
institutions, their financial assets and liabilities, and related financial services is in 
response to the demand for their services by investors and savers in the real 
economy". The financial system, therefore, plays a passive role and only reacts to 
a demand for financial services. 
A situation where finance is a 'demand-follower' implies a thrust towards economic 
development quite separate from any measures a financial system might adopt to 
promote it. Hence there must be in existence a number of economic and other 
influences that encourage real investment. The very lack of a suitable clutch of 
financial arrangements and intermediaries will in some circumstances stimulate their 
creation, and it would appear that in a number of 19th century European contexts 
where sustained growth got under way little difficulty arose in diverting some of the 
enterprise making its presence felt in non-financial developments into finance. 
Indeed, historical evidence appears to provide many instances of manufacturing 
entrepreneurs diversifying into finance so as to gather the funds and provide the 
services they themselves and their fellow-industrialists require. For example, in 
relation to industrialising England, Cameron (1972 op.cit. p.12) notes, " .. banks were 
often founded by industrialists .. ". 
In modern developing countries the basic commercial fact of life is that, though there 
may be considerable nominal demand for capital funds, many project proposals are 
not easily assessed, due to the lack of standing and proven ability of many applicants 
for funds, so mainstream financial systems do not automatically expand to 
accommodate these applicants. Even in a situation where a clutch of financial 
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intermediaries, originally established for exploiting business opportunities considered 
safe, or deliberately brought into being by government pressure or dictat, has funds 
to spare, it will be reluctant to lend and invest in such high risk contexts. As Porter 
(1966 p.352) points out, there may not be sufficient bankable projects to absorb the 
funds available. Indeed, the end result may be detrimental to growth, for "there are 
large classes of borrowers whose operations are socially desirable and who now pay 
high - even exhorbitent - rates of interest for non-bank loans, but who may be cut off 
entirely from credit if an enlarged banking system draws elsewhere their suppliers' 
funds". (Ibid. p.353-4). It becomes, then, almost incumbent on financial 
intermediaries (4) to address the problems that give rise to high commercial risk. 
Bhatia and Khatkhate (1975 p.137-8) observe, "the policy of developing financial 
intermediaries must be supplemented by a whole range of measures directed towards 
minimising both the risk of lending to new entrepreneurs and the cost of 
administering new loans". 
Financial intermediaries may undertake a range of functions supporting the provision 
of finance, such as standard in-house assessment of proposals submitted to them, 
monitoring, guidance, training and supervision, and so on. Though services of this 
nature are typically assumed to be especially important in relation to small and 
medium business financing, clearly they are appropriate in the support of any type of 
credit or equity capital facility where especial risk attaches. 
Such comprehensive support of development financing can be costly (5), and this is 
reason enough to explain why intermediaries are reluctant to get involved in the 
business. As a consequence there is a case for government - or some other agency 
(see Pt. 1 Ch. 3) - assisting in the process by shouldering some of the financial 
burden of providing support services. This is not a matter of subsidising lending 
costs, but of improving the environment in which lenders and borrowers operate so 
that the likelihood of finance being properly used and timeously serviced is greatly 
increased. A problem arises of course as to where the border comes between the 
financial obligations of government and intermediary, but given integrity and goodwill 
the issue is not insoluble. 
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(c) Supply-leading intermediation. 
The alternative scenario means finance taking a leading role. As Patrick (op.cit. 
p.186) explains, "Before sustained modem industrial growth gets under way, 
supply-leading may be able to induce real innovation-type investment". The ways in 
which this can occur are identified as the transfer of resources from agriculture to 
nascent industrial sectors, and - more significantly from the point of view of the 
present study - the assumption of a non-financial entrepreneurial role by financial 
institutions. 
(d) Comment. 
The neat classification of financial intermediaries into 'demand followers' and 'supply 
leaders', though useful for analytical purposes, does not fit reality very well. From 
'extreme' supply leading to 'extreme' demand following there are a spectrum of 
possibilities, and quite obviously an institution that provides extension advice - a 
function considered above in the 'demand' sub-section - is more of a leader than one 
that is more passive. It is not too clear where Patrick would have drawn the border 
between the two stances, and whether or not he would have put the intermediary with 
an active policy of supporting and monitoring the recipients of funds in the supply 
leading category is uncertain. 
However, at the 'supply' extreme lies the financial institution that itself actually 
initiates and carries through new projects, with or without the collaboration of 
partners that it persuades or pressurises into joining with it, or which government 
instructs it to work with. Though Porter remarks, " ... there is no clear mandate for 
making a 'leading' sector of banking" (Ibid p.348), developing country governments 
in recent decades often appear to have behaved as if this was more or less the case, 
and to have pushed or encouraged intermediaries into an entrepreneurial role with 
regard to new projects. 
This arrangement, of course, fails to explain exactly how the mechanism works, and 
in practice the convergence of a number of other factors is necesary if - what will be 
referred to from now on as - 'pure' supply-leading is to be successful. In particular. 
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a financial intermediary in this role must have within its staff structure people with 
such a high endowment of entrepreneurial flair and managerial expertise that they 
would probably do far better for themselves - and understand that they would do 
better - outside the confines of the organisation. Though Patrick does not avoid 
referring to the channels connecting financial resources with real development, the 
discussion remains fairly generalistic. 
Finally, it is as well to note the relevance of the words of Nevin, which he wrote as 
far back as 1961 (p.9) "There can be no escaping the fact that in the majority of 
underdeveloped territories an overall expansion of credit will not in itself stimulate 
the rate of economic development". 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES AND THE MOBILISATION OF SAVINGS 
The sections above on demand following and supply leading focus on the distribution 
of capital funds. Not to be ignored, however, is the question as to whether financial 
intermediaries bring about an increase in savings. Patrick is optimistic. Firstly, by 
their very existence, financial intermediaries are seen as attracting savings from the 
public at large, who hitherto had to hold surplus wealth in the forms of precious 
metals and inventories. Secondly the creation of a range of financial assets makes 
saving even more attractive, since there is something to suit all tastes. As a result, 
resources are mobilised and are available to borrowers and investors, and interest 
rates tend to fall in a system which by definition is more efficient than previously. 
However Porter, quoting Bloomfield, warns " ... against assuming that a mere 
multiplicity of savings institutions will in itself solve the problem of inadequate 
saving". (Porter op.cit p.348). Savers may distrust financial intermediaries, they 
may seek to accumulate only a given quantity of saving, irrespective of the ease of 
putting money aside at interest, and they may fear the erosion of the value of 
financial assets by inflation (6). Furthermore, according to Porter, there is little 
evidence that higher interest rates will call forth more savings. 
In the light of these observations, the prospect of D.F.l.s bringing about an increase 
in the volume of domestic savings is weak, especially as they are not normally geared 
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to collecting savings at the retail level. Certain possibilities, however, are reviewed 
in Pt. 1 Ch. 5, a chapter which centres specifically on the role and functions of 
D.F.I.s. 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND THE CONCEPT OF FINANCIAL 
REPRESSION 
(a) Introduction. 
Previous sections have referred to certain contexts in which the state may playa role 
in the business of development finance, as in Gerschenkron's 'Russian' model, and 
in the recommendations about the finance by the state of extension work. This 
section looks at state involvement more comprehensively, so both including and going 
beyond these issues. 
Broadly speaking, state involvement in the finance of development via financial 
intermediaries means either direct intervention in intermediation, or the creation of 
background economic (and other) conditions that influence the process. The 
sub-sections below follow this categorisation. 
(b) State involvement in intermediation. 
1. New facilities. 
Direct state intervention In modem developing countries 10 the business of 
development finance via intermediaries has typically meant the actual setting up and 
the funding - wholly or in part - of such intermediaries. Patrick (op.cit. p.186), in 
the context of his supply-leading hypothesis, suggests that" ... deliberate creation of 
the supply of financial services may have favourable allocative and incentive effects; 
it may well be desirable for the government to establish its own financial institutions 
or to subsidise private investment institutions". Also, existing intermediaries may be 
taken over and/or have their remits altered to bias them towards the sort of business 
the state favours. To quote Patrick again, "the monetary authorities should encourage 
financial institutions into those kinds of investment activity where the social marginal 
productivity is relatively high". (Ibid. p.186). 
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It is possible to support a policy wherby the state aims to fill out the capital market 
by setting up or encouraging the establishment of development finance intermediation 
facilities while warning against the inefficiencies that can so easily follow, and which 
the authors quoted above appear to gloss over. Easy subsidisation can lead to 
complacency and inefficiency: social marginal productivity is with difficulty 
computed, and can too readily be pressed into service to justify financial losses. 
Furthermore, the state may pressurise D.F.l.s to operate in accordance with political 
or ideological goals: this topic is investigated fully in Chapter 3. 
2. Financial repression. 
Very frequent has been the biassing of interest rate levels and structures away from 
market reality, so as to afford cheap loan finance to some. As Galbis (1977 p.59) 
writes, " ... the role played by most governments in less-developed countries needs to 
be taken into account. In general, this has not been encouraging at all as a 
proliferation of regulations based on misguided principles has contributed significantly 
to the malfunctioning of the financial system, and to the inefficient use of real 
resources. Take, for example, the widespread practice of regulating interest rates". 
He goes on to explain that allowing interest rates to reach their market levels would 
enhance economic growth by allocating scarce resources to the investment 
opportunities with the greatest return. Artificially low rates, however, mean inflation 
and credit rationing. The result, as McKinnon (1973 p.70) observes is that "It" - the 
banking system of colonial days - "has been replaced by a very similar neo-colonial 
banking system, where favoured private and official borrowers still absorb the limited 
finance available at low rates of interest which are often far below the opportunity 
cost of scarce capital". This practice, termed by McKinnon 'financial repression' is 
of course prone to lead to financial losses by lending institutions as beneficiaries of 
funding, selected for their social worthiness or high political profile rather than 
business acumen and prominence, get into arrears with interest and repayments, 
and/ or the margin between borrowed and loaned funds is too narrow to cover an 
intermediary'S expenses. 
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Bhatia and Khatkhate (op.cit. p.135) are not so dismissive of interest rate rigging. 
They give two reasons for " ... modifying the criteria generally preferred by the 
financial institutions for their lending policies". Markets for labour and capital are 
imperfect, so " ... the prevailing prices do not reflect social productivity". (Ibid. 
p.135), and also there are serious inbuilt constraints operating against local 
entrepreneurs. An imaginative approach towards new local entrepreneurs need not 
lead to losses, and may indeed improve resource allocation: "To the extent that the 
financial institutions do not recognise these market imperfections in devising their 
lending practices, the allocative effect of financial intermediation tends to be 
negative" (Ibid. p.136). 
The reference to 'social productivity' comes up against the same general objections 
as were aired earlier. Furthermore, to cure imperfections in the labour and capital 
markets by interest rate manipulation is difficult to objectivise. Too easily it can in 
practice mean, as McKinnon observes (see above) little other than help to favoured 
groups. 
3. Extension assistance. 
An earlier section defined a role for the state in the taking on of some of the 
extension work that supports a successful programme of development financing. 
Though the problem of delineating appropriate state functions from financial 
intermediary functions was noted, clearly in the sphere of education there is 
considerable legitimate scope for state involvement. This can mean both the passing 
on of technical knowledge related to the types of business pursued by recipients of 
funds, and also financial instruction. 
Such state activity aims to help businessmen achieve viability by increasing their 
efficiency rather than by subsidising their costs. With the usual caveats about the 
chance of the patrimonial state biassing its help towards favoured people, this type 
of work seems a sounder approach towards buttressing development finance than the 
suggestions in the above sub-section. 
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(c) General state policy. 
Within the context of this section, the other area for state activity is the creation of 
an environment conducive to the finance of development. Indeed, Cameron (1967 
p.320) appears to favour this role before direct intervention: "While there will 
obviously be exceptional cases, in general the state would do better to devote its own 
limited resources to creating the conditions in which private enterprise and private 
capital can flourish". This is a very large issue, and can encompass virtually all 
facets of government policy: as such, a full theoretical treatment is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, it is clear that the state, often motivated by ideology, 
political theory, social aspirations or prejudice (see Ch. 3 for a full analysis), and 
typically not - as Cameron prescribes - wishing to help private enterprise, has 
influenced the circumstances of development finance in ways which the harsh 
economic realities of the 1980s have showed to be short-sighted. The result in many 
developing world countries appears to have been a blighting of the process of 
development. 
ASSESSMENT 
The establishment of 'demand-following' financial intermediaries is not a matter of 
controversy: entrepreneurs who have on the drawing board projects that need to be 
funded beyond their personal resources require organised financing arrangements. The 
problems centre on the judgement of the worth of project proposals and the type of 
support and assistance that financial intermediaries can give to business. On the other 
hand pure 'supply-leading' intermediary does not have, by definition, a ready-made 
market for its services, though it may be that the mere fact of the establishment of 
a financing institution reveals a latent and viable demand for funds, that had not had 
any reason before to make its presence felt. 
However, aside from this, pure supply-leading intermediaries will be under something 
of an obligation to justify their existence. As noted, this is fraught with problems, 
as various devices are employed to try and force development funds into new 
projects, and as the frequent involvement of the state tends to bring non-commercial 
criteria into financing decisions. 
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The evidence for purely supply-leading intermediaries in history - though not 
non-existent - is weak. To refer again to the research conducted by Cameron and his 
associates on banking and industrialisation in 19th century Europe and elsewhere, 
what is apparent is the considerable amount of enterprise - not directly associated with 
financial business - that was ready to go in for industrial projects and the willingness 
of governments to preside over circumstances conducive to growth without the 
prejudices and interventionist predilections that have been typical of developing world 
regimes in recent times. 
For example, Crisp (in Cameron et al. 1967 p.233) observes about 19th century 
Russia, " ... it must be stressed that the development of the Russian banking system 
was itself part of the industrialisation process", though admittedly, "in many spheres 
of economic activity in Russia the banker was the initiator and not simply the 
servant". With regard to government behaviour (Ibid. p.238), "On the whole, during 
the period under consideration, and especially after the l880s, both the State Bank 
and the Imperial Government acted with wisdom and restraint". 
And, with regard to Japan, Patrick (Ibid. p.288) states "Given the generally 
favourable economic environment, financial and general economic development in 
Meiji Japan should be attributed primarily to the private individual response to profit 
(and status) incentives to increase output", and "The government provided a setting 
conducive to the growth of the economy ... " 
From the research programme referred to, many similar comments could be quoted 
in relation to banking and industrialisation in countries not mentioned above. The 
conclusion is that pure supply-leading by financial intermediaries, whether or not 
affected by state guidance or pressure, does not represent an uncontroversial policy 
option that may be adopted as a sure method of bringing about economic 
development. The main features that emerge from the historical analysis are the 
existence of considerable entrepreneurial thrust that, while it might sometimes work 
through the financial system, did not depend on it as the prime initiator of growth, 
and governments which, while far from ignoring economic development and the 
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finance of it, were more concerned with removmg constraints and providing 
supporting infrastructure than forcing the process through - almost inevitably -
normatively-determined channels. 
NOTES PART 1 CHAPTER 2 
1. The word 'optimal' is of course subject to many interpretations. Here the 
maximum real rate of sustainable economic growth in percentage terms is implied, 
though admittedly this ignores the distribution of income question, and also the social 
cost/benefit viewpoint. 
2. This qualification is put in in the light of empirical evidence in Part 2. 
3. 'Economic development' and 'industrialisation' are not of course synonymous, 
but the semantic difference does not have much operational significance in the case 
of the modern developing country. Almost inevitably such countries aim to build up 
manufacturing and commerce, but even if efforts are concentrated on mining and 
agriculture, ancillary industries, infrastructure, sophisticated commercial services, and 
new methods in primary production qualify in a broad sense as 'industrialisation'. 
4. At this stage in the study the discussion is not meant to apply only to 
specialised D.F .I.s. Other intermediaries may well have occasion to diversify into 
this type of business. 
5. The exception is of course when a partner in a project takes on the support 
functions itself. 
6. (a) Ghosh (1986) gives an interesting example from India of a reluctance to 
save in monetary form. He points out that subsistence farmers, at times when it 
would be possible to save, that is when crops are abundant, prefer to save in kind, 
so as to avoid being dependent on money-lenders at some future time when the crops 
might fail. He does not explain why farmers should not sell the surplus in good 
years, save the receipts, and so have funds available when needed, but inflation and 
25 
the differential pnces caused by different crop outcomes may be postulated as 
preventing these tactics. 
(b) It is possible that higher interest rates might shift savings from goods, e.g. 
cattle, to banks, or from banks abroad to local banks. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 
POLITICAL ECONOMY ASPECTS 
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The previous chapter investigated the nature of the place for financial intermediation 
in the business of the finance of economic development. The present chapter 
considers the political, ideological and sociological factors that have during recent 
decades often influenced governments in developing countries in their approaches to 
the process. Clearly any investigation of development finance institutions must take 
account of this issue in order to properly isolate features that fall into the 'soft state' 
category. 
SOCIALISM 
For the classical Marxist theorist, 'socialism' associates rather incongruously with low 
income developing countries, where the bulk of the people are ill-educated peasant. 
farmers. To achieve a socialist society, supposedly a necessary pre-condition was a 
large industrial proletariat who, impoverished by falling wages and increasing 
unemployment - the result of a falling rate of profit - would eventually put an end to 
capitalism and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. The subsequent 'withering 
away' of the dictatatorship and how it would be replaced by a 'communist' system 
was never fully worked out. 
In practice, of course, this scenario was never of much relevance in even those 
relatively industrialised countries - mainly in Eastern Europe - that supposedly opted 
for a Marxist programme, and, given the nature of the systems that came to operate 
there many left theorists eventually began to label them 'state capitalist' rather than 
'socialist' or 'communist'. However, until the sudden and remarkable demise of this 
politico/economic panorama in the late 1980s, development academics of a Marxist 
turn of mind generally tended to refer to this group of nations - and a number of 
other ideologically empathetic territories - as the socialist bloc. For example, in 1982 
Amiya Bagchi in 'The Political Economy of Underdevelopment' wrote (p.3) "We 
have witnessed, since 1917, the emergence of a world-wide socialist socialist bloc 
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covering a quarter of the world surface and population, the latest additions to the bloc 
being South Vietnam and Cambodia". However, in the late 1980s, economic failure 
in Eastern Europe and the concomitant collapse of supposedly 'socialist' regimes 
there, together with the analogous inability of developing country 'socialist' systems 
to 'deliver the goods', led to considerable heart-searching and debate within 
developing countries, and must weaken the attractiveness in the future of 'socialist 
style' development policies. Furthermore critical comment on this issue in the 
developing world no longer just comes from afar. J.N. Moyo, in the 'Southern 
Africa Political and Economic Quarterly" (1989 p.10) observes, "The quest for a 
Marxist-Leninist egalitarian society has long derailed, if it ever was on a track": and 
later - in relation to Zimbabwe - "1988 showed that socialist propoganda serves no 
useful purpose in a country with a leadership under the spell of materialism". Dr 
Byron Hove observed in 1990, (p.4) "I hope that in this decade Zimbabwe does not 
have to go through the nightmare of a one-party state, as the Romanians did, before 
they jettisoned it". 
There are several reasons why developing country leaders were attracted by 
supposedly socialist policies. 
Firstly it appeared for a time as though state ownership and rigorous central economic 
planning in the Soviet Union were bringing about rapid growth without inflation and 
unemployment, and this, coupled with the 'conception of pre-revolutionary Russia as 
an undeveloped country, made them want to follow suit. In this context Killick 
writing about Ghana, reports President Nkrumah as having resolved to "generate a 
socialist transformation of the economy through rapid development of the state and 
cooperative sectors" (Killick 1978 p.39). 
Secondly state ownership of industry meant that profits did not go out to private 
sector shareholders, many of whom were abroad, but were available for domestic 
investment and other forms of government expenditure. Indeed Killick refers to 
Nkrumah in Ghana as having equated industrial involvement by foreigners as akin to 
'neo-colonialism' (Ibid. p.38) (1). 
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Thirdly, there were supposedly African forms of traditional socialism, on to which 
newer ideas, compatible with a modem industrial society, could be grafted. It has, 
however, never been made apparent that African societies in pre-colonial days did 
behave in ways that could unequivocally be described as 'socialist'. However, 
Tanzania is a well- publicised example of a country that tried to embrace a 
supposedly historical socialism. As Blomstrom and Hettne (1984 p.145) explain, 
"From this moment on" i.e. the Arusha Declaration of 1967, "capitalism was seen 
as the main enemy. The alternative was to revitalise the 'traditional' African 
socialism, an original approach which attracted much international attention at the 
time. The new development strategy gave priority to the development of the rural 
areas ... It was primarily a question of increasing the agricultural production. How 
was this possible in a country in which the population was widely dispersed with only 
small lots at their disposal? The so-called Ujamaa villages were thought of as the 
solution: more efficient production should be achieved by the peasants movmg 
together in villages, which also facilitated the provision of social services". 
A rather different conception of 'African' socialism in Kenya will be considered in 
later pages. 
Fourthly there was the attractiveness of an ideology where free democratic elections 
were not required. There were supposedly economic advantages in this, since long 
term economic plans could be seen through by continuing governments, and hence 
the emasculation of proper democratic processes by developing country governments 
was accorded a spurious legitimacy. To refer again to Tanzania, which in its 
post-independence salad days was one of the most admired examples of developing 
world socialist endeavour, "In our democratic one-party system, the act of electing 
a Parliament does not imply a choice between different policies .... In our country 
there is only one dominant policy, namely the policy of socialism and self-reliance 
already adopted by TANU and ASP" i.e. Tanganyika African National Union and 
Afro-Shirazi Party. "Therefore in our circumstances, the act of electing a Parliament 
merely implies the choosing of suitable persons who are distinctly capable and 
committed and who can be relied upon to be in the forefront in implementing the 
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accepted policy of our parties, T ANU and Afro-Shirazi". (Tanzania Investment Bank 
1975 p.29). The practical application of socialism in the developing world varied 
considerably from place to place, but usually there was - perhaps grudging -
acceptance of more or less private enterprise (2). However countries labelling 
themselves 'socialist' all tended to favour nationalisation, extensive planning, the 
diversion of profits to the state, and strong curbs on what remained of the private 
sector. As such the pre-1989 Eastern European countries were powerful role models, 
though, as noted, some leaders tried to espouse supposedly related philosophies such 
as 'African socialism'. 
The implications for the financial sector in general, and development finance in 
particular, reflect these approaches. The more ideologically-dedicated the whole 
'socialist' strategy, the more likely it was that financial institutions would be 
nationalised: indeed this happened in Tan~ia. Furthermore in a strict 'socialist' 
context new D.F.I.s would only be established at government instigation, and even 
if government chose - in the interests of gathering in capital from elsewhere - to hold 
less than 100% of the equity, strong government presences on D.F.I. boards and 
pervasive government influence on remits and business were virtually inevitable. 
Other 'socialist' features of D.F.I. business included the buying out of private -
especially foreign - concerns, the favouring with finance of government and 
parastatals, and a penchant for lending to cooperatives and other collective groupings. 
However, it is instructive to note, as will be apparent in forthcoming sections, that 
policies such as the above may be pursued without recourse to 'socialist' 
justifications. 
NATIONALISM 
Few of the countries that in the middle decades of the 20th century achieved 
independence from European colonial rule were discrete 'national' entities in terms 
of ethnic, cultural or linguistic uniformity. However, to avoid conflict, there was 
little option but to regard old colonial boundaries as inviolate, and to identity the 
peoples in the newly-independent territories as 'nations'. As Sami Zubaida (1978 
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p.60) points out, "When, for a variety of reasons, colonial powers were preparing for 
the eventuality of independence, the nation state was the only one that was available 
for post-independence statehood". In colonial days indigenous leaders had sought to 
manufacture and marshall nationalist feeling as an aid to winning independence, and 
later many were ready to tap the nationalist sentiment they had been instrumental in 
creating in pursuit of the type of economic growth they wanted. As Killick (1978 
p.26) explains, "If the new nations could capitalise upon the patriotic fervour created 
by the struggle for for independence, then after an heroic initial effort, the take-off 
would be achieved, and the benefits enjoyed". Nationalism everywhere tends to have 
an anti-foreign flavour but in developing countries the xenophobia, though usually 
more passionate than elsewhere, has in practice often been propogandist rather than 
operational. However, there is plenty of empirical evidence to support the pursuance 
of nationalist-based policy, such as the nationalisation of foreign companies, 
compulsory buying into foreign concerns by the state or by parastatals, indigenisation 
of employment, locational restrictions on foreign firms, curbs on the repatriation of 
profits and capital, and regulations on the ability of foreign firms to get credit locally. 
Furthermore in developing countries there has been considerable running together of, 
and operational confusion between, socialism and nationalism, since both come to 
mean strong state control and intervention in the running of economic affairs. For 
example Killick, writing about Ghana, observes, " .. socialism came, in its economic 
dimension, to mean a large and growing share of the state in economic activities". 
(Ibid. p.43). Whereas Harvey (1977 p.2l3) points out, "The primary motive in the 
Zambian nationalizations has been to lessen foreign ownership and control rather than 
to achieve public ownership itself ... Where no private sector institutions were able to 
take over the foreign concerns, the government did so - as in the case of the mines. 
Similarly, where the government wants new foreign investments to be undertaken in 
collaboration with local people, the sheer size of the operation usually dictates that 
the government itself is the only possible partner". Possibly, as the above quote 
suggests, the nationalist approach tends to mean that indigenous nationals and 
groupings are favoured at the expense of foreign interests, irrespective of how local 
people are organised, whereas socialism might be expected to be more concerned with 
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class structure and type of organisational framework. However in practice there has 
been little consistency, and even where socialist-type policies have been pursued with 
a degree of dedication - as in Tanzania - they have been buttressed by nationalist 
sentiments. 
As a result, when considering the parameters within which development finance 
institutions may be required to operate, it is not very illuminating to try to distinguish 
'nationalist' aims from 'socialist' - or indeed 'capitalist' - ones, a point already 
intimated in the section above. Government-owned or controlled D.F.I.s that are 
motivated by nationalist sentiment will be likely to be agents of nationalisation, 
buyers of majority or minority holdings in other foreign companies, agents for 
implementing other aspects of governments industrial policy, and so on. However 
these things may equally be justified by socialist apologetics. The main exercise, as 
with socialism, is to consider whether D. F . I. behaviour inspired by nationalism is 
consistent with the financial viability of such institutions, and with economic growth 
in general. 
If nationalism leads to policies that choke off foreign capital and expertise, provide 
finance and/or jobs for indigenous people too readily without sufficient concern as to 
their integrity and business acumen, centralise power and privilege, and leave 
financial institutions at the mercy of whatever is government's interpretation of the 
national interest, the effect can be pernicious. Though in theory nationalism might 
have the opposite effect - as is intended - and that is to mobilise people's aspirations 
and efforts efficiently in pursuit of economic progress, this does not seem to have 
happened much. 
NEO-COLONIALISM AND D.F.I.s 
It is difficult to arrive at an objective definition for 'neo-colonialism', not least 
because it is a very value-loaded concept, and attractive more to populist politicians 
and their supporters than to academics. Broadly it would imply the situation 
whereby, despite a former colony getting political independence, it is still in reality 
in thrall - principally via economic links' - to the metropolitan power or business 
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interests associated with that power. The All-African People's Conference in Cairo 
in 1961 defined it as "the survival of the colonial system in spite of the formal 
recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims 
of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military 
or technical means". (quoted in Leys 1975 p.26). There is often a Marxist flavour 
to nea-colonialist theory, the assumption being that capital migrated to the 
undeveloped areas in search of the enhanced profits that were supposed to follow 
from an abundance of unexploited resources and cheap labour, and that western 
business was always unwilling to allow political independence to deny it the 
advantages it previously enjoyed. Bagchi (1982 p.78) writes, "The British may 
indeed be regarded as the real founders of modem neo-colonialism, for both in Latin 
America and in India in the late 19th century they depended more on economic power 
and political influence than direct use of political power at every stage for obtaining 
the lion's share of the surplus of the dominated economies" . 
According to Bagchi, foreign economic influence in the first stages of industrialisation 
in developing countries is wielded through the development of concerns making fairly 
basic import substitutes. When the market for these goods is saturated, business 
interests tum to more complex import substitutes, such as consumer durables and 
capital equipment. Here foreign influence is that much more intense, because of the 
increased dependency "on advanced capitalist countries for technology, product 
development and managerial expertise" (Ibid. p.128) (3). As a result of this 
involvement from abroad, "One of the consequences of the iron grip of the firms in 
the advanced capitalist countries on the products characteristically taken up in the late 
stage of import substitution is that the overt payments to the parent firms in the form 
of royalties, technical and consultancy fees, dividend remittances and undercover 
payments in the form of inflated transfer prices for components and materials are 
rather large". (Ibid. p.128). 
Though the analysis by Bagchi indentifies the economIC channels by which 
nea-colonialism is supposedly practised, it omits the political dimension. A country 
in the grip of neo-colonialism must, after all, have in administrative and governmental 
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positions a strata of indigenous people prepared to acquiesce in or involve themselves 
in foreign-controlled economic activity. This is assumed to occur in fully-fledged 
neo-colonial situations. Leys (1975 p.26) observes, "Nkrumah wrote of 'neo-colonial 
States' and their 'rulers' who, he said, derived 'their authority to govern, not from 
the will of the people, but from the support they obtain from their neo-colonialist 
masters'''. (4) 
In Anglophone Africa it is difficult to identify a country which might be pigeon-holed 
as a 'neo-colony' (5). The stance and assertiveness of the various presidents and 
prime ministers have never squared wit~ supposed subservience to neo-colonial 
masters. Furthermore the returns - on average - gained by multinational companies 
from their African investments have never been so buoyant as to either suggest 
excessive power and influence in the territories or to encourage increased involvement 
in the future. 
The above paragraphs have dealt with broad generalities. However at the 
microeconomic level behaviour with something of the flavour of neo-colonialism 
about it may be postulated. This occurs when a government gives a business - which 
may be a branch of a multinational concern, but which may equally be a 
domestically-owned firm - especial privileges and protection to buttress its economic 
position. Such a policy, however, is rarely a one-way arrangement. If successfully 
supported, a business, in the manner of monopolies, will generate rent income, which 
to a greater or lesser extent may be creamed away - either officially or informally -
by government or government officials. 
There are several ways in which a D.F.1. may feature in this type of activity. Firstly 
it may be a vehicle for government association via a shareholding with the profits of 
a protected concern. Secondly it may favour protected concerns before others in 
granting credit. If aD. F.1. IS a source of scarce foreign exchange, this is a 
particularly powerful operational feature. Thirdly, it is likely to constitute an 
administrative and information link between businesses and government, and so is 
able to identify and exploit opportunities for extracting income from successful 
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concerns. 
However, despite the plausibility of the above scenario, intimations from interviews 
(see in Part 2) suggest a much more unstructured, pragmatic reality. Policies aimed 
at cushioning companies in order to generate profits are typically undermined by 
prohibitions and regulations that damage their prospects. 
(Appendix 1 is an analysis and discussion of the creation and extraction of monopoly 
rents and the effects of government interference in the process) 
PATRONAGE AND REWARDS 
The discussion below, though not wholly concerned with practices typical of the soft 
state, does subsume many of the effects of this phenomenon, and so adds to the 
remarks about the soft state made in Chapter 1. 
The previous section identified D.F.l.s as potential vehicles for channelling business 
profits to government. There is no need, of course, to associate the vaguenesses of 
neo-colonialism with the practice. In general a variety of devices can be and have 
been used to direct largesse to government or government officials. This can include 
anything from straightforward corruption, as when an official is bribed to carry out 
-or not carry out - some duty, to quasi-legal methods, as when, for example, 
expensive import licences have to be obtained before essential imports can be bought. 
As well as income extraction, there exist other questionable practices that cannot but 
be damaging to economic development. The paragraphs below, which relate to the 
whole issue of 'patronage and rewards', consider some examples. 
Firstly, in Africa, the 'extended family' system, though by no means as uniformly 
omnipresent throughout the continent as is sometimes assumed, can lead to dubious 
behaviour. Broadly, the system implies that an economically successful man or 
woman should be prepared to subsidise even distant relatives. An unfortunate 
practical result of this is that, if such financial support becomes a severe drain, there 
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may be less scruple about taking bribes and other irregular payments to supplement 
income. Also, a person in a position of power and influence, may be prepared to 
'create' jobs for relatives. Thus the extended family system, though perhaps in a 
traditional tribal society a useful form of informal social security, in a commercial 
context is an energy-sapping incubus. 
Apart from the obligation to the extended family, there are other bases for extracting 
largesse from the system. Leys (op.cit. p.209), referring to Franz Fanon, observes, 
"Fanon focussed his attention primarily on the educated strata who were brought into 
being under colonialism and who inherited state power at independence. The essence 
of this 'bourgeoisie of the civil service' .. .is that it is weak financially and therefore 
politically. It therefore sets about using the state machinery to make itself rich by 
inserting itself as a sort of commission agent in the foreign-dominated commercial 
system". Indeed, as he writes later (p.265), looking to the report of the 1972 I.L.O. 
mission to Kenya, " ... the political aim of taking over the economy became merged 
almost imperceptab1y with individual aspirations to take over the jobs, positions and 
life-styles which the economy made possible". 
Secondly it has been commonplace in ex-colonial societies for high salaried and 
influential posts to be assumed by those in positions of political power or bestowed 
on a man as a reward for political services. Killick (1978 p.216), writing about the 
favouring of party activists in Ghana, notes, "State enterprise ... was an instrument of 
political power". And Bates (1981 p.104) observes, "Cohen and Stevenson document 
the tendency of the political elite in the Ivory Coast and Kenya respectively to hold 
directorates in private firms and state industries". 
Thirdly and closely allied to such practices is the furtherence of political ends by 
wielding power over economic resources. So, as Bates (Ibid p. 7) explains, " ... market 
intervention becomes a basis for the programmes," that is, the development 
programmes, "for direct personal gain, or to create a political following". 
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Finally, as was noted above, the extraction of revenue from commercial processes 
may be quite open, and expressed in the form of payments for bureaucratic 
impositions. Also trade may have to be conducted through agencies that are owned 
by government or favoured individuals. Firms, both domestic and - as was observed 
in the last section - foreign, can be given monopoly status, so accumulating profits 
that benefit both themselves and - via taxes and other levies - the government. 
The above discussion suggests several implications for D. F . I. s, both as partakers in 
the practices referred to, and as furtherers of them. Posts within a D.F.I. may be 
filled by members of the ruling elite, and even if such people are well-qualified, 
holding several jobs at the same time may leave insufficient time for any of them to 
be done properly. More dubious is the penchant for giving unqualified political 
associates responsible positions in D.F.I.s: such people may then to be doubled by 
'advisors', indicating a waste of resources. Another frequently observed area of 
D.F.I. waste is the supply of various perquisites to directors and senior managers in 
addition to money emoluments (6). 
As providers of finance, D.F.I.s may disburse money to applicants for political 
and/or personal reasons, with the result that sound applicants with viable projects may 
fail to get help (7). This type of policy does not necessarily mean that only 
indigenous people will be favoured. Discussion in the last section suggested that 
favoured multinationals may be provided with finance before others. 
SOCIAL CRITERIA 
(a) General. 
The purpose of this section is to review criteria for shaping the remits and/or the 
operational behaviour of D. F . I. s that are pragmatically' social' rather than 
dogmatically 'socialist', though often there must be some overlap between the two 
concepts. 
In some circumstances it is reasonable to take a more benign view towards financing 
work that has a social aspect than it is towards D.F.1. dealings biassed by crude and 
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urgent nationalist or socialist motivations, and in this respect this section is 
qualitatively different from the others. If D.F.I.s are to justify themselves (see Part 
1 Ch. 5 for full discussion) they must take on work that mainstream intermediaries , 
because of the higher perceived risk, prefer to avoid. Sometimes if financing and 
associated operations do not seem capable of being validated by standard financial 
criteria, criteria containing 'social' elements may be used instead to help support 
moves to allocate funds to applicants. Not of course that this is meant to give D.F.I.s 
carte blanche to make financial losses: it is all too easy to justify bankruptcy by an 
appeal to the pursuit of broader social advantages. The business to be developed 
must (i) promise long term economic advantages and (ii) involve structured 
approaches towards coping with and in due course nullifying the integral financial 
problems. Discussion at appropriate junctures throughout the study focuses on how 
D.F.I.s may approach ostensibly 'difficult' business and yet remain viable. (The 
reference in Pt. 1 Ch. 2 to the importance of extension and associated work 
represents an initial gesture towards this issue.) 
The bulk of the discussion in this section centres on the finance of small (see (b) for 
definition difficulties) business. This type of work seems more readily to accord with 
the ideas in the last paragraph than other guidelines with social ends in mind that are 
often laid on D.F.I.s, since it lends itself to positive addressing in terms of (i) and 
(ii) above, as well as, if successful, satisfying the social aim of bringing ever larger 
numbers of people into the commercial economy. Financial intermediaries in colonial 
times largely ignored small business finance, and so could be accused by 
post-independence leaders of undue conservatism and lack of social conscience. 
Developing country governments have generally been - ostensibly - keen to try and 
fill this gap in financing facilities. 
(b) Small (and larger) business finance. 
1. Apologia. 
The present study IS predominantly concerned with 'general' D.F.I.s that are 
concerned with the finance of mainly secondary and tertiary industry at the non-small 
business level. The specialised nature of small business finance suggests separate 
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treatment, and so to avoid inordinate length and complexity there is no comprehensive 
investigation of the topic. 
However, certain academic problems remain. Firstly is the difficulty that no perfect 
division between small and larger (or medium) business exists, and it may often 
happen that a business ineligible for assistance from specific 'small business' 
financing facilties may have problems and needs similar to smaller concerns that are 
eligible. Secondly in real world situations some D.F.I.s finance small as well as 
large business, and this side of their work cannot be ignored if they are to be properly 
studied. Hence for both these reasons some space is given in the study to the smaller 
business and its financing. The paragraphs. below look at the issue from a theoretical 
angle, and in Part 2 there is analysis of certain Kenyan and Zimbabwean schemes. 
(Also see Appendix 3 for limited investigations of certain small business D.F.I.s) 
2. Problems of Small (and medium) Business Finance. 
Though the exceptional difficulties that attach to financing people In the small 
business sector exist also in rich nations, they are more acute in developing countries. 
Firstly, to judge the credit-worthiness of many small-scale borrowers is expensive and, 
through lack of accurate information, prone to error. Secondly the costs of arranging 
and managing small-scale loans and investments are not proportionately smaller than 
those for large loans and investment, whereas the return, if of course paid, is 
substantially less. Thirdly the beneficiary, no matter how well-meaning, may run into 
difficulties when his lack of education and/or experience render him unfit to cope 
with difficulties and emergencies that come his way. As Anderson (1982 p. 40) 
observes, "Page (1979 p.29) notes that, in Africa, 'surveys of small firms find that 
the majority of entrepreneurs fail to keep even rudimentary financial records'. The 
quality and extent of book-keeping efforts appear to improve with size of firm, but 
even for those firms maintaining some form of accounts system, the records are 
frequently deficient and not regularly consulted as a management tool". Fourthly the 
collection of interest and repayments may not only come up against the problems of 
distance and business failure, but also against the actual disappearance of the 
borrower, who, in the backwoods, as it were, can 'melt into the bush' to avoid 
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paying what is due. 
3. Extension and Related Issues. 
Financial intermediaries concerned with small and medium business financing may 
address these problems by monitoring the use of loaned money, running a special debt 
collection department, and organising various extension services. In this context 
Anderson (op.cit. 1982 p.933) lists 'industrial extension and advisory services', 
'management training', 'vocational training', 'the provision of specialised trading and 
technical services', 'infrastructure services', 'the promotion of local subcontracting', 
and 'the provision of industrial estates'. 
Unfortunately all this is very expensive, and can easily erode away such income as 
a D.F.1. may otherwise accumulate. As Levitsky (1986 p.35) observes, "Considering 
the limited onlending margin, commercial 'finance institutions cannot be expected to 
provide broad based technical assistance". In recognition of this drawback, it is 
feasible to shift responsibility for some of these activities away from the D. F. I. , 
leaving it to concentrate on the purely financial business. Writing under the auspices 
of the World Bank, he stresses (p.42) the importance of this organisation adding 
extension to its small enterprise financing. "Projects to assist SME", that is 's'mall 
and medium enterprises'," should include a technical assistance component, despite 
poor experience so far with such efforts. An effective technical assistance component 
could raise the degree of success of sub-projects, introduce new technologies and 
increase the number of first time entrepreneurs". 
Such arrangements are not, however, without problems. Firstly there is the 
synchronisation of technical and financial assistance, a point implied in one of the 
above quotes. And in addition, "Most of the Bank's technical assistance arrangements 
took much longer to implement than the credit programmes they were supposed to 
support". (Ibid. p.36). Secondly is the 'staff issue. Extension and other support 
services require numerous trained specialists to implement them. Domestic experts 
are often too few, whereas foreign experts are usually unfamiliar with local 
conditions. Thirdly is the matter of delineating between purely 'financial' activity. 
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and extension (8). A D.F.!. will want to shift the expense of support services away 
from itself as much as possible, and its viability then becomes partly a function of its 
success in doing this. Fourthly when somebody else is responsible for many of the 
services that buttress loans and investments, a D.F.!. may relax the rigour that should 
accompany its willingness to extend capital to beneficiaries. On the other hand a 
non-financing provider of support services is not directly concerned about the 
payment of debts, so may in its tum be over-confident about the effectiveness of its 
operations. 
However, despite these worryIng aspects of the matter, extension support from 
sources extraneous to the D.F.!. itself must remain a preferred policy. Other 
methods for assisting applicants for funds, such as subsidised interest rates (see 
Ch.2), have much less to commend them. 
4. Guaranteeing Credit. 
Another established device for reducing the risk that financial institutions face when 
lending and investing on a smaller scale is to guarantee some of the credit extended. 
Conventional insurance companies are reluctant to take on this type of risk, so 
normally the guarantor in a country is the central bank or the government itself. 
A number of shortcomings have long become apparent in these credit guarantee 
schemes. Firstly there is often considerable delay between the application for a loan 
and the decision whether or not to grant it, as it must be agreed to both by the lender 
and the guarantor, and suitable working arrangements established between them for 
administering it. Furthermore excessive conservatism in providing finance will be 
the result if both are cautious, and friction will develop if one party is cautious and 
the other adventurous. Secondly it is generally expected that the lender bear some 
of the risk and not pass 100% to the guarantor. As a result, the lender may not be 
any more indulgent towards helping small enterprise than he would have been without 
the guarantee scheme. 1. Levitsky and R.N. Prasad (1987 p.3) point out that 
commercial banks having to continue to bear some of the lending risk still tend to ask 
for collateral. On the other hand, of course, a 100% guarantee could make the lender 
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less careful than otherwise in the allocation of funds. Thirdly is the question of 
delays in meeting claims and the reluctance of guarantors to reimburse banks for their 
losses. Often it can be a matter of opinion when a loan should be written off, and 
it is in the interests of the guarantor to put off the date as long as possible. 
As Levitsky and Prasad (Ibid. p.24) observe, "For an effective guarantee scheme to 
be developed, governments and relevant public authorities must understand that the 
introduction of a scheme will result in claims that must be met efficiently and fully. 
Any attempt to avoid or delay meeting claims will inevitably result in the 
undermining of confidence in the scheme". Indeed their investigation of a number of 
developing world schemes throws up some dismal results. In the Cameroons, 
"FOGAPE," that is 'Fonds d' Aide et de Garantie des Credits aux Petites et Moyennes 
Enterprises', "has been criticised by the commercial banks as being too 'risk-averse' 
and for delays in processing guarantee applications through prolonged examination 
of each request". (Ibid. p.66). In the Ghana Credit Guarantee Scheme, "Claims paid 
out over the period 1970-80 were reported to be C 1. 1 m, or 0.5 % of the amount of 
guarantees issued in that period. Such a low payout rate over a 10 year period of 
great economic difficulty raises questions about the operation of the scheme". (Ibid. 
p.69). Regarding a Liberian scheme, "Confidence in the scheme was low, and 
commercial banks were sceptical about receiving payment after they filed claims". 
(Ibid. p.72). 
5. Discussion on lending problems. 
Analysis and evidence would suggest, therefore, that there is no surefire way of 
muting the especial risks that an institution faces when lending to small and medium 
business. Substantial default is a fact of life, and in this context Anderson (1982 
p.50-51) presents some interesting figures indicating how severely a lending 
institutions's operations are affected by even modest defaults. Assuming a lending 
institution borrows at 5 %, and that administrative costs are 5 % of turnover, then with 
a 20% default rate, an interest rate of 37% would need to be charged for viability. 
If defaulting was at the rate of 50 %, there would have to be an interest rate of 120 % ! 
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To the basic problem of lending successfully to the small businessman may be added 
a not infrequent laxness in the administration of the loans. This may be due to staff 
inadequacy, whether in quality or quantity, and/or a relaxation of standards born of 
a determination to help those considered to have been 'deprived', come what may. 
In this context Harvey's blunt comments on the Credit Organisation of Zambia, 
formed to advance money to small farmers, are salutary. "C.O.Z. is to some extent 
a misnomer, since much of the money distributed by it ... has been more in the nature 
of grants than credit. No down payments are required, there is no arrangement with 
the marketing boards to arrange for repayment out of crop proceeds, and in some 
cases there has been little care taken in obtaining postal and physical addresses of 
applicants. More important, the application forms make little attempt beyond 
inquiring the crop and acreage to be planted to assess the profitability of the venture 
which the applicant intends to finance with the loan". (Harvey 1975 p.1). 
6. Group lending. 
A method of lending which tries to sidestep the problems inherent in trying to 
appraise individuals who apply for finance is to lend to groups of people. This is a 
very large subject, and it is not intended to address it in depth in this study. 
However the few remarks below say something on the issues involved. 
A number of advantages are associated with group finance. As the World Bank (1989 
p.116) observes, "The idea is that by joining together, small borrowers can reduce 
the costs of borrowing and improve their access to credit. The outside lender's costs 
are reduced because lending to a group lowers the risk of dealing with small 
businesses and circumvents the problems involved in selecting borrowers". And even 
when the loans are made directly to individual members of a group, "... the group 
provides a guarantee; it is answerable to the lender for the repayment of loans". 
Unfortunately, though from time to time apparently viable group lending schemes 
have survived for a while - the World Bank refers to certain of them (Ibid. p. 117) -
groups are prone to suffer from management inefficiencies, lack of book-keeping 
knowledge and internal squabbling. In Appendix 3, there are some discouraging 
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observations on attempts to lend to cooperatives - which have 'group' features - in 
Zimbabwe. The necessity for extension support, therefore, is not removed by the 
establishment of group financing schemes. 
A further feature that is often associated with groups is a mildly ideological ambience, 
since groups imply some degree of collective rather than individualistic behaviour. 
Clearly if the formation of groups is encouraged for this reason, commercial integrity 
takes second place. 
(c) Miscellaneous. 
Other more generalised 'social' aims that appear almost as a matter of course in the 
prospectuses of D. F. I. s are such goals as the increase in wage employment, the 
promotion of indigenous people to managerial positions - referred to earlier but then 
in the context of nationalism - and the transfer in of technology by firms associating 
with D. F. I. s in new ventures. Though these objectives will not necessarily conflict 
with the achievement of D.F.1. financial viability, on the other hand they may do so. 
A justification of them in terms of the parameters of social cost/benefit analysis 
technically removes the necessity for overt D.F.1. solvency, but, as was noted in 
Part 1 Ch. 2, given the notorious difficulties inherent in using this approach in the 
context of developing countries, it is dangerous to subordinate commercial success to 
other criteria. And unlike the policy of allocating funds to small businessmen and 
groups, the aims referred to in this paragraph are much less suited to the sort of 
management that has a chance of overcoming the likely inherent financial drawbacks. 
It cannot be recommended, therefore, that D.F.l.s be burdened with many of the 
'social' aims that governments are prone to lay upon them. 
CONCLUSIONS 
(a) General Observations. 
D.F.1. prospectuses and annual reports almost inevitably state that the organisations 
shall conduct their business so as to be financially solvent. If, however, they are 
obliged to follow criteria in line with socialist, nationalist or other normative criteria, 
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financial viability may be in question, as ideological considerations are to be put 
before hard commercial ones. 
Secondly, though the term 'neo-colonial' is rather nebulous as a description of a 
developing world country in its totality, elements consistent with the idea of 
neo-colonialism may be identified in particular micro-commercial contexts, such as 
mutually advantageous links between multinational businessmen and domestic 
politicians. If D.F.I.s become the middlemen in such arrangements, then their 
viability or otherwise is influenced by overall industrial and foreign policy, and by 
the nature and dealings of the personalities involved. 
(b) The 'soft' state. 
In addition to the inevitable burdens that fall upon development finance institutions 
if obliged to operate on the basis of ideological or social criteria is a typical lack of 
conviction and consistency with which government requires adherence to these 
criteria. Hence practice is distinguished by confusion and hesitancy, with erratic 
application of ideological principles that are themselves prone, like chameleons, to 
change colour with changing fashion and changing officials. As Killick, quoting 
Genoud, records about Ghana, "Day after day, year after year, what was often called 
nationalism is being renamed socialism". (Killick op.cit. p.39). And Leys notes an 
example where a quasi-ideological approach to general economic strategy is used to 
buttress the prosperity of a limited strata of people. "(African socialism in Kenya) 
focussed on redressing social grievances in order to ensure the continued existence 
of bourgeois society". (Leys op.cit. p.221). Secondly, and connected with the 
sentiments in the paragraph above, are the implications of patronage, and the 
associated dubious activities discussed earlier, for both ideologically-motivated 
development financing - though this gives more scope for such practices - and 
financing that is supposedly associated with more objective criteria. 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that D.F.!. experience has been fashioned or 
influenced by one or more of the phenomena discussed in this chapter, and Part 2 will 
review the evidence in the context of two African economies. Under the 
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cIrcumstances it is not surprising that during recent decades few congratulatory 
bouquets have been tossed at developing country D.F.I.s. 
PART 1 CHAPTER 3 NOTES 
1. Or, in the rather tasteless adaptation by Kwame Nkrumah of a ringing biblical 
exhortation, "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all the rest will be added unto 
you", quoted by Killick (op.cit.) 
2 ..... though Killick (op.cit.) quotes Nkrumah as saying about Ghana (p.37), "we 
would be hampering our advance to socialism if we were to encourage the growth of 
Ghanaian private capitalism in our midst". 
3. Helleiner develops the issue of technology dependence in 'International 
Technology Issues: Southern Needs and Northern Responses' , explaining that foreign 
firms prefer to use that technology with which they are familiar, and this tends to 
mean capital-intensive methods. He puts forward a rather utopian vision (p. 308): 
"If developed ... country governments were to finance ... research and development on 
technological problems of particular concern to the L.D.C.s and make the resulting 
knowledge freely available to them, the gains would be considerable". 
4. This idea has been developed as the 'comprador' argument. See Leys (op.cit.) 
Ch. 1. 
5. However, elsewhere in Africa, fully-fledged neo-colonialism may seem to be more 
In evidence. Killick (op.cit. p.328) writes, "Observers have contrasted the 
'neo-colonial' but booming economy of the Ivory Coast with the more 'independent' 
but stagnant economy of Ghana". N.B. The Ivory Coast no longer 'boomed' in the 
1980s. 
6. This clearly relates to Oliver Williamson's 'managerial discretion' model of the 
firm, where potential profits are sacrificed to more managerial utility. 
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7. It is reasonable to postulate that a bestower of funds will be more easy-going over 
interest and repayments if the beneficiaries are his friends and relatives. 
8. Mr Osunga, of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation in Kenya, put 
this point to me. 
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Chapter 4 
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 discussed the nature of the place of financial intermediation in the finance 
of economic development. This chapter considers the scope of the work carried out 
by the mainstream financial systems in African developing countries (1) so as to 
define what scope remains for dedicated development finance intermediaries. At 
appropriate points in the chapter it is necessary to bring in some of the arguments 
from Ch. 3 in order fully to understand the ways in which the operations of 
intermediaries may be (and indeed have been) influenced by normative considerations. 
BANKS 
(a) Background. 
Banking services were in place soon after the establishment of European colonial rule 
in the 19th century. Administrators, merchants and settlers needed to receive 
remittances and make payments, and so required the sort of facilities with which they 
were familiar in their home countries. Naturally enough the new banking offices 
soon began to grant credit, but - understandably - they kept to the lending principles 
that had been forged in Europe. 
Though in parts of continental Europe banks had been prepared to go in for term 
lending and even for equity finance this had not been true of the U. K., and this 
attitude was transferred to U.K. colonial territories. (See quote below) 
(b) Lending practice after political independence. 
Although it is dangerous to be dogmatic about financial conditions in post-colonial 
Anglophone African countries, in general most banks have preferred to keep to 
established business methods. With exceptions, this includes banks governments have 
created and into which governments have bought. As Kitchen (1986 p.121) states, 
"Traditionally British-type commercial banks specialize in the provision of short-term 
business credit, especially trade credit and working capital, and personal credit. They 
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provide little in the way of long-term loans relative to their total assets, and seldom 
take equity stake in business". 
The standard British banking-type antipathy to long term financing - even in the U.K. 
- was based on an unwillingness to balance predominantly short term deposits with 
long term credit and investment, and also on caution against assuming that the 
prospects for a potential borrower's proposed venture could be assessed with 
sufficient certainty. Bridging loans, on the other hand, could be expected to span a 
predictable gap between payments and receipts. 
The difficulty of prognosticating the success or failure of a beneficiary of long term 
finance in the poorer developing countries is that much more acute than it is in 
advanced nations, due to lack of information about many deficit units, and also to 
different customs and traditions, which can produce unexpected and inconvenient 
attitudes towards bank finance and its servicing. Furthermore many would-be 
borrowers in developing countries cannot give adequate security, so have to be 
assessed on the basis of less tangible criteria. Conventional bankers tend to mistrust 
such criteria, despite much official support for this type of approach. For example, 
an official Kenyan publication of 1986 observes (p.39), "Commercial banks and 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions tend to extend credit primarily on the basis of formal 
security (collateral) while ignoring the assessment of the credit-seeking firm's 
economic potential. Security and collateral procedures and criteria should be 
reviewed by the banks. Bank staff will have to be trained to assess the financial 
viability and the economic growth potential of firms - especially small, 
newly-established firms - seeking bank loans". 
Bank caution and conservatism in former colonial territories was perhaps rein forced 
by the achievement of political independence, for there could be considerable 
uncertainty over likely state policy towards them in subsequent years. Fears of 
nationalisation, controls over the deployment of lending, curbs on profit repatriation, 
and more dubious behind-the-scenes pressures on their business served to buttress the 
desire to keep, as far as possible, to well-tried habits. 
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(c) Government and banks. 
Nevertheless governments in many developing countries have not been backward in 
wanting to introduce changes to their ban~ng systems. The philosophy behind this 
has generally been to bring more of a 'development' flavour to the business of finance 
and to get money into the hands of favoured or hitherto deprived groups. As the 
publication quoted above urges (p.39), " ... the provision of longer term funds from 
financial institutions would improve this" - that is, the lack of long term credit in 
firms' capital bases - "situation". As well as trying to change the business activities 
of existing banking institutions governments may also, both directly and by 
encouragement, bring about the establishment of new ones, including, of course, 
D.F.I.s. 
Imposing modified remits on existing banks is generally resisted, and often results in 
practice in only limited changes at the margin. The cautious bank schemes in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe for helping small business (see Part 2) are examples of this. Even 
nationalisation of banks or joint ownership by government and - probably - the 
original owners frequently results, as noted above, in behaviour, either by design or 
default, much the same as before the ownership change, often despite intentions to 
the contrary. 
For example, Shetty (1978 p.1487) discusses how the nationalisation of major banks 
in India in 1968 failed to achieve the intended aims. He suggests that the major aims 
were "(i) wider territorial and regional spread of branch networks; (ii) faster 
mobilisation of financial savings through bank deposits; (iii) re-orientation of credit 
deployment in favour of small and disadvantaged classes all along the production 
spectrum". He dismisses what he describes as 'pompous' aims such as to "serve 
better the needs of development of the economy in conformity with national policy ... " 
However, some years after nationalisation, " .. it can be said that the performance of 
the public sector banks in regard to their sOcio-economic obligations, particularly the 
'priority sector' advances, has been too meagre, too inequitous as between states and 
regions and too disparate as between banks". (p.1434). He notes that the share of 
bank credit going to medium and large firms actually fell, and that the share of 
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short-term loans in bank portfolios rose (p.1434-1435). 
Another variety of government intervention in the banking system of a developing 
country is to relax rules for incorporation, so as to encourage more indigenous people 
to get into the industry. However, unless the supervision of banks is comprehensive, 
efficient and impartial, there is scope for c9rruption, as when the new proto-bankers 
choose to lend money to themselves and their friends, and slovenliness, when, having 
little or no knowledge of sound banking practices, they invest funds in impossibly 
risky ventures. C. V. Brown's excellent book (1964) on Nigerian banking gives an 
illuminating picture of this sort of thing in that country, and Part 2 in this study 
describes similar experiences in Kenya. However, there have been successes. For 
example, Harvey (1990 p.232) writes, "There were a number of ... financial 
institutions created after independence... The Botswana Co-operative Bank's 
customers were co-operative societies and unions. It remained small. It ran into 
some problems in the 1980s, reflecting in part the problems of its clients, and in part 
the weakness of its management. However, the government took the necessary 
action, and it remained solvent". 
(d) Private sector banking developments. . 
In Europe and America banking and finance have not stood still, and likewise the 
mainstream private sector financial sectors in some African sub-Saharan countries 
have been expanded by the establishment - though not on a systematic basis - of new 
institutions and practices. Such are merchant banks which can arrange loan packages, 
discount houses - in certain territories - and various commercial banking subsidiaries 
dispensing specialised - including long-term - finance. However in general the results 
in terms of the provision of finance with a 'development' ambience appear to have 
been disappointing. Unless pressurised to expand into areas of business they consider 
risky, institutions have preferred to remain faithful to established criteria, and to 
accommodate only established customers. And indeed, in some contexts financial 
systems appear to have retreated rather than to have gone forward into new types of 
work (see Part 2). 
STOCK MARKETS 
(a) Background. 
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Gerschenkron, Cameron and the other writers considered earlier primarily focussed 
on the role of banks as engines of development. The establishment of sophisticated 
domestic capital markets linked to stock exchanges was a later development in the 
mainly European countries with which they were concerned, and, as they were 
primarily interested in the initiation, rather than the later stages, of rapid economic 
- equated to 'industrial' - growth, detailed analysis in relation to stock markets was 
inappropriate. 
Though throughout the colonial period in colonial territories there was substantial -
and largely unrecorded - investment of savings at local level in a multitude of 
small-scale ventures, the bulk of capital funds to finance western-style industrial and 
commercial ventures was brought in by foreign companies, who did not, therefore, 
see colonial territories as important sources of long term money. With time, the 
necessity for territorial governments to raise loans, and the establishment of 
development finance institutions witnessed to the stirrings of embryonic capital 
markets. Local incorporation, and 'over the counter' securities trading then led, in 
certain instances, including the countries of concern in this investigation, to the 
formation of stock exchanges. Zimbabwe with its very early stock exchange is 
unusual. (See Part 2). 
(b) Supply-leading or Demand-following. 
1. Demand-following. 
Basically, a capital market based on one or more securities exchanges is a 'demand 
follower'. A stock exchange is there to facilitate the transfer of securities, and does 
not of itself initiate industrial and commercial ventures. When a company issues 
shares to the public, whether to dilute the ownership of existing assets, or to raise 
new funds, commercial profit and loss considerations are the main motivating factors, 
and these centre on the market place where the goods or services in question are 
being traded. 
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2. Supply-leading. 
However, in a more indirect sense, a developed capital market with stock market 
facilities may be said to possess some 'supply-leading' characteristics. 
Firstly its existence may cause savings to be channelled into business, so increasing 
the resources available to industry and commerce, and keeping down the price of the 
funds. The latter favourably affects firms' costs, and so will in some cases constitute 
the difference between viability and unviability. 
With regard to a stock market, by its existence, actually increasing - as opposed to 
redistributing - the flow of savings into an economy, this clearly will happen if 
foreign money is attracted in. However, in practice, the issue is not very significant 
because (i) for years foreigners have had little inclination to go in for portfolio 
investment in developing countries, and (ii) governments would baulk at the increase 
in foreign ownership of domestic assets that it would entail. 
In a purely domestic context writers are not agreed as to whether more investible 
funds are generated by the existence of a stock market. However, Drake (1983 p.75) 
observes, on the basis of evidence in previous writings by himself and Arowolo, 
(Drake 1969, Arowolo 1971) "It is, at the very least arguable that a portion of the 
funds which have been subscribed to corporate shares and debentures in the 
developing countries would not otherwise have been saved and invested locally". 
Secondly, a stock market enables enterprises to expand by providing a method for 
raising new capital funds. Even if banking institutions exist that lend on the long 
term, equity capital is, in an emergency, less risky, since, given a downturn in a 
firm's fortunes, dividends can be reduced: interest on loans, however, normally has 
to be paid. 
Thirdly, if security prices move freely according to market forces, capital funds are 
deemed to flow into the most profitable ventures. As Samuels and Yacout (1981 
p.219) observe," Funds coming to the exchange are allocated to where they can most 
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effectively be used... Over time there is pressure on firms to employ their resources 
effectively". On the other hand, of course, capital market imperfections are less 
likely to be ironed out in small markets where there are not many stocks and only 
limited trading. Hence stock prices may not properly reflect the marginal efficiency 
of capital, so damaging allocational efficiency. 
Fourthly, a stock exchange can be a channel for the implementation of monetary 
policy. Though this fact may not be directly relevant to business centring on equities, 
nevertheless open market operations, as an instrument of monetary policy, may be 
less distortive of general resource allocation than other more specific monetary 
measures. As Drake (1985 p.77) notes, "A flourishing securities market is invaluable 
for the implementation of general official financial policy, which is less damaging to 
resource allocation than are selective controls". 
(c) The insufficiency of a stock market in a developing country. 
The paragraphs that follow address the question as to whether or to what extent a 
stock market in a developing country can satisfy an economy's capital funds 
requirements without any need for development finance institutions. Though the 
usefulness of a stock market from the theory-focussed discussion in sub-section (b) 
above was established, in reality there are a number of features in the context of 
developing countries that may prevent stock markets reaching their full potential. 
To begin with, the demand for industrial securities - debentures and equities - will be 
considered. By definition demand comes from (i) individuals and (ii) institutions. 
In a developing country demand from individuals is, relative to both population size 
and to the demand of institutions, weaker than in a developed country. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly there are, proportionally, far fewer people with the 
sort of incomes that allow for involvement in the business of stock market trading. 
Drake quotes Maniatis as saying, "... there is not a sufficiently large class of 
well-to-do to sustain a corporate securities market in an underdeveloped country". 
(Drake 1977 p.79) (3). Furthermore the minority of affluent people that do exist may 
- if exchange control rules are liberal- typically prefer to invest surplus funds abroad. 
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Even where exchange control regulations are fairly tight - and normally curbs are 
accepted as understandable in relation to personal monies even in liberalised financial 
systems - the influential may still find ways to export their savings. Secondly, 
information on the subject of financial investment is, in general, not widely diffused, 
so many people, particularly those away from towns where financial knowledge is 
more readily available, remain more or less ignorant of this channel for saving. 
Associated with this may be a paucity, as part of a general shortage of skills, of 
investment advice and operators in the business of broking and market-making. 
Thirdly, attempts to persuade people to put their surplus cash into the financial 
markets rather than keeping it with them are more readily served by the diffusion of 
banking offices and various forms of saving apparatus than by sophisticated stock 
exchange business. Banks and analogous bodies promise secure interest, whereas 
direct investment in industry carries with it more risk. 
In consequence, therefore, surpluses emanating from the personal sector are less 
likely than in economically developed countries to find their way directly into stock 
market paper. 
Demand from institutions is differentiated depending on the institutions in question. 
Banks within the British tradition tend not to put money into equities and debentures, 
though they do invest in government stock. Insurance companies and pension funds, 
however, go for a range of assets. Multi-national companies tend to prefer to 
repatriate profits, if exchange control rules allow it. Though they may be prepared 
to put money into shares of sound companies, governments, suspicious of further 
foreign control of their economies, frequently disallow this, and usually require 
retained profits to go into designated government stock. Apart from purchases - for 
monetary reasons - of their own stock, developing country governments have little 
reason to be direct players in their nations' stock markets. Development finance 
institutions constitute the principal channel through which funds directly from or 
indirectly via the state go in this direction. As a preliminary to later discussion, it 
can be intimated at this point that D.F.I.s may have a role in stock market 
development. 
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Referring to work he had done on south-east Asian countries, Drake, (1985 p.8) 
mainly due to institutional demand, downgraded the importance of demand as a factor 
preventing the development of stock markets: "There is evidence of widespread and 
generally strong demand for securities in many countries, for example Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia". However, these are prime examples of 
the group of rapidly growing countries, where an expected accompaniment to the 
build-up of secondary industry has been substantial development in all aspects of 
financial business: sub-Saharan African countries have some way to go to reach the 
level of sophistication of the above group. 
To turn now to the supply of stock market securities circulating in many developing 
countries, an initial division can be made between government stock and industrial 
paper. The supply of government stock is largely a function of high government 
spending, and since high government spending is a typical feature of such countries, 
a lot of stock is issued. This mops up savings, and distorts markets, when 
governments, by pressure, regulations on the investment of profits and reserve 
requirements, oblige various institutions to hold more than otherwise they might have 
wished. In recent years the economic problems of many developing countries, 
together with the requirements of structural adjustment, have led to programmes of 
retrenchment, with governments aiming t<? reduce their calIon national resources. 
However success often seems elusive, for established patterns of government 
expenditure are not easily curbed. As a result, the market for equities is seen by 
business to be reduced in that governments commandeer a large proportion of the 
funds available, and certain groupings of those with spare funds are not allowed to 
purchase equities. 
A number of other reasons exist for the generally small number of industrial 
securities, both new and existing issues, in African developing countries. 
Firstly, in so far as new long-term capital funds are to be raised by multi-nationals 
for use in such territories - and not much of this has been happening in recent years 
_ capital markets abroad and the resources of head office establishments are a more 
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convenient and smoother source of funds than the more politically and economically 
uncertain contexts of the hosts. On the other hand there is some advantage to a firm 
in diversifying a share issue locally amongst a wide variety of holders, since it then 
becomes cumbersome for government - or agent of government - to take over the 
concern by buying up equities. 
Secondly, it is one thing for a company to issue shares locally, but often quite another 
to get permission to switch the money raised into foreign exchange to cover the 
imports that real investment usually necessitates. 
Thirdly, the large number of small businesses and small family companies in a 
developing country do not, traditionally, make use of the stock market (4). Partly, 
as with the demand for securities, it is due to a lack of information and 
understanding. However, for the small businessman, the stock market is an 
inappropriate way of raising capital as the amounts of money needed are too small to 
justify the trouble and expense, and there would in any case be no demand for the 
stock of unknown concerns. Family savings, and financial intermediaries, where 
ancillary services may accompany finance, are more appropriate sources of capital. 
Fourthly, larger domestic firms, which might more realistically use the stock market, 
may prefer, even if registered as companies, not to go public and obtain a listing, 
partly out of conservatism, but also to avoid diluting ownership with outside 
shareholders. As Drake (1985 p.9) observes, "Such firms have been noticeably 
unwilling to adopt corporate form, issue equity and admit outsiders even as minority 
shareholders" . 
However, before being too keen to go on to a dismissal of the value of a stock 
market, it is as well to quote Drake's (1977 p.79) riposte, "It is therefore sometimes 
argued that the whole machinery of public companies, issuing shares and bonds which 
are traded on the stock exchange, is inappropriate to underdeveloped countries where 
there is likely to be, for some time, a preponderance of firms which are too small to 
approach the public capital market and depend on institutional finance for expansion. 
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In these circumstances, a case can perhaps be made for long-term bank financing, in 
the traditional way of the continental banks which provide equity capital, often 
substantial, to firms... (But) in the absence of a securities market the investments 
(equity and debenture type) made by banks and other institutions will lack liquidity 
- with a consequent diminution of the flexibility and an increase in the costs of bank 
operation; second, total reliance on institutional finance would close off the important 
entrepreneurial avenue of direct appeal to the public; finally ... it cannot be presumed 
that institutional lending will be conducted at lower real cost than fund raising via the 
securities market". In line with Drake's point of view, a role for D.F.I.s in this type 
of business is discussed in Chapter 5. 
(d) Government Intervention. 
The shortcomings of stock market operation discussed above did not look into 
government intervention in the stock market, excepting for issues that could not be 
avoided without weakening the analysis, such as the raising of funds via the sale of 
stock. As far as possible, however, the politico-economic dimension was avoided. 
Governments parading hard socialist credentials are likely to be opposed to the very 
existence of stock markets, though interestingly enough no African stock exchange 
in existence before independence has been closed. More general is intervention in 
capital market processes, sometimes justified on the basis of socialist, or nationalist, 
aspirations, sometimes related to Africanization, sometimes more to do with raising 
government revenue, nepotism, patronage or greed. 
Firstly taxation may be so arranged as to discriminate against share income. As 
Drake (1985 p.ll) observes, " .. .it is usual that interest paid by companies on loan 
funds is treated as a tax-deductible operating expense, whereas dividends are paid out 
of profits upon which tax has usually been levied already". And, "Moreover, 
dividends accruing to individuals are truly taxed twice - as part of company's profits 
and again as income in the hands of shareholders". (Ibid p.12). 
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Secondly, the financing of excess government spending may introduce distortions into 
the capital market. For example, if government sells stock by offering exceptionally 
high interest rates, funds will flow into' government stock and desert industrial 
securities. Furthermore - and this refers to the tax issue as well - " ... the tax-free 
status (in some countries) of time deposits and government and public enterprise 
bonds lessens the appeal of corporate debt instruments". (World Development Report 
1989 p.ll0). As a result, share prices would fall, and new issues not be feasible. 
If government issues stock at low rates of interest they can only sell it by leaning on 
financial institutions - either informally or by reserve requirements - to buy it. This 
precludes investible funds flowing into viable industrial opportunities. 
Thirdly, government body(ies) that oversee the working of the stock market in a 
country may be costly to run, implying substantial fees from those wishing to issue 
securities, slow and cumbersome in coming to decisions, and may adopt dictatorial 
or partial stances in determining the terms surrounding new issues. All or part of an 
issue may have to be placed with parastatals and/or chosen individuals, and the initial 
price put unrealistically low, so that these favoured holders can make immediate 
capital gains. 
Fourthly, vanous financial disabilities may be put on foreign firms, such as 
exceptionally severe restrictions on the transfer of dividends to foreign shareholders 
or on the repatriation of capital abroad. (See Appendix 1 for an investigation of these 
policies). Other distorting effects on stock markets noted by Drake (1977 p.76) have 
already been considered in Pt. 1 Ch. 3. They comprise the effects of monopoly 
power wielded by firms - an arrangement frequently bestowed on companies by 
government (See Appendix 1), and general market imperfections. Inevitably all the 
activity discussed above weakens a stock market as an accurate indicator of the value 
of real assets, misallocates resources, and reduces the willingness of institutions and 
individuals to use the system. Such a stock market fails to develop, and as a 
corollary the ancillary services that would otherwise surround it, for example the 
business of issuing shares, remain undeveloped. 
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FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
The types of government intervention surveyed have been prevalent features of 
developing country economies in the last few decades. Belief that they have been 
contributory causes of the economic doldrums of the 1980s has led in many countries 
to programmes (or intended programmes) .of financialliberalisation. 
Liberalisation with regard to banks covers a variety of possible moves, including 
relaxation of various controls on lending, deposit-gathering, interest rates and the 
provision of financial services. There is a difficulty in distinguishing between 
politico-administrative restrictions and monetary measures, and it will always be 
possible for some curbs on banking business to be justified by monetary reasoning. 
Turning to stock markets, liberalisation can mean the relaxation of regulations on the 
business of new issues, taxation that does not discriminate against income from 
shares, no preferential treatment for government stock issues, and withdrawal from 
attempts to rig stock market prices and yields. Controls on inflows and outflows of 
capital funds and outflows of profits are relaxed. 
However, as a necessary support to financial market liberalisation, without which 
results are unlikely to be as positive as desired, associated macroeconomic 
adjustments are advisable. (This ties in with Cameron's view introduced in Chapter 
2, that the most useful role for government in the finance of development is the 
creation of an environment conducive to the process) Such are the liberalisation of the 
external trade in goods and services, a realistic exchange rate regime, relaxation of 
any credit restrictions that may exist, and the fostering of competition in industry. 
Indeed, Dooley and Mathieson (1987 p.32), having firmly excoriated financial 
repression - " ... the costs that such a system, "that is, repression, and in the context 
of their paper they are defining it more widely than McKinnon does in his interest 
rate thesis, "imposes on the private sector may be ..... substantial" , - suggest that the 
apparent failure of liberalisation in a number of contexts may be due to this. To 
quote, "The outcomes of these reforms have also varied, with some reforms being 
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sustained over an extended period with relative stability (for example in the Republic 
of Korea) but others ending in the midst of financial crises (for example, Argentina 
and Chile}.... Such inconsistencies were principally associated with the fact that 
goods and financial markets adjust at different speeds, and the real exchange rate 
changes that may be generated by a financial reform make the integration of domestic 
and foreign goods markets much more difficult". (Ibid.). Furthermore, and in 
addition to the above macro-economic constraints on the effectiveness of financial 
market liberalisation measures, liberalisation, though it may undermine some features 
associated with a soft state, does not automatically put an end to many dubious 
practices, such as the commandeering of blue chip shares by influential people, or 
kickbacks for favours. 
SUMMARY 
The following paragraphs briefly draw together the conclusions reached In the 
previous sections of this chapter. 
With regard to financial institutions - apart of course from D.F.I.s themselves -
commercial banks have been unwilling to go whole-heartedly into long-term lending 
either directly or via subsidiaries, due to traditional lending practices and caution in 
an environment less measurable than is the case in Europe. Locally-based banks in 
the hands of indigenous people and organisations, though in theory better fitted to 
understand and work within domestic conditions than foreign-based banks, have 
tended to follow foreign models: others have been driven to bankruptcy by 
inefficiency and internal corruption. Government may also intervene, forbidding 
banks to go in for long-term lending, preventing foreign-based companies from 
getting loans, or crowding out private sector borrowers by forcing banks to channel 
their resources into government stock, parastatals, or other favoured beneficiaries. 
As with banks, to explain the inadequacy of capital markets as sufficient generators 
of long-term funds in developing countries, the discussion must be aware of both 
economic factors, which centre on the inevitable deficiencies of embryonic 
capital-generating arrangements, and political factors, which cover the distortions 
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produced by government intervention in the business of raising long term funds. 
Though liberalisation measures do away with some government-imposed restrictions 
on financial systems, they obviously do not solve all the problems associated with 
raising capital funds. Ideally they create a climate more conducive than before to 
financial market development, and as such are important not just in relation to 
mainstream intermediaries but also to dedicated development finance institutions. 
Furthermore by releasing conventional banks and stock markets from damaging 
constraints liberalisation does not automa~icall y render D. F. I. s unnecessary, even 
though the conditions might have been created whereby with time they may be 
rendered progressively less vital. For the time being, though, financial market lacunae 
may still exist, so intimating a role for D.F.I.s. It is the business of the next chapter 
to explore and delineate that role in depth. 
NOTES PART 1 CHAPTER 4 
1. To reiterate, the focus is, in the light of the African case studies in Part 2, on 
Anglophone African countries, though some relevant data from other contexts is 
introduced into the discussion. 
2. To anticipate the discussion in Part 2, Kenya and Zimbabwe would appear, in 
contrast to most other African countries, to have large business sectors and middle 
classes. 
3. While Drake states that the arguments explaining low demand for securities in 
underdeveloped countries are "well put" by Maniatis, he goes on to observe (1977 
p. 80), "No widespread empirical evidence has yet been marshalled in support of these 
arguments.... While they seem intuitively sensible, there is enough contrary 
argument and fragmentary evidence to suggest that it would be wrong to regard the 
characteristics just described as universal constraints on securities demand". 
4. This applies also to small businesses in economically advanced countries. 
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Chapter 5 
A ROLE FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
Before identifying and commenting on the role and functions of D. F. I. s in developing 
countries, it is intended to explore the definition of the D.F.I. contained in the first 
chapter by considering how the distinction between the 'public' and the 'private' 
D.F.1. is to be understood. 
All types of financial institution in existence to-day have been pioneered by the 
private sector. Thus the development finance institution can be traced back at least 
to the establishment of the Credit Mobilier by the Pereire brothers in France in 1852 
(Kitchen 1986 p.71). Though this particular institution, whose aim was to mobilise 
small savings and invest in development projects, failed, there were many imitations, 
and there are to-day numerous financial intermediaries throughout the developed 
world dedicated to long term finance. 
However, herein lies a difficulty of definition, for it is unsatisfactory to label every 
institution that is concerned with long term lending and investment aD. F. I. Most 
banking organisations throughout the western industrialised world that make term 
loans and buy equity are more akin to conventional commercial banks than D.F.I.s, 
for they see themselves as commercial organisations selling a particular set of 
financial products in an assessable market place, and are not guided by a philosophy 
of economic development. In contrast to this, D.F.I.s are identified more with the 
idea of filling gaps left in the private sector financial markets, in order that economic 
development projects, with their specialised financial requirements, shall not be 
starved of capital funds. Also, as discuss~ in Chapter 2, D.F.I.s may sometimes 
themselves be active initiators of new projects. Hence the totally - in all senses (l) 
_ private sector D.F.I. is, by definition, uncommon, and probably only appears as a 
borrower's organisation, as when those running a particular industry, or group of 
industries, set up a financial intermediary to raise money and direct it to themselves. 
A rare developing country example of this type of organisation is the dormant - but, 
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despite the sensitivity of the name, still extant - Industrial Promotion Corporation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, set up in Central African Federation days by industry to 
channel money into established industry in the absence of a sufficiently extensive 
capi tal market. 
The European-dominated Central African Federation, though, was an unusual species 
of developing country, and truly independent D.F.I.s do not exist in the large number 
of indigenous-governed developing nations of to-day. Gordon (1983 p.8) states, "In 
the original conception of the World Bank - which was not the inventor of D.F.I.s 
but has been their leading supporter for more than thirty years - the model D. F. C. 
was privately owned and controlled but", he significantly goes on to say, "it generally 
required a special sanction and concessional financing (subordinated low - or 
no-interest loans) from government". This observation implies strong government 
involvement, irrespective of ownership. And furthermore, the interests that do own 
D.F.I.s labelled 'private' are automatically assumed by Gordon to be banks, insurance 
companies, the I.F.C. and similar bodies, in other words organisations that are or can 
be made susceptible to government influence, and/or have a philosophy of 
development promotion. 
Some D.F.I.s are overtly 'public' in having 100% or majority state ownership. 
However, beyond this the distinction between 'public' and 'private' becomes unclear 
and indeed perhaps - in the present context - irrelevant, because the reasons for the 
establishment of the various D. F. I. s and the nature of their operations inevitably have 
been and are affected by the predilections of government. Also, to quote Gordon 
(p.10) again, "Not only do these various institutions have different purposes, market 
niches, and clienteles, but they are heavily influenced by different national traditions, 
cultures, and economic environments. All these factors may override the state-private 
dichotomy". In later pages, therefore, it is not proposed in the analysis to elevate 
the importance of the 'private versus public D.F.I.' issue. In general, a country's 
clutch of D.F.I.s will be treated as a unitary group, rather than as a pair of 
sub-groups. 
THE ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL FUNDS 
(a) General factors. 
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Before reviewing the specific destinations to which D.F.I. money should be directed, 
it is useful to note the more general factors that help to define the allocative role. 
Firstly is the reluctance of banks, as was "discussed earlier, to lend on a long term 
basis. As Gordon (Ibid. p.3) explains, " .. typically, banks have been less responsive 
to long-term credit needs - especially those of evolving industrial sectors - because 
of their inadequate resource base, risk aversion, low profitability, and so on. 
Basically, industrial term lending runs counter to their traditional habits, attitudes, 
criteria and procedures. Most commercial bank loans involve the commitment of 
funds for no more than a few months, and they largely finance goods in import-export 
trade or inventories, which themselves constitute reliable collateral". Furthermore 
some large and - expectedly - worthwhile capital projects may take an exceptionally 
long time before yielding returns. Government, through D.F.I.s, may be prepared 
to take the long view, in the full expectation of eventual financial success, while 
banks prefer to avoid tying up money for very long periods. 
In recent years change has come, and banks in the more 'advanced' developing 
countries (2) have shown a growing willingness to lend long, but inevitably they keep 
to firms with "established financial record(s)" (Ibid. p.3). Hence there remains a 
place for the D.F.I. in the business of term lending. 
Secondly, D.F.I. loans may be denominated in foreign exchange, when sourced by 
foreign and international agencies. Given that capital projects usually require 
imports, and that developing countries are typically short of hard currency, this is a 
valuable attribute. Though commercial banks may in theory obtain foreign currency 
from overseas head offices or international financial markets, in recent years the 
international debt crisis has put an end to most term lending from the foreign private 
financial sector. 
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The main disadvantage of D.F.I. foreign currency lending is the question of who 
bears the exchange risk. A large number of developing country currencies have 
shown a secular tendency to depreciate, and hence borrowers of foreign exchange, 
whether the D.F.I.s themselves and/or their own debtors, find themselves having to 
find increasing quantities of local money to service repayments and interest. True, 
depreciation caused by domestic inflation can mean proportionately larger local 
earnings for borrowers, so compensating for higher debt charges: in practice, though, 
domestic inflation does not affect firms uniformly, and the economic distortions 
produced by inflation can so affect an economy in general as to damage the viability 
of debtors. Even where the exchange rate in a country is kept fixed for a substantial 
period a sudden devaluation will make things difficult for repayers of foreign 
currency denominated loans, and the chance of this happening may make them 
unwilling to borrow in the first place. Exchange risk may be addressed by 
insurance-cum-guarantee schemes, but 10 the uncertain politico-economic 
environments of modern developing countries mainstream commercial banks have 
been reluctant establish them, and hence it has been left to governmnts and/or central 
banks to make the arrangements. However, this does not automatically smooth away 
the problem. Apart from the consequent financial burdens that will fallon the 
authorities, foreign exchange protection can lead to complacency and hence slack 
operational behaviour on the part of the borrowing institutions. 
Thirdly is the necessity that D.F.I.(s) be created to ensure a wider range of types of 
capital finance, since a properly geared company requires both loan and equity 
finance in appropriate proportions. Despite the above discussion on the relative 
unwillingness of banks to lend on a long term basis, it is more straightforward for 
banks to diversify in this direction, than for a fully-fledged stock market to become 
established. Therefore even when long term loans are available from commercial 
banks, a development corporation concerned with equity still has a place. 
(b) The direction of funds and gaps in the financial markets. 
1. General. 
The identification of 'gaps' indicates the unwillingness or inability of the mainstream 
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financial system to meet all - or all desirable or potential - needs. That aD. F. I. has 
a role in making up for the rest of the system's deficiencies highlights its position as 
a 'demonstration vehicle'. As RBC Dominion Securities Component 3 Vol. I (1989 
p.iv) points out, "If D.F.I.s succeed in demonstrating that managing assets involving 
higher risks and/or non-traditional financing structures can generate attractive returns, 
they may induce other financial sector intermediaries to pursue these business 
opportunities". Crucial in the following paragraphs, therefore, is comment on how 
D.F.I.s, when undertaking work mainstream intermediaries may avoid, can address 
the factors that are expected to lead to losses. 
2. Small business finance. 
Firstly D.F .I.s are important as sources of finance to small businessmen, for 
"Bankers everywhere... are reluctant to lend to small business". (World 
Development Report 1989 p.100). As noted before, the distinction needs to be made 
between the very small or totally new one man/family business with no fixed assets 
worth mentioning and very likely no accounting records, and the established formal 
sector business (3). Especial difficulties surround attempts to finance the first type 
- not that this automatically rules out formal financing provisions (4) - but 
arrangements and specialised intermediaries to help the second group have over the 
years been widely established. 
Though for the larger company appropriate gearing of capital structure is the right 
approach, there is a case for suggesting that for the small business finance is better 
extended as debt rather than equity, so as to impose upon small businesses the 
discipline of having to generate returns. It can be too easy for the inexperienced 
small businessman to get to see equity capital as 'free' money, since no repayment 
or compulsory dividend returns are required. On the other hand, where the flexibility 
that equity funding gives is absent, some potentially viable projects will not be 
undertaken. As McKendry (1991 p.2) points out, "Institutions which use only loan 
finance limit their ability to balance risk against return" . 
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Nevertheless, even if equity capital is inappropriate for the very 'small' businessman, 
there will come a stage in the growth process of a 'small' business when it has the 
sophistication to consider raising money this way. (The issue is looked at fully in the 
next sub-section.) When this occurs, a more important constraint is the lack of a 
securities market for trading in locally-issued paper. For as the 1989 World 
Development Report (p.lOl) - in the context of discussion on small business finance 
- observes "With the development of securities markets, venture capital is more likely 
to appear as a source of finance for risky new projects". 
Sometimes it may be appropriate to lend on a short term as well as long term basis, 
given the unwillingness of commercial banks even to advance working capital to small 
concerns. Too heavy an emphasis on such business, however, threatens to tum a 
D.F.I. into a commercial bank, as safer short lending comes to look a more attractive 
option. 
The recommendations do not seek to ignore the enormous problems connected with 
small business finance - problems amply elaborated in Chapter 3 - and the difficulties 
of achieving internal viability. There is no absolutely certain way of avoiding losses, 
but there are methods for reducing their likelihood. 
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that a major reason for small business D. F. 1. 
unviability is the heavy ancillary costs that will accompany serious and properly 
thought out schemes, and it was argued that a good proportion of these costs may 
plausibly be borne by government - and/or external agency - as part of a general 
approach towards education and expanding the indigenous business community. 
Though writing about D.F.l.s in general, the following point made by Kitchen (1986 
p.125) does subsume the suggestion: "It may be a contentious view, but it seems 
better to allow DFCs to concentrate on being sound financial institutions rather than 
social institutions ... " (5). 
The 'social' aim that allows for subsidised interest rates on lending cannot, however, 
easily be defended, and there is no need to rehearse again the arguments against this 
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aspect of financial repression. In brief, skills training should make a borrower better 
able to service debt at the due time, whereas subsidised credit clouds market reality 
and invites lethargy. There are other bad practices that the development objectives 
for D.F.I.s in relation to small business finance can be interpreted to justify, for 
example massaging unpaid interest and repayments into de facto grants, the handing 
over of funds just to dam the onset of insolvency, capitalising interest and 
repayments, and of course financing companies for personal and political rather than 
business reasons: all of this squanders resources, and pushes towards bankruptcy both 
D.F.I.s and the businesses they support. 
3. The finance of medium size domestic companies. 
For the purposes of the present discussion it is assumed that domestic medium size 
firms are those which are sufficiently established to be prepared to issue equity. 
However, by virtue of being unknown, and/or because of the lack of facilities for 
trading securities, they would not expect to make much headway if they tried to sell 
shares to the public in general. Hence there is a role for D.F.I.s taking up and/or 
underwriting this paper. 
Risk can appear to attach to buying the stock of the type of concern identified above, 
but it is a necessary task if home-grown firms are to make headway. And this is not 
to imply that losses will automatically result. Firms aiming to capitalise assets or 
expand are hardly likely to be making losses themselves, and relevant D.F.I.s, 
committed to the expansion of industry and staffed largely by indigenous people with 
a more pertinent understanding of local conditions and customs, should have more 
scope for properly assessing prospects than the general public, who, lacking 
knowledge, can be expected to be cautious. 
The same observations apply when domestic firms that are not yet well known apply 
for long term loans in support of expansion programmes. The practice of long term 
lending from the mainstream financial system tends to become established in 
developing countries much sooner than institutional support for equity finance. but in 
general banks are only prepared to accommodate the well-established 'blue chip' firm. 
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D.F.l.s, though, should employ and nurture the expertise that can address the credit 
needs of obscurer but still successful or potentially successful concerns. As with 
'small' business, support services for the financing of 'medium' firms are 
appropriately financed in part by governm~nt and/or other external agencies. 
4. Collaboration in new projects. 
Linked to both the previous two discussion points is the possibility of aD. F. I. being 
in with a local partner at the birth of a new venture. The partner may be a private 
interest or a government body. Again, the reasons for D.F.I. involvement are the 
difficulties of the associate in raising sufficient equity funds due to the weakness 
and/ or caution of the stock market. 
The usual reservations attach to D.F.!. collaboration with a state body. Usually it 
would be impossible for a D.F.I. not to associate in a venture with a goverment body 
- and to keep financing it - if sufficient pressure was brought to bear, even when 
business logic suggested otherwise. And indeed this may also be true of collaboration 
with private interests, if these interests consist of politically powerful or politically 
favoured people. 
5. Partnership with foreign firms. 
In some circumstances, D.F.l.s may collaborate financially with foreign firms at the 
outset of projects. Indeed governments may insist on this arrangement, so as to avoid 
total foreign control of new projects. Clearly some foreign firms considering setting 
up in developing countries may favour association with D.F.I.s. They do not have 
to provide all the capital needed themselves, and can hope for government protection 
and favours. And for the country there is an inflow of capital and expertise. 
However other firms prefer to remain independent, and will not come if collaboration 
with D.F.I.s is compUlsory. As long, therefore, as foreign firms can choose whether 
or not to have D.F.!.s as partners, it is a useful function. 
6. The social cost/benefit issue. 
The above discussion has implicitly made financial viability an essential feature of 
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recommended D.F.1. functions. Now it is true that, technically. the purported 
external benefits that may be expected to follow from a new venture may be used to 
justify D.F.1. involvement in a financially loss-making concern: this issue was 
referred to in Chapter 2. However the many difficulties associated with computing 
external benefits, together with the ease with which financial losses may always In 
this way conveniently be excused, make this a dangerous practice. 
PROMOTION 
The unwritten assumption in the section above was that, though they might be active 
in monitoring, extension and management collaboration, D.F.I.s did not actually 
initiate projects. However, at the extreme a D.F.I. may actually be a promoter of 
a new venture, - what was defined in Chapter 2 as 'pure' supply leading - planning 
and/or financing it wholly itself, or seeking on its own initiative domestic and/or 
foreign partners. If it chooses to be the sole agent in a new venture it must inevitably 
get involved with entrepreneurship and management. As a developmental tactic, 
promotion is ostensibly a legitimate function of a D.F.1. However, as Gordon (1983 
p.22) notes, "It is an important process, often glamorous and exciting, but beset with 
unforseeable difficulties". In Chapter 2, examples from European history fail to 
provide much unequivocal evidence of successful pure supply-leading behaviour. The 
dynamism of extra-bank business interests was always far more significant than any 
direct impetus from the sphere of finance. Though there is no obvious reason why 
supply-leading financial institutions should be any more effective in modern 
developing countries than in 19th century Europe, political leaders have been ready 
to use such institutions to try to achieve the deployment of development that, for 
whatever reasons, they favoured. 
Can any quasi-objective case be made in favour of promotion? (i) It bypasses the 
caution of private domestic and foreign interests by leading rather than just supporting 
new developments. (ii) It substitutes for a dearth of local entrepreneurship. (iii) It 
can be designed to accord with standard approaches to industrial development, such 
as import substitution or export industry expansion. 
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However, the above points are matched by serious shortcomings. (i) A promotional 
D.F.1. has to employ various experts to seek out viable project designs, conduct 
feasibility studies, locate partners, and so on. This goes way beyond extension and 
monitoring, is very expensive, and must - if done properly - tum the D.F.I. into 
something other than a financial intermediary. (ii) To substitute for a dearth of local 
entrepreneurship implies that the D.F.1. takes on the entrepreneurial function, in other 
words, that the D.F.!. somehow has good entrepreneurs amongst its employees. This 
is not very likely, since such people would be more profitably employed running their 
own businesses. In consequence, there is a strong possibility that government will 
find itself having to subsidise the mistakes of entrepreneurial incompetence. (iii) In 
line with observations made above there will always be a temptation to promote 
schemes for social and political reasons rather than hard business ones. Even less 
happily, the powerful may pressurise D.F.I.s into underwriting ventures designed for 
their personal aggrandisement. 
Though it would be wrong to rule out D.F.1. promotion of new business in all 
circumstances, experience has been disappointing. As Gordon observes (1983 p. 22), 
"A few companies" - that is, development finance companies - " .... have created new 
enterprises, frequently to their subsequent regret". 
THE NORMATIVE AGENDA 
(a) Introduction. 
In previous sections it has been at times impossible to avoid bringing in some of the 
normative features that inevitably become associated with the more objective functions 
that a D.F.!. might be expected to undertake. Here consideration is given explicitly 
to the more blatant socio-political factors that have often been included in the remits 
of D.F.!.s in their capacities as allocators of capital funds. As Kitchen (1986 p.123) 
without either disapproving or approving, observes," .. the development bank assumes 
a wider role than if it were a purely private sector financial institution. It becomes 
an instrument of government policy, and is generally expected to act in the long-term 
interest of a country's economic development, a function which may often clash with 
its criterion as a profit-making institution". Or, as the World Bank (1989 p. 54) 
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observed, "Most (governments) believed that without intervention their financial 
systems would not be cooperative partners in the development effort". This section, 
therefore, departs somewhat from the basic aim of the chapter, and does not so much 
identify as review practices that developing country governments have expected of 
their countries' D. F . I. s. 
To return to Kitchen's discussion, amongst other "broader aims" he mentions the 
creation of employment, the diversification of industry, the distribution of income, 
and the encouragement of entrepreneurial activity. (Op.cit. p.123). Following the 
sub-section immediately below, Kitchen's ideas will be used as the basis for the 
subsequent discussion. 
(b) Money for parastatals. 
Numerous instances exist of D.F.I.s financing, usually at government instigation, 
parastatal industries. The World Bank (1989 p.57) remarks on this - "State-owned 
enterprises in some countries have clearly benefited from directed credit" - and it is 
all too obvious that this has been largely the result of these organisations making 
losses. As the World Bank goes on to say (Ibid. p.57), "Artificially low prices, 
excessive staffing, or activities that were inherently unviable have resulted in low 
profits and low retained earnings. Borrowing was necessary not just for investment 
but to cover losses". Of course directed credit does not have to be just from D. F . I. s, 
but they are important in this type of business because usually their ownership profile 
means that they are more readily influenced by governments than are commercial 
banks. 
A further use of D. F . I. s in the context of public ownership of industry has been to 
make them agents of nationalisation by the directed purchase of 100% or majority 
holdings of companies' shares. Minority holdings may also be acquired if dividends 
are good, and if for other reasons majority holdings are to be avoided. 
Political considerations constitute a major factor behind D. F. 1. involvement with 
public sector industry, and in the days when philosophies that celebrated the virtues 
73 
of massive government intervention in industry were uppermost, it would have been 
thought very proper for D.F.I.s to collaborate with government in this activity. And 
indeed, ceteris paribus, there would have appeared to be no reason why a parastatal 
should be any less successful than a private sector firm. However, in practice, as the 
above quote indicated, parastatals have made losses throughout the developing world, 
and in consequence, D.F.I.s have been damaged. 
Unless (i) business is initiated and carried through on a firm commercial basis, and 
(ii) a 'developmental' aspect can be identified, D.F.1. financing of parastatals cannot 
be recommended. 
(c) Employment creation. 
Unless it replaces, or by its existence results in the liquidation of, one or more other 
undertakings any new venture can be expected to increase employment, but clearly 
to maximise employment creation from a given input of money capital, it is necessary 
to go in either for industries that are inevitably labour-intensive, or for 
labour-intensive methods of production where there is a choice. However, unless a 
D.F.1. is the sole instigator of a new venture, the scope for deciding what to produce 
or how to produce it is limited: too much pressure may make the partner or client 
pull out. And quite obviously, the partner or client will wish to produce in whatever 
way is thought most likely to be profitable. As the sole promoter of a new venture, 
a D.F.I. may deliberately decide in favour of labour-intensive production methods, 
but unless the wage level is sufficiently low to make this the most cost-effective 
approach the degree of protection and the level of output prices to ensure viability 
will have to be that much higher. And/or there will have to be more government 
financial support. A further problem which can arise in the long term - even where 
labour intensive production methods are apparently justified by low wage levels - is 
the matter of spare parts. High wage developed countries favour capital-intensive 
production methods, so capital equipment producers in such countries may be unable 
to service 'simpler' equipment which is regarded locally as obsolete. Furthermore. 
goods for exports have to meet international quality standards, and this may mean 
using the latest machinery. 
7.+ 
A further, considerably more dubious, practice in relation to employment levels exists 
when D. F. I. s are expected to increase manning in their subsidiaries and associates 
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so as to absorb some of those seeking work, and so help to show a statistical rise in 
wage employment. Gillis and Peprah (1981 p.36) identify - "A .. common socio-
economic justification for establishing state-owned enterprises is that of employment 
creation, or reduction in unemployment" - and D.F.I.s, as an intermediate layer 
between government and industry, may be in a position to pressurise not only 
majority-owned subsidiaries but also firms in which they have only minority interests 
to take on more staff. And not to be ignored is the tendency for D.F.I.s to multiply 
their own workforces. 
(d) Industrial diversification. 
Typically the internal market for a substantial range of industrial products is, in a 
large number of developing countries, small by European standards, due to a 
combination of small populations - though usually, of course, growing fast - and low 
modal incomes. Given scale economies, then in the case of many product lines there 
is no room for multiple firm industries if just the domestic market has to be served 
(6). Hence D.F.l.s concerned with secondary industry tend to have diversified 
portfolios consisting of stakes in firms that are not in competition with one another, 
and which typically are heavily protected against competition. 
This recipe for' single firm' industries meets with considerable criticism from Harvey 
(1991 p.10): "The argument for monopoly on grounds of economies of scale has been 
overworked, and is almost always damaging. If an economy really is so small that 
only one steel manufacturer or motor assembler can operate on a sufficient scale, the 
country is probably better off importing the commodity in question, since without 
competition the producer's costs will always be excessive". Some industries, such 
as textiles, can operate successfully with many firms even in a small market, but this 
is partly because textiles by definition comprise diversified ranges of products. 
However, in the case of a single firm industry, if it is faced with import competition, 
something which present-day liberalisation measures aim to bring about, it can no 
longer behave as a monopoly. Obviously some types of business would not survive 
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import competition, but the approach towards industrialisation in developing countries 
must be to spot those types of production, which, due to cheap local materials or 
some other indigenous factor, can hold their own. Also there is room for several 
firms in an otherwise single firm industry if it develops a flourishing export business. 
Perhaps such a development should be supported by the establishment of export 
processing zones, as has been true, with considerable subsequent success, for certain 
countries, such as, for example, Mauritius (Fowdar 1986 passim). 
(e) The redistribution of income. 
Because of its specialised and limited role in an economy, a standard D.F.I. cannot 
have a very substantial role in the matter of macro-economic income redistribution. 
All it can really do is to create the conditions whereby some people in business may 
enhance their economic status, by providing them with investment funds and ancillary 
support. In so far as the policy is successful, then the beneficiaries are relatively 
better off. 
Another way in which a D.F.I. may contribute to the goal of income redistribution 
is to improve the economic circumstances of a number of indigenous people by giving 
them managerial and other senior positions in the D.F.I. itself or in firms over which 
aD. F. I. has influence. This policy is quite legitimate if such people have appropriate 
qualifications and experience: otherwise inefficiency results or salary costs rise as 
qualified expatriates have to double the locals. Furthermore foreign partners may be 
reluctant to establish new ventures or expand existing ones if obliged to employ staff 
they consider unsuitable. Even more ill-thought-out approaches to redistribution 
involve favouring particular tribes, classes, political classes and families. As Hailey 
(1991 p.14) observes, "For a variety of social and political reasons some governments 
actively discriminate in favour of certain groups within the population to encourage 
their involvement in the small business sector". 
In general income redistribution is more appropriately achieved by the government 
fiscal and general macroeconomic policy than by the activity of D.F.I.s. 
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(t) The nurturing of entrepreneurs. 
The encouragement of entrepreneurs is most obviously important in relation to small 
business support. Earlier chapter material explored this and associated issues, and 
suggested that government should be principally responsible for the finance of 
extension assistance - including entrepreneurial training - to businessmen, even though 
some aspects of the package are appropriately operated through D.F.I.s. 
Discussion on other aspects of entrepreneurial activity by D.F.I.s has been to some 
extent implicitly covered in the sub-section on promotion, since the initiation of new 
ventures must imply entrepreneurial behaviour. Comment in that section was not 
enthusiastic about D.F.l.s taking on this role, despite Cameron's observation (1969 
p.4) that, " .. to maximise the output of the economy as a whole the few really 
capable entrepreneurs should be placed in positions where they can exercise the 
greatest leverage. Surely the banking system would be one such strategic area.". 
Though Cameron was writing about banks in general, what he says is quite relevant 
to D.F.l.s. Unfortunately, the staff of developing country D.F.I.s have tended to be 
made up not of people with entrepreneurial flair but of those qualified in 
administrative and financial disciplines - plus of course political appointees - who look 
to protection rather than business astuteness to see their ventures payoff. However 
there are exceptions. The Botswana Development Corporation, for example, has 
always been staffed by managers with business/private sector backgrounds (7). 
(g) Conclusion. 
For D. F.1. s to pursue social and political objectives creates obvious problems of 
viability, since they are likely to conflict with hard commercial criteria. To a very 
large extent, such aims are best treated in the context of general government policy 
rather than assigned to be carried out by D.F.l.s. 
CAPIT AL FUNDS FROM ABROAD 
Within the above text on the allocation of funds are - inevitably- observations on the 
inflow of capital from abroad, and the paragraphs here elaborate on that material. 
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International agencies and foreign national financial institutions - whether specialised 
organisations or commercial banks - that channel money into developing country 
development often use D.F.I.s as conduits for capital funds. Or, as Gordon (1983 
p.16) puts it," ... they are usually the favoured channels for loans from public 
international or bilateral sources" .(8) There are good reasons for this. Firstly it 
means the delegation of allocation decisions to personnel supposedly skilled in this 
function. Secondly - though of course very much linked with the first reason - it is 
a sensible way of disintegrating 'wholesale' sums of money into many 'retail' 
allocations. Thirdly, if money contributions are in the form of capital rather than 
loans, the expatriate agencies are owners of the D.F.I.s in question, and so in theory 
can influence decisions. (And indeed, there is a tendency for donor agencies not to 
want to be involved with D.F.I.s where there is a strong government presence, in the 
belief that governments are prone to bulldose allocation policy into business where 
social and political rather than sound commercial considerations are paramount.) 
However, too much should not be made of this. As pointed out, the whole point of 
D.F.l.s as middlemen is that - administratively - they substitute for the donors, and 
in practice staff of donor agencies are often too stretched to exert more than broad 
long-term influence. Also, governments may still try and use their weight to 
pressurise D.F .I.s in receipt of external funds to allocate money in ways they favour 
(9). Fifthly, donors - with exceptions - prefer, for ideological reasons, not to finance 
private sector industry directly. Sixthly donors can more readily insist on 
governments guaranteeing funds provide9 via D.F.I.s rather than through less 
structured channels. 
The other main way - already referred to - in which D.F.l.s may be the catalyst for 
foreign funds coming into developing countries is when they become partners with 
foreign firms in providing equity finance for new ventures. If there is a favourable 
context for foreign inward investment, then - given that existing large scale business 
and finance in developing countries is usually rare and/or foreign - D.F.I.s constitute 
a convenient method of associating foreign capital and expertise with domestic finance 
and domestic aspirations. Unfortunately, as noted earlier (and see Appendix I) too 
often governments show the vacillation and contradictory behaviour typical of the soft 
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state, heaping disabilities on firms with foreign components in them, while at the 
same time affording them monopolistic advantages. 
Finally, as already noted in Ch.l, it is theoretically possible for D.F.I.s to float bonds 
on the international capital markets. However in practice such institutions in 
developing countries would be unlikely to command much interest for the paper they 
issued. 
D.F.I.s AND INTERNAL SAVINGS 
(a) Introduction. 
There are two issues to discuss below. They are the questions as to whether D. F . I. s 
can (i) increase total domestic savings, (ii) influence the deployment of savings. 
(b) The increase of domestic savings. 
Drake - echoing Porter (see Chapter 2) - observes (1977 p.74), "The mere provision 
of financial institutions and of opportunities for acquiring financial assets will not per 
se raise the rate of saving in an economy". This assertion seems particularly 
applicable to D.F.I.s, which have always typically taken money in wholesale amounts 
from agencies that did not require the existence of financial intermediaries as a spur 
to accumulating funds. Furthermore, since D. F. I. s channel money to beneficiaries 
at market or concessionary rates, they are not in a position to generate more savings 
by offering high returns. 
However, it is plausible that small businessmen, aware that D. F. I. financial and 
technical help can make it possible for them to get ahead, may consider it worthwhile 
to save capital funds themselves for future business investment, whereas before they 
might have spent their spare money. If D.F.I. funding is made conditional on some 
accumulation of own funds, a willingness to save is reinforced. 
Finally, a prosperous, well-run D.F.I. can become a repository for industrial 
surpluses that might otherwise - given exchange control permission - have gone 
abroad. This may not increase the total savings generated internally, but it prevents 
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some of them being lost. Needless to say, this type of scenario assumes that D. F. 1. s 
are so financially structured as to be able to accept random industrial surpluses, and 
also are more attractive to those with money to place than other financial 
intermediaries. In practice, these supporting conditions have never been much in 
evidence. 
(c) The deployment of savings. 
Gordon (1983 p.16) - as noted earlier - postulates a function for D.F.I.s as mobilisers 
of foreign savings, since they act as channels for the inflow of foreign funds, but 
apart from that his comments mainly apply to internal allocation. He notes that" .. the 
record of D.F.C.s in mobilising domestic resources is mixed, but poor on the whole 
for both private and state-owned D.F.C.s, particularly the latter. Government 
institutions, by and large, are not concerned with the availability of domestic 
resources because they draw on the national budget or the central bank for whatever 
sums their approved lending targets require, often at concessional rates" and later (p. 
17), " .. state-owned D.F.C.s have been less active and innovative than their private 
counterparts in mobilizing domestic resources, especially in the market. State-owned 
D.F.C.s have little incentive to woo private funds so long as they can count on public 
money to meet contingencies". The above comments are borne out by experience. 
Research shows (see Part 2 Chapters 5-8 and Appendix 3) that D.F.I. money comes 
principally in loan and equity capital form from governments, parastatals, domestic, 
foreign and supranational development agencies, and - rarely - major financial 
intermediaries. There are also grants from governments, de facto if not de jure. 
There is virtually no use of private sector funds, except, as noted, for occasional bank 
or insurance company money. Mobilisation of private sector surpluses may be 
desirable as increasing pool of funds available to D.F.I.s, but, as was intimated in 
the last sub-section, requires a superior record of business dealings to create the 
necessary confidence. 
A related issue concerns the possibility of a D.F.I. diverting to itself more of a 
nation's total savings by accepting deposits. It would be impractical and inconvenient 
for a D.F.I. to attract in small deposits from low-waged people. This is better done 
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by commercial banks and other many-branched intermediaries geared to this type of 
work. However, the idea of accepting deposits in wholesale amounts from 
institutions and companies is financially feasible. The World Bank (1989 p.120) sees 
it as improving resource allocation, and providing better opportunities - at one stage 
removed - for small savers. 
Furthermore deposits are regarded (Ibid. p.120) as an important disciplinary feature 
in a financial system: " .. financial institutions require the independence and discipline 
that only voluntary deposits can give". In the light of the generally unsatisfactory 
experiences of developing country D.F.I.s., deposits might indeed act as a valuable 
'disciplinary' factor. On the other hand, most deposits would have to be long term, 
or an institution's 'development' status, implying the provision of long term funds, 
would be compromised: hence many potential depositors, not wanting to tie up money 
for long periods, would be put off. A solution would be to issue certificates of 
deposit, but a requirement for this is a sophisticated financial system, where such 
paper can be traded. 
Clearly, though, the above suggestions are of little relevance unless financial systems 
and the D.F.I.s within them are perceived as operating in circumstances of efficiency 
and integrity. Without this, and in the light of the experiences of the last few 
decades, D.F.I.s in Africa will have little option in the foreseeable future but to 
obtain money from the well used sources. 
OTHER D.F.I. FUNCTIONS 
The above sections have considered to what extent D.F.I.s have a role with regard 
to the key functions of financial institutions in general, that is gathering funds from 
surplus units and channelling them to deficit units. Here certain relevant ancillary 
functions and issues are reviewed. 
The term 'development' in the generic title implies a mode of behaviour not 
automatically true of other financial institutions. Essentially a D.F.I. is concerned 
with financing the growth of industry and commerce (or designated sectors of industry 
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and commerce) in the absence of 'mainstream' financial facilities. In so far as it 
holds equity capital, in due course it should sell off its shares, so recouping funds for 
new operations. If it ties up funds in shares for long - perhaps indefinite - periods, 
then it mutates into little more than a holding company or investment trust. 
With regard to lending, loans should b,e dignified by the firm expectation of 
repayment on time, so that in the same way money is constantly generated for new 
borrowers. 
Drake (1985 p.9) writes," .. (in less-developed countries' securities markets) the most 
general, continuing and severe problem has been an insufficient supply of securities", 
and clearly if a D.F.I. is active in the business of revolving capital, and sells off 
shares in established ventures, it helps the growth of the private capital market. 
Indeed Kitchen (1986 p.123) states that the development of the capital market is one 
of the "broader aims which governments expect development banks to subscribe to". 
To elaborate on this point, apart from increasing the supply of securities on the 
market when they sell, D.F.l.s, by associating with domestic and/or foreign interests 
in the finance of new projects - as discussed earlier - help to increase the total supply 
of securities existing inside countries, and via the formation of investment trust 
subsidiaries can attract more people into the stock market by spreading perceived risk. 
Furthermore they can require recipients of loans to go public, and can, via the 
influence they wield when financing firms, bring about an upgrading of accounting 
and financial reporting practices, and so promote then into the category of 
organisation that can plausibly ask for a stock exchange quotation. Also aD. F .1., by 
fostering an increase in stock market activity, should be a catalyst for more the 
establishment of more financial services ancillary to the stock market, such as 
stock-broking and investment advice business. Unfortunately, in practice, as Gordon 
(1983 p.24) - with D.F.l.s in mind - observes, "The results ... have been 
disappointing. Although the development of capital markets is often included amongst 
government policy objectives, it is seldom given high priority ... " 
At the margin, for a D.F.I. to dispose of shares amounts to 'privatisation'. This is 
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obviously the case when a wholly-owned subsidiary is disposed of, but even when a 
D.F.1. is only a partial proprietor in a company it could amount to the same thing if 
previously the D.F.1. had been in control. Now 'privatisation' has a political tlavour, 
and would previously not have been thought to be a term applicable to a D.F.I. that 
as a matter of course revolved capital by disposing of shares in established 
companies. On the other hand D.F.l.s have often been used by governments as 
agents of nationalisation and the creation of new state enterprise: in the neo-liberal 
era, with widespread state ownership of industry and commerce being no longer 
fashionable, to the sale to the public of assets, held by D.F.I.s for long periods as a 
matter of state policy, the term 'privatisation' is quite apt. 
A commercial - as opposed to ideological - complication of privatisation (or indeed 
the sale of minority shareholdings) relates to the matter of profits and losses. As 
Bere and Shirley (1987 p. vi) point out, "One obstacle to this" that is, 'privatisation'," 
is the fact that governments in developing countries rarely want to sell profitable state 
enterprises, and the money losers they do want to sell are unattractive to buyers". 
Indeed, it may not be, as the quotation suggests, a question of choice, since a D.F.1. 
may rely on a handful of profitable subsidiaries to cross-subsidise unviable 
investments, and so keep financially solvent. Now clearly any financial intermediary 
going in for financing that has a 'venture capital' tlavour must expect some failures 
amongst its financing ventures, and so has to rely on profitable ventures to maintain 
solvency. However, this is not a recipe for D.F.I.s never selling off performing 
equity holdings. Investment appraisal should come up with an expected average rate 
of return on planned projects, and it is suggested that when this rate of return equals 
or exceeds that on those existing shareholdings that have positive returns, disposal of 
assets may take place (10). 
SUMMARY 
D.F.I.s have been shown to have a role in the provision of long term finance, and, 
in instances where they are funded by foreign agencies, in the provision of foreign 
currency loans. Furthermore, even when banks have become more responsive to 
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longer term credit needs, D.F.l.s may be necessary to achieve better company gearing 
ratios by investing in equity. 
More specific directions for finance include loans to small businesses, though with 
the proviso that government provides and pays for various support services, equity 
capital (as well as loans) to domestic firms that, due to (i) the caution and/or 
ignorance of private investors, and/or (ii) stock market underdevelopment. cannot 
raise equity privately, and collaborative financing with foreign interests. There are 
reservations with regard to a D.F.I. being a sole promoter of new ventures. Though 
D.F.I.s should establish extension divisions staffed by various extra-financial 
specialists for properly assessing applications for funds, identifying worthwhile 
collaborative ventures and monitoring and guiding the progress of new projects, the 
initiation and carrying through of projects by D.F.l.s themselves require a level of 
entrepreneurship and involvement in industry of a quite different order: as noted 
earlier, most such ventures have been high cost failures. 
Even more overtly 'social' aims cannot be recommended for D.F.l.s. Ventures 
strongly seasoned with this approach tend to end up as loss-making D.F.!. liabilities, 
and/ or take the protectionist high road to inefficiency. 
D.F.I.s certainly influence the deployment of savings, and may, in certain indirect 
senses possibly bring about an increase in total domestic savings. Also, via 
collaboration with foreign and international agencies, they can bring in to their 
countries more of - as it were - other peOple's savings. 
Finally, D.F.l.s have a role in the development of countries' private capital markets. 
This occurs when they underwrite new issues by local companies which - by virtue 
of being unknown - need this type of support, and when, as revolving capital 
organisations, they sell shares in successful ventures. 
ENVOI 
At the end of Part I, it is as well to acknowledge the basic dilemma which relates to 
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D.F.l.s as providers of finance. If they are to fill capital market gaps, and yet 
provide money profitably on commercial terms, then it may be wondered why they 
are necessary. Why indeed would mainstream private intermediaries leave any 
financing gaps in the first place if such business was profitable? On the other hand, 
if D. F .1. s take on work to which especial difficulties attach, losses are to be expected. 
It has been the main purpose of Part 1, and particularly of this chapter, to admit to 
especial difficulties surrounding the provision of development finance in certain 
developing country contexts, but to argue also that tailor-made D.F.I.s can be 
endowed with attributes - not necessarily available to mainstream intermediaries - that 
can cause them to take on such work and yet remain viable. To state the arguments 
here would of course be to repeat what has already appeared in earlier sections. 
However a major weakness in the establishment of D.F.I.s in developing countries 
has been lack of appreciation of the basic dilemma and hence of the energy to address 
the task of reconciling opposing objectives. D.F .I.s typically are supposed to pursue 
'worthy' social objectives, such as lending to poor risk borrowers at sub-commercial 
rates of interest, and using their influence to expand employment and indigenisation, 
but at the same time obtain funds commercially, stand on their own feet and make 
profits. Add to this 'soft' state features, such as D.F.1. jobs and funds as rewards 
and bribes for political support, and the indifferent performance of so many 
developing country D.F.l.s is understandable (11). 
These issues are now to be examined In Part 2 In the context of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. 
NOTES CHAPTER 5 PART 1 
1. A D.F.1. that was technically wholly privately owned, but which was subject 
to considerable official pressure as to how it conducted its business operations, would 
not be regarded -in the context of this study - as properly independent. 
2. . ... such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
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3. Increasingly, though, commercial banks in developing countries have been 
encouraged into establishing small business lending schemes. Usually, though, these 
schemes are very limited in scope and heavily guaranteed. 
4. A well-known example of lending to exceptionally small businesses is the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. However, this institution is concerned with rural 
credit, not small industrial or commercial loans. Furthermore, Dr Huq of Glasgow 
University explained that though successful, it is relatively small, accounting for only 
about 5 % of rural credit. And it relies on an exceptionally able chief executive, and 
a level of cooperative organisation amongst the Bangladesh peasantry not necessarily 
found in Africa. 
5. In answer to a question at the 1991 Development Studies Association 
conference, David Wright of the O.D.A. preferred extension assistance to come from 
agencies separate from the donor organisations. 
6. Bottle stalls, repair shops, food markets and the like do, of course, represent 
areas of production and distribution where a plethora of businesses may exist even in 
limited market contexts. However the text at this point is mainly concerned with 
'western-type' manufactured products. 
7. I am indebted to C. Harvey for this information. 
8. Obviously direct loans and grants to governments for large scale infrastructure 
creation do not normally pass through D.F.r. hands. 
9. Technically, of course, the consequences of donor influence over D.F.I. 
financing operations may, for different reasons, justify it being criticised just as 
firmly as government influence. 
10. Other plausible arithmetical prescriptions may be devised. However, the one 
suggested here is discussed in Appendix 2. 
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11. In the preparation for this study the writer had a look at the remits of various 
D.F.I.s in a number of Anglophone African countries, and was able to arrange 
interviews at some institutions not addressed in the main text. The results of this 
work appear in Appendix 3. 
PART 2: 
APPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
GENERAL 
The second part of the study applies the ideas of Part 1 to the establishment and 
operational behaviour of certain of the development finance institutions in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. To this end the politico/ideological bases, the economic experiences, and 
the nature of the mainstream financial systems of the countries are reviewed as 
necessary backgrounds to and justifications for the D.F.I.s that are in place. 
Following this, there are detailed investigations of the main D.F.I.s concerned with 
- principally - the finance of secondary industry. In Part 3 the material is synthesized 
and reviewed, in order to isolate features of D.F.I. organisation and behaviour that 
accord with the 'soft state' concept. 
The rest of this chapter is mainly concerned with the historical groundwork for the 
investigation. 
THE BACKGROUND 
(a) Introduction. 
Any study that aims to compare some aspect of recent Kenyan history with the 
parallel Zimbabwean aspect comes up against one very important area in which the 
two countries have been very similar, and another in which they have been quite 
different. Indeed it is this fact which makes a comparison especially interesting and 
informative: if the countries had been alike in all respects, much less of value might 
have emerged from the study. 
The similarity is to do with economic and financial status and structure. Of all the 
countries of Anglophone Africa - and ignoring South Africa - Kenya and Zimbabwe, 
during the period when European colonial territories were achieving independence, 
stood out as by far the most industrially developed. Both had - by African standards 
_ substantial secondary industry, and were increasingly suppliers of manufactures to 
neighbouring territories. Furthermore, as a corollary of this, their financial systems 
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were more highly developed. From this it may be supposed that the necessity for 
specialised officially-sponsored D.F.I.s would be that much less, since in general the 
more sophisticated a mainstream financial system in a country is, the wider the range 
of credit and equity needs that can be satisfied by it. 
The difference centres on the nature of the political history of the two countries, 
which, although showing some superficial resemblence during the first half of the 
20th century, diverged markedly in the middle years. Furthermore, despite some 
earlier resemblence, factors present earlier are largely responsible for what happened 
later. Hence it is necessary to take a brief look at the historical background to the 
two countries, for only in this way can later attitudes to matters such as the provision 
of development finance be fully understood. 
(b) Kenyan history. (1) 
Prior to the colonial period the coastal area of Kenya was linked commercially to the 
Middle East, and - except for a period when Portuguese influence was paramount -
the Arabs for several centuries controlled and operated from several ports. Of these, 
Mombasa was the chief. Far western parts came in the 19th century under the 
suzereignty of the fairly sophisticated kingdom of Buganda, but the rest of the 
territory was dominated by the culture of African traditional societies. The interest 
of the British in East Africa in the 1890s focussed on Uganda, and Kenya became a 
colony almost by default, since it was the area through which a railway had of 
necessity to be built if Uganda was to be controlled. The capital, Nairobi, roughly 
half way between the coast and Lake Victoria, and - crucially - lying on a modest 
river, originally came into being as a railway centre. 
Though on the Equator, the central regions of Southern Kenya are high and so quite 
temperate. As such they attracted in a number of European settlers, and cash crop 
production, particularly in tea, coffee and tobacco, was developed. However there 
has, to date, been little commercially viable mining. Manufacturing flourished in the 
later colonial years, particularly when Kenya joined with Uganda and (what was then) 
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Tanganyika in the East African Community, and trade turned these territories into 
markets for Kenyan goods. 
It is unlikely that the European population ever exceeded 7()()()() persons, so with an 
indigenous population of several millions rising fast, there was never any possibility 
that Kenya could become a new 'white' dominion. Though the British quashed a 
tribalist-cum-guerilla uprising in the 1950s, the changing face of Africa made 
independence inevitable, and it occurred in 1963. 
(c) Zimbabwean history. (2) 
Zimbabwe, lying in south-central Africa just north of South Africa, was the location 
of an organised society during European mediaeval times. The Portuguese then 
exercised spasmodic influence or suzereignty during much of the 16th and 17th 
centuries, but in 1692 lost all but a foothold in the Eastern Highlands. More lasting 
European control came in 1890, when Cecil Rhodes led a band of settlers into the 
area in order to exploit - what was hoped to be - abundant mineral wealth. The 
indigenous population at this time - broadly speaking - consisted of the majority 
Shona people, in thrall to the Ndebele, who, two generations before, had migrated 
there from Natal. 
Consolidation of British power led, over the years, to a substantial - by African 
standards - European influx, and industry, infrastructure, and towns developed more 
vigorously than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa (3). A further economic boost was 
given to what was then known as Southern Rhodesia by the creation in 1953 of the 
Central African Federation. Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia, became the 
Federation's capital, and Southern Rhodesia was built up as the centre of the 
Federation's manufacturing capability, rather to the detriment of Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, which were somewhat neglected. 
With the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
went their separate ways as Zambia and Malawi, and in 1965 the prime minister of 
Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith, seized independence for that country. The settler 
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government, beleaguered by economic sanctions, presided, during all but the last 
years of illegal independence, over a high rate of economic growth and extensive 
industrial diversification (4). However, war and other pressures eventually brought 
the regime to the conference table, and legal independence under African majority 
rule was achieved in 1980. At the same ti~e, the name 'Zimbabwe' was resurrected, 
and applied to the country. 
(d) Comment. 
Several points that are relevant to future discussion emerge from the above. Firstly, 
the extent of European penetration and influence, due to numbers, economic power, 
the historical conception of the place of the European in the country, and erstwhile 
political power, was, at the time of legal independence, much greater in Zimbabwe 
than in Kenya. Secondly, the nature of the 1950s uprising in Kenya was rooted in 
traditional tribalist culture, and this left the country with leaders looking -
superficially at least - to a new Kenya linked to old ideas. Zimbabwe, however, went 
through a much longer period of struggle, and the indigenous leaders of the 
independence movement looked to East Europe for sympathy and support. Partly as 
a consequence their philosophy and ideas were influenced from this quarter. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most significantly, Zimbabwe came to legal independence later than 
Kenya, and indeed most other African former colonial territories. As a consequence 
the mistakes of others could be seen, if not necessarily avoided. 
THE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN KENY A AND ZIMBABWE 
At independence the governments of both Kenya and Zimbabwe put a high priority 
on economic growth, and, as was the case in other African countries, saw in the 
concept of the development finance institution a method that would contribute to the 
achievement of this goal. Though in both countries D.F.I.s already existed, their 
economic weight was slight. Hence in due course new D.F.I.s were established, and 
those already existing were given an enhanced profile. 
The rest of this section identifies and describes the D. F. I. s operating in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe in the eighties. In the chapters that come later it is not intended to cover 
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all of them, but for the sake of clarity it is important to appreciate what is omitted 
from the study as well as to preview what is to be included. 
The D. F . I. s to be fully investigated are the Industrial Development Corporation in 
Zimbabwe and the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation in Kenya 
(formerly also called the I.D.C.), the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya and 
the Industrial Development Bank in Kenya, and lastly the Zimbabwe Development 
Bank. The first two date back to pre-independence days, and mainly hold equity 
capital in business, though they are at liberty also to lend money. The I.D.B. and the 
Z. D. B. were established after full independence from colonial rule, and are 
predominantly concerned with loans. The D.F.C.K. is strong in both equity and 
loans. The destination of the funds of these organisations is largely secondary 
industry and commercial services, though the occasional interest in primary 
production and tourism appears in their portfolios (5). 
Omitted from the later chapters in Part 2 are investigations into the specialised 
concerns that focus on agriculture, tourism and mining. A number of very specific 
problems attach to the finance of these areas, particularly, of course, agriculture, and 
to have included full investigations of them would have impossibly expanded the 
scope of the study. Also excluded are the specialised organisations to do with small 
business finance, because once again this area justifies more substantial treatment than 
would be practicable here. However, some of the omitted organisations are briefly 
surveyed in Appendix 3, and even in the main text it has not been possible to totally 
ignore small business finance, because certain of the more 'general' D. F. I. s inel ude 
such work amongst their other functions. Also left out is consideration of the 
Industrial Promotion Corporation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Set up in Central 
African Federation days, and technically still extant, in recent years it has been 
dormant (6). 
FINAL NOTE 
Though the following chapters are geared to an analysis of the D.F.I.s in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, the deductions and recommendations are intended to have wider 
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application. However, though the experience of D.F.I.s has, in recent years, been 
unsatisfactory throughout the developing world, the countries of Asia and Latin 
America do have features and problems different not only from the countries of 
Africa, but also from each other, so it would be rash to assume that the lessons 
learned from Kenya and Zimbabwe are automatically relevant in totality to them. 
Also, even in Africa, traditions in the Francophone amd Lusophone territories are 
rather different from those with a British-influenced background. Hence the results 
of the investigation into Kenyan and Zimbabwean D.F.I.s mainly have relevance to 
Anglophone Africa. 
NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 1 
1. Much of the historical material on Kenya comes from 'Kenya: the Quest for 
Prosperity' by N.N. Miller (Westview Press 1984). However, there are other 
standard works. 
2. 'Rhodes of Africa' by F. Gross (Cassell 1956) was consulted for some of the 
remarks about early Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) history. 
3. . .. always excepting, of course, South Africa. 
4. The economics of the earlier part of the Rhodesian U. D. I. period were 
considered in 'Central Banking in the Economies of Central Africa', 1973 M.Phil. 
thesis by J .E. Maynard for the University of Reading. This provides the basis for 
some of the remarks here. 
5. Kenyan D.F.I.s in particular often seem to do the same type of business. 
Barbara Grosh in 'Performance of Development Finance Institutions in Kenya' 
(Institute for Development Studies: University of Nairobi - Working Paper 1987) 
notes this when she writes (p.4) , "The chronology of the D.F.l.s shows a marked 
tendency to organizational proliferation and duplication". 
9.+ 
6. Investigation of development finance in Central African Federation days (and 
the U .D.1. period) is a very specialised study in itself, and it has not been the purpose 
in these pages to tackle it in depth. 
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Chapter 2 
THE POLITICO-IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF KENYA AND ZIMBABWE 
IDEOLOGY AND INTENTION IN KENYA 
At the time of Kenyan independence considerable obeisance was made to the adoption 
of 'African socialism'. This approach rejected the ideas of Marx in favour of something 
more associated with traditional society, pointing out that "Valid as Marx' description 
was", that is, of mid-19th century factory conditions, "it bears little similarity to Kenya 
today". (Republic of Kenya 1965 p.7). Furthermore, Marx was also rejected on the 
grounds that his prophesies for future years had been shown to be wrong. "As predictive 
models of what would happen to factory system societies, both Marxian socialism and 
laissez-faire capitalism have been failures". (Ibid. p.7). 
'African socialism' was perceived as a much looser philosophy, implying mutual help 
and responsibility rather than the imposition on society of a rigid political construct. In 
a nutshell, "There are two African traditions which form the essential basis for African 
socialism - political democracy and mutual social responsibility". (Ibid. p.5). Not of 
course that political democracy as applied in modern Kenya was taken to mean free 
elections and different political parties, any more than such arrangements had been 
commonplace in traditional Africa. Rather was 'democracy' associated with specified 
curbs on the power of those in control. "Even where traditional leaders appeared to have 
greater wealth and hold disproportionate political influence over their tribal or clan 
community, there were traditional checks and balances including sanctions against any 
possible abuse of such power". (Ibid. p.3). 'Mutual social responsibility' indicated the 
duty of everyone to work, as the following makes clear: " ... African Socialism expects 
the members of the modern state to contribute willingly and without stint to the 
development of the nation" (Ibid. p.5). 
The picture, then, is of a corporatist, paternalistic state, where political democracy in a 
western sense does not exist, but where somehow abuses of power can be prevented (1). 
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Nevertheless, this scenario results in considerable power flowing into the state's hands. 
" ... the European tradition of absolute own~rship has gradually been eroded so that today 
the right of the State to guide, plan, and even order the uses to which property will be 
put is universally recognised and unquestioned". (Ibid. p.lO). And, "Under African 
Socialism the power to control resource use rests with the state". (Ibid. p.ll). 
However, such pervasive state involvement is not identified as having to imply wholesale 
nationalisation. State ownership of firms is a respectable option, but all other forms of 
ownership are valid, depending on circumstances and current policy. What can be 
expected are many state controls and regulations, and a lot of explicit economic planning. 
These ideas are too generalistic to be capable of tight and consistent application to the 
circumstances of any country, but suggestions were made as to how they would be used 
as guidelines in Kenya. Planning would be adopted, and nationalisation used when 
appropriate. The occasions for nationalisa~ion would occur (i) when the assets in private 
hands threaten the security or undermine the integrity of the nation; or (ii) when 
productive resources are being wasted; or (iii) when the operation of an industry by 
private concerns has a serious detrimental effect on the public interest; and (iv) when 
other less costly means of control are not available or are not effective". (Ibid. p.27). 
Also much emphasis, in the publication liberally quoted here, was put on Africanization. 
Now it is difficult to see how such an approach squares with any philosophy labelled 
'socialism', a term correctly associated with notions of social justice and egalitarianism 
and not with racial or ethnic favouritism. However, this anomaly was clearly not thought 
to matter. In the matter of Africanization, the Kenyan D.F.I.s were seen to have an 
important role. " ... the Land Bank, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Industrial 
and Commercial Development Corporation and the Marketing Boards" should make 
"capital available to Africans with small down payments and at low interest rates". (Ibid. 
p.29). Furthermore, the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya, the Kenya Tourist 
Development Corporation and the I.C.D.C. were to ensure government stakes in 
large-scale investments. Joint ventures were to be favoured, so avoiding total foreign 
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control of new firms, and it was proposed that some types of business be reserved to 
African participants. Existing foreign enterprises were expected to provide for increasing 
African involvement in ownership, and "both foreign and domestic firms should be 
required to provide training facilities for Africans at all levels" . (Ibid. p.30). 
IDEOLOGY IN PRACTICE IN KENYA 
The ideas discussed above do not provide much of a blueprint for policy. Also, of 
course, much of what was identified as traditional African socialism in modem dress 
could equally be pigeonholed under a 'nationalist' label, an equation already considered 
in an earlier chapter. This is obviously true of pervasive state intervention in pursuit of 
economic growth, a suspicion of foreign business interests resulting in the imposition of 
controls on them and the preference for joint ventures, and Africanization in all its 
aspects. Furthermore pragmatism and the whims of politicians played their full parts in 
Kenyan history after independence. 
Perhaps the only rigid application of a principle derived from the Kenyan conception of 
African socialism was the institution of a one-party state, but with the leader seemingly 
not in practice being subject to the 'checks and balances' that constrained the autocracy 
of tribal leaders in traditional society. Indeed, even to describe independent Kenya as 
a one-party state falls short of the truth, for under Jomo Kenyatta it was increasingly 
subject to economic and political domination by the Kenyatta family, sometimes cynically 
known as the 'royal' family (Miller 1984 p.59). Presidential influence was used to gain 
advantages for this group, and - often in cooperation with multinational corporations -
it developed business activities in many disparate fields, such as ranching, gemstones, 
insurance, and casinos (Ibid. p.59). As the Economist Intelligence Unit (1986 p. 25) 
observes, "President Kenyatta' s Kenya, in spite of protestations about' African Socialism' 
was a country where the allocation of resources was guided by market forces, heavily 
influenced by political muscle and family connections". Inevitably civil servants and 
indigenous businessmen sought to emulate the prosperity of the ruling clique, so 
extending the network of nepotism and patronage. Miller (op. cit. p.37) explains, 
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"Taking their cue from the top leadership, civil servants engaged increasingly in outside 
business interests. Simultaneously, independent black businessmen grew in numbers and 
took their place in the middle class. The two groups fused and formed an economic 
patron-client system that derived power and resources from the government and garnered 
support from clients in exchange for a share of the resources" . 
The assumption of power by Moi after Kenyatta's death in 1978 did not appreciably 
change the politico-economic arrangements. To quote again from Miller (op. cit. p.99), 
"The Moi regime kept the same government structure, the same policies, and even the 
same informal process that saw much of the day-to-day policies carried out by 
special-interest groups". However, whereas Kenyatta was a "political monarch", Moi 
was an "astute political survivor".(Ibid. p.99). (U.S.) A.I.D. (1990 p.I-3), while not 
even considering it relevant to pronounce on 'socialist' aspirations, commented on the 
decline in democratic arrangements that followed from the rise of the personal-cum-
oligarchic rule, noted above. "While the situation is far better in Kenya that in many 
other African nations, there has been a steady deterioration over the past few years in 
both the number and the role of democratic institutions". The inevitable corruption that 
developed from the emergence of a privileged elite is trenchantly observed: "The Kenyan 
case has long been marked by a tension between market forces, entrepreneurship and 
technocratic management on the one hand, and paternalism and what has been termed 
'crony capitalism' on the other". (Ibid. p.I-4) (2). 
Comment, therefore, does not see much evidence of 'socialism' in modem Kenya. Even 
Africanization, a policy with very dubious 'socialist' credentials has sometimes lost out 
to ad hoc pragmatism. As the E.!. U. observes, "In spite of populist 
rhetoric .... multinationals in Kenya have no fears about their ability to get work permits 
for the foreign workers they want". (E.!. U. op. cit. p.40). And, as Leys points out, 
(1975 p.208), "The foreign middle class had to be treated with great circumspection if 
new foreign capital was not to be frightened away i.e. it had to be ritually humiliated 
while practically wooed". 
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The politico-social situation where hard philosophy has in all meaningful senses given 
way to the self-seeking predilections of an entrenched ruling elite and their supporters, 
and where a sort of painful but vacillating accommodation has been made with foreign 
business interests, is well-fitted to deliver economic inefficiency. (U.S.) A.I.D. (op.cit. 
pI-I) observes, "Government policies and bureaucratic procedures continue to hinder 
expansion of private enterprise and make it difficult for farmers and entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of opportunities", and " ... the problem of entrenched bureaucratic interests, a 
result of continuity, is an explanation for slow implementation of policy reforms". (Ibid. 
p.I-2). It may at this stage be intimated that the prospects for Kenyan D.F.I.s, in the 
light of the above discussion, would not appear to be encouraging. 
Clearly, the above scenario, if fair, coincides with the idea, discussed in the opening 
chapter, of a 'soft' state. There, such phenomena as "overcentralised government, which 
undermines local initiatives" (p.6), "the collusion of government officials and top civil 
servants with powerful individuals and groups whose conduct they are supposed to 
regulate" (p.5) were referred to. These things appear to have existed (and still to exist) 
in Kenya. 
POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ZIMBABWE 
In Zimbabwe at the time of independence propoganda was very firm in its espousal of 
'socialist' principles. However, these principles had little to do with the vaguenesses of 
, African' socialism, with which Kenya flirted: they were rooted much more in the beliefs 
of Marxist-Leninist thinkers. This position owed much to the ideas of the new prime 
minister, Robert Mugabe, an avowed Marxist, who gained support from wanting the 
wealth of the settler- and foreign-dominated economy redistributed in favour of the 
impoverished African people. An official Z.A.N.U. (i.e. Zimbabwe African National 
Union) statement, referred to in a Zimbabwe country study, was uncompromising in its 
advocacy of this philosophy: "In ideology ZANU is guided by the Marxist-Leninist 
Principle. ZANU aims to achieve a socialist revolution. All the means of production 
and distribution will be publicly owned by the people of Zimbabwe. Economic 
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cooperation will be established and strengthened with the socialist world so as to bring 
capitalist U.S.A., Britain, West Germany etc., to ultimate doom". (Foreign Affairs 
Study: the American University 1983 p.205). 
In other official publications, indication is given of what was to be expected of socialist 
Zimbabwe. For example, Mukarati, in the UNIDO publication 'Zimbabwe: Towards a 
New Economic Order' (1980 p.19) explains that the intention in agriculture is towards 
the creation of state farms, and - ominously for agricultural efficiency - "The task of a 
'manager' can early be taken up by a politically advanced cadre with experience in 
farming". And, with regard to manufacturing, Nyathi-Mdluli (Ibid. 1980 p.91) writes, 
"The socialist state can only create a socialist mode of production by establishing social 
ownership of the means of production through nationalisation". The Zimbabwe Banking 
Corporation, stressing more the likelihood of strong state involvement in the economy, 
states, ".. a much more interventionist economic policy aimed at rapidly improving 
economic and social conditions for the majority of the population can therefore be 
anticipated". (Z.B.C. 1980 p.2). However, despite the concern that independence might 
bring a quick implementation of these and analogous suggestions," .... assurances (by Mr 
Mugabe) have been given to the white population and business community that any 
changes in current policies will be implemented on a gradual basis". (Barclay's Bank 
1980 p.1). 
The Transitional National Development Plan 1982-3 to 1984-5 is long on rhetoric about 
socialism, but short on specific policies for implementation. In the 'Foreword' President 
Mugabe asserts, "Our firm belief is that it is only within the framework of a planned 
economy that Government is better able to influence and purposefully direct 
development, create appropriate institutions, and establish the magnitude of investment 
and its allocation as well as the formation of a pattern of income and wealth distribution 
in harmony with socialist objectives. The role of Government in the development of our 
national economy is indispensible if we are to move speedily towards the establishment 
of the socialist state we envision". Reflecting these aspirations, the main text goes on 
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to say, "Lasting economic and political stability .... requires, among other things, a 
deliberate and sustained process in the direction of social ownership of the means of 
production, equitable distribution of income, and popular participation in the management 
of development". (Transitional Plan 1982 p.1) For good measure, obeisance is made 
to neo-colonialism -"The problem situation in independent Zimbabwe is that created by 
the inherited system of capitalist exploitation that invariably assumes a neo-colonialist 
form in Third World countries" (Ibid. p.17) - and nationalism - "This pattern and 
structure of property relations, "that is, foreign control of technical knowledge and much 
of the capital stock, "is obviously opposed to the socialist and nationalist principle of 
vesting the ownership of our country's resources in the people of Zimbabwe through 
their socialist or State organs" . (Ibid. p.3) (3). 
Participation by the Zimbabwe government in industry, and controls on foreign firms are 
best left to the discussion on D.F.I.s. For the rest, socialism in practice came mainly 
to mean substantial expansion of the social services, especially education, a much more 
pervasive role for the state in general and the implementation of 'self-help' schemes for 
the creation of basic amenities, mainly in the rural areas. However, overall there were 
no radical changes, and the structure of society remained largely unaltered, with the 
salaried African middle class expanding inexorably as administrators and businessmen 
multiplied. Furthermore, despite the predilections of the prime minister for a one-party 
state - " . .in line with our Second Congress Resolution we pledge to work towards the 
attainment of a one-party state" (Mugabe 1985) - clauses in the 1980 Lancaster House 
agreement prevented it - for the time being - happening. 
Fiery rhetoric on socialism became less in evidence as the 80s decade progressed. The 
1986-90 National Development Plan more or less restricted itself to economic issues with 
only limited reference to ideological considerations. For example the assertion that 
"Government intends to control industries which are deemed strategic to socio-economic 
development" (First 5-Year National Development Plan 1986 p.30) is a very tentative 
statement about public ownership. Indeed, elsewhere, the Government resolved. in the 
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mInmg sector, to "encourage exploration by the private sector and international 
partners". (Ibid. p.29). And by 1989, pragmatic support for the private sector meant that 
obeisance to socialist principles in industry was little more than ritualistic. As 'The 
Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations' of April 1989, stated (p.4), "The 
Government recognises the important developmental contribution that the private sector, 
both local and foreign, can make by increasing investment in Zimbabwe". 
By the end of the decade, Zimbabwe had achieved a socio-political economic system 
much the same as most other sub-Saharan African countries. A large political and 
administrative elite lived lives of privilege and affluence far above the lives of the bulk 
of their countrymen (4). Though there was a substantial loss-making parastatal sector 
(5), most industrial, commercial and agricultural undertakings remained in private hands. 
A trenchant comment from a successful Zimbabwean businessman underlined the 
position: "It's just as well Zimbabwe learned from the mistakes of other 
newly-independent countries and did not try to interfere and to nationalise industry. The 
Government has recognised and accepted the private sector, and that was a wise 
decision". (Zimbabwe: a Field for Investment 1989 p.33). An uneasy and fluctuating 
relationship was had with foreign economic interests who were, as will be seen in later 
discussion, at the same time relied on and hampered. 
Though a theroretical commitment to a socialist one-party state remained, criticism of 
the idea was (and is) open. Dr Byron Hove - already quoted in Part 1, Chapter 3 -
suggested that one party systems led to sluggishness, inertia, and corruption, and 
prevented people participating in decision-making processes (Financial Gazette 16-2-90 
p.4). Furthermore, "The motivating force behind a one-party state dogma is to install 
dictatorship by one or more individuals". (Ibid. p.4). And J .N. Moyo, also quoted 
earlier, commented," 1988 showed that socialist propoganda serves no useful purpose in 
a country with a leadership under the spell of materialism". (Southern Africa Political 
and Economic Monthly Feb 89 p.10). To date Zimbabwe continues to be a pluralist 
democracy, though it must be admitted that at election time the pervasive optimistic 
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exposure given to the main political party, ZANU, gives other parties little chance to 
make much of an impact. The progressive establishment of economic and social 
structures based on doctrinaire socialism has in practice been put to one side, and this 
has been affected by the requirements of structural adjustment, which expects a more 
open, market-orientated economy. 
SUMMARY 
To summarise the discussions on the respective ideological styles of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, it is apparent that each started from a somewhat different theoretical base , 
and that the practical outcomes have not been in accord with the implications of these 
bases. 
The uncompromIsIng socialism of Zimbabwean rhetoric has never been realised. 
Nationalisation has been limited in extent, and large scale industry remains - both in 
terms of ownership and senior management - in predominently Zimbabwe-European or 
expatriate hands. Freedom of expression is permitted, and Zimbabwe is still - technically 
at least - a multi-party state. Possibly one advantage of the country coming late to legal 
independence was, as was suggested in Chapter 1, that it could observe and learn from 
the mistakes made by African countries who were free from colonial rule earlier (6). 
Kenya started from the much vaguer and imprecise tenets of 'African' socialism, which 
were deemed to justify a swift transition to a one-party state. Coupled with the fact that 
freedom of expression has been less than in Zimbabwe, this appears to have resulted in 
a much greater concentration of power and privilege in a ruling elite. Though there is 
substantial state ownership, most industry remains in private hands, and the philosophy 
is capitalist. 
It may be concluded that in socio-political terms Zimbabwe and Kenya do not in practice 
present as very different. How much each suffers from the 'soft state' syndrome is 
another matter, but in the later core analysis on D.F.I.s, the issue will be explored. 
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NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 2 
1. There is some evidence for this in Africa. Zaki Ergas, though refering to the 
Oyo in West Africa, writes in 'The African State in Transition' (1987) p.4. "There were 
effective' checks and balances' between the three 'branches' of government, and the King 
was by no means a ruthless tyrant or despot. He could, in fact, be impeached". 
2. Though it has something of a 'slang' ambience, 'crony capitalism' as a term has 
become established to describe a context where the rewards supposedly bound up with 
capitalist production are distributed to friends, relatives, political clients, and so on. (See 
Part 1 Chapter 2 on the 'patrimonial' system). Clearl y, such arrangements are prone to 
deliver economic inefficiency. 
3. These quotes well illustrate the sort of confusion that used to exist in developing 
countries between ideas derived from separate nationalist and socialist dogmas. 
4. An interesting observation related to this point comes from the (Zimbabwe) 
Financial Gazette of 15th Sep. 1989 (p.4), where William Fernham, a specialist in 
international finance notes that in the parliament of 100 members, 52 were ministers. 
5. In 'Parastatals - no end yet to the muddle' (p.ll) in Parade June 1988 is the 
observation, "According to informed sources, the Zimbabwe Goverenment is ulikely to 
get much needed assistance from the World Bank if it continues to subsidise 
money-losing enterprises like Air Zimbabwe and the National Railways of Zimbabwe" . 
6. President Mugabe lived in Mozambique in the late 1970s, and witnessed the dire 
effects on the economy of that country when most of the skilled Portuguese left. This 
could hardly have failed to influence his attitude to policy in post-independence 
Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 3 
THE ECONOMIC PROFILES OF KENYA AND ZTh1BABWE 
STATISTICAL SHORTCOMINGS 
An inevitable problem in looking into the economic profile of any country is the 
unreliability and incompleteness of the available statistics. This is especially true of 
developing countries, where to the problems of collecting data from the monetary 
sector are added the almost insoluble puzzle of working out the statistical dimensions 
of the non-monetary sector. Thus, in the data employed later in the text, there are 
sometimes gaps, and different sets of figures referring to the same economic 
phenomena do not always exactly agree if derived from different sources. 
THE GENERAL AIM OF THE CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is not to investigate the economic structures and recent 
economic experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe as an end in itself, but to identify and 
comment on those features which may have some bearing on (i) the justification and 
necessity for economic development and, 'by implication, the finance of it, (ii) the 
constraints on the finance of development arising from the nature of the economic 
structures and economic experiences of the two countries, and (iii) the recommended 
directions of development in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
There is no especial focus on D.F.I.s, for at this point in the progress of the analysis 
the necessity for them in Kenya and Zimbabwe has not yet been established. 
However a case in favour of development and the finance of it does validate the 
possibility of establishing D. F. I. s, so reference to them is not entirely absent from 
forthcoming sections. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER 
(a) Preliminary remarks. 
The next main section looks at the economy of Kenya, the one after that at the 
economy of Zimbabwe, and finally there is a concluding section. 
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The investigation of the economic profile of each country will be focussed on the 
three issues stated in the' General aim' section, and to this end the topics covered will 
be 'Population and national income', 'Investment and saving', 'The government 
sector' and 'Trade and payments'. To avoid repetition, 'introductions' to these topics 
follow straight on this sub-section, and can be taken as ushering in the 'applied' 
discussions with the same titles in each of the 'country' sections. 
(b) Introduction to 'Population and national income'. 
It is a truism to assert that virtually every country, desirous of achieving higher living 
standards and presenting a more powerful national profile, makes economic growth 
a major goal. That in itself validates the business of development finance and, in 
appropriate contexts (see Part 1 Chapter 4 and 5 and Part 2 Chapter 4) the 
establishment of D.F .I.s. However, a more urgent issue is to look into not only the 
desirability of development but the necessity for it. In other words, how important 
is economic development not only to enable a country to forge ahead, but to stop it 
falling behind? In this context population growth and national income growth are 
crucial variables on which to focus. 
(c) Introduction to 'Investment and saving'. 
In the immediate post-second world war decades, too much emphasis in development 
studies may perhaps have been laid on finance as the engine of economic growth, 
with a consequent underplaying of other factors (1), and indeed the principal aim of 
the present piece of work as a whole is to highlight the importance of certain of those 
other factors. However in the context of an economics-orientated chapter it is 
appropriate to focus on the principal financial factors that are contributory to the 
furthering of economic development. This suggests a study of real investment and 
savmgs. 
(d) Introduction to the 'Government sector'. 
Government intervention in economic activity inevitably must have a major impact 
on the finance of development and, since they are part of the scenario, on specialised 
development finance institutions. The relevant sections on Kenya and Zimbabwe look 
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at the broad issue of government economic involvement in terms of the taxation/ 
spending role, government's profile and record as the owner and operator -
sometimes fairly indirectly - of parastatals, and government's position as an agent for 
structural adjustment measures. 
(e) Introduction to 'International trade and payments'. 
The discussions in the sections on 'International trade and payments' consider the 
profiles of goods and services traded by Kenya and Zimbabwe. This gives some 
clues as to the industries that might fruitfully be developed in those countries as 
producing goods which substitute for imports or goods and services which, by making 
use of local resources or other advantages, can earn revenue as exports. 
KENYA 
(a) Data sources and currency. 
The figures that appear in this section are derived from various Kenya government 
publications, and from the U. N. D. P. 's ' African Economic and Financial Data' 
(1989). Though the standard currency unit in Kenya is the Kenya Shilling, and prices 
are always expressed in shillings, the government, to cut down cumbersome 
numerical expressions, likes to present monetary values in Kenya Pounds (K£). 
Twenty shillings, of course, equal one pound. 
The U.N.D.P. expresses values in U.S.$, and when appropriate, as in G.N.P. per 
capita, uses the World Bank Atlas conversion method to obtain equivalent dollar 
values, rather than the current exchange rate between the indigenous currency and the 
U.S. dollar (2). 
(b) Population and national income. 
For a number of years Kenya appears to have had one of the highest rates of 
population growth of any country in the world, the annual rate of increase having 
been slightly over 4 %. The following table shows how numbers have as a 
consequence been rising. (The figure for 1988 and the alternative for 1987 come 
from the Kenyan Statistical Abstract for 1988, and the differences, the result of 
expected collection difficulties, are too small to matter.) 
TABLE 1 
1980 
16.63 
1985 
20.35 
Kenyan Population (mil.) 
1981 1982 1983 
17.30 18.01 18.75 
1986 
21.21 
1987 
22.10 
1988 
21.80 22.70 
1984 
19.53 
SOURCE: UNDP - African Economic and Financial Data 1989 Table 1-2. 
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The clear significance of this rapid growth is the necessity for the economy to expand 
at a consistently high rate just to keep the average standard of living stable. 
The earlier years of Kenyan independence saw rapid economic expansion, as boom 
conditions in the west led to increased demand for primary goods from the 
agricultural sector, and Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya's partners in the East African 
Community, took increasing amounts of manufactures. On the basis of this growth 
in exports, Kenya built up its import substitution industries. Thus it is believed that 
from 1964 to 1974 real G.N.P. rose by an average of about 7.5% a year, well ahead 
of population growth (World Bank 1985 p.10). However some years later, comment 
on this apparently successful period became critical. A government publication of 
1986 (p.17) observes, "During the 1970s, import substitution took place behind high 
protective barriers and Government encouraged many large-scale investments -
including its own - at high cost to the economy. The result is an industrial sector 
that, although it sometimes earns handsome profits, still produces at costs well above 
those in world markets ... ". The problems arising from oil price rises, world 
recession in the early 1980s, the demise of the East African Community in the 1970s, 
and the drought of 1984 cut this growth down to an average of 4.5 % a year from 
1974-84. (Ibid. p.10). It is probable though that the rate of growth was markedly 
lower after 1980: indeed (U.S.) A.I.D. (1990) believes that average per capita income 
fell by 0.2 % a year from 1981-4. 
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Furthermore in more recent years G.D.P. growth has barely kept pace with 
population, as Table 2 shows. 
TABLE 2 
G.D.P. AT FACTOR COST (1982 PRICES) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total GDP 
(K£m) 2860.14 2998.24 3061.64 3091.78 3240.13 3416.82 3580.8 Rate of 
Growth (%) 4.8 2.1 0.9 4.7 5.4 4.7 GDP Per 
Cap. (K£m) 164.94 166.25 163.57 158.7 160.08 162.54 l64.~ 
SOURCE: (Kenyan) Annual Abstract of Statistics 1988 Table 38(b). 
(The Kenya Economic Survey for 1989 in its Table 2.1 gives marginally higher 
figures for the smaller span of years it covers, and suggests that in 1988 a G.D.P. of 
K£3838.45m led to a per capita G.D.P. of K£169.39). 
The above figures suggest that in the 1980s Kenyan average real income per head was 
more or less static. However, according to the U.N.D.P., the situation was rather 
more dismal. Working with real U.S.$ equivalent, it is reckoned that from a high 
point of $422 in 1981, per capita income fell to $300 in 1985 before picking up to 
$330 in 1987 (U.N.D.P. op. cit Table 1-16). 
To conclude, the plus side of the above scenario is the substantial average rate of 
economic growth over the long period. The worrying aspect is the flagging in recent 
years and hence the increasing difficulty of keeping consistently ahead of the rising 
population. There is no doubt, therefore, that an ongoing high rate of economic 
growth is vital just to keep Kenya - in standard of living terms - standing still. 
(c) Investment and Saving. 
1. Recent Kenyan experience. 
In the above sub-section it emerged that economic growth in Kenya was unsatisfactory 
when considered against population growth. It is important, therefore, to look at the 
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level and financing of investment First of all, investment in relation to G.D.P. is 
shown in Table 3 below. 
TABLE 3 
INVESTMENT AND SAVING IN KENYA (% OF GOP) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Gross Domestic 
Investment (GDI) 30.0 28.4 22.1 21.2 23.5 20.1 22.6 24.6 
Gross Domestic 
Savings (GDS) 18.7 19.5 18.3 20.1 22.1 19.0 22.6 19.6 
Gross National 
Savings (GNS) 15.8 17.8 15.6 18.0 19.8 16.6 19.8 16.7 
Resource 
Balance 
-11.4 -8.9 -3.8 -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -0.1 -5.1 
SOURCE: UNDP - African Economic and Financial Data 1989 Tables 1-9 to 1-12. 
It is estimated that in 1988 gross investment was equal to about 26 % of G. D. P. , 
which would suggest a continuation of the recovery shown in Table 3. Furthermore, 
these figures were amongst the highest in sub-Saharan African countries. However, 
although the 1989 Economic Survey makes a point of commenting favourably on this 
trend, it is only a recovery from a low point in the mid-80s. As seen above, the 
percentage at the start of the decade was much higher. 
In purely arithmetic terms - avoiding for the present foreign exchange considerations 
- the investment could not be financed from domestic savings, since savings as a % 
of G.D.P. were always less than investment as a % of G.D.P. The 'resource 
balance', which is the difference between G.D.I. and G.D.S. (see Table 3) is rather 
misleading as an indicator of the necessary foreign contribution to investment, as it 
ignores the fact that some of the savings had to go abroad to service foreign assets 
in Kenya: this, however, is duly taken into account in the G.N.S. figures. Hence 
investment funds equal to variable amounts of the G.D.P. - anything from 3% to 15% 
- have had to be found from foreign sources. It is also worth noting that an 
unspecified amount of domestic saving is 'forced' saving by foreign business, which 
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is faced by restrictions on profit repatriation (see later) to retain funds in Kenya. 
Hence the financing of this investment was as in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
FINANCING OF INVESTMENT IN KENYA 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(prov) 
Grants from Abroad (K£m) 92.55 108.69 117.71 126.99 205.27 Net Borrowing from 
Abroad (K£m) 86.30 79.90 31.06 409.47 403.01 
Domestic Saving (K£m) 749.83 1102.44 947.20 1088.50 1343.77 
Foreign Contribution 
as % of Total 19.26 14.60 13.57 33.01 31.16 
SOURCE: 1989 Economic Survey Table 2.7. 
Towards the end of the decade a substantial share of investment was having to be 
financed from abroad. As the 1989 Economic Survey observes, "A large share of 
foreign resources invested in fixed assets was in the form of loans from friendly 
countries (e.g. mainly U.S.A., Japan and West Germany) and international agencies 
such as the World Bank and the E.E.C. Grants from friendly governments doubled 
from K£109m in 1985 to K£205m in 1988". (1989 Economic Survey p.21-22). 
However in contrast to this, what is indeed striking is the small inflow of new capital 
funds from non-official sources abroad. Lack of statistics make it impracticable to 
treat this issue comprehensively - non-official foreign loans for example are in the 
available data taken to include local surpluses that are reinvested - but it is clear from 
balance of payments statistics that net inward foreign direct investment plummeted 
from 78m U.S. dollar equivalent in 1980 to 3m in 1981 before later recovering 
somewhat (see Table 5). It is possible that the U.S.$37m for 1987 is an error: the 
1989 Kenyan Economic Survey suggests a net K£9.99m (Ibid. Table 7.1'+) inflow, 
which has the much smaller official exchange rate dollar value of $12. 1 m. 
TABLE 5 
NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN KENYA (CURRENT U.S.Sm) 
(N.B. Included in the 'foreign borrowing' figures in Table 4) 
1980 
78 
1981 
8 
1982 1983 1984 
394 
1985 1986 1987 
13 28 37 
SOURCE: UNDP - African Economic and Financial Data Table 2.8. 
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It is not possible to judge the efficiency of investment in terms of output since 
figures for net capital formation are not available. Even the 1989-93 Development 
Plan cryptically observes, " ... .it has been generally assumed that the sectoral 
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) values will either stabilise at about the 
average level observed during the last few years or rise slightly over time". 
(Government of Kenya 1989 p.50-51) but gives no figures! Anecdotal evidence, 
however, suggests that the overall ICOR has been disappointing. 
2. Comment. 
As noted earlier, Kenya's population has been rising fast In consequence, for per 
capita income to increase economic growth has to accelerate. More efficient use of 
existing resources can go some way towards achieving this. The government 
publication quoted above identifies the existence of unused plant and equiment (p.17): 
"High protection often leads to overbuilding of industrial plant and may be 
responsible for some of the excess capacity observed in Kenya manufacturing today. 
The demise of the East African Community in the 1970s also created excess 
capacity". In so far as faster economic growth can be achieved by a higher level 
of investment, more resources are required. However, unless government decides to 
commandeer a smaller proportion of the G.N.P. via taxes (see later), it is probably 
not realistic to prescribe that those resources come from more domestic saving. 
Amongst low average per capita income sub-Saharan African countries, designated 
'IDA-eligible', Kenya's savings/G.D.P. ratio has been one of the highest, and indeed. 
as Table 3 shows, has over the years been remarkably constant. The answer is to 
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bring in more funds from abroad. Government policy and negotiation has much to 
do with this, but D. F. I. s may have a role, (noted in Part 1 Chapter 5) as channels for 
the movement in of money, and as agents in partnership ventures and extension help. 
(d) Government sector. 
1. Public Finance. 
The figures in Tables 6 and 7 and the comments that follow them testify to the 
substantial increase in the Government's weight in the Kenyan economy as a user of 
the national product 
TABLE 6 TABLE 7 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE % INCREASE 
IN KENYA (K£m) (rounded figures) BETWEEN 
1 2 3 COLS 1 & 3 
1984/5 1986/7 1988/9 IN TABLE 6 
Current Rev. 1017 1387 1890 86 
Current Exp. 1091 1517 2140 96 
Current Surplus 
-74 -130 
-250 236 
Capital Rev. 3 3 8 208 
Capital Exp. 218 326 393 81 
Net Lending 37 48 84 127 
External Grants 71 63 367 420 
Deficit 256 437 352 38 
N.B. A 'minus' surplus, of course, implies a deficit 
SOURCE: 1989 Economic Survey Table 6.1. 
Current revenue rose from 22.9% of G.D.P. (current market prices) in 1984/5 to 
24.8% in 1988/9 but total government expenditure went up from 34.5 % to 39.4 % 
(1989 Economic Survey p.63). Despite substantial external grants (see Table 6) a 
large deficit remained each year, and had to be covered by foreign and domestic 
borrowing. Indeed domestic borrowing at K£169.4m in 1988/9 rose by over 93% in 
5 years (Ibid. p.62). 
It is not self-evident that government resource requirements on this scale are a cause 
for concern, unless clear disadvantages can be identified. Also, to be fair, Kenya in 
this area has not been out of line with many other African countries. Howe\'er there 
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are a number of reasons for concluding that government spending has been excessive. 
and indeed, the conditions of Structural Adjustment (see below) advised that there be 
cuts. 
Firstly, the base for levying income taxes is small, because the great majority of 
people do not receive money incomes, receive money incomes too meagre to be 
taxed, or have money incomes that cannot accurately be assessed. As a result, the 
few in receipt of both substantial and identifiable incomes bear a heavy tax burden. 
And there has to be heavy reliance on indirect taxes". For the last three years sales 
tax has displaced income tax as the most dominant source of revenue". (Ibid. p.65) 
- a policy which discriminates against the less well-off. 
Secondly, internal borrowing has had the potential to crowd out private borrowing, 
since financial regulations (see later for details) 'require' institutions to take up 
government securities at whatever interest rates government chooses to offer. "Since 
the central bank works for the Government the Government and its parastatals have 
first calion banking system credit". «U.S.) A.I.D. op. cit. Part p.I1-18). Perhaps 
in Kenya 'crowding out' in relation to the actual availability of Kenyan resources has 
only been part of the issue. A further significant point is that scarce foreign currency 
has been less available to the private sector and to private investment due to large 
government requirement (3). 
Thirdly is the possible effect of government financing on the money supply and 
inflation, which reached around 15% per annum in 1989. 
Fourthly, continuous borrowing from abroad can soon accumulate a large foreign debt 
into a sum which, if the money has gone into current spending or poor investments, 
cannot be serviced. Total Kenyan government foreign debt in 1988 was reckoned at 
the equivalent of K£2717.41 m, which equals nearly half the national income. 
Furthermore in 1987 Kenya's debt service/export ratio was 41.7% (African Economic 
and Financial Data Table 3-21) - one of the highest amongst 'I. D. A. recipient' 
African countries - and the proportion of its total foreign grant and loan receipts on 
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non-concessional terms was, at 34.2 %, the highest in this group except for Nigeria 
(Ibid. Table 3-21). 
Fifthly, few developing world governments have given much proof of being able to 
handle large expenditure programmes with integrity and efficiency. The paragraphs 
that now follow well illustrate this in relation to Kenya. 
2. Parastatals. 
At the time when independence was achieved the government of Kenya was not 
preaching standard Marxist socialism, so large scale nationalisation undertaken as an 
ideological necessity did not occur. However, the government inherited a number of 
state-run industries, such as Kenya Railways, and the establishment of new concerns 
or the take-over of run-down foreign firms, largely through the D.F.l.s - which are 
themselves mostly parastatals - greatly increased state participation in industry and 
commerce. 
The theory of the parastatal sector was expressed in terms of Ken yanisation. 
Supposedly African people were short of three central elements in the build-up of new 
private sector ventures, that is, savings for ploughing into business, management 
expertise and entrepreneurial flair. Parastatals would therefore in the short term 
substitute for the inability of Kenyan people to create successful businesses 
themselves, though in due course they would be sold off to the private sector. The 
obvious question as to where good managers and entrepreneurs would come from -
in a country short of these skills - to run the parastatals was never proper! y 
addressed. 
In practice very little divestment has taken .place. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, parastatals have in general been financial catastophes. As the World Bank 
put it, " .... the vast majority of the enterprises in which the public sector has a 
majority interest, and many in which it is only a minority shareholder, are 
unprofitable and inefficient". (World Bank 1985 p.12). It goes on to castigate them 
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as "undercapitalised". and "neither economically nor financially viable". (Ibid. p.12). 
The basis of this unviability does not need to be discussed in detail here, as the 
subject is comprehensively covered later in relation to D.F.I. experience: however. 
a couple of observations may usefully be made. Poor management is identified by 
the World Bank as a significant factor. "For all firms", that is, state firms, "it is of 
utmost importance that qualified management be in place". (Ibid. p.15) Also, (U.S.) 
A.I.D., in an observation that applied equally to ministries and parastatals, pointed 
out that employment in government had been going up by 4.6% per annum during 
the 1980s, to become 50% of total wage employment in 1988, and so commented that 
the government had become "employer of last resort". «U.S.) A.I.D. 1990 p.I-8). 
Consequent on developments such as these, costs have been high and losses have 
resulted. Indeed, the World Bank reckoned that in 1983 7.2 % of the Kenya 
government budget was devoted to propping up parastatals. Obviously, even if 
offered them, the private sector would have been unenthusiastic about buying such 
concerns. 
Secondly, to quote the World Bank (1985 p.12), "Because of political and social 
considerations, the Government has generally been reluctant to liquidate even 
intrinsically non-viable parastatals". This observation contains a number of inexplicit 
intimations, but it is not inconsistent with the discussions in Chapter 3 Part 1, where 
it was suggested that government economic influence may be wielded to reward 
political supporters and to generate income for officials who have extended families 
to finance. 
Thirdly, it may be argued that government could not sensibly afford to divest itself 
of those few parastatals that do make money, since the losses on the rest are so much 
larger. (See later discussion about D.F.I.s). 
Fourthly, the very scale of government. involvement in some concerns inhibits 
divestment. In many instances, sufficient local capital funds could not be generated. 
and selling to foreign interests would be politically unacceptable. 
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Attempts in the late 80s to address the shortcomings of parastatals failed to get to 
grips with the underlying malaise. Better reporting systems, attempts to limit 
financial assistance to parastatals, and the creation of an investment trust to facilitate 
a modicum of divestment do some good, but a sheltered monopoly position, over-
employment - often of unqualified people - and patronage require a tougher 
approach. 
3. Structural adjustment. 
The accumulating internal economic shortcomings in Kenya were brought to a head 
- as they were in many developing countries - by the problems arising from huge oil 
price rises in 1973/4 and 1979/80 and the associated foreign debt. The end result was 
the imposition of Structural Adjustment in the early 80s, whereby Kenya received 
credits from the I.M.F. and the World Bank in exchange for drastic economic 
restructuring. The aim was freer markets and less government intervention, which 
implied in Kenya the liberalisation of imports, adjustment of an over-valued exchange 
rate and a more streamlined private sector capital market. Also, government was 
advised to cut its spending in relation to G.D.P. By the late 1980s however 
government spending as a % of G.D.P. was in fact higher than it had been at the 
beginning of Structural Adjustment. The government's own rather low-key 
observation on this was, "Demand for more and better public services has led to 
increased total public expenditure". (Economic Survey 1989 p.62) 
4. Comment. 
Government involvement with the economy of Kenya seems to have been more a 
constraint than a promoter of development. The substantial transfer of national 
resources to government reduces the pool of resources available for development, 
except, of course, in so far as government uses them for capital projects or transfers 
them to D.F.I.s. Also the heavy government requirement for foreign exchange 
thwarts the effectiveness of and hence the enthusiasm for investment by hampering 
the ability of firms and corporations to buy abroad. Finally the poor state of 
parastatals will debilitate industry in general by providing unreliable and high cost 
goods and services. D.F.I.s that have money in them will lose out, and also - since 
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most D.F.I.s themselves are parastatals - will suffer from the same weaknesses as the 
rest. 
(e) International trade and payments. 
Table 8 shows the principal categories of exports and their relative importance in the 
totals. 
Coffee 
Tea 
Petroleum Prods. 
Miscellaneous 
TOTALS 
TABLE 8 
PRINCIPAL KENYAN EXPORTS 
1987 
Value (K£m) % of Total 
1988 (prov) 
Value (K£m) % of Total 
194.57 25.8 244.55 26.6 
163.37 21.7 185.26 20.2 
95.36 12.6 110.31 12.0 
187.47 24.9 244.08 26.6 
753.41 100.0 917.72 100.0 
SOURCE: 1989 Economic Survey Table 7.8 (adjusted). 
Clearly, exports rely very heavily on primary crops, and their relative importance has 
not changed for many years. 'Petroleum products' represent the onward sale of fuels 
and lubricants to neighbouring countries of imported oil that has been locally refined. 
'Miscellaneous' subsumes substantial manufacturing exports, and in this area Kenya 
is ahead of most African countries. 
Nearly half Kenyan exports go to the E. C., with the U. K. being the largest single 
market. Africa takes about 26 % of exports, and Kenya has some advantage in selling 
to African countries because its manufacturing industries are more developed than 
those of any country on the eastern side of the continent except Zimbabwe, and it is 
a member of the Preferential Trading Area, an association of African eastern and 
south-eastern nations that is in being to promote freer trade. The P.T.A. is still some 
way from being a totally free trade region, and despite its existence transport logistics 
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result in Kenya's African exports predominantly going to nearby countries, that is 
Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Also, it is a matter of debate whether. 
given the desire of most African countries to industrialise, Kenya will be permitted 
indefinitely to exploit its local comparative advantage in manufacturing (4). 
Imports in 1987 and 1988(prov) were valued at K£1430.88m and K£1765.14m 
respectively. (Ibid. p.82). The percentage composition of imports is given below. 
TABLE 9 
COMPOSITION OF KENYAN IMPORTS (% OF TOTALS) 
Food and Beverages 
Industrial Supplies 
Fuel and Lubricants 
Machinery and other Capital Equipment 
Transport Equipment 
Consumer Goods 
Other 
SOURCE: 1989 Economic Survey Table 7.9. 
1984 
11.6 
26.4 
30.3 
16.9 
10.3 
4.3 
0.2 
1986 
8.7 
30.5 
17.8 
19.0 
19.4 
4.5 
0.1 
1988 
5.7 
36.4 
13.9 
23.5 
15.1 
5.3 
0.1 
The points to notice about the above are the substantial rise in the relative proportion 
of imports made up of capital goods, and the small relative rise in consumer goods 
imports. Since imports as a percentage of factor cost G.D.P. have remained at 
around the 30 mark for some years (calculated from Ibid. Table 2.6) the former 
indicates not only the drive for economic growth, but also the apparently increasing 
inability of Kenya to produce capital equipment itself: the latter suggests that import 
substitution production has reached a plateau (5). 
Given the nature of most imports, the majority come from the E.C. plus other 
western industrial countries, with the U.K. the biggest supplier. As implied above, 
Kenya imports little from elsewhere in Africa, and has a trade surplus in this area. 
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The substantial balance of trade deficit is modified to a smaller current account deficit 
by the invisible items. Tourism, bringing in well over K£200m a year, is now one 
of Kenya's biggest export earners, and there are large export earnings from selling 
transport services to neighbours. However, there is a substantial outflow of funds to 
service accumulated foreign debt. The inflow of loans and grants from abroad, 
identified in the last section as filling the real investment gap, appear in the balance 
of payments to make up the shortfall in the current account. 
The obvious deduction from the above is that Kenya should build on its 
manufacturing base and its erstwhile manufacturing advantages in order to (i) expand 
export markets and (ii) meet more of its capital goods requirements. There are other 
African countries waiting in the wings to supply their own and foreign markets, and 
without a clear and efficient policy of ploughing development finance into secondary 
industry, Kenya could fall behind. Tourism, given Kenya's superb natural 
advantages, could be expanded further, though some might decry the aesthetic price 
to be paid for this. So far the industry as a whole has done well despite serious 
shortcomings on the government's side. In this context Appendix 3 throws some light 
on the creeping miasma besetting the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation, which 
is the flagship of official state activity in tourism promotion. 
ZIMBABWE 
(a) Data sources and currency. 
Similar to Kenya, the main sources for Zimbabwean statistics are vanous 
Zimbabwean official publications and U. N. D. P. 's 'African Economic and Financial 
Data'. The Zimbabwe currency is the dollar, conventionally divided into a hundred 
cents. Originally two dollars equalled the U.K. pound sterling, but there was a 
substantial devaluation in 1982, and thereafter the dollar has been allowed to creep 
continually lower against a personal (to Zimbabwe) basket of currencies. 
(b) Observations on the Zimbabwe economy. 
In important ways Zimbabwe started at official independence in 1980 with more 
significant economic advantages than many other 'new' African countries. 
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Firstly, Zimbabwe had a diversified economy. In 1980 pnmary production 
constituted only 23.3% of G.D.P., and by 1988 this was down to 20.9%. At the 
same time manufacturing, at 24.9% in 1980, moved up to 26.5 % (from Quarterly 
Digest of Statistics March 1989 Table 9.2). Indeed an associated U. N. D. P. defini tion 
in 'African Economic and Financial Data' Table 1.5, and referring to 'industry' 
rather than 'manufacturing', puts the percentage in 1987 as high as 38.8. This is well 
ahead of any non-oil sub-Saharan African country, and even including the 
oil-exporting territories, only Nigeria is a little ahead. However in contrast Nigeria's 
agricultural value-added is put at 29.7% of G.D.P., whereas in Zimbabwe, where 
services have a greater weight, it is only 9.7%. Furthermore, within each category 
of economic activity in Zimbabwe, there is considerable diversity. Manufacturing 
ranges over a very wide spectrum of products - this partly due to the enforced 
diversification during the U.D.I. period (6) - and no raw material or other primary 
product has ever become of such overwhelming significance as to result in the 
economy being based on it. 
Secondl y, the range of Zimbabwean exports is wide. Hence the effects on the 
balance of trade and the balance of payments of a decline in foreign demand for one 
export is lessened by continuing sales of other products. 
Thirdly, both as a buttress for, and as a consequence of, economic development, the 
infrastructure is - in an African context - well-developed. Roads and railways have 
an internal logic, and do not, as in most other African countries, just connect 
production areas with convenient ports or frontier posts. There is also a large and 
varied financial system, which is discussed fully later. 
Fourthly, as pointed out in Part 2, Chapter 1, the country attracted in more European 
immigrants than any other sub-Saharan African country except South Africa, the 
significant point being that nearly all were skilled and qualified (7). Hence the 
expertise was there to fashion a modem economy quite speedily and to train 
indigenous people into the possession of similar abilities. Furthermore, the possibility 
that Southern Rhodesia - as it was formerly - might become a new 'white' dominion, 
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helped for many decades to encourage the inflow of capital funds. 
Though the last U.D.I. years saw economic stagnation, at legal independence the 
strengths surveyed above in the main existed (8) and an optimist in 1980 might have 
seen in Zimbabwe the makings of the first African N.I.C. So far this has not 
happened, but in 1990, after a decade of problems, the prospect was still there. As 
is reported in the 'Banker', referring to bullish sentiments by Dr Chidzero, the 
Finance Minister, "His enthusiasm is shared by many in the business and financial 
community, who believe that the country has the potential to emulate the Pacific Rim 
states, and become Africa's first newly-industrialising country". (Turner Oct 1990 
p.87). 
(c) Population and National Income. 
1. General discussion. 
Zimbabwe is described as a 'middle income' African country: it is also a 'middle 
population' African country. At around 9 million in 1989, it is exceeded by a 
number of states, including Kenya, but there are plenty of African minnows with far 
fewer people. The figures below show growth over the eighties: at a rate of increase 
of on average 2.8 % a year, it is typical of Africa in general rather than the very fast 
expanding Kenyan population. (The alternative lower figure for 1987 and the one for 
1988 are the estimates of the March 1989 edition of the Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest 
of Statistics Table 1). 
1980 1981 
7.01 7.25 
TABLE 10 
ZIMBABWEAN POPULATION (Mil.) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
7.52 7.80 8.10 8.41 8.72 9.04 
8.64 
1988 
8.88 
SOURCE: U.N.D.P. - African Economic and Financial Data 1989 - Table 1.2 
G.D.P. grew fast in the early 80s largely due to government excess spending financed 
by borrowing. Later growth flagged, partly due to the 1982 drought. but also 
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because the government retrenched. Later it picked up again. The real G. D. P. 
figures are given in the table below. 
TABLE 11 
G.D.P. AT FACTOR COST AND CONSTANT (1980) PRICES 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total (Z$m) 3224 3537 3589 3461 3540 3798 3873 3847 4050 % Increase 9.7 11.2 -3.6 2.3 7.3 2.0 -0.7 5.3 Per cap (Z$) 438.7 487.9 477.3 447.7 437.0 451.6 460.5 425.6 (UNDP Figures) 445.3 456 % Increase 11.2 -2.2 -6.2 -2.4 3.3 2.0 -7.6 2.4 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics March 1989 Table 9.2. and 
V.N.D.P. African Economic and Financial Data Table 1.2. 
Within the data in Table 11 it was the service sector rather than the primary and 
secondary sectors of the economy that saw the most rapid growth. As the Senior 
Minister of Finance stated, "Whilst growth in the major productive sectors - mining, 
manufacturing and agriculture - has been erratic, along with overall gross domestic 
product, growth in the service sectors has remained positive for most of the period" . 
(Chidzero 1989 p.2). However, this expansion was not so much to do with 
commercial as with social services, in particular education, for from 1980 a 
programme of universal education was quickly conceived and implemented. Of 
course though such a policy might generate useful skills for the creation of wealth in 
the future, in the meantime it requires substantial income generated from 'productive' 
areas of the economy to support it Chidzero was all to well aware of this: " .... in 
order for a process of growth to be sustainable growth in the service sectors should 
be backed by correspondingly high growth in the productive sectors.". (Ibid. p.2). 
Indeed expanding social expenditure not only relies on productive sector expansion 
but can inhibit it by taking resources away from investment As Chidzero 
observed," .... there is a tendency to direct resources away from productive areas". 
(Ibid. p.2). 
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Though the progress of the G.D.P. was, as Chidzero pointed out, erratic, it averaged 
a growth rate of around 3 % a year. The per capita income figures in Table 11 are 
probably much more unreliable than the total G.D.P. figures, but they show no trend 
upwards, as would be expected from overall growth that hardly exceeded popUlation 
growth, and which was burdened with heavy overseas debt servicing (see Table 12). 
However the mass of the people would have felt the benefit of more comprehensive 
social services, in particular education. 
TABLE 12 
LEAKAGE OF INCOME ABROAD FROM ZIMBABWE 
1 2 3 4 
G.D.I. Net G.N.I. (2) as % 
(market Factor (market of (1) 
prices) Income prices) 
($m) Paid ($m) 
Abroad 
($m) 
1976 2166 59 2107 2.7 
1978 2359 42 2317 1.8 
1980 3441 47 3394 1.4 
1982 5197 194 5003 3.7 
1984 6404 195 6209 3.0 
1985 7019 284 6735 4.0 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of.Statistics Mar 89 Table 9.1 
Thus the overall economic health of Zimbabwe during the 1980s was somewhat 
disappointing. Though extraneous developments played some part in this - and, 
indeed, indifferent economic progress was widespread in Africa during these years 
- it is likely that internal events and policies were also to blame. 
2. Development finance implications. 
As with Kenya, therefore, there can be no compacency about economic growth. It 
has on average only just been keeping up with population, and moreover has been 
relying too heavily on more social provision rather than expansion of industrial and 
commercial productive activities. The business of development finance is thus of vital 
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importance, and within this there is plausibly a role for D. F. I. s. 
3. A note on employment. 
The rate, consistency and nature of economic growth in Zimbabwe necessarily had 
an influence on formal sector employment. The table below illustrates the position 
over a number of years. 
TABLE 13 
EMPLOYEES IN ZIMBABWE (000) 
TOTAL 
MINUS MANUF ACTURING 
TOTAL AGRICULTURE ONLY 
1970(an.ave) 853.3 555.5 114.7 
1975 " 1050.2 686.4 156.0 
1980 " 1009.9 682.9 159.4 
1981 " 1037.7 743.4 173.2 
1982 " 1045.9 711.6 180.5 
1983 " 1033.4 769.9 173.4 
1984 " 1036.4 765.2 166.3 
1985(Sep) 106l.6 787.0 17l.3 
1986 " n.a. 815.5 180.4 
1987 " n.a. 823.1 180.1 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics March 1989 Table 7.1 
From the above it is clear that during the 1980s the number of employees in 
manufacturing was not on a rising trend .. Though the figures have not been given, 
the same is true of construction. And in mining and agriculture the movement has 
been gradually downward. Thus the main areas where the increasing numbers of 
relatively unskilled people coming on the jobs market would expect to find 
employment are virtually closed. 
Secondly, the areas where growth has been apparent are distribution, public 
administration and - very especially - education, the latter two of which are financed 
from the income generated by other sectors. Indeed the accent on education, while 
socially impeccable, has a dangerous unlooked-for consequence. in that it results in 
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a lot of quite well-educated people whose aspirations are then unlikely to be fulfilled. 
And this while in certain sectors shortages of skills are apparent As was pointed out 
in the 1986-90 Development Plan, "All sectors of the economy are greatly short of 
personnel with scientific and technological know-how ... " .(p.8) At the same time, 
Government was, and is, concerned about the general employment issue, though the 
following is more a ponderous cry of anguish than a policy: "The creation of 
additional opportunities is intended to provide the majority of able-bodied 
Zimbabweans with gainful employment. Detailed survey of the economy shows that 
the issue of unemployment could continue to be one of the main problems during the 
Plan period". (Ibid. p.11) 
(d) Investment and saving. 
The rate of growth of the Zimbabwean economy was lower than in Kenya. This 
would suggest a lower rate of real investment, and the figures below make it clear 
that this was the case. 
TABLE 14 
CAPITAL FORMATION IN ZIMBABWE (1980 prices) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
G.F.C.F. ($M) 528 722 788 765 618 506 520 496 
% change 19 36 9 -3 -19 -18 3 -5 
G.F.C.F. as % of 
G.N.P. (constant 
16.0 12.5 12.7 1980 prices) 15.6 19.2 20.7 19.9 
G.C.F. (inc. 
706 741 742 stock changes) 646 950 815 600 
(i)% change 65 47 -14 -26 18 5 <1 
(ii)As % of G.N.P. 19.0 25.3 21.4 15.6 18.3 18.3 18.1 
SOURCE: from Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics for March 1989 Tables 9.3 
and 9.4 
The first - 1986-90 - National Development Plan observed bleakly about investment 
(p.5), "Shortly after independence, the reconstruction programme as well as the 
general political and economic climate, led to high levels of investment. .... Investment 
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declined significantly during most of the (Transitional National) Plan period. By 
1985, the volume of investment in fixed capital was one fifth below its 1982 level". 
And, with regard to sectoral investment (p.5), "Before Independence, investment in 
the three productive sectors, agriculture, mining and manufacturing, accounted for 
42.0% to 44.0% of total .... during the economic recession that followed, the share of 
these sectors fell below 40 % ..... These structural imbalances in investment have led 
to serious implications on the development of the economy and on employment in 
particular". And, as the Annual Economic Review for 1986 observes, "The decline 
in real gross fixed capital formation since 1982 has become a major cause for concern 
at policy-making level". (p.5). 
The investment of the early 80s was boosted both by government expenditure on 
infrastructure, including investment for social services, and private sector investment 
in industry. Thereafter private sector investment in particular fell away, as drought 
which sent the economy into recession, low returns on capital, and the multiplication 
of restrictions discouraged business. As of the end of the 1980s decade it appears 
that the resources devoted to capital formation were insufficient to maintain intact the 
existing capital stock and generate a satisfactory rate of growth. Interviews the author 
had with businessmen in Zimbabwe bear this out, since there were frequent comments 
about obsolete equipment not - for various reasons - being replaced. The 
Government, clearly concerned about the stagnation in investment, made a number 
of oblique intimations of encouragement and support in 'The Promotion of 
Investment: Policy and Regulations' of 1989. With regard to foreign investment," ... it 
will endeavour to accord further protection to it by entering into appropriate bilateral 
and multilateral investment protection or guarantee treaties". (p. 7) Referring to 
constraints that "hamper the development of new entrepreneurial skills .... In its 
promotion of investment by the local private sector, Government will therefore 
introduce measures to remove these constraints". (p.5) Such sentiments - and others 
like them - sound laudable but say nothing about concrete policy. 
Gross savings, which - domestically - release resources that may be used for 
investment, overtook investment spending in 1986, but for most years fell short of 
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investment Table 15 gives the details. 
TABLE 15 
SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE (current prices) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Gross Nat. 
Savings ($m) 294 492 587 
Gross Cap. 
568 549 1110 1320 1706 
Formation($m) 
inc. stocks) 358 648 1026 1102 1002 1212 1497 1691 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics for March 1989 Tables 9.4 and 
9.6 
Gross domestic savings have not been listed above, but, as in Kenya, were above 
G.N.S. due to income transfers abroad. For example, 'African Economic and 
Financial Data' Tables 1.10 and 1.11 reckoned G.N.S. in 1987 to be 18.1 % of 
G.D.P. whereas Gross Domestic Saving was 21.9%. The resource gap in the early 
80s between G.N.S. and the value of capital formation was, in the absence of much 
direct private foreign investment, largely ~ade by official borrowing from abroad. 
With regard to the reasons behind the substantial rise in savings later on, it has been 
suggested (1986 Annual Economic Review p.7) that, "An underlying cause might 
have been a shortage of durable consumption goods generated by foreign exchange 
shortages". And a salutary point - by no means surprising to a traditional Keynesian: 
"The development with regard to savings in 1985 is of interest in that it highlights 
that measures introduced to encourage savings do not necessarily result in increased 
investment levels". (Ibid. p.8). 
In conclusion, real investment in Zimbabwe has been inadequate in relation both to 
keeping the existing capital stock intact and generating economic growth. Clearly 
there is a role for D. F . I. s and/or other arrangements in channelling funds to these 
ends. 
(e) The Government Sector. 
1. Public Finance. 
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The table below gives details of Zimbabwe government revenue and expenditure over 
some recent financial years. 
TABLE 16 
TAXES AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ACCOUNT EXPENDITURE 
1985-6 1986-7 1987-8 1988-9 
REVENUE: 
(est. ) 
Domestic revenue 2520 2954 3661 4352 
International aid grants 100 103 124 160 
TOT AL REVENUE 
(from unrounded figures 2619 3056 3785 4211 
constituent figures) 
TOT AL EXPENDITURE 3127 3822 4296 5016 
SURPLUS( + )or DEFICIT(-) 
-508 -766 -511 -805 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics for March 1989 Tables 19.3 and 
19.4 
As it happened, the deficit estimate for 1988-9 proved too sanguine, and the actual 
figure was $1150m. The Finance Minister observed," In order to release resources 
for productive purposes so as to achieve an economic growth of 5 % per annum as 
envisaged in the current National Development Plan it will be necessary to 
progressively reduce the Budget deficit during the next few years to, say, less than 
5 % of Gross Domestic Product Although in the recent past, we have made all effort 
to keep down expenditures, the size of the deficit, which is still about 10% of Gross 
Domestic Product, continues to be far too large". (Chidzero 1989 p.6). And in 
addition to the above budget deficits, government has incurred more debt liabilities 
by making investments, lending to parastatals, lending to miscellaneous other bodies, 
and repaying past loans. The composite figure was expected to be in the region of 
Z$I000m for 1988-89. 
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'African Economic and Financial Data' (1989 Table 4-4) estimates Zimbabwean 
government 'expenditure and lending minus repayments' in recent years as equalling 
in value anything between 35% and 41 % of G.D.P. These figures are more than in 
most other sub-Saharan African countries. However, Zimbabwe sources put the 
percentages much higher. The 'Annual Economic Review of Zimbabwe' for 1986 
(p.23) put total expenditure (inc. net lending) at 45.3% in 1985-6 and 49.2% in 
1986-7. This is up from 38.6% in 1978-9. Even allowing for the inevitable statistical 
inaccuracies, an examination of the relevant figures in Zimbabwean statistical 
publications suggest that these latter percentages are nearer the truth. 
Chidzero (see above) asserted that the budget deficit was too large to enable the 
current development plan to be fulfilled. It may also be suggested that the very size 
relative to the G.D.P. of government appropriations also must have crowded out 
spending on investment by private and official non-central government agencies. On 
the other hand, in the 1980s investment in Zimbabwe stagnated (9) at the same time 
as firms were becoming very liquid. It seems that - similar to, but rather more 
seriously than in Kenya - the situation was not one of conventional crowding out, but 
of foreign exchange crowding out Massive government spending bore heavily on the 
foreign exchange available, so potential spenders on investment projects were held 
back by not being able to get enough. Zimbabwe dollars lay idly in banks and were 
available to cover government borrowing requirements. Had it been technically 
possible for real capital investors to buy what they needed internally, then almost 
certainly inflation would have been higher" than in fact it was. 
2. Parastatals. 
As with Kenya, many of the Zimbabwean parastatals became during the 1980s a 
byword for inefficiency and waste. An article in ' African Business' observed drily, 
"In its five-year National Development Plan (1986-90) the government states that 'it 
is essential to improve the performance of parastatals in order to reduce their 
dependence on government subsidies and investment funds', but this elusive improved 
performance seems to be a dream unlikely to be fulfilled in the remaining three years 
of the plan period". (Chenje 1988 p.30). A further quote graphically illustrates the 
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position: "Despite years of constant prodding, the government appears to have failed 
to make the majority of parastatals break even, let alone turn in a respectable profit. 
And despite attempts to cut subsidies in some of these companies, the government 
continues to pour millions of dollars annually into these organisations to keep them 
afloat". (Ibid. p.30). As an example of this sort of thing, the Finance Minister, in 
his 1989 Budget Statement, stated, "I have allocated $223.9m to the Ministry of 
Transport. This includes an amount of $115m for subsidies, of which $l00m is for 
the National Railways of Zimbabwe, and $15m for Air Zimbabwe". (Chidzero 1989 
p.10). In other words, more than half a Ministry's budget allocation was going to 
prop up loss-makers. 
The Justice Smith Commission was set up in 1985 to look into the workings of 
parastatals. Chenje (p.3l) explains that it laid bare "sordid details of 
mismanagement, inefficiency, irregular staff appointments and general disregard for 
laid-down procedures". Even more alarmingly, he writes (p.3l) of Air Zimbabwe 
being "mired in various management scandals". 
As a result of these investigations, the government - after a long period of preparation 
- established in 1988 the Parastatals Commission to monitor the business operations 
of the various organisations. However it is not too cynical to speculate whether this 
body will not in its turn become victim to the same maladies as those it seeks to 
watch. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes"! (Juvenal) Indeed the issue referred to above 
in the quote from Dr. Chidzero shows that it did not have much immediate impact. 
That reform is necessary is indisputable, especially as the ramifications of parastatal 
losses go beyond the unacceptable drain of subsidy payments from the Exchequer. 
For, "According to informed sources, the Zimbabwe Government is unlikely to get 
much-needed financial assistance from the World Bank if it continues to subsidise 
money-losing enterprises like Air Zimbabwe and the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe". (Parade June 1988 p.l1). 
132 
The implications for development finance in Zimbabwe are the same as in Kenya. 
Firstly, subsidies to parastatals divert reSources away from new real investment 
Secondly, in so far as parastatals are held wholly or partly by D.F.I.s, the financial 
positions of those D.F.I.s are jeopardised. Thirdly, parastatal D.F.I.s may be 
weakened by the same shortcomings that affect the others. 
3. The context of structural adjustment. 
Though the government of newly independent Zimbabwe in 1980 was not faced with 
having to service inherited foreign debt - due of course to the fact that sanctions had 
prevented the U.D.I. regime borrowing abroad - it quickly built up indebtedness as 
a result of the massive rises in its spending. Difficulties mounted in 1982 with 
drought, world recession, and the international debt crisis - which involved Zimbabwe 
- and a Structural Adjustment Programme was urged on the country. The currency 
was devalued in 1982 by 20%, and certain facilities from the World Bank and the 
I.M.F., including $70m (U.S.) for an export revolving fund, were extended to 
Zimbabwe. However, partly due to continued heavy state intervention in the 
economy - a scenario in line with the ideological predilections of the new government 
- which meant that, inter alia, the country's external debt rose to 54% of G.D.P. in 
1984, most supranational credit arrangements were suspended. 
A comment in 'The Banker' on the state of the Zimbabwe economy in 1990 makes 
for depressing reading. "There is now a desperate crisis in transport, near-crises in 
almost every other infrastructure, more and more breakdowns in mining, 
manufacturing and agricultural machinery, lack of spare parts, dilapidated capital 
equipment, and G.D.P. growth rate dependent on good weather for agriculture. But 
of greatest concern to President Mugabe's government is unemployment, which now 
threatens to undermine the country's relativ~ political stability". (Raath May 90 p. 71) 
(10). However despite the above 'end of decade' gloom, and the worrying features 
discussed in previous sub-sectures, Zimbabwe's overall performance in the 80s had 
been not without bright spots, as is explained below. 
Though the mid-80s were years of drought, a very restrictive set of policies improved 
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the country's fiscal profile, even though draconian curbs on imports helped bring 
about the run-down atmosphere explained in the quote from Raath. What is decribed 
as an "impeccable repayments record, even during the peak of debt servicing in 
1985-7" (Turner 1990 p.90) led to external" debt falling to less than 50 % of G. D. P. in 
1990. Furthermore," ... with debt servicing due to fall below 20 % this year -" that 
is, of the value of exports, down from 33% in 1987 -" the country is now officially 
classified as underborrowed". (ibid. p.87). And, unusually,in the light of the 
impinging of international debt problems on the banks, Standard Chartered and 
Barclay's in 1987 put together a loan of $70m to the Zimbabwe government. 
At the end of the decade there was a greater acceptance of - and move towards -
liberalisation measures implicit in the requirements of Structural Adjustment. This 
includes an Investment Centre (see later for full discussion), the introduction of 
collective bargaining for wages instead of nationally imposed rates, a relaxation of 
price controls, easier access to foreign currency by business, and the replacement of 
import quotas by tariffs. It would be rash, however, to predict how firmly and 
quickly all this would be allowed to become effective. 
The above scenano does not bode well for economic development, nor does it 
describe a very impressive development performance. It is suggested that only 
adherence to a strict structural adjustment programme, with the short term hurt that 
accompanies it, is likely to produce the confidence and gather in the resources -
inevitably, it seems, mainly from abroad - to get the economy of Zimbabwe moving 
ahead faster. 
(e) Trade and the payments balance. 
As noted earlier, Zimbabwean visible exports cover a broad range of goods. The table 
below gives the exports in a number of categories for 1981 and 1987. Tobacco, 
which constitutes almost all of the second category, remains the single largest export, 
and its percentage contribution to total exports is not dissimilar to coffee in the total 
of Kenyan exports: manufactures, however, account for a much larger proportion of 
the total than in Kenya. 
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TABLE 17 
ZIMBABWE EXPORTS IN 1981 AND 1987 
Classification Value (Z$m) % of Total Value (Z$m) % of Total (current prices) (current prices) 
Foods 133 15.0 350 18.5 Beverages & 
tobacco 225 25.3 422 22.3 Crude materials 167 18.8 291 15.4 
Fuels (inc. 
electricity) and 
chemicals 21 0.3 39 2.1 
Manufactures and 
semi-manufactures 342 38.5 789 41.7 
TOTAL 888 100.0 1892 100.0 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe Quarterly Digest of Statistics March 1989 Table 11.5 
The customers for Zimbabwe exports are also many, and although the U. K. , 
Germany and South Africa dominate the market, together they still take considerably 
less than half the total. Other African countries, particularly neighbouring ones, are 
important markets, and given that the Preferential Trading Area operates as is -
supposedly - intended, exports to them should increase further. 
For most of the independence years, - 1981 and 1982 were the exceptions - the 
Zimbabwe dollar value of visible exports has been greater than the value of visible 
imports. This is not so much due to the influence of industrial growth and market 
forces as to rigid controls on foreign exchange allocations. The 1986 Annual 
Economic Review (p.10) explains, "Import allocations have been a burning issue 
since 1983 when cuts were necessitated by the deteriorating balance of payments 
position, and allocations continued to decrease up to 1984. The trend was reversed 
in 1985". Zimbabwe also makes a surplus on its trade in services. 
Though in current Zimbabwe dollar terms merchandise exports in the 80s rose on 
average by something like 15% per annum, whereas current G.D.P. rose by 12%. 
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depreciation greatly reduced their international value. The U.N. D.P. 'current U.S. 
dollar figures' show no overall rise, as the table below indicates. Import values are 
also given, and they actually fell. 
Exports 
Imports 
TABLE 18 
ZIMBABWE MERCHANDISE TRADE (Mil. current $U.S.) 
1980 
1445 
1339 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1452 1314 1155 1175 1116 1317 1447 
1535 1471 1069 989 917 1008 1069 
SOURCE: U.N.D.P. African Economic and Financial Data 1989 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
Regarding the balance of payments on current account as a whole, heavy payments 
of investment income pushed it well into the red in the mid-80s: at the end of the 
decade a small surplus was achieved. 
Noticeable in the balance of payments capital items in the 1980s is the almost 
complete cessation into the Zimbabwean economy of direct foreign investment Indeed 
in most of the years there was net disinvestment. (Chapter 7 explores this issue 
further). As against this, there was substantial foreign borrowing, mostly by the 
government and state organisations, and predominantly in the earlier years when 
structural adjustment loans were operative. In Table 19 below, which gives details, 
'other capital flows' includes short term debt, but for the rest acts as a balancing 
item. 
TABLE 19 
CAPITAL INFLOWS INTO ZIMBABWE (Mil. current U.S. dollars) 
Net foreign dir. inv. 
Net long term 
borrowing 
Other capital flows 
1981 1983 1985 1987 
4 -2 3 -31 
291 
334 
443 
-156 
29 
128 
3 
106 
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SOURCE: D.N.D.P. 'African Economic and Financial Data' 1989 Tables 2.8, 2.9 
and 2.10. 
In conclusion, by African standards the composition of Zimbabwean industry and of 
Zimbabwean exports are extraordinarily diversified. To maintain this lead, and even 
to aspire to N.1. C. status, development suggests (i) expansion on a broad 
manufacturing front, and (ii) the aim of getting into sophisticated 'high tech' 
industries that are not yet usual in African countries - always excepting, of course, 
South Africa. Development finance institutions might, therefore, be encouraged to 
set their sights on providing funds for ventures that accord with these proposals. 
Unfortunately, of course, the run-down of secondary industry in the late 1980s did 
not bode well for such developments. 
ASSESSMENT AND SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the implications of the economic 
structures and experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe for the provision of development 
finance in terms of three issues, (i) the necessity for economic development and the 
associated financing of it, (ii) the constraints on the process, and (iii) the development 
directions into which finance should be channelled. The following lines summarise 
the deductions. 
The necessity for economic growth is self-evident. Zimbabwe has a steadily rising 
population and Kenya a rapidly rising one. Unless Zimbabwe can grow by at least 
3 % a year, and Kenya by considerably more, standards of living cannot be 
maintained, let alone improved. 
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However there are several financial constraints on growth. By commandeering large 
shares of the national product, governments in both countries reduce the pool of 
national resources available for capital investment. Much government spending has 
gone on large social budgets, and such unfortunate ends as subsidising parastatals, and 
though social spending, particularly on education, is necessary for development, it 
may be asked whether there has not been over-emphasis on this area. Many partially 
educated people, without the parallel availability of jobs that match their aspirations, 
are a recipe for social discontent. Furthermore, government spending does not only 
affect the domestic deployment of resource allocation, but - perhaps more importantly 
- in both countries it uses up scarce foreign exchange, so denying it to those going 
in for capital investment Lastly, economic and political conditions - coupled with 
world economic vicissitudes - have cut down the amount of foreign capital funds 
going into both Kenya and Zimbabwe. Amongst other aims, structural adjustment 
guides and presses governments into addressing the causes of the financial constraints 
on development, but by the late 1980s the governments of neither Kenya nor 
Zimbabwe had been reluctant to embrace some of the the severer provisions of 
structural adjustment with much enthusiasm. 
Important industries on which there is no focus in this study - except for some brief 
discussion in Appendix 3 - are agriculture and mining. The main areas of production 
that are relevant to the later D.F.I. analysis are manufacturing and commercial 
services, and both Kenya and Zimbabwe are, by African standards, strong in these 
areas. To maintain their comparative advantages in manufacturing vis-a-vis their 
African neighbours, and to expand export markets, it is essential to introduce more 
capital funds into secondary industry as well as to make better use of the resources 
there already. Much the same is true of services. If properly financed and properly 
run both countries stand to do well out of them. , 
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NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 3 
1. To some extent, the result of trying to apply something of Keynesian 
short-term stabilisation policy transferred to the circumstances of developing 
economIes in the post-2nd world war decades was an over-emphasis on purely 
monetary demand as the engine of economic growth. For example, in I.M.F. Staff 
Papers of March 1967 (p.80) Hannan Ezekiel writes, "The low rate of saving in less 
developed countries is one of the most important obstacles to their rapid growth" , and 
he goes on to develop a model showing how monetary expansion can supplement the 
process. 
2. To quote page 1 of the U.N. D.P. 's 'African Economic and Financial Data', 
"Series in current prices are converted to U.S. dollars at average annual exchange 
rates. For series in constant prices, G.D.P. and its components are converted to U.S. 
dollars at the base year official exchange rate ..... The G.D.P. implicit deflator for the 
national currency series is the most broadly based deflator, showing annual price 
movements for all goods and services produced by an economy". And later, on page 
30, "The Atlas conversion factor for any year is the average of the official exchange 
rate (or alternative conversion factor) for that year and the exchange rate for the two 
preceding years, after adjusting them for differences in inflation between that country 
and the United States". 
3. Killick and Mwegma (1990) betray some uncertainty on the question of how 
government use of resources crowds out other business. They assert (p.52), "We 
have found evidence, econometric and otherwise, that credit to the public sector is 
crowding out private borrowers". However at an earlier point in the text (p.44) they 
had observed, "But while some crowding out has undoubtedly occurred we are less 
sure of its effects on the private sector ... It.may be that shortages of credit are for the 
private sector as a whole of secondary importance by comparison with difficulties 
created, say, by price controls or foreign exchange restrictions". 
It remains the opinion of the writer that - certainly for non-small business in the 
Kenyan private sector - the 'crowding out' effect was more to do with forex shortages 
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than shortage of purchasing power in Kenya. And indeed, Killick and Mwegma tend 
to support this view when they write (p.54), "Although at the time of writing there 
are statutory minimum cash and liquidity ratios, we have shown that these have 
rarely, if ever, been raised to levels at which they begin to affect the lending 
decisions of at least the major banks ... " 
Finally, there were of course other reasons as well as forex shortages behind the 
dearth of non-small private sector business investment. 
4. A leading businessman in Nairobi remarked in 1990 during an interview that 
if the P.T.A. was 'successful' in terms of its remit, then it would not be allowed to 
continue! 
5. This does lend some support to Bagchi' s neo-colonialist scenario. See Part 1, 
Chapter 3. 
6. Not all commentators, including, in an interview, a leading merchant banker, 
have felt that diversification was a - though unlooked for, nevertheless - happy 
consequence of economic sanctions following the 1965 unilateral declaration of 
independence. Rather than putting money into a lot of small, high cost, industrial 
establishments, funds would have been better spent, it is suggested, - given, of 
course, favourable economic and political conditions - building up production in areas 
where the country had a particular advantage. 
7. At its peak the European population of Zimbabwe was close on a quarter of a 
million. At the end of the 80s it was probably down to a little over 100000, but since 
censuses were no longer conducted on an ethnic basis greater accuracy is not 
possible. 
8. A damaging occurrence at the end of the 70s - which of course continued in 
subsequent years - was an outflow of European skills. This was partly due to a 
policy of the Ian Smith government in the short Zimbabwe-Rhodesia period, when, 
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in order to get more Africans quickly into the civil service, many Europeans were, 
very generously, pensioned off. Seeing little prospect of new jobs in a stagnating 
economy, they left. However, by the late 80s, the government was urging European 
young people not to emigrate, but to use their skills in the country. 
9. . .. except of course that a persistently high public deficit may generate a 
pessimistic economic outlook such that investment plans are shelved. 
10. This last point was put to the author by a senior official in Zimbabwe, who 
went on to suggest that a police state may be the inevitable outcome, now that the 
'people's republic'-type option is no longer available. 
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Chapter 4 
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 constituted a selective review of the economic structures and experiences 
of Kenya and Zimbabwe in recent years. The importance of the investigation was 
partly to sketch in the climate within which economic development occurs, but more 
importantly to focus on the need for, the constraints on and the destinations of 
development finance. The necessity for having specialised development finance 
institutions was not, however, addressed. This chapter, by investigating the nature 
and scope of the countries' financial systems, delineates a role for such organisations. 
KENYA 
(a) Overall structure. 
Although in Kenya the financial system - excluding development finance organisations 
- consists of a large number of separate institutions, more indeed than in Zimbabwe, 
the variety of institutions is much less, suggesting a less balanced structure. This is 
congruent with - what was originally - a colonially dependent relationship with the 
metropolitan power. Colonial Kenya never achieved the degree of apartness from the 
U.K. that Southern Rhodesia had reached as early as the 1920s, and hence the 
financial institutions and arrangements were never conceived as needing to constitute 
a discrete comprehensive system, since any gaps could be filled by the closely linked 
U.K. system. This legacy at independence has never been substantially changed, 
though in the 1980s the LF.C. strongly recommended that the financial markets be 
developed (LF.C. 1984 passim, and see later sections). 
Nevertheless, as was explained in Chapter 2, Kenya early reached a position of 
economic importance superior to its neighbours, and the financial sector grew as part 
of the process: hence in comparison with most of the rest of Africa - Zimbabwe and 
South Africa being the clear exceptions in ex-British Africa - the I.F.C. is not \\-Tong 
when it states," ... Kenya is rich in type, number and depth of its financial assets". 
(Ibid. p.5). 
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The I.F.C. went on to report that for 1983 Kenya's financial assets equalled in value 
64% of G.N.P. This put it ahead of most African countries, including oil-rich 
Nigeria, which in 1983 was put at 62 % (Ibid. p.5). (However in 1985 Zimbabwe 
was at about 130%). Given the effective collapse in the later 80s of a number of 
banking institutions, which, however, were not formally liquidated, any later 
measures relating financial assets to G.N.P. must be suspect, since it is questionable 
how much of the deposit. money in these bankrupt institutions should appear in the 
statistics. 
The central bank is called the Central Bank of Kenya. Then there are over 20 
commercial banks, though five of them, Barclays Bank of Kenya, the Standard Bank, 
the formerly-named Bank of Credit and Commerce, and the public sector Kenya 
Commercial Bank and National Bank of Kenya accounted in the late 1980s for over 
two thirds of total bank deposits. There are over 30 non-bank financial institutions, 
which, owing to a quirk of monetary policy which allowed them to pay more interest 
than banks, grew in both numbers and size in the eighties. Indeed, a number of them 
are associated with commercial banks, who in this way could circumvent interest rate 
regulations. There are no discount houses (1), and only recently have certain 
commercial banks established merchant banking divisions, such as Barclays Merchant 
Finance. 
For the rest there are between 30 and 40 insurance companIes, some building 
societies, various private pension plans, a Post Office Savings Bank, many hundreds 
of savings and credit cooperative societies, and a few securities brokerage firms. 
There is also a stock exchange which, in the 1980s, was not very active. 
A flavour of the politico-economic context surrounding Kenyan finance can be 
intimated by certain I.F.C. comments (Ibid. p.7). (From the standpoint of the early 
1990s they appear optimistic, but this is because they were made before the Kenyan 
bank failures.) Firstly it observes, "Kenya's financial system has not suffered from 
the severe financial instability and structural weaknesses that have plagued other 
developing countries in recent years", and goes on to cite moderate inflation and 
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administered interest rates that are more or less positive in real terms. This is broadly 
true, as the figures below indicate, but a substantial upturn in inflation in the late 80s 
promised to bring about negative real returns on loaned funds. (see table 1). 
TABLE 1 
INFLATION AND CERTAIN INTEREST RATES IN KENYA 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Inflation rate (%) 9.1 10.7 5.7 7.1 10.7 
Discount rate (%) 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Commercial bank savings 
deposits (min rate) (%) 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 10.0 
SOURCE: U.N.D.P.:African Economic and Financial Data Tables 1.21 and 1.27 and 
Kenya Economic Survey 1989 Table 5.7 
The I.F .C. goes on to say, "A second area of strength in the system is the separation, 
in the private sector, of ownership of financial institutions from their clients. Hence 
credit decisions, at least in the private seCtor, appear to be made at arm's length, 
encouraging better credit allocation". This observation was later shown to be wrong, 
though not, of course, in relation to the major banking institutions (see in next 
sub-section). Finally,"... there is far less government intervention in credit 
allocation than one finds in other developing countries". This is very much a relative 
remark, since the I.F.C. had already pointed out in the text that banks and N.B.F.I.s 
had, amongst other constraints, to lend to agriculture an amount equal to 17 % of 
deposits. In so far as there are elements of truth in what it says, a gradual move 
away from the vaguenesses of' African' socialism, an awareness of the mistakes made 
by others, an acceptance of unashamed capitalist principles, and a lack of civil service 
expertise in the field of finance probably account for it. 
(b) The banks. 
The I.F.C. notes, "The domination of the financial system by commercial banks and 
deposit-taking non-bank financial institutions and the absence of any significant 
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securities market has led to a bias towards short-term credit in the provision of 
finance to the private sector" (I.F.C. op.cit. p.i). This was in 1984, and the situation 
did not appreciably change during the rest of the decade. As in Zimbabwe, a 
combination of traditional banking practice and caution in an uncertain 
politico-economic environment caused banks and N.B.F.I.s to be wary of term 
lending, other than to some sound, established customers. Further discouragement 
came from the policy of administered interest rates, whereby margins on loans were 
sqeezed (2). This latter constraint was clearly understood by the government in 1986, 
and an intention paraded to do something about it, as the following makes clear: "One 
result of this regulatory framework is that the financial system caters excessively to 
short-term financial needs. This is partly the result of interest rate regulations, which 
severely affect the commercial banks. The gradual freeing of interest rates will shift 
funds to longer term uses". (Republic of Kenya 1986 p.38). 
Such term lending as did occur was - as intimated above - to well-established 
assessable firms, and indeed there was a bias in all lending to this type of borrower. 
Even the nationalised banks have avoided being too adventurous. As Grosh (1987 p. 
18) writes, "The KCB has been chosen to help decentralise resources outside of the 
cities by bringing banking services to the wananchi", that is, the ordinary rural 
people. "Such a program is expensive, and if pushed too far could cause insolvency. 
This has not occurred. Furthermore, it could be interpreted that since KCB must take 
banking to wananchi that it must extend these loans on less than commercial 
conditions. This also has not happened. It appears that KCB is operating in a very 
business-like way with proper controls and procedures". 
In the type of phraseology that has been used in many analogous contexts, banks have 
been exhorted to be more adventurous in their lending policies. "Commercial banks 
and Non-Bank Financial Institutions tend to extend credit primarily on the basis of 
formal security (collateral) while ignoring the assessment of the firm's economic 
potential. Security and collateral procedures and criteria should be reviewed by the 
banks. Bank staff will have to be trained to assess the financial viability and the 
economic growth potential of firms - especially small, newly-established firms -
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seeking bank loans". (Ibid. p.39). This type of urging lacks specificity, and is vague 
about any meaningful agenda by which banks may learn to lend successfully in 
unaccustomed directions. 
Nevertheless, as a result of government pressure and the desire to appear socially 
responsible, banks have made some moves towards helping small business. KCB set 
up a small business advisory service, but over time it tended to become more 
concerned with corporate finance. Barclays has been directing USAID short loans 
to them into small scale rural development at fixed interest rates, with the useful 
proviso that USAID guarantees the loans the bank makes. Various other schemes, 
operated by other banks, for lending to small business, exist, but interviews with 
bankers in Kenya suggest that concern over security, and also a lack of suitably 
trained personnel in branch offices, have held back their growth. 
Finally, a rather distasteful episode in recent Kenyan financial history has tarnished 
the financial sector and reinforced the determination of the major banks to err on the 
side of caution. A relaxation of regulations, aimed at getting more indigenous 
Kenyans into the business of finance, resulted in the formation of a large number of 
small 'banks', N.B.F.l.s and building societies by people with inadequate expertise 
and dubious business ethics. Domestic institutions, in particular parastatals, were 
induced to place deposits with them, and the money accumulated was often loaned by 
the owners to themselves or their relatives and friends for consumption or investing 
in unlikely projects. The inevitable finanCial crash came in 1985-6. A number of 
institutions collapsed, others were kept in limbo - extant but doing no business - as 
liquidation would mean the disappearance of large parastatal deposits on their balance 
sheets. It was observed in early 1990 that government aimed to amalgamate a 
number of the moribund institutions into the Consolidated Bank of Kenya (Njururi 
1990 p.28), but clearly such a project would require a large subsidy to get it under 
way. The result of the crash was a Banking Act in 1989 which allowed the central 
bank more supervision over the deposits and loans of financial institutions. Though 
the purpose of the act was essentially to curb dubious financial behaviour, the effect 
was also - as noted above - to reinforce the traditional preference for lending based 
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on safe conservative criteria (3). 
(c) The money market. 
Unlike in Zimbabwe, the money market in Kenya has remained stunted. Though 
Treasury bills are issued on 91 day, 1 year and 3 year maturity bases, a secondary 
market has been all but absent. The I.F.C. (1984 p.ii) observed, "The only liquidity 
mechanism available to investors is discounting with the Central Bank, an option 
severely discouraged in practice". Furthermore interest rates on Treasury bills have 
been administered - as they have been on many other financial claims - with reserve 
ratios and 'behind the scenes' pressure making sure they are absorbed. Commercial 
bills have generally been held to maturity, given no organised secondary market. 
Indeed the only fairly virile financial short term market has been the overnight 
interbank call market. 
The I.F.C. (Ibid. p.iii and iv) recommended a number of changes including (i) the 
issuing of certificates of deposit, (ii) the freeing of interest rates, (iii) the issue of 
Treasury bills by auction or tender, (iv) free trading of Treasury bills and (v) a 
development of Central Bank rediscount facilities. To parallel all this was seen the 
necessity for more brokerage and dealership services. Echoing these sentiments the 
Kenya Government publication 'Economic Management for Renewed Growth' (1986 
p.38) asserted, "A market should be developed in short-term paper," and 
" .. Government will therefore allow banks and NBFI that meet prescribed criteria to 
issue bearer negotiable certificates of deposit as a first step in introducing private 
instruments". However, change was slow in coming. In the Dec. 1989 edition of 
African Business it was noted that the Reserve Bank was "reviewing the possibility 
of" issuing bearer CDs (Machua 1989), and not till 1990 did they come about. 
(Foreign exchange CDs, in the event, and perhaps not unexpectedly, proved a 
failure.) Another development in the process of liberalisation occurred in Aug. 1989. 
when interest rates were freed. 
Money market analysis is somewhat removed from development finance institutions, 
the focus of the study as a whole. The above discussion, therefore. is mainly 
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important in the implications it has for the capital market and for D.F.I.s. In this 
context the following points may be made., Firstly, the lack of a flexible secondary 
market in money market instruments locks banks and other financial institutions into 
such assets, reducing their liquidity, and so increasing caution in the business of loans 
and advances. Secondly, (and on the other hand) the introduction of CDs should 
increase the amount of deposit money that banks can be sure of keeping for definite 
time periods, so making longer term lending more feasible. Thirdly, non-
administered interest rates should enable banks to respond more readily to market 
trends and market conditions. Though in one sense this enhances the feasibility of 
making term loans, there is always the danger that rising interest rates will make 
existing loans uneconomic. Matching assets and liabilities alleviates, but does not 
solve, the problem. A possible way out is to build interest rate flexibility into the 
arrangements for granting long term credit. 
(d) The capital market. 
The capital market with its stock exchange constituent - an association of a few 
broking firms with no trading floor, and founded in 1954 - has, if anything, been in 
recent years even quieter in Kenya than the equivalent arrangements in Zimbabwe 
(see later). Though real investment expressed as a proportion of National Income has 
been more bullish (see Chapter 3) than in Zimbabwe, the government has been the 
main spender of capital funds, and such private sector industrial investment as has 
occurred has largely been sourced from accumulated profits. 
New share issues locally have been very rare, as indeed has the inflow of new private 
capital funds from abroad (4). Though written in 1984, the aforementioned I.F.C. 
Report (p.27) shows clearly how the onset of Kenyan independence seemed to lead 
very speedily to a diminution of stock market business. "Analysis of selected 
characteristics of the 55 companies which have equity securities listed on the 
Exchange reveals two important features. First, 73 % of these 55 companies were 
incorporated before 1955 and 88 % before 1965, confirming that most of the 
companies that have been established in Kenya in the last 20 years have not raised 
equity publicly. Second, a significant proportion (33 %) of the 55 are foreign 
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controlled. For these, raising additional equity through new local issues may not be 
a course they desire because they want to maintain control or do not have additional 
investment plans in Kenya". As a result, there are not many domestic shares to 
trade, and holders tend to hold on to any securities of the more well-regarded firms 
that they manage to purchase, even though dividends, whether before or after 
taxation, have been indifferent. 
However, as the I.F.C. (Ibid. p.v) pointed out, "In contrast to the limited and 
infrequent issue of corporate securities, the Government is a major issuer of 
long-term loan stocks with maturities ranging from 5-20 years, which is an inevitable 
consequence of the high government spending in excess of revenue ... These fixed 
interest securities have typically been offered at yields which are not competitive with 
alternative private financial assets. Consequently investors consist mainly of a captive 
group of Government financial institutions, notably the National Social Security Fund 
and the Central Bank ... ". 
Several reasons may be put forward for the lack of activity in the Kenya stock 
market. First is the generally high liquidity of many multinational concerns in 
Kenya, due to the restrictions put on repatriating profits and capital: hence they have 
not needed to make local stock issues. Indeed it appears that despite their liquidity 
firms in recent years have been unwilling to put money into government bonds, due 
to the poor return. (An exception to this was an issue in 1990 of very high interest 
Treasury bonds designed to mop up some of this liquidity.) In general rates on 
various cash deposits have been better. A second reason has been caution by private 
industry over new investment in Kenya due to general economic and fiscal 
constraints. As has also been true of Zimbabwe, price controls have squeezed profits 
and cut dividends. At the same time, dividends have been taxed heavily, and such 
dividends as are to be remitted abroad have been subject to the availability of foreign 
exchange. Thirdly and again similar to Zimbabwe, it may not be easy to switch 
locally raised funds into foreign currency so as to import equipment (5). Fourthly 
has been the existence of a number of bureaucratic and unsympathetic procedural 
arrangements cumbering a potential new issue on to the financial markets. The 
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Capital Issues Committee, set up in 1971, and now replaced by the Capital Markets 
Development Authority (see below), discouraged issues by setting prices and 
determining to which favoured people and institutions shares should be allotted. As 
the World Bank cryptically put it in 1985 (p.51), " .. demand becomes a potential 
problem if undue restrictions are placed on the allotment of shares to discriminate in 
favour of individual investors". Fifthly has been the dearth of services surrounding 
a stock market, such as issuing houses, sufficient brokers, investment advice 
facilities. Indeed the stock exchange itself was criticised by the World Bank for 
having no specified accounting and auditing standards. 
The main move by the government towards addressing the factors that reduced the 
effectiveness of the stock market was the passing in 1989 of the Capital Markets 
Authorities Act. The purpose of this act was," ... to establish a Capital Markets 
Authority for the purpose of promoting and facilitating the development of an orderly, 
fair and efficient capital market in Kenya and for connected purposes". (Republic of 
Kenya 1989 p.1275). Broadly, the aim was to remove impediments to the operation 
of the system, set up self-regulatory arrangements, implement government policies 
with regard to the capital market and set up an investor compensation fund (Ibid. 
p.1287). However, considerable scepticism has surrounded the establishment of this 
body: in certain senior business areas, it is seen as just another layer of bureaucracy 
in an already inflated process. For though government and Central Bank were 
expected to retire from their capital market roles in favour of the CMDA, this has not 
happened. 
Clearly substantial other changes are necessary if the stock market is to function more 
effectively. The abolition of price controls, the relaxation of rules on foreign 
remittances, tax reform and greater integrity in official circles are necessary for more 
private sector investment and a parallel growth in capital market arrangements. 
(e) A role for D.F.I.s. 
It is evident that the mainstream financial system in Kenya has - in certain significant 
respects - retreated in recent years. New local share issues have become rare, and 
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there is little company share trading on the stock exchange. The banking sector has 
been tarnished by a scandal and has shown little interest in developing new 
approaches to lending, especially term lending to borrowers other than soundly 
established customers. Only when pressurised by government, have banks gone in 
for new types of business, such as the limited schemes for providing credit to small 
businessmen. Also, private equity capital and long term loans from abroad have 
largely dried up. Although a case could be made out for D.F.l.s - as financial 
gap-fillers - in Kenya at the time of Kenyan independence, their potential role had, 
by the end of the 80s, become that much greater, due to the atrophy of the 
mainstream financial system. 
Recommended work for D.F.I.s in Kenya equates very well with the theoretical 
discussion of Part 1 Chapter 5. In the years after independence - which occurred in 
1963 - an important area to address was small business lending, which had previously 
been neglected. Also medium sized domestic business, which, being relatively new 
or unknown, found it difficult to raise term loans or to float equity capital, stood to 
benefit from D.F.1. assistance. It must be stressed, of course, that the ability of 
D.F.I.s to remain financially viable when taking on this type of work rests on factors 
such as (i) the staff employed by the organisations, who, being both appropriately 
qualified and (mainly) indigenous, should better be able to judge applications than 
conventional bankers, (ii) the willingness of government (and other agencies) - in 
some circumstances - to finance aspects of extension work, (iii) the scope for taking 
a 'longer' view of projects, consequent on D.F.1. liabilities not generally being in the 
form of withdrawable deposits. 
Post-independence D.F.I.s might also be expected to get involved in the following 
types of fairly standard work related to the finance of economic development. 
Firstly, appropriate institutions might partner those incoming foreign companies that 
wish for such an arrangement in setting up new concerns. Secondly they could act 
as conduits for the inflow of development money from foreign and international 
agencIes. This function means the acquisition of foreign exchange and - in all 
likelihood - access to expertise. Thirdly, by selling shares on the stock exchange 
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D.F.I.s both stimulate the development of the stock market and renew the funds 
available for investment. Fourthly, although 'pure' supply-leading by D.F.I.s, 
whereby D.F.I.s, either alone or with a junior partner, actually initiate and carry 
through new projects, has not been ruled out in earlier theoretical discussion in , 
Kenya as elsewhere, it remains a possibility, if hedged with reservations (see Part 1, 
Chapter 5). 
From the standpoint of the early 60s, the two paragraphs above would encompass a 
plausible set of suggestions for D. F. I. operational behaviour. Ceteris paribus, by the 
late 1980s D.F.I.s, if they had set a good example, might have seen some of their 
functions wholly or partly taken over by others. 
However, in practice, D.F.l.s had, potentially, a bigger role than before. Capital 
funds for local business - apart from small businessmen who got funds from specific 
not very successful small business D.F.I.s - were no more easily come by. Local 
share issues were discouraged by the existence of a not very active stock market, and 
incoming foreign private capital had all but dried up. 
ZIMBABWE 
(a) Overall structure. 
Zimbabwe, at independence, had the most comprehensive financial system in 
sub-Saharan Africa, always of course excepting South Africa. A central bank had 
long been in place, originally, in Federation days, as the Bank of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland and later, during the D.D.1. period, as the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia (6). 
A comprehensive apparatus of monetary control based on interest rate manipulation, 
last resort lending and reserve ratios, had been developed, and the business of 
managing foreign payments - mainly via the Swiss franc - in a context of general 
economic and monetary sanctions had sharpened its acumen in the foreign exchange 
markets. It is likely that much experienced expertise was lost to the Bank when 
independence led to quite speedy Africanization. 
The commercial banking sector consisted in the late 80s of five organisations. One 
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of these, the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation, or Zimbank, was a parastatal, having 
formerly been the Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia, in which after independence the 
government bought a controlling interest. Long established subsidiaries of Barclays 
and Standard were the largest banks, controlling between them well over half banking 
deposit liabilities in the country. In general the business operations of all banks were 
(and are) founded on British principles and practice. 
A small but vigorous money market had been established in the 1950s, consisting, 
institutionally, of two merchant banks and, more unusually, of two discount houses. 
These made a market in bills, and so - in Federation days - ensured domestic outlets 
for short term funds that previously had gone abroad, as well as fostering, internally, 
seasonal crop financing facilities. After the 1965 unilateral declaration of 
independence, they were more than ever necessary as a destination for short term 
funds, as residents were no longer able to send such money out of the country. By 
the late 1980s there were four merchant banks, of which two were commercial bank 
subsidiaries (7). 
Several finance companies existed, again to some extent bound up with commercial 
banks, well over 70 insurance companies, and a stock exchange. There were also 
three building societies, a post office savings bank and a clutch of D.F.l.s. 
(b) The high profile of the financial sector. 
In general, a country with a well-developed financial system has little need, or indeed 
no need at all, for specialised D.F.l.s, as the range of financial intermediaries and 
arrangements in existence is able to accommodate most demands for finance. In the 
U.K., for example, though, institutions with a 'D.F.I.-type' character exist, they are 
very marginal in terms of volume of lending in relation to the mainstream financial 
markets. 
The discussion in sub-section (a) above intimates that the financial sector in 
Zimbabwe is, relatively speaking, large, and indeed this is the conclusion of a 
relevant World Bank publication (1989 p.21), "Compared to many developing 
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countries, Zimbabwe has a highly sophisticated financial intermediary system with a 
broadly based institutional structure spanning over banks, finance companies, pension 
funds and insurance companies". It goes on to say, "In terms of the overall degree 
of intermediation, the country's financial. system is comparable with the average 
performance of middle-income developing countries .. ". (Ibid. p.21-3). Some 
interesting statistics bear this out. Total assets of Zimbabwean insurance companies, 
expressed as a percentage of G.N.P., were at the end of 1985 approximately 22%: 
this put it in the same league as countries like Australia, Canada and Japan, and way 
ahead of Nigeria, the Phillipines, Jordan and many other developing countries (Ibid. 
p.22). Financial assets as a whole as a percentage of G.N.P. were about 120%, which 
is comparable with nations like Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (Ibid. p.23). 
However, the substantial private financial system (8) has not meant a high level of 
real investment in the productive sectors of the economy, nor has it addressed the 
trickier types of capital financing. 
With regard to the first point, that is the disappointing level and amount of real 
investment, the World Bank publication indicates that" .. the business community have 
identified three broad sets of constraints: [1] supply-side factors, related primarily to 
the shortage of foreign exchange necessary for imports of essential capital goods and 
industrial inputs; [2] excessive administrative intervention in the areas of investment 
decision-making, labour relations and price controls; and [3] socio-political factors 
reflecting the country's history, strategic location and political evolution ..... their 
importance is underlined by the fact that conventional indicators of investment 
incentives, such as profitability, a supportive tax incentive scheme, and the lack of 
any apparent financial constraint, have been rather favorable in recent years" (Ibid. 
p.l). Possibly the latter observations are a little too optimistic. For example the 
system of price controls has squeezed profits, with the result that rates of return in 
industry - according to an RAL Merchant Bank source (9) - have rarely been above 
the rate of inflation. 
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In general, capital needs in the company sector have been largely self-generated. As 
the World Bank notes, "A high degree of self-financing is a central feature of 
corporate finance in Zimbabwe" (Ibid. p.16). This is clear from the following table, 
where also an upward trend during the 80s in self-financing is evident. 
TABLE 2 
FINANCING SOURCES OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN ZIMBABWE 
(% of total sources of funds) 
Average 
1980-7 1981 1983 1985 1987 
Gross Internal Funds: 59.2 40.1 50.9 82.6 74.1 
Retained earnings 37.0 28.2 10.9 54.3 53.9 
Depreciation 22.2 12.0 40.1 28.3 20.2 
New stock issues 8.3 10.8 9.4 0.5 14.7 
Medium/long term loans 3.2 14.0 4.4 -13.7 -7.2 
Short term loans 9.6 13.4 18.7 6.6 4.7 
Trade credits 17.5 17.5 12.5 19.2 13.9 
Other sources 2.1 4.1 4.1 4.8 -0.2 
SOURCE: Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy 1989 Table 3.1. 
Of the funds available, well over half have gone on investment in fixed assets. The 
average percentage of the total use of funds of non-financial corporations over the 
period 1980-7 was 77.4, and so prompts the World Bank to observe, "This ratio of 
fixed assets is much larger than in other developing countries and is strikingly close 
to the pattern observed in industrialised countries, particularly the U.S. and the U.K" 
(Ibid. p.18). Furthermore, with regard to the self-financing of fixed investment, 
"internal sources of funds were equivalent to over 100% of fixed investment in the 
1980s for both local and foreign-controlled companies" (Ibid. p.17). 
Clearly then the private sector financial system has been of very limited significance 
in raising long term capital funds for industry. This would not necessarily have 
mattered if the volume of funds devoted to real investment had been large relative to 
G.D.P. However in practice the volume of funds devoted to real investment has 
hardly been sufficient even properly to· replace obsolete plant and equipment. 
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" ... although investment rose 8.5 % at constant prices in 1988 to the highest level in 
real terms since 1983, at under 16% of G.D.P. (the average since 1980 has been 
about 17.5%), this was hardly above replacement level". (Stoneman 1990 p.4) It is 
appropriate, therefore, to investigate the reticence of the financial system towards the 
provision of capital funds. 
The failure of capital to flow more abundantly into the generation of industrial growth 
is a function of both demand and supply. Major constraints on the demand of 
existing business for capital funds were identified above in a quote from 'Zimbabwe: 
Private Investment and Government Policy'. Since these constraints will be 
frequently referred to in the later discussions that focus specifically on D.F.I.s it is 
unnecessary to consider them further here. However they are clearly congruent with 
the nature of the socio/political setting described in Chapter 2. From a supply angle 
the understandable caution (or lack of enterprise?) of the mainstream financial 
intermediaries in being prepared to channel long-term funds into economic growth 
except via very well-established, sound borrowers contributes to the low level of real 
investment. In general, and ignoring any social and political functions that are 
expected of them, D.F.I.s in developing countries are supposed to compensate for the 
inadequacies of the mainstream financial systems, and so provide the capital funds 
that are not available elsewhere. In Zimbabwe it would appear neither that the most 
sophisticated financial system in sub-Saharan Africa - always excepting South Africa 
- could boost the carriage of investment funds into industrial growth, nor that the 
D.F.I.s could do so instead. The remainder of this section considers further the first 
point, and the chapters that follow, the second. 
(c) The commercial banks. 
It is not possible to gauge accurately from published statistics how limited was the 
extent of commercial bank involvement in long term lending, but a few conclusions 
may be drawn from the available figures. To begin with, World Bank data already 
referred to above notes that the percentage of non-financial corporations' financing 
from medium/long term loans, at 3.2 % of the total in 1980, rose to a high point of 
32.4% in 1982 and then was down to -7.2% in 1987. (Ibid. p.17). Although 
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medium and long term borrowing is not necessarily from commercial banks, such 
institutions are plausibly part of the source. 
Referring to the combined bank balance sheets, though advances of all time spans are 
covered in the figures, it is noticeable that after 1981 advances to manufacturing 
industry steadily declined as a proportion of total advances to corporate and 
unincorporated enterprises - from 38.2% (1981 average) to 21.9% (1988 September) 
while advances to mining remained static even in money terms. Advances to finance, 
insurance and real estate also declined over this period - from 19% to 10.5%. In 
contrast there were substantial percentage rises in relation to agriculture and - though 
more erratically - distribution. (Quarterly Digest of Statistics March 1989 Table 
20.3). A tentative observation that can be made from this is that the sectors of the 
economy in which Zimbabwe had outclassed most of the rest of Africa, that is 
manufacturing and finance, were becoming less significant in bank business 
operations. Ceteris paribus, long and medium term advances to these sectors, as 
constituents of the totals, will also have fallen in percentage terms. 
Furthermore, as real investment in the economy faltered in the later 80s, the liquidity 
of the banks gradually increased. A liquidity calculation based on cash, money at 
call, Reserve Bank balances and bills rose from a low point of 25.2 % in 1983 to 
34.3 % in September 1988. (Ibid. Table 20.1). 
As already mentioned, a very obvious reason behind the indifferent lending 
experience - short as well as long term - of·banks in the eighties was the insufficiency 
of demand for credit by established industry. Indeed the demand for money from 
foreign companies - defined as firms 25 % or more foreign-owned - was subject to a 
regulation which allowed them to borrow locally only up to an amount equal to 22 % 
of their capital. However it is likely that this as one of many interferences with 
foreign businesses rather than as a direct curb depressed the desire to borrow. 
As referred to above a standard explanation from the supply side of the market in 
relation to the lack of long term lending was of course the banks' traditional caution 
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in this area of business. This is as true of Zimbank, the government-owned bank. as 
the foreign-owned ones: in Feb. 1990, for example, the writer was told that nearly 
all Zimbank loans were in overdraft form, and of less than 5 years to maturity. 
Indeed, the banks' reticence about lending long was understandable in view of the fact 
that loans of all types tended to perform badly. To quote an observation from a 
university discussion paper about lending in Zimbabwe," . .it is not uncommon for 
non-performing loans to be some eight times larger than banks own up to in their 
published accounts". (Roe 1988 p.4). And very graphically, the Head of Corporate 
Finance in Zimbank, with reference to financing the small industrialist, noted," At the 
moment we do lend, and we are taking tremendous knocks. When we send someone 
out to the growth points, we find there is nothing there". (Lorrimer 1989). It is not 
surprising that Roe writes (p.5), "Banks which are preoccupied with survival usually 
make different portfolio decisions from those getting on with normal day-to-day 
business" . 
Despite the reluctance of banks to lend on a long term basis other than to very safe 
firms, government pressure has caused banks to become involved in specialised small 
business financing arrangements. In the late 80s, the Credit Guarantee Co. was set 
up, with shares owned by the commercial banks and the central bank. Potential small 
business borrowers were screened by this organisation, which then recommended 
bank lending to those who seemed to have viable business plans. The RBZ would 
reimburse banks for 50% of defaults. This type of scheme is not uncommon in the 
developing world, and, like many others, it has not - at the time of writing - had 
much impact. Managing small business lending involves much specialised expertise, 
and the CGC did not have it. Banks also were short of such skills. Finally, the RBZ 
tended to show reluctance in covering its share of bad debts. 
Reputedly banks began instead to develop their own personal small business credit 
schemes, where they could match demand for loans to the resources they had 
available. Part I Ch 4 discussed the problems related to small scale lending, and 
there are no especial grounds for believing that these miscellaneous bank schemes will 
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have more than a marginal effect. The following Reserve Bank statement gives the 
impression of being little more than a ritual wringing of hands over a situation which 
had not been changing and was not likely to change. "In the past, the credit policies 
of banks and financial institutions have tended to channel more credit to established 
businesses than to small and newly founded businesses. The Reserve Bank is working 
out modalities with banks and other financial institutions to redress the historical 
imbalance as far as access and distribution of credit is concerned". (Herald 28th Oct. 
1989). 
(d) Merchant banks. 
The business of merchant banks in Zimbabwe is much the same as that of the U.K. 
merchant banks, on which of course they are modelled. Accepting bills - hence the 
generally used alternative designation 'acceptance houses' - is the greatest single 
source of income, but they have been active in a number of other financial areas. 
Their role as issuing houses, however, has declined with the drop in new share 
Issues. 
A reseach paper from the University of Zimbabwe identified their role in term loans 
in the early 80s - " ... merchant banks specialise in medium term loans which are 
primarily used to finance capital development projects". (Chirombe et al. 1981 p.3) 
- and this function has continued. Hence these organisations do constitute a source 
of capital - outside the government sector (10) - for industry in Zimbabwe, and in that 
certain of them are subsidiaries of commercial banks it would partially explain why 
their parents avoid long lending themselves. However, there are important 
qualifications to note. Firstly the merchant banks are only concerned with lending 
to established, mainly foreign-owned companies, with proven records. Secondly 
'loans and advances' - for whatever length of time - in merchant bank balance sheets 
are small compared with commercial bank 'advances'. For example, in August 1988 
they amounted to $280.2m as compared with the commercial banks' $1400.9m. 
(Quarterly Digest op.cit. Tables 20.3 and 21.1) and indeed discussions in Zimbabwe 
revealed that by no means all of this amount constitutes term lending. 
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Lack of viable demand may once again be intimated as the main factor behind this, 
a circumstance supported by evidence from another set of intermediaries. For 
example, the life assurance institutions have been obliged to put 55 % of their funds 
into government and municipal paper - it was 60% until December 1989 (11) - and 
have considered it wise to put 20% into property, so leaving only a minority of funds 
for lending to business: demand, however, fell short of what was available (12). The 
figures quoted earlier on long and medium term borrowing by industry tend to 
corroborate this. 
(e) Interest rates. 
During the 1980s, official determination of interest rates prevented the lending 
institutions responding to the market as economic conditions changed. Bank Rate, for 
example, until 1981 at 4.5%, was then raised to 9%, and ever after kept at this level. 
All other important rates, including overdraft minimums, were pegged to this. At the 
end of the decade there were signs of more flexibility, but it was administered 
flexibility, reflecting government socio-economic policy, and institutions became no 
freer to determine rates as they thought fit than before. Thus the Herald (21 st Dec. 
1989) observes, "The Government has made it easier and cheaper to borrow money 
- but only if it is used to create jobs, increase productivity and boost exports". 
Financial repression, therefore, continued. 
(t) The capital market. 
As with Kenya, by 'capital market' is meant the arrangements pertaining to the issue 
of company securities and government stock, and the trading of this paper. Given the 
nature of the current investigation the principal focus in the paragraphs below is on 
company securities. 
As early as 1896 a stock exchange was set up in Southern Rhodesia's - as it was then 
_ second city, Bulawayo, and later, facilities were established in Salisbury (Harare). 
This remarkably prompt development so soon after the territory became occupied by 
Europeans must be seen in terms of the rather different circumstances surrounding the 
occupation of Zambezia as opposed to other parts of Africa that came under British 
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control. Southern Rhodesia was a creation from Cape Province of an influx of 
settlers determined to create a new white dominion, and they lost no time in 
fashioning all the sophisticated appurtenances of a western society with which they 
were familiar: British overall control was a reluctant extra on to a mainly 
domestically run system. Elsewhere British rule came first, and only much later 
when the settlers had found their feet under the imperial umbrella did they consider 
the question of securities markets. And indeed in most colonies formalised securities 
exchange mechanisms were never forged. 
In 1975 all stock exchange business in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was concentrated in 
Salisbury (Harare). After legal independence the new government, armed with 
socialist credentials, did not favour the perpetuation of a stock exchange, but 
anecdotal evidence from interviews with financiers suggests that they were persuaded 
to let it continue. However business at the stock exchange has for some years been 
slack. After a boom period in the early 80s, when there was a number of new issues 
and trading in stock was brisk, turnover has been low as a dearth of new issues has 
starved the market of paper, and holders, flush with liquidity, have tended to hold on 
to such shares as they can get hold of. Van Agtmael (1984 p.6) as early as 1984 
noted that a number of brokers had left the business and merchant banks were 
orientating their business even more markedly than before to trade finance rather than 
securities. 
A glance at a few pertinent statistics will clarify the quiet profile of the Zimbabwe 
stock exchange. The number of firms listed - 53 in mid-1988 (IFC 1988 p.70) - is 
only a fraction of those operating in the country, and has been gradually falling, 
though the fall of 13 since independence has been due to merger and take-over rather 
than liquidation. Numbers of new listings have been negligible in the 1980s. The 
figures for market capitalisation appear to rise quite substantially over the years 
shown, but in fact the percentage rises are very close to the rises in the local share 
index. For example, parallel with the rise of 60.5 % in Zimbabwe dollar market 
capitalisation from 2nd quarter 1987 to 2nd quarter 1988 and 48.1 % in U.S. dollar 
terms (I.F.C. Ibid p.70) the index went up 53.5%. And, since figures in Table 3 are 
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at current values, trading value actually fell in real terms. 
TABLE 3 
ZIMBABWE STOCK EXCHANGE STATISTICS (mil.) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
2nd 2nd 
quarter quarter 
Market Capitalisation: 
In Zimbabwe dollars 264 591 688 817 1308 
In U. S. dollars 176 360 410 488 723 
Trading Value 
In Zimbabwe dollars 8 14 20 10 12 
In U.S. dollars 6 9 12 6 7 
SOURCE: IFC op.cit p.70 
Given the paucity of trading, Zimbabwe stock exchange prices over the years showed 
very little volatility. The twice daily call-over at the Harare stock exchange has led 
to generally upward adjustments - as indicated above - in line with market forces and 
analogous movements in stock market prices elsewhere. 
In Part 1 it was made clear that a stock exchange - or of course some less formalised 
method of securities trading - cannot be a 'pure' supply-leader of the economic 
development process in any direct sense .. Rather is it an indirect leader in that its 
existence may encourage stock issues and hence the real economic results that follow 
the investment of funds raised. However the stock market in Zimbabwe, despite its 
age and history of sometimes frenetic activity, has in recent years failed to be other 
than a marginal, and indeed declining factor in the fostering of economic growth. 
Reasons for this retreat are not hard to find. Inevitably, given the theoretically leftist 
stance of the Zimbabwe government, there has been some anxiety about the continued 
existence of arrangements that were, as far as orthodox political opinion was 
concerned, ideologically suspect. (As indicated above, there was a chance that the 
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stock exchange would have been closed down after independence.) Probably, at the 
beginning of the second decade of independence, this politically-linked worry has 
subsided. However economic and administrative concerns remain, irrespective of 
governmental ideological attitudes. 
Firstly, there is the foreign exchange situation. For a reputable firm to raise money 
locally via issuing shares would hardly have been a problem, particularly in the later 
80s, when much other business became liquid. However, to translate the funds raised 
into foreign exchange for the import of new equipment is another matter, given the 
rigorous foreign exchange conservation policy of the central bank. Indeed, before 
considering going to the market it has been essential first of all to obtain a foreign 
exchange allocation (13). 
Secondl y, general worry about the state of and prospects for the Zi mbabwean 
economy together with the associated indifferent returns on real investment (see 
Chapter 3) inhibited new investment. 
Thirdly, a number of inefficiencies and restrictions bore down on potential industrial 
expansion. Included were a vigorous local employment policy, which prevented the 
employment of expatriates except in very specialised circumstances (14), price 
controls, and considerable administrative procedures before an issue of capital could 
be made and/or real investment go ahead. The Investment Centre, the official 
organisation set up to expedite the sanctioning of new investments - whether or not 
involving a stock issue - was only able to approve investments up to the value of 
$5m, and, according to interview evidence, was proving to be cumbersome and slow. 
All of these factors could be expected to increase firms' costs - or potential costs -
and so discourage new real investment. 
In the light of the above, the scope for new local share issues was reduced. Hence the 
increase in stock market trading, which might have followed from the existence of a 
larger pool of equities in Zimbabwe, did not happen. The lack of D.F.!. participation 
in the stock market, an issue considered more fully in Chapter 7, may have 
163 
contributed to the market's stagnation, but was by no means the only factor. 
(g) A place for D.F.I.s in Zimbabwe. 
There appears to be a role for D.F.I.s 10 Zimbabwe that, in terms of the 
recommendations in Pt 1 Chs 4 and 5, is fairly standard. Also, it is much the same 
as the role discussed for D.F.I.s in Kenya. 
The mainstream private sector financial system in Zimbabwe is, by African standards, 
mature. Intermediaries do make long term loans, though, as may be expected, only 
to established borrowers who are considered very unlikely to default. Indeed, the 
writer at interviews found some reticence about the extent of this type of lending, and 
the criteria for making loans. There is a place for D.F.I.s in being prepared to lend 
more widely in the community, particularly in the small business sector, which is 
always starved of credit. Such a recommendation does not imply that D.F.I.s should 
make an overall loss, though it is not appropriate that D.F.I.s profit-maximise. (see 
Appendix 2). With externally-financed help and support, the risks that D.F.I.s face 
in more advanturous lending are reduced. And, given the extensive commercial bank 
branch networks in Zimbabwe, a system might be developed whereby D. F. I. s work 
in outlying areas through these bank office, and possibly employ some bank funds. 
Though it was noted above that mainstream intermediaries are prepared to lend long 
to established customers, a major practical constraint on this business is that the 
money is generally not in foreign exchange. Since long term borrowing typical I y 
requires the import of equipment, this IS a major problem, given the perennial 
Zimbabwe foreign exchange shortage. If D.F.I.s can become conduits into the 
country for foreign exchange from development agencies overseas which - typically 
- tend to prefer this route over others, they are useful facilitators of new real 
investment. Clearly a necessary proviso is that a workable formula for handling 
foreign exchange risk can be established. 
Multinational companies have been reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe in recent years. 
Cooperation with D.F.I.s in partnership ventures may attract in some companies, who 
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value not having to provide all the necessary capital themselves, and who expect 
advantages from being associated with official or semi-official bodies. On the other 
hand, of course, when the partnership arrangement for incoming firms is compulsory, 
those firms who do not like it stay away.D.F.I.s, therefore, have a role as willing 
partners in new ventures, if asked, but to maximise the inflow of new capital into 
industry and commerce, this type of linkage should be optional, both for the 
interested firm, and for the D.F.I. 
Finally a stock market revival is necessary in order to create the conditions whereby 
an ever-widening group of businesses are able (and have the incentive) to raise capital 
funds by issuing shares locally. Government liberalisation measures and the 
relaxation of various restrictions are of paramount importance in this. However, 
D.F.I.s can have an important role buying shares of domestic firms that go public, 
joining with domestic firms in the finance of new ventures, and selling shares of 
mature firms on the stock exchange. This latter activity both stimulates stock market 
trading and releases funds for new D.F.I. investment. 
SUMMARY 
In all developing economies a number of 'difficult' financing areas can be identified 
which mainstream intermediaries tend to avoid but which D.F.I.s may plausibly be 
expected to try and cover. In the fulness of time, D.F.I. functions may well be more 
and more taken over by other intermediaries as they emulate the example set and as 
greater sophistication in business and finance lead to better understanding and 
management of risk. If, indeed, D.F.I.s work themselves out of a job, they can be 
seen to have been highly successful. 
In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, the scope - in theory - for D.F.I.s seems to have been 
greater some years after political independence than at independence. In certain 
respects the existing existing financial systems were more cautious and less active 
than before. This seems to be due to overall economic circumstances and the effects 
of government policies. How the D.F.I.s slotted into this changing scenario is the 
subject of the next few chapters. 
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NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 4 
1. This need not be significant. Discount houses are a peculiarly British invention 
which were cloned in certain British colonies. Other countries have done without 
them. 
2. An interview in 1990 with a senior official of Barclays Bank of Kenya 
corroborated these points. He observed also that though another supposed reason for 
not lending long was the riskiness of making long term loans from short term 
deposits, in fact savings deposits were a substantial part of the whole. Unfortunately 
figures of this degree of detail are not given in the Annual Reports. 
3. A similar episode occurred in Nigeria 20 years before this. See C. V. Brown's 
book 'The Nigerian Banking System' (O.U.P. 1964). 
4. Interviews led to some fairly devastating comments on the subject of foreign 
inward investment. Policy was felt to be very confused. On the one hand it was 
wanted, but (a) the process was cumbered by red tape, and (b) ministers only wanted 
it in on their own terms. This did not necessarily mean using the fairly objective and 
respectable device, whereby a multinational associates with aD. F. I.: ministers 
wanted to arrange the accrual of control and profits to themselves. 
5. Anecdotal evidence has it that foreign exchange may usually be obtained if 
gratuities are passed to the right persons. 
6. For a detailed account of financial developments in the period of the Central 
African Federation, see R.A. Sowelem - 'Towards Financial Independence in a 
Developing Economy' - Allen and Unwin 1967,7. Rhodesian central banking during 
about half the U .D.1. period is analysed in J .E. Maynard - 'Central Banking in the 
Economies of Central Africa' - unpublished M.Phil. thesis held in Reading University 
library . 
166 
7. The merchant banks are Syfrets, the Standard Merchant Bank, the Merchant 
Bank of Central Africa and RAL Merchant Bank. Surprisingly, 'RAL' stands for 
Rhodesian Acceptances Ltd. 
8. For convenience Zimbank is included in the 'private' financial system. 
9. From an interview with a senior banking official. 
10. Strictly speaking, Syfrets Merchant Bank is in the public sector, but since it 
appears, with its parent, Zimbank, to operate fairly independently of government, it 
is included, at this point in the text, with the other merchant banks, in the private 
sector. 
11. A passage from 'Banks cut interest on business loans' in the 'Herald' of 21st 
Dec. 1989 reads," .. the legal provision that insurance companies and pension funds 
must invest 60% of their assets in prescribed assets will be eased to 55 % to 
encourage them to invest more in the productive sectors". The trouble with this 
attitude is that it does not consider whether the demand for funds is there. 
12. From an interview in Feb. 1990 with a senior officer of the Prudential. 
13. From an interview with a stockbroker. 
14. An industrialist explained that, not infrequently, when employers were obliged 
to take more inadequately qualified local people on to the management staff, they 
generally became 'personnel managers'. 
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Chapter 5 
THE (KENYAN) INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORA TION 
INTRODUCTION 
The I.C.D.C. of Kenya, a 100% government-owned organisation, was set up in 1954 
during colonial days as the Industrial Development Corporation, and became the 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation - "a name which reflects the full 
scope of its activities" (I.C.D.C. c.1987 p.4) - in 1967 under the terms of a new Act. 
Though, during its years of existence, it has concentrated on the the finance of 
secondary and tertiary industry, it has been prepared to put money into primary 
production, such as fishing, where such business was on a corporate basis. 
From the outset it has been a government-sponsored and financed institution, though 
other interests have been involved in providing money, such as commercial banks and 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation. At first only equity finance was 
provided, but later the organisation began to undertake term lending as well, 
principally, according to an I.C.D.C. official, for rehabilitation purposes, smce 
concerns in sufficient trouble to require such credit would not be able to acquire it 
from mainstream commercial financial intermediaries (1). Though certain loans, such 
as one in existence in the late eighties in favour of the Development Finance 
Corporation of Kenya, were not made for purposes of rehabilitation, these are 
exceptions. 
THE REMIT 
The purpose of the original I.D.C. was to assist in the establishment and development 
of local industries in a financial context where there was little generation of equity 
capital. Though it was not specifically a tailored 'small business' organisation, the 
accent was on the smaller end of the market, and - perhaps unusually in a colonial 
context - it was understood that Kenyan African involvement in industry and 
commerce was to be supported. Leys (1984 p.25) reports that It ••• the political 
turbulence of the 1950s depressed local capitalism ... the number of African private 
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companies dropped from 15 % of the total (in competition with European and Asian 
firms) to 2 % in 1953, and zero in 1954 .. ", and there was a desire to revive African 
business. However in this aim, given the problem of assessing the viability of much 
indigenous African enterprise schemes, the I.D.C. was not very successful, and 
foreign-owned subsidiaries and Kenyan European and Asian firms mainly benefitted. 
Leys (Ibid.) reports that, "As late as 1959, the bulk of the formal economy was in 
European hands". 
The I.D.C. clearly saw itselfas a 'revolving capital' organisation, for as late as 1967, 
four years after independence, the I.C.D.C. Act. 7 of 1967, echoing Act. 63 of 1954, 
stipulated that the Corporation (under its new name) "shall have regard to the 
desirability of requiring early liquidation of any loan or investment in order to ensure 
as far as possible that the liquid resources of the Corporation may be available for 
other purposes ... " (s.3 [2c] quoted in Henley 1989 p.5). It is indeed interesting to 
note that the Kenya Stock Exchange was established in 1954, the same year as the 
I.D.C., and though there was no explicit identification of the I.D.C. as an agent for 
nurturing the stock market, the disposal of shares by it would contribute to this end. 
Despite the superficial continuity, with independence came change. A more explicit 
commitment to the control of private enterprise within the terms of 'African' 
socialism led to a suggested higher profile for the - now - I.C.D.C. in its association 
with the private sector". The government expects the private sector to playa large 
role in development, subject, however, to firm controls and explicit guidance when 
necessary ....... Partnerships with private capital will also be instituted by the 
D.F.C.K. and I.C.D.C". (Republic of Kenya 1967 p.42-3). More explicitly, though 
an attempt in 1970 to define the I.C.D.C. 's role and activities indicated an expanded 
remit, the lack of precision in the specifications allowed for much discretion and 
partiality amongst those who ran the organisation (I. C. D. C. 1970). 
There was a move away from the theoretic emphasis on smaller business, and now 
large projects would explicitly qualify for I.C.D.C. participation, on the grounds that 
finance on a substantial scale was less easily procurable than modest funds. 
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Potentially profitable projects "needing encouragement" would be favoured, as would 
projects that were profitable but risky. Clearly there is something of a contradiction 
in terms here, though the implication suggests a notion to help local concerns that 
cannot raise capital easily. Indeed, elsewhere it is stated, " ... it was felt that the 
commercial banks were not granting enough loans to Africans to finance reasonable 
business" (Ibid. p.8) and that therefore the I.C.D.C. should fill the gap. Also, the 
I.C.D.C. should favour "marginal" projects, or those in which there was a strong 
public interest, such as mining ventures. However in relation to all this guidance on 
operational behaviour, and potentionally very much in conflict with it, the I.C.D.C. 
was supposed to give a high priority to profitability, the saving or earning of foreign 
exchange, and the creation of employment. Perhaps more usefully, it had to consider 
the technical and managerial requirements for any project, and whether these were 
available, and also the necessity or not for foreign participation. 
That the I.C.D.C. had moved to being much more than before a government 
pressured organisation is clear from a statement by the Chairman in a later 'Role and 
Activities' publication. "The Corporation must always take into account the various 
five-year Development Plans published by the government from time to time as well 
as other major Government policy statements and guidelines designed to accommodate 
changing economic realities and priorities". (Gatei from I.C.D.C. c.1987 op. cit. p. 
1) This type of official suasion is indicated later in the same publication in the 
following words (p.4): "After independence the Corporation underwent several 
structural and policy changes in order to reflect the aspirations of a new nation .. " .. 
Gatei's reference to Development Plans is well illustrated by the statements that the 
I.C.D.C. "has been instrumental in increasing Government control of the 
manufacturing sector" (Republic of Kenya 1979 p. 153), and "The Government will 
continue to participate as necessary with the private sector in the promotion and profit 
of jointly-owned enterprises engaged in strategic economic activities". (Ibid. p.27). 
However, by the end of the next decade a run of economic vicissitudes and poor 
D.F.I. experience had led to Development Plan recommendations more in keeping 
with the behaviour of the former I.D.C. "Some development companies will divest 
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themselves of their present portfolios in the course of this Plan period and revert to 
their original roles as providers of venture capital". (Republic of Kenya 1989 p. 70). 
The exact format of the I.C.D.C. 's remit since independence has not, therefore, been 
very well delineated. Annual Reports say little that is specific, 'Role and Activities' 
booklets hint but do not properly explain. This leaves the field wide open for 
operational behaviour that can be subject to political and personal pressures. A study 
of what the I.C.D.C. has actually done will therefore be more illuminating. 
However, before looking into this matter, it is necessary to discuss two subsidiary 
arrangements that the I.C.D.C. supports beyond its mainstream activities. Firstly, 
in that the I.D.C. in colonial days had failed properly to address the problem of small 
business finance, in 1965 a Small Industries Loans Scheme was established. It 
"operates as a revolving fund .... for the purchase of industrial machinery and 
equipment, construction or purchase of industrial premises and, for limited cases, 
provides the initial working capital requirements for the project". (I.C.D.C. c.1987 
op.cit. p.5). It was designed to operate through four channels, defined as the 
Property Loans Scheme, the Commercial Loans Scheme, the Small Industrial Loans 
Scheme and the Machinery Loans Scheme, though the lack of precision in the 
separate arrangements has meant that a prospective borrower can often quite logically 
apply for money from more than one of them. As is intimated, finance is meant to 
be provided as credit rather than equity. 
Secondly there exists the I.C.D.C. Investment Co. Ltd., which has been the only 
obvious example of the I. C. D. C. being prepared to dispose of some of its assets to 
the public. The formation of this organisation - in all but name an investment trust 
- was in 1967, its purpose being "to buy shares in profitable companies and to sell 
its own shares to African citizens" (Leys 1975 p.I64-5). To begin with it bought 
non-I.C.D.C.-owned shares, though later a number of I.C.D.C. stocks were spun off 
into it (Henley op.cit. p.5). In 1987 it held investments listed as worth KShs.83m. 
Of these KShs.3.5m were quoted investments, all in non-I.C.D.C.-linked companies. 
and KShs. 79.5m unquoted investments, most in I.C.D.C.-linked companies (I.e.D.C. 
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Inv. Co. Annual Report for 1986/7 p.14). Since all the investments are given at cost, 
it is not obvious what the current market valuation would be. However, accepting 
the uncertainty of the figures, something like one tenth of I.C.D.C. investments 
appear to have gone to the I.C.D.C. Inv. Co. In the main, as the above quote from 
Leys would suggest, they are shares in I.C.D.C.-linked companies that are profitable 
(see later for discussion of this issue), such as N.A.S. (National Airport Services) and 
Minet Insurance, so the Investment Co. overall has been able to remain viable. 
Most of the rest of this chapter will focus on the 'mainstream' activities of the 
I.C.D.C., that is the business of lending to and investing in substantial companies. 
Only towards the end will the work of the Small Loans Scheme be considered. There 
is no need to mention the I.C.D.C. Investment Co. again. 
OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
(a) Introduction. 
The actual behaviour of the I.C.D.C. towards investment and divestment seems to 
have been motivated more by pragmatism, whim and politico/ideological aspirations 
than by a clear and efficient conception of how financial resources might best be 
devoted towards the achievement of sustained economic development. The pragmatic 
stance is related to a desire to remain financially viable, however questionably 
financial viability may on paper be presented: the normative influence is related to 
(African) Kenyanisation, and not too well explained social aspirations. 
(b) Partnership. 
The move towards 'partnership' with foreign enterprise (and private enterprise 
generally) was under way soon after independence. The process was traced by Leys. 
"Perhaps a growing awareness of the ultimate limitations on the effectiveness of 
controlling foreign companies which, taken as a whole, disposed of far greater 
resources and skills than the government, contributed to a revival of interest in public 
ownership towards the end of the 1960s, especially since it had become clear by then 
that a certain amount of nationalization ...... was now widely accepted by international 
business". (Leys 1975 p.126). However it seems to have become quickly 
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appreciated that nationalization changed the ownership of assets without altering the 
stock, and that an unlooked-for result was the migration of capital and skills. Hence 
the emphasis shifted to joint participation in new ventures. Furthermore," Staking 
out a government interest in new investments had the additional advantage that the 
government would have some share in the profitability of enterprises which enjoyed 
a high level of protection. Moreover, joint ventures with foreign private capital could 
give the government control over investments without having to finance them fully 
itself .. ". (Ibid. p.131). And so, "The main instruments for this policy were the 
Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), which participated in 
the equity of foreign companies and also lent money to them .. ". (Ibid. p.131). To 
support this aim of government, the restriction on local bank borrowing by foreign 
companies to 20% of the value of the investment (Exchange Control Notice No. 19 
referred to in Henley and Maynard (1991 p.232-233)) made foreign firms more ready 
to go into partnership with the I.C.D.C., unless of course the constraint discouraged 
them from coming at all. 
In the years after independence, according to official comment (see Chapter 3), there 
was considerable foreign interest in partnership ventures, and hence the I.C.D.C. lists 
amongst its holdings a number of established multinational names: later, 
however, with adverse economic conditions and the bureaucratic and legislative 
disadvantages related to doing business in Kenya, foreign capital inflows all but dried 
up. Indeed it was remarked (2) that in 1975 the I.C.D.C. "pushed for" -
successfully, as it turned out - General Motors to set up in the country. Furthermore, 
it is unclear how much new capital investment from abroad has been lost to Kenya 
because of the insistence on partnership with domestic organisations. Though some 
firms have valued the link - one expatriate executive said he would not want the 
I.C.D.C. to dispose of its holding in his company - others clearly prefer complete 
autonomy. 
The I.C.D.C. did not only expand its assets via association with new incoming 
capital. Henley (1989 p.5) notes that it went in for buying existing stock through the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange. And rather more informally, as an official of Barclays Bank 
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observed (3), the government negotiated with shareholders in some concerns to buy 
their holdings. 
And in practice it has not necessarily been true that - as Leys suggested - equity 
participation with foreign interests has meant control by the 1. C. D. C. An official of 
the organisation was quite prepared to admit (4) that, given foreign managerial and 
technical expertise, the I.C.D.C. was not in control of the most important aspects of 
the administration of a company even with a majority capital holding. 
An interesting question arises as to what indulgences private enterprise/I.C.D.C. 
concerns were (and are) afforded by government in order to foster their prosperity, 
so that mutually acceptable rent income can be generated (see Appendix 1 for 
theoretical discussion). Evidence must be largely anecdotal, and the fact that 
I.C.D.C. income actually received comes mainly from the big multinational concerns 
with which it is linked may just testify to the superior managerial abilities and useful 
global connections of those multinationals .. An official of one concern indicated that 
although competing imports were in theory kept out, appropriate payments made by 
firms abroad to the 'right' people in government and civil service could get round the 
ban. Hence in the case of his firm he found imported goods undercutting his products. 
Furthermore, he was still obliged to pay duties on imported materials and 
components, because government "needed the money". An official of General 
Motors enlarged on the - theoretical - ban on competing imports, but could see no 
further advantages beyond the fact that an I.C.D.C. subsidiary, being technically a 
parastatal, would be 'listened to', and that major ones (5) were authorised to sell at 
preferential rates in the regional Preferential Trading Area. 
The policy of the Kenya Government towards ensuring that I.C.D.C. companies, 
whether foreign- or local-linked, are domestic monopolies, by disallowing the 
establishment of competitors, has been inconsistent. General Motors, for example, 
has two firms in Kenya competing with it, whereas N.A.S. and Kenya National 
Trading Corporation are on their own. Furthermore, whatever advantages I. C. D. C. 
firms were (or are) afforded can be soured by various restrictions. Tariffs on 
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essential imports have been mentioned, and foreign exchange for imports and for 
profit repatriation by foreign firms is limited by a rather ad hoc system of currency 
allocation. 
A further intended by-product of I.C.D.C.lprivate enterprise association in industry 
was to further Africanization. Informal pressure on foreign companies in the 
post-independence period that they dispose of shares locally had resulted in a 
disproportionate amount going to Kenyan Asians, "since Asians possessed so much 
spare cash". (Leys op.cit p.129) (6). Hence, joint I.C.D.C.lprivate enterprise 
ventures would mean that "a large share of the planned new expansion was African 
owned and managed". (Republic of Kenya 1963 p.30). There were, however, 
further ways in which the I.C.D.C. was used to try and further Africanization, other 
than at the official level. It appears, for example, that the bulk of the money loaned 
under the terms of the Small Loans Scheme went - in the early years of independence 
- to "finance the enforced take-over by Africans of Asian businesses (mainly in 
distribution) , which was made possible by new legislation implemented in 1968 .. ". 
(Okello 1973 p.80) And to support these developments, in 1965 a subsidiary, the 
Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) was established. A monopolist in the 
large scale wholesaling of a number of products, in general it was intended to work 
downstream only through African distributors. 
(c) Acquisitions of abandoned companies. 
As well as building up its portfolio of subsidiaries and associates by 'partnership' 
arrangements, the I.e. D.C. acquired a number of businesses, moribund and often 
heavil y in debt, that their owners abandoned (7). There was a strong social aspect 
to this function, since the aim was partly to try and preserve jobs. However it was 
not necessarily true that all such firms were destined to be inevitable loss-makers. 
Some businesses abandoned by owners keen to leave Kenya or obtained at 
knock-down prices could plausibly be turned round and made to yield profits. 
However until the RBC Report on Kenyan DFIs in 1989, little appears to have been 
done to properly address the problems of these concerns, and for the most part they 
became drains on I.C.D.C. funds, or remained dormant. 
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(d) Divestment. 
Finally, the idea of divesting assets to raise fresh capital, while always permitted to 
the I.C.D.C., and indeed recently reiterated (see last section), has been approached 
in a very cautious and piecemeal way. The writer was advised that there were 
divergent views on the subject, and it needed to be established in each case what the 
reasons were for selling off assets. It was not desirable that the private sector, having 
taken over holdings in formerly I.C.D.C.-controlled concerns, should indulge in asset 
stripping. In general, therefore, selling I.C.D.C. assets was not even in theory 
looked at as an ongoing process, and would only occur when there was a deliberate 
decision to privatise a concern. Perhaps most significantly, there was no enthusiasm 
for selling off holdings in profitable companies, since the I. C. D. C. relied on returns 
from these, in order to help cover its expenses (8). 
(e) Summary. 
The last chapter suggested a list of specific functions available for a D.F.I. in Kenya. 
Only to a limited extent have the activities of the I.C.D.C. been congruent with them. 
In the past some foreign capital may have been attracted into the country by the 
apparent advantages of I.C.D.C. linkage, but these advantages have not proved 
significant enough to counterbalance the unattractiveness of undertaking investment 
in Kenya in the last decade. Miller (1984 p.124) notes that, IIIn the Moi years ll - that 
is since 1978 - IIthere has been a leveling off of foreign corporate investment II . Apart 
from this, little divestment has taken place, nor is there much in the offing. Hence 
the I.C.D.C. has not been strong as a revolving capital organisation, nor has it 
contributed to stock market development. Money does not go to local enterprise 
except via the Small Loans Scheme, and here the main recipients have been small 
African businessmen wanting to buyout Asians in distribution. There has little taste 
for 'risk', (see remarks in last section) except in so far as buying up abandoned 
concerns qualifies, but in the light of later discussion on I.C.D.C. finances, this is not 
unsurprising. Lastly, the desire of the Corporation to hang on to its stakes in concerns 
that are - or ought to be - profitable, certainly makes accounting sense, but whether 
this activity qualifies as 'development' is another matter. 
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The next task is to consider how successful the I.C.D.C. has been in (i) ensuring its 
own financial viability, and (ii) assisting the process of economic growth by fostering 
the prosperity of the industrial and commercial ventures in which it has financial 
interest. The following sections consider these matters, after which it will be possible 
to assess overall the corporation's contribution to the development of the Kenyan 
economy. 
INTERNAL FINANCIAL POSITION 
(a) Introduction. 
Though the I.C.D.C. (and its earlier I.D.C. manifestation) has been in existence since 
1954, the purpose of the present study is not so much to conduct an historical survey 
as to look into the present-day condition of selected D.F.Is. Hence in the main 
figures and analysis below will relate to recent years. 
In general, official statements on D.F.I. s in developing countries call for financial 
viability, and, as was intimated earlier, the I.C.D.C. is no exception to this rule. The 
purpose of this section, therefore, is to establish whether the I.C.D.C. has been 
viable, and if so, how solvency has been achieved. 
(b) Total funds employed. 
The figures in the table below give an idea of the I. C. D. C. 's perception of the source 
deployment of the funds it employs. 
TABL'E 1 
TOTAL FUNDS EMPLOYED BY THE I.C.D.C.(KShs.m) 
As at end 
of June 
1981 
1985 
1987 
1989 
Kenya 
Gov. Funds 
581.1 
682.2 
719.0 
804.4 
Local Bank 
Loans 
26.7 
59.8 
34.3 
43.2 
D.E.G.* 
Loans 
1.3 
80.3 
121.4 
273.6 
Cap. & 
Rev. Reserves 
83.6 
211.4 
274.9 
416.9 
SOURCE: VARIOUS I.C.D.C. ANNUAL REPORTS 
Total 
692.7 
1033.7 
1149.6 
1538.0 
* Deutsche Gesellschaft Wirtschaftliche, a German development finance agency. 
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As is clear, the majority of funds employed are from the Kenya government. Though 
as a proportion of the whole government funding has steadily fallen - from 78 % in 
1981 to 52 % in 1989 - the increases in absolute terms have been substantial, and 
represent a continuous inflow of grants, loans - which tend to become de facto grants 
(see later) - and interest capitalisation. Furthermore, Annual Reports have shown 
some uncertainty about the categorisation and management of government money. 
As the Auditor in the 1986-7 Annual Report states, "In the previous year's report, 
attention of the Corporation was drawn to the fact that agreement had not been 
reached on loans and grants received from government particularly regarding the total 
amount, the analysis between loans and grants, the accrual of interest as well as on 
the terms of repayment of such funds. The Corporation has, as in the previous year, 
indicated that discussions with Government regarding the issue are still in progress. 
Until agreement is reached on the matter, it is uncertain whether or not the amounts 
shown in the Balance Sheet as Government Grants and Loans are fairly stated, 
whether or not the profit for the year and prior years will require revision for the 
accruals of interest payable on any of the funds that are finally agreed to be loans". 
(Okoth 1988 p.23). As late as the 1988/9 Annual Report, there was no sign that this 
matter had been cleared up. 
The financial relationship with the government was further complicated by the fact 
that some government money was 'managed' by the I.C.D.C. For several years the 
status of these funds was in sufficient doubt for the auditor to comment, for example, 
" ... 1 have not seen any confirmation from Government on the funds advanced or 
acknowledged that the Government would underwrite any losses that may ultimately 
accrue on these investments". (Okoth 1986 p.24). Fortunately by the end of the 
decade the issue appears to have been sorted out, and in 1989 the Corporation listed 
several companies into which it had put KShs.130m of 'managed' funds," ... against 
which no provision for losses is made in accordance with the Corporation' s 
accounting policy .. ". (Annual Report 1988/9 p.26). There has also been some 
German money, as the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 
(D.E.G.) has advanced several long term loans. These monies are advanced on 
concessional terms, and - unlike the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. (see later) - the 
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I.C.D.C. bears the exchange loss when repayment is due in the context of a 
depreciating shilling. However, there is some justice in this, for the loans seem more 
to do with making the Corporation viable rather than fostering development. As is 
observed in the 1988/89 Annual Report (p.5), "The Corporation's cash position 
improved from a net overdraft of KShs. 31. 2m at the close of the previous year to a 
cash balance of KShs.120m, as at 30.6.89. This was mainly attributable to a loan of 
DM15m (KShs.150m) received from D.E.Goo". Temporary credit from local 
commercial banks is small and not significant as development capital. 
'Capital and Revenue Reserves', a substantial and proportionately growing item 
amongst the sources of funds, is sufficiently complex to merit a separate sub-section 
below. 
(c) Current sources of funds. 
As implied above, the deployment of new funds to the I.C.D.C. has in recent years 
been different to the overall totals of funds employed. In the table below, 
government money constitutes small percentages of the totals, whereas 'capital and 
revenue reserves' 100m large. 
TABLE 2 
I.C.D.C. CURRENT SOURCES OF FUNDS (KShs.m.) 
Kenya Repayments 
Gov. & Interest Disposal 
Loans Cap.& Large & of 
and Rev. Medium Small New Loans Invest-
Grants Reservs. Loans Loans Local For. ments Total 
1980-1 43.2 34.9 12.7 32.4 0.1 123.3 
1984-5 39.0 57.3 23.9 33.9 0.1 154.2 
1986-7 7.9 96.4 14.3 33.1 2.7 
154.4 
1988-9 47.0 137.3 26.4 46.3 20.0 175.0 
452.0 
SOURCE: Various I.C.D.C. Annual Reports 
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('Capital and revenue reserves' are omitted from the present discussion and analysed 
fully in the next sub-section.) 
Loan repayments are small relative to the amounts outstanding, which in June 1989 
were listed as KShs.474m for large and medium size loans and KShs.366m for small 
loans (I.C.D.C. Annual Report and Accounts 1988/89 p.6). KShs26.4m is about 
5.5% of KShs.474m, a rate of repayment which means an average loan period of 18 
years. Admittedly, though, small loan repayments were rather better in 1988-89. 
However a number of disturbing factors related to loans have to be taken into 
account. Firstly considerable sums are regularly written off: for large and medium 
loans this was KShs.25m. in 1988/9 and for small loans KShs.9m. (Ibid. p.24). 
Hence the arithmetic relationships between repayments and total admitted credit are 
even less healthy than they appear. Secondly, how much money is recouped from 
past loans seems more a matter of chance than commercial correctness, and this 
seems especially to be true in relation to small loans. As the Corporation's Chairman 
noted, "The Corporation ... managed to raise KShs.46.3m from repayments of small 
loans as compared to KShs.31.4m collected in the previous year. This was mainly 
due to intensified debt collection efforts and cooperation from borrowers .. ". (Gatei 
in Ibid. p.2). Thirdly indiscipline is further apparent in the loan programme in 
relation to interest obligations, since it is unclear how much interest is actually 
received. Though income statements in I.C.D.C. Annual Reports tell of substantial 
annual interest payments, an ominous explanatory note in the 1988/9 Report 
states, "interest on loans and management fees include income received and accrued 
during the accounting period". (Ibid. p.22). In consequence, unpaid interest IS 
formally indicated in the Accounts as becoming part of new loans. 
The significance of the D.E.G. money was referred to in the last sub-section. Finally, 
in line with policies discussed in the previous section, virtually no funds have been 
derived recently from the sale of investments. 
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(d) Capital and revenue reserves. 
As noted above, this item substantially contributes to employed funds, whether on an 
overall or current basis. Below are the relevant figures for 1988/9. 
TABLE 3 
CAPITAL AND REVENUE RESERVES 1988/9 (KShs.m) 
Profit before taxation 
Adjustments for items not involving the movement 
of funds: 
Depreciation 
Increase in government interest payable 
Amounts provided for losses on equity 
investments and loans 
Profit on sale of fixed assets and 
equity investments 
Total generated from operations 
SOURCE: I.C.D.C. Annual Report and Accounts 1988/9 p.2l. 
49.3 
4.1 
8.4 
75.8 
(0.3) 
137.3 
The main source of 'profit' is 'income', which in this year stood at about 
KShs.238.5m. However, the bulk of this came from loan interest, which, as seen 
earlier, though due, may not necessarily have been received, and from dividends -
making up nearly 50% of income - about which there is similar uncertainty. The 
1988/9 Report (p.20) is rather coy about this when it observes, "Dividends are taken 
into account when declared during the accounting period" , whereas earlier reports had 
been less guarded. For example the 1984/5 Report (p.5) had said, " .. substantial 
amounts of interest and dividend arrears ... had not been realised in cash at the end of 
the year". And in the 1986/7 Annual Report (p.3) are the words, "As at 30th June 
1987, dividends amounting to KShs.86.7m. were in arrears". It must be assumed, 
therefore, that each year some of the expected income does not materialise. 
From the 'income' was deducted interest charges - KShs.29m in 1988/9 (p. 19 of the 
Report) - but interest due to government (see Table 3) was put back into the kitty. 
Nearly KShs.83m was allowed for 'amounts written off and provision for losses' 
(Ibid. p.19) but most of this reappeared as available funds (see Table .3). 
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Administration costs, - also, of course, deducted - came to KSh.77m. 
Grosh, (1987 p.20-25) attempts to assess the significance of administration costs by 
comparing them with investment portfolios, and suggests that they ran at about 2-3 % 
of them from the 1960s to the late 1970s, though with a gradual upward trend. On 
this basis, administration costs in 1988/9 stood at over 10% of investment portfolios, 
which suggests a considerable deterioration in efficiency. Now, by going on to 
compare costs with directors' valuations of investments, Grosh manages to produce 
a more or less static percentage relationship. However, this must be unreliable in the 
light of the optimistic total valuation that directors used to make. Given that many 
I.C.n.C.-linked companies are not quoted on the stock exchange - so that market 
valuations do not exist - and that others that are highly valued are doing no business, 
many published valuations can be questioned. It is reasonable to conclude that, given 
an approximate doubling of the consumer price level (U.N.D.P. 1989 p.23) between 
1981 and 1989, a rise from KShs24m to KShs.77m in I.C.D.C. administrative costs 
- given that only a handful of new investments had been added to the I.C.D.C. 's 
portfolio by the later date - may represent some deterioration in efficiency. 
In conclusion, therefore, 'Capital and revenue reserves' as representing funds 
available for I.c.n.c. operations embrace some very unreliable figures. 'Income' is 
uncertain, since it is unclear how much interest and dividends due are ever actually 
received. Again, although certain legitimate charges are deducted from the notional 
income, certain of them, such as interest to government, does not seem to have to be 
paid, so can be added back in after profit ('income' minus 'expenses') has been 
calculated. The whole exercise seems a rather unsatisfactory example of financial 
activity and accounting standards. 
THE APPLICATION OF FUNDS 
(a) Investments. 
An analysis of the lists of companies in which the I.C.D.C in recent years has had 
capital holdings, whether subsidiaries - where the I.C.D.C. has a majority of the 
equity - or associates - where it has a minority - indicates little or no disposal of 
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assets, and hence turnover of capital. For example all six wholly-owned subsidiaries 
listed in the 198112 Annual Report appear amongst the eleven in the 1988/9 Annual 
Report, and of the eight 'other - that is majority but not l00%-owned - subsidiaries' 
in 198112, six make up the 'other subsidiaries' total in 1988/9. (The remaining two 
still remain in 1988/9, but have now become 'associates'). And the 'associates' list, 
in general, remained fairly static through the 80s decade. 
Parallel with this, substantial funds invested have in recent years been devoted to 
rescue schemes rather than expansion. For example, in the 198112 Annual Report 
the Chairman states (p.3), " .. the Corporation stepped up its outlays on the 
rehabilitation of ailing projects", and in the 1986/7 Report was saying (p.l), " .. the 
weak and ailing projects continued to be given significant emphasis". Similar 
sentiments appeared in the 1988/89 Report (p.2): " ... the Corporation disbursed 
KShs.43.3m in a combination of equity and loan funds to projects which needed 
rehabilitation, compared to KShs.73.5m spent the previous year, reflecting reduced 
cash requirements for the exercise. In making these rehabilitation efforts, the 
Corporation was convinced that projects which have potential to be successful should 
be assisted to overcome temporary financial or other difficulties so that they can bring 
their idle capacity to productive use, provide employment to Kenyans and otherwise 
make their expected contribution to the development of the country" . 
Ailing projects can, in the right circumstances, be turned round and made to pay, as 
the Chairman quite fairly observes. However, later discussion of company experience 
in Kenya does not show much evidence of this happening. Furthermore, though the 
supposed expenditure on rehabilitation in 1988-9, for example, was rather less than 
114 of the funds disbursed to business - mirus small business finance - it is not clear 
that much of the rest financed genuine expansion. During the year only one totally 
new project, a plant for bottling Coca-Cola, apparently was completed- though there 
were various ongoing studies and discussions about other commercial possibilities 
(Ibid. p.2) - and a lot of money went on emergency advances to firms. 
Table 4 indicates I. C. O. C. investments at cost for 1981 and 1989. 
TABLE 4 
I.C.D.C. INVESTMENTS (KShs.m) 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
Other subsidiaries 
Associated companies 
TOTAL 
1981 1989 
27.6 143.1 
147.0 256.8 
270.6 324.8 
445.2 724.7 
SOURCE: I.C.D.C. Annual Reports for 1981/82 p.32/3 and for 1988/9 p.28/9. 
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However, the figures are of little relevance as guides to the current value of the assets 
they cover since (i) most of the concerns to which the investments apply are not listed 
at the stock exchange, and (ii) trading of shares, whether via the stock exchange for 
those that are listed or more informally for those that are not, is virtually 
non-existent. Hence there is no reliable ongoing market valuation of the equity. 
Indeed, given that each annual report notes certain companies as 'liquidated' or 'in 
receivership' the current real values of the assets in question must be close to zero. 
Furthermore, it has been normal for only a minority of subsidiaries and associates to 
declare dividends, 17 out of 47 listed, for example, in 1985 and 16 out of 47 in 1986 
(I.C.D.C Annual Report for 1985/6 p.35) - later reports guardedly refrained from 
publishing this type of information - and given that, as indicated earlier, it is not clear 
how much dividend money is paid over, the real value of many still extant companies 
must in most cases be low. In consequence, the conclusion in the following passage 
from Grosh (1987 p.9) must be regarded with considerable wariness: "I.C.D.C. 
carries its investments at cost on the balance sheet, but in the notes to the accounts 
it gives the market value for investments in firms quoted on the stock exchange and 
the directors' valuations of total unquoted investments (9). The reported valuations 
have exceeded cost, at least since the mid-70s. For example, in 1981 the directors' 
valuations exceeded cost by 61 %. This suggests that the balance sheet has 
consistently unerestimated the value of investments". 
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In fairness, the I.C.D.C. does hold a minority of good investments, and considerable 
capital gains on these would probably be realised if they were ever to be sold. The 
RBC Dominion Securities 'Kenyan Development Finance Institutions Study' of 1989 
- already referred to in Part 1 Chapter 1 - stated (p.32 of Component 3), " ... the 
Project looked for, and found, what it perceived to be a number of significantly 
undervalued assets in the D.F.I. equity portfolios. These involved dividend-paying 
stocks, many of them old retainers, which did not appear key to the D.F.I.s' 
economic development role .. ". Of the ten companies I.C.D.C. companies listed 
(Ibid. p.10) only one, Kenya Wine Agencies, was not just an associate. However, 
despite a handful of performing concerns, there is no reason for optimism about the 
aggregate real value of I.C.D.C. investments. 
(b) Loans and advances. 
An unsatisfactory picture emerges from a study of the I.C.D.C. 's long and medium 
term loan portfolio. In June 1989, the 'principal outstanding' for loans to subsidiaries 
was KShs.209m. and for loans to associates KShs.57m, against which KShs.13.5m. 
had been allowed for bad debts. (I.C.D.C. Annual Report 1988/9 p.25). 
Somewhat more ommous is the 'advances' portfolio. This is in the nature of 
emergency credit to ailing concerns, and has risen inexorably over the 80s decade to 
reach in 1989 KShs.144.7m. for subsidiaries and KShs.43.0m. for associates (Ibid. 
p.31). Several concerns in the 'advances' portfolio, such as Kenya Fishing Industries 
and East African Clothing Factory, have received help several times, often at zero 
interest (10), and in one instance the 'advance' is referred to as an 'overdraft facility'. 
However once again several benefiting companies are seen to be 'in receivership'. 
Perhaps wisely, if shockingly, the I.C.D.C. has had to allow money equal to more 
than half the advances outstanding as provision against bad debts. (Ibid.p.26) 
PROBLEMS INTRINSIC TO THE I.C.D.C. 
Despite the opacity of its accounts, it is clear that the I.C.D.C. has not been a 
financial success. The following sections examine the reasons for this. First are 
problems intrinsic to the I.C.D.C. itself, where as far as possible issues that centre 
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on the recipients of its equity and loan funds will be ignored in the analysis. 
Secondly is the relationship of the I.C.D.C. with these recipients and how it is 
affected by the outcomes of their business operations. The subsequent two sections, 
on company and then on small business financing, cover these matters. 
The Government is substantially at fault for the unhappy picture of I.C.D.C. finances 
that has emerged. Not defining how its money inputs are to be divided into loans and 
grants, not - until recently - being explicit about funds the I.C.D.C. manages on its 
behalf, regularly waiving interest, and never insisting on loan repayments, are not 
likely to induce rigorous management by the Corporation of its own finances. Thus 
the I.C.D.C., not being troubled about servicing most of its own debt, can afford to 
be coy about the interest and dividends it actually receives, and is too ready to 
capitalise unpaid interest and debt. Though much of the new money that has come 
its way has been devoted to rehabilitation, the beneficiaries have rarely seemed much 
improved from this help. As a result, the problems have mounted, as the fudging of 
one year generates more difficulties for the next, and government is increasingly the 
crucial 'subsidiser of last resort'. That the government is prepared tacitly to accept 
these arrangements testifies to "a dangerously uncritical attitude amongst the 
regulatory agencies of the state, both of the D.F.I. itself and of its specific 
investments" (Henley and Maynard 1991 p.233). They go on to observe, "Clearly 
it is unwise of the state to assume that one of its D.F.I.s has the capacity to evaluate 
an investment opportunity". 
Furthermore, bound up with and compounding the apparent commercial laxity of the 
Kenya government are extra-commercial influences that impinge on the I.C.D.C.'s 
structure and conduct. Tough political and ideological guidelines have never meant 
much in Kenya in terms of consistent application 'on the ground', but at the personal 
level anecdotal evidence and relevant phrases in published material testify to 
potentially unsatisfactory practices. Apparently, according to one commercial bank 
official, all senior appointments to the I.C.D.C. have to be approved by Government. 
Though this could be just an innocuous desire to monitor the quality of appointees. 
it also gives scope for patronage. 
I.C.D.C. SUBSIDIARIES AND ASSOCIATES 
(a) The condition of the companies. 
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Apart from the internal weaknesses in the I.C.D.C., discussed in the previous section, 
the sorry state of many of the concerns in which it has had equity stakes is a principal 
cause of its poor financial condition. The year ending 30th June 1987 was the last 
year for which, in the relevant Annual Report, information on dividends from 
subsidiaries and associates was published (p.35-36), and, as noted earlier, only a 
minority of companies actually declared dividends, 4 out of 18 subsidiaries and 17 
out of 48 associates. Of these, a number were Kenyan branches of established 
foreign firms, such as General Motors, Associated Battery Manufacturers, Chloride 
Exide, Firestone, Metal Box, and Raymon~ Woollen Mills, and others had powerful 
domestic monopoly positions, such as NAS. Superficially it is surprising that other 
monopoly concerns, such as Kenya Fishing Industries and Kenya Bowling Centres, 
failed to be profitable. Of course the actual declaration of dividends did not 
automatically result in the speedy payment of the money due, as discussion above on 
I.C.D.C. finances explained. 
Furthermore all annual reports testify to the considerable credit that has been 
frequently poured into ailing companies to prevent them going under. It is interesting 
to note that of the 16 I.C.D.C. subsidiaries listed in the 1988/9 Annual Report 
(p.28,30,31) two were in receivership, one had just been liquidated, and all but two 
of the rest were in receipt of loans and advances. Indeed several had received more 
than one injection of credit, as also had the two concerns in receivership. 
(b) Extraneous influences. 
It is suggested (Henley and Maynard op. cit. p.233) that although until the mid-70s 
a number of I.C.D.C.lmultinational partnership ventures operating behind tariff 
barriers and substituting for imports were quite profitable - as indeed some still are 
_ a later crop of ventures following the 1977 coffee boom had less to justify them. 
Firstly they were established largely in highly competitive markets, such as textiles, 
and secondly an "aggressively expansionary chief executive of the I.C.D.C." presided 
over a number of ventures where "foreign equity participation was on a minority basis 
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and consisted of little more than capitalised management or technical services fees". 
(lbid.p.32). The structural adjustment requirements of the early 1980s resulted in a 
substantial devaluation of the Kenya shilling in 1981, and continued creeping 
devaluation after that (see Pt 2. Chapter 3 for more details). Domestic inflation 
helped to protect some companies against the rising foreign exchange cost of imports, 
but others, unable to increase local prices in line with the trend due to price controls 
or slack demand as a result of recession, were hit. 
(c) Company problems. 
An important reservoir of data on the problems of many of the I.C.D.C. investments 
is the RBC Dominion Securities 'Kenyan Development Finance Institutions Study' of 
1989. Most of its findings were borne out by the later more limited work the writer 
was able to do on Kenyan companies, and so many of the facts introduced below 
come from that source. Vol. 2 Component 3 (passim) (11) records the main results 
of its company investigations. 
Of the I. C. D. C. subsidiaries considered in the Report, only General Motors - 5 1 % 
held by I.C.D.C. - is referred to as 'successful', all the rest - if not in receivership 
- requiring monitoring or restructuring. RBC does not identify any 'successful' 
I.C.D.C. associates, but this is probably because its sample does not include 
multinational branch establishments like Chloride Exide that appear to have done 
well. As a result, the entire sample of associates require "monitoring", 
"restructuring", are "uneconomic" or are in receivership. Indeed in respect of the 
latter category, frequently no useful information, financial or otherwise, was 
available, so RBC could make no comment. 
A number of reasons crop up for the companies' difficulties. These are: 0) raw 
material sourcing problems. Since this supply obstacle is partly in connection with 
Kenyan raw materials - for example 'cashewnuts' - clearly upstream production 
problems exist. Apart from this, there could be "import licence constraints" (Ibid. 
p.2) and the effect of devaluation (see previous sub-section); (ii) poor production 
facilities. This covers a number of possibilities such as frequent equipment 
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breakdowns, and the use of obsolete equipment that cannot be replaced due to 
insufficient income; (iii) overmanning. This relates to general government 
employment policy and the habit of creating positions for people connected with 
influential officials; (iv) poor management, "resulting in the overestimation of market 
size and capacity planning, the lack of employee training, and the absence of strategic 
planning and direction" (Ibid. p.2); (v) competing imports. In the light of the Kenya 
Government's supposed policy of banning imports when local similar products are 
manufactured, this would be a surprising item in the list of problems, had not an 
indication of how the regulation can be breached been discussed in an earlier section. 
So as the 1986 Annual Report states (p.IO) in relation to Seracoatings, "The 
company's volume of sales was slightly lower. .. due to continued stiff competition 
from imported similar products"; (vi) price controls. These mainly affected (and 
affect) essential products, so hitting concerns such as Salt Manufacturers; (vii) 
excessive financial expenses, largely due, in I.C.D.C. companies, to "imprudent 
capital structures". (Ibid. p.2). This, of course, implies a high proportion of loans 
relative to equity capital, and is an almost inevitable result of company difficulties, 
since financial intermediaries - principally in this context the I.C.D.C. itself - are 
understandably reluctant to bolster with equity a concern unlikely to pay dividends. 
In general, RBC wrote of poor morale, and of firms working well below capacity: 
Pan Vegetable Processors, for example, was reported to be operating at only 6%-8% 
of capacity. Even RBC's occasional displays of optimism are not always well 
founded. Rift Valley Textiles was described as being "close to being a successful 
holding". (Ibid. p.30). However, given Rift Valley's frequent recourse to the 
I.C.D.C. for rehabilitation credit, the assertion is questionable. 
(d) The I.C.D.C. connection. 
Factors integral to the companies themselves, therefore, and to the politico/economic 
environment in which they operate, are of great importance in explaining their poor 
performance. However, it is necessary to consider to what extent the I.C.D.C. may 
be responsible for the rough condition of much of its portfolio. Principally must be 
cited its failure properly to address the problems of (i) companies taken over \\hen 
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abandoned and (ii) companIes that, for whatever reason, at a later stage got 
themselves into difficulties. 
The RBC Report noted that in 1987 56.4% of the companies in its sample - which of 
course does include, but does not only include, I.C.D.C. companies - gave 
"insufficient or untimely financial statements". (Ibid p.2). For the I.C.D.C. to be 
unable to insist on the provision of such information removes its ability to assess the 
whole range of financial decisions and practices on which the present and future 
efficiency and prosperity of the various concerns depends. Financial slovenliness 
leads back to management weakness, which was identified above as a frequent factor 
behind company difficulties. This again should be capable of being addressed by the 
I.C.D.C., particularly where it is the dominant or majority shareholder, but as is 
implicit in the RBC Report, this has not been well done. In general, then, it must be 
concluded that the I.C.D.C., in the crucial commercial sphere, has been inadequate 
in monitoring and guiding company operations. 
The inevitable consequence, as the I.C.D.C. failed to address the outward 
manifestations of company problems, and saw companies continue in or slip into 
unviability, has been damage to the finances of the I. C. D. C. itself. Now once a 
concern has become unviable there are really only two options. Either the 
shareholders wind up the company without more ado, or, on the basis of a radical 
shake-up that expert advice supports, new funds are provided to genuinely rehabilitate 
the concern. Clearly, in relation to many of its weak subsidiaries and associates, the 
I.C.D.C. has been reluctant to follow the former course, and unable properly to carry 
through the latter, with the inevitable result that it holds for too long, on a minority 
or majority basis, concerns that are a drain on its finances, and contribute little or 
nothing to its income. Such behaviour is not inconsistent with government pressure 
to prop up dying firms with money for social (12), prestige and personal reasons, 
while sidestepping the issue as to whether this support be in practice anything other 
than straight subsidisation. 
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Furthermore, from the point of view of the companies themselves, too easily obtained 
rehabilitation credit from the I.C.D.C. may be detrimental to their efficiency, in that 
they have a reduced incentive to use the money carefully. 
THE SMALL LOANS SCHEME 
(a) The remit. 
As was indicated earlier, the I.C.D.C. 's Small Loans Scheme comprised four separate 
sub-schemes, of which the 'commercial' scheme, involving largely loans in 
connection with distribution, is easily the biggest in terms of loans outstanding. For 
example, in June 1989, commercial loans outstanding stood at KSh.223.3m out of a 
total of KSh.412.7m (I.C.D.C. Annual Report for 1988/9 p.8). Despite the array of 
purposes for which small loans may in theory be had, it is accepted that a major 
reason for the establishment of the scheme was to enable indigenous Kenyans to buy 
out Asian traders, who were obliged after independence to dispose of their businesses. 
And furthermore, even amongst indigenous Kenyans preferences operated. As Leys 
(1975 p.201) observes, "Kikuyu traders and manufacturers took the lion's share of the 
I.C.D.C. 's loan programmes"(13). It is not possible to tell whether this tribal 
partiality has continued into more recent years, but certainly the move to transfer 
Asian firms to Africans foundered, as people without relevant abilities failed to 
succeed in their new business activities. (Later many Asians purchased businesses 
back, something to which the Kenya government turned a pragmatic blind eye). 
Due to the problems with which many of the new African owners were beset, such 
that they failed to service loans, for a period of several years in the early eighties the 
Small Loans Scheme was suspended in its entirety. The Commercial and Small 
Industrial sub-schemes are now revived, and an indication of the type of approach by 
the I.C.D.C. towards the operation of them may be intimated from the I.C.D.C. 
chairman in the 1988/9 Annual Report (p.2). With regard to 'commercial' loans. 
"The demand .... continued to rise. The service sector such as export-import, clearing 
and forwarding and medical clinics also benefited". As for 'small industrial' loans, 
"The demand ... is expected to rise due to the Corporation's softer terms and the need 
to assist graduates .... to get started on their own. In this way we shall, in addition 
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to helping develop human skills, create employment especially in rural areas". It is 
interesting to note that a 'rising' demand for commercial loans contrasts with an 
'expected rise' in demand for small industrial loans, and this is reflected in approvals 
and disbursements, which, as in the case of the totals in the first paragraph of this 
section, are heavily weighted towards commerce. The table below expands on the 
above points by giving the distribution of small loans over time. 
TABLE 5 
'SMALL' LOANS OUTSTANDING (KShs.m) AS AT 30th JUNE 
TOTAL 
SMALL INDUSTRIAL 
COMMERCIAL 
PROPERTY 
MACHINERY 
1982 
241.4 
45.9 
106.0 
77.6 
11.9 
SOURCE: Various I.C.D.C. Annual Reports 
(b) Financial aspects. 
1986 
267.5 
60.6 
118.6 
71.8 
16.4 
1987 
292.3 
65.4 
138.7 
69.6 
18.6 
1989 
412.7 
95.7 
223.3 
69.8 
23.9 
Discussion in earlier chapters has highlighted the difficulties of lending successfully 
to small businessmen. Administrative costs are high relative to the average value of 
loans; interest returns and repayments are uncertain. And extension services, which 
hopefully may render a borrower successful in his business, and can include 
mechanistic devices for recouping money owed, training schemes and so on, are 
themselves very expensive. As has been argued before, there is logic in separating 
some support costs from the basic financial intermediation costs, and having them 
covered by some other agency. The money may come from the government, a 
relevant foreign agency, or even - in the case of a mUlti-purpose D. F. I. - from the 
income generated by the non-small business operations. Unfortunately the I.C.D.C .. 
though diversified, has not been in a position to cover a programme of extension 
services from profits generated elsewhere, due - as discussed earlier - to the 
indifferent state of its overall finances. 
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In general, it is not possible to know how much the small loans scheme has been 
costing to run, as the accounts fail to separate out the expenditure pertaining to it. 
The elaborate administrative arrangements reaching down to provincial and district 
level must be fairly costly, though admittedly this apparatus is not only in place for 
small scale lending. However the dismal record of interest collection and loan 
repayments (see later) is sufficient witness to the inability of the I.C.D.C. 
management to sift out unviable applications for loan funds (14) and to collect debt 
that is due. The politico/economic motivations for lending, referred to in the last 
section, are no doubt significant factors contributing to this unhappy state of affairs, 
since it means that applications from favoured groups of people asking for money for 
purposes supported at government level are likely to be approved before other 
commercially sounder proposals. A point made by an I.C.D.C. official, that the 
Corporation must be prepared to take losses on loans initially, until the businessmen 
in question "got on their feet" (15) is reasonable as long as viability is not too long 
in coming. Large and expanding arrears, "however, suggest more than just teething 
problems. 
The Small Loans Scheme was never intended to help completely new businessmen, 
the integral Small Industrial Loans Scheme in 1987, for example, being prepared to 
advance not less than KShsl0000 and with an upper limit of KShs2m. Interest rates 
charged have not been wildly concessionary. 15 % on industrial loans in 1987 is 
respectably above the Kenya central bank discount rate that year of 12.5 % (African 
Economic and Financial Data 1989 Table 1-27), but as against this the borrowers in 
question would in most cases hardly have got money elsewhere, except on very 
onerous terms. And, of course, if the interest is not paid (see later), the rate is 
irrelevant. 
Operational experience has been very unsatisfactory. As mentioned, the whole 
scheme was suspended in the early 1980s and later only revived for two of the four 
separate facets. The position is usefully intimated in the 1984/5 Annual Report (p. I): 
"Dividends and interest income remained below expectations due to the problems 
facing the Corporation's projects .... The financial assistance from the Treasury 
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continued to decline. ... In the light of the above, the Corporation's Small Loans 
Scheme remained suspended for the fourth year II • Indeed, the interest income outturn 
from small loans is worse than 'below expectations': it is doubtful if much has ever 
been collected. Every year without fail the annual reports of the I.C.D.C. show 
interest as being capitalised as new loans. For example, in the 1988/9 Annual 
Report, the following figures are given: 
TABLE 6 
I.C.D.C. SMALL LOANS SCHEMES - A SUMMARY 
Loans outstanding as at 117/88 
Loans issued during the year 
Interest charged during the year 
TOTAL 
LESS Repayments during the year 
LOANS OUTSTANDING AT 30/65/89 
No. 
2901 
468 
3369 
142 
3227 
SOURCE: I.C.D.C. Annual Report for 1988/9 p.8 
Amount (KShs.m) 
348.1 
49.4 
55.7 
453.3 
40.6 
412.7 
Capitalised interest has not only been regularly more than the value of new loans, it 
has also been regularly more than the value of repayments. Hence for a number of 
years borrowers have failed to pay back any 'real' principal, and only met some of 
the interest not paid at the due time. Furthermore, the I. C. D. C. is fairly realistic 
about the possibility of recouping many of the funds owed. As the 1985/6 Annual 
Report (p.2?) explains, "Known bad debts are written off and specific provision is 
made against those loans, including accrued interest, which are doubtful of recovery . 
In addition a general provision is made on the balances remaining at the following 
rates: Industrial - 25 %, Commercial - 20%, Machinery - 50%, Property -5 %". 
(c) Comment 
Like so many small business finance arrangements in developing countries, the 
I.C.D.C. 's Small Loans Scheme is not viable. Apart from the well-known reasons 
for such an outcome, specific blame must attach to the I.C.D.C. for clearly being too 
ready to capitalise interest, and for the political considerations that supposedly 
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motivated it, at least in the early years of independence. 
It is not very useful shifting the focus to the recipients of loans, for there are many 
of them, and to investigate their conditions and problems is a research project in 
itself. It is fairly certain, though, that the management and financial weaknesses 
identified by the RBC as applying to companies are equally, if not more starkly true 
of small businesses. 
REVIEW OF EVIDENCE 
It was established in the last chapter that within the mainstream Kenyan financial 
system provisions that relate to the gathering in and application of development 
capital funds are weak. It was also suggested that economic uncertainties and 
government restrictions had, since the early years of independence, led more to 
retreat than to expansion in the capital market. This is seen in a massive decline in 
new share issues locally, a virtual cessation in the inflow of new private capital funds 
from abroad, and a moribund stock exchange. There would seem to be a place for 
D.F.I. 's, therefore, both to fill the gaps in the market for capital funds, and to help 
reverse the retrenchment of the private sector in this field. 
Though, in theory, the I.C.D.C. had a major role in this process, it is difficult to find 
any empirical examples of unqualified success. 
In its earlier independence years Kenya was able to attract in foreign capital. 
Normally incoming foreign firms had to enter into partnership arrangements with the 
I.C.D.C., or another D.F.I. So, given this regulation, in a passive sense the 
I.C.D.C. was instrumental in bringing about industrial development. However, to 
counterbalance that, it is clear that other foreign companies were alienated because 
they did not wish for partnership with the I.C.D.C. Furthermore, such advantages as 
foreign companies might have expected from government by being linked to the 
I.C.D.C. have been damaged by inconsistent application and by debilitating 
disadvantages. Protection from competing imports, though standard in theory, does 
not necessarily happen in practice, vital imports to service industry may be made 
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expensive by indirect taxes, restrictions are put on the repatriation of profits, the local 
borrowing capacity of foreign investors has been limited to 20 % of the investment , 
and an accent on Kenyanisation does not so much mean severe restrictions on the 
employment of qualified expatriate personnel as the necessity to take on indigenous 
Kenyans as well, which leads to overmanning. 
There are many arguments against domestic monopoly power, but it may be offered 
as an incentive to foreign companies to attract them into a country. Concerns with 
strong multinational inputs do not appear to have been given this advantage in Kenya, 
but I.C.D.C. firms entirely held by Kenyan interests have benefited in this way, and 
for some it has meant large monopoly profits, as for example in the case of National 
Airport Services. 
However, as the earlier section on I.C.D.C. companies indicated (see figures for 
dividends) profitability on average has been poor. The basis for this, apart from the 
reasons mentioned above, involves faults in company management, I.C.D.C. 
monitoring, and financial shrewdness. The result is a development corporation 
hanging on to its few good investments for the sake of income from them (16), 
relying on government financial indulgence, and devoting much of any new money 
that comes its way on rehabilitation exercises that rarely seem - in the light of RBC 
discussion - to successfully tum round ailing companies. The poor state of its small 
business arm adds to its difficulties. 
The result is that the I.C.D.C. is no longer - and has not been for many years -
appreciably fostering sound business expansion in secondary or tertiary industry. And 
by no longer being a revolving capital organisation, willing regularly to sell 
investments, it has done little to help develop the stock market. 
Indeed it may plausibly be argued that the I.C.D.C. has not only failed in its primary 
functions, but has in fact damaged Kenyan development. Firstly, without the 
I.C.D.C. many unviable companies would have gone out of business, so releasing the 
funds devoted to propping them up for other purposes. Secondly its role as a 
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necessary partner for multinationals considering investment in Kenya discouraged 
some from going ahead: though others went along with the arrangement for a number 
of years, experience in the last decade shows virtually no new foreign interest in an 
I.C.D.C. link-up (17). Thirdly, by obtaining blocks of some of the best shares in 
Kenya and keeping them indefinitely, it has denied the stock market the impetus to 
expansion that comes from active trading in sound securities. Fourthly the I.C.D.C. 
has sent quite the wrong signals to the small business sector by its mismanagement 
of this sphere of lending. Fifthly the generally unsatisfactory record of the I.C.D.C., 
supposedly a major player in the field of development finance, is a discouraging 
example to those, both internal and external to Kenya, who might consider real 
investment in the country, and to institutions that might be prepared to lend money 
to the country for financing development. . 
And behind the I.C.D.C., and organically connected to it, has been a government, 
clearly neither able or willing to properly monitor or control the Corporation, nor to 
follow through a consistent set of policies towards the companies under its auspices. 
It is suggested, therefore, that the I.C.D.C., though initially suited to filling certains 
gaps in the capital market and to fostering the development of that market, has been 
undermined by the 'soft state' syndrome (see Pt.1 Chapter 1), so that it has become 
little more than a loss-making holding company. 
NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 5 
1. This point was made by an official of the I.C.D.C.in 1990. 
2. Interview of April 1990 with an executive at General Motors (Kenya). 
3. Interview of April 1990. 
4. Explained by an I.C.D.C. official in April 1990. 
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5. Any firm 25 % or more owned from abroad would not qualify for preferential 
rates in the P. T . A. markets. 
6. Technically, foreign investments in Kenya were protected by the 1964 
Investor Protection Act. However Leys identifies an informal desire by government 
for foreign firms to sell shares: " .. the emphasis of official policy had been on 
inducing foreign companies to 'go public', and thus enable citizens to become 
shareholders". (op.cit. 1975 p.128). 
7. This is a sensitive issue in Kenya, and was explained to me by J. Henley, to 
whom I am grateful. 
8. The dilemma is understandable, and is referred to elsewhere in this study. For 
an intermediary that aims to be financially viable to sell off profitable assets can seem 
unwise, even though it accords with a development stance. A rough rule of thumb 
could be that expected average returns from present investment should at least equal 
the past average returns from assets to be disposed of. (See Appendix 2 for a full 
analysis.) 
9. In annual reports later in the decade, the directors stopped doing this. 
10. Apart from this type of indulgence, technically the I.C.D.C. has not made 
loans and advances at concessionary rates. "Since 1980 I.C.D.C. 's yields on its loan 
portfolio have continued to approximate the commercial bank lending rate .. ". (Grosh 
1987 p.10) Of course, this observation begs the question as to how much money due 
actually materialised. 
11. The 1989 RBC Dominion Securities Report on Kenyan D.F.I.s. the source 
of much of the factual information below, is not referred to again except where 
specific quotes from it are included in the text. 
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12. A reference in the 1988/9 Annual Report, already quoted in an earlier 
section, may appropriately be mentioned again in this 'social' context. One of the 
reasons for justifying efforts towards rehabilitation was to "provide employment for 
Kenyans" (p.2). 
13. Leys goes on to refer to Marris and Somerset, 'The African Businessman' 
where it is stated on p.71 that down to April 1966 64% of industrial loans and 44% 
of commercial loans "went to Kikuyu recipients". 
14. . .. despite the fact that many applications are rejected. 
15. Interview at the I.C.D.C. April 1990. 
16. . .. apart, that is, from some disposal of equity to the I.C.D.C. Investment 
Co. Such activity, however, has slowed up in recent years. Indeed annual reports 
indicate that its portfolio of investments in 1986-7 was very little different to that of 
1979-80. 
17. General economic conditions are of course also responsible for foreign firms 
being reluctant to come to Kenya. 
Chapter 6 
THE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE COMPANY OF KENYA 
AND THE (KENYAN) INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK 
INTRODUCTION 
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This chapter considers the experience of the other two major D.F.I.s in Kenya, the 
Development Finance Company of Kenya and the Industrial Development Bank. 
Since the analysis continues to centre on the provision of capital funds in Kenya, 
obviously the political, ideological and economic landscape against which the two 
institutions operate is the same as for the I.C.D.C. Consequently, the span of the 
present chapter can - by avoiding unnecessary repetition - be shorter than that of 
Chapter 5. 
THE ORIGIN AND REMIT OF THE D.F.C.K. 
The D.F .C.K. was established in 1963 with capital supplied by the C.D.C., the 
I.F.C., West German and Dutch development agencies, and the I.C.D.C. Other 
funds, in the form of advances and loans facilities, have been provided during the life 
of the D.F.C.K. - often on concessional terms - by a variety of Kenyan and 
non-Kenyan concerns, including the 5 shareholders. 
There is thus a substantial weighting of non-Kenyan interests in the ownership of the 
D.F.C.K., and as such it has remained a private sector company, rather than being 
considered a parastatal. Foreign development agencies, prepared to put money into 
Kenya, but unwilling to be tied up with the government in the I.C.D.C., preferred 
to participate through a new concern, where their voice was - in theory perhaps - the 
strongest. A by-product of this was some reassurance to foreign firms interested in 
investing in Kenya, some of whom were thought to be reticent about financial links 
through the I.C.D.C. with a government as yet untried in managing economic and 
financial affairs, and which gave vent to various disturbing ideological intentions. The 
emphasis on non-Kenyan concerns is made clear by Leys (1975 p. 131-2): " .. the 
Development Finance Company of Kenya .. provided mainly loan capital for 
large-scale new investments by foreigners". Not of course that the D. F. C. K. was 
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intended to be so biased, and it did not remain that way. From the Kenyan point of 
view the parameters of the scheme meant that most funds available to the Corporation 
were from abroad, and were denominated in foreign currency, and in so far as the 
prospect of loans and equity funding would attract foreign investors, there would in 
due course be further inflows of capital brought in by them, and also of managerial 
and technical expertise. 
As amply discussed in earlier chapters, provision of long term credit has typically 
been lacking in economies where the banking systems have been formed on the 
British model, and at the outset the D.F.C.K. was designed to help to fill this gap in 
the market. Also its remit was only to direct money to large scale enterprise. As 
Grosh (1987 p.4) explains, " ... the Development Finance Company of Kenya was 
started with the goal of lending to medium and large scale industrial projects". Thus 
in the beginning there was - in theory - a rough complementarity with the I.C.D.C. 
The l.e.D.C. was considered as more to do with smaller enterprise, and, although 
authorised to make loans, was more properly concerned with equity investment. The 
D.F.C.K. was directed at big business, and was a loan rather than equity 
organisation, though it was not barred from share ownership. And, given the sources 
of its funds - capital from non-private sector concerns, and over the years a series of 
loans from a variety of agencies, non-commercial as well as commercial - it was able 
to lend on concessional terms. 
THE OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE D.F.C.K. 
A number of factors intervened, however, to shift the operational behaviour of the 
D.F.C.K. away from the original conception of the remit. Firstly, despite the 
majority non-Kenyan ownership, the I.C.D.C. remained the largest single 
shareholder. In 1988, for example, it held 30.5 % of the capital, with the next largest 
holder, the German D.E.G., holding 28.8% (D.F.C.K. Annual Report and Accounts 
1988 p.4). Hence, by dint of ownership, the government had (and has) via the 
I.C.D.C. a powerful voice in the direction of the company, with the Chairman 
inevitably being a Government nominee. The RBC Dominion Securities Report Vol. 3 
Component 1 (1) suggests that government influence must be greater than is implied 
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by the size of its shareholding when it states (p.5), " ... the Government appears to 
exercise a degree of control over management out of proportion with its 
shareholding". Though a glance at the list of senior managers tends to back up this 
observation, in that nearly all are Kenyans, it cannot necessarily be assumed that such 
salaried employees are automatically Government stooges. However, irrespective of 
any possible implication for D.F.C.K. business behaviour of a Kenyan senior 
management, 'behind the scenes' influence by the government has, as was made clear 
to the writer, been strong (2). 
Secondly, but connected with the first point, is the nature of the D.F. C.K. ' s portfolio, 
as it has been built up over the years. Though conceived of as principally a lending 
organisation, the company finished the 80s decade with many equity holdings. In 
1988, for example, of 82 companies in which it had financial interests, there were 23 
in which it held equity, though to a number of these 23 it had loaned money as well. 
It is easy to see the reasons for this substantial diversion of funds into equity. As 
explained in Chapter 5, after independence, government aimed at partnership between 
foreign firms and Kenyan interests, and, "The main instruments for this policy were 
the I.C.D.C .... (and) the D.F.C.K". (Leys op.cit. p.131). The last paragraph made 
it clear that having through the I.C.D.C. only a minority stake in the D.F.C.K. did 
not mean that government was unable to make Kenyan interests paramount if it 
wished. Hence a number of foreign/D.F.C.K. concerns, sometimes also including 
direct I.C.D.C. participation as well, have been established. As to whether foreign 
firms linked with D.F.C.K. equity capital could expect any especial government 
favours as opposed to free-standing firms, the arguments looked at in the context of 
the I.C.D.C. (see Chapter 5) apply equally here, and need not be repeated. Indeed, 
confirming the Chapter 5 conclusions on this issue, a D.F.C.K. official observed in 
1990 that the government was "inconsistent". 
Thirdly, and as a result of the above, "Other investments, both by I.C.D.C. and by 
D.F .C.K., were in marginal new ventures which the government wished to encourage 
for political reasons; for instance large injections of capital were made or committed 
for sugar-refining and paper-milling in western Kenya (3), which foreign investors 
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did not expect to be very profitable". (Leys op.cit. p.133). The initial focus on 
loans to incoming foreign business, noted by Leys, was lost, possibly inevitably. as 
an increasing number of domestic concerns, perhaps with foreign capital components. 
looked for credit, and as foreign companies lost interest in setting up in Kenya. 
Not unexpectedly, these developments have led to the ominous word 'rehabilitation' 
being used in connection with money disbursed, and terminology similar to that noted 
in I.C.D.C. annual reports is found in D.F.C.K. Chairmans' reviews. For example. 
in the 1986 Annual Report (p.7) is the following: " ... the amounts due from D.F.C.K. 
associated companies amounted to Shs 127,261,486 at the close of the year up from 
Shs 109,180,537 outstanding on Dec. 31st 1985. However, a large proportion of 
these arrears were due from a few problem projects whose rehabilitation proposals 
are being prepared by management. During the year management has striven to 
reduce the volume of funds tied in this way". 
Fourthly was the formation of a small business subsidiary, the Small Enterprises 
Finance Corporation (4). Inevitably it soon became necessary to establish SEFCO 
in its own offices, and a specialised staff was recruited, who as a consequence 
duplicated (or competed with) the work of analogous staff elsewhere. Commercial 
concerns and aid agencies do not seem to have been impressed by SEFCO, as the 
Kenya Government has had to be by far the most important financier of it (5). 
The discussion in this section bears out Grosh's (1987 p.6) observation, already 
referred to in Chapter 1, that "The chronology of the DFIs reveals a marked tendency 
to organizational proliferation and duplication". The duplication is apparent in the 
convergence with the I.C.D.C., shown in the thrust of the financing, the experiencing 
of similar problems, and even the formation of a small business arm (6). 
Nevertheless, and as implied above, duplication may not necessarily be a bad thing. 
if organisations doing similar work are spurred on to efficiency by competing with 
one another. Unfortunately, this does not seem to have happened, or to have been 
allowed to happen, in the case of Kenyan D.F.I.s, where government has been behind 
the scenes manipulating business in all cases (see passim in Chs. 5 and 6). 
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The one significant feature that is different between the I.C.D.C. and the D.F.C.K. 
is the heavy foreign currency content in the D.F.C.K. 's financing operations. This, 
however, carries with it its own burden, since borrowing companies have had to bear 
the exchange risk themselves, and have been hit as the Kenyan shilling depreciated, 
internal inflation not necessarily compensating for increased capital repayments. 
Finally, a further point that was put to the writer in 1990 was that the D.F.C.K. as 
a lending organisation was latterly being supplanted by banks and N.B.F.I.s, who 
were increasingly going in for long term - or perhaps more usually roll-over 
short-to-medium term - lending. A further advantage was that this money, though 
more expensive, was in local currency, and could be changed into foreign currency 
via the Treasury, with no exchange risk to the borrower. 
It is however important to put these rather surprising assertions into perspective. 
Firstly, though the writer did not find obvious enthusiasm in the banks for lending 
long, neither was there marked hostility to it, and it is reasonable to conclude that, 
as in the U.K., financial institutions with organic or inspirational links to the U.K. 
have in recent years been more prepared than formerly to lend long. However, of 
course, mainstream financial intermediaries will only be prepared to lend to secure 
borrowers, and the liberalisation in 1990 of the regulations as to how much foreign 
companies may borrow locally increases the size of this market. It is unlikely, 
therefore, that the D.F.C.K. would have its rehabilitation loan business taken away 
from it. Secondly, the Treasury, concerned about the foreign exchange reserves, has 
- in theory - a stringent allocation procedure for determining who may change 
shillings into foreign currency. However, concerns with good prospects have a better 
chance than unassessable applicants for obtaining foreign funds for essential imports. 
Hence the D.F.C.K. has increasingly become a source of finance for those applicants 
in which mainstream intermediaries would not be interested, and who would not 
otherwise easily get foreign exchange. 
THE FINANCES OF THE D.F.C.K. 
The finances of the D.F.C.K., as presented in the annual reports are considerably 
204 
more transparent than those of the I.C.D.C., and so more amenable to interpretation. 
However the picture that emerges is almost as bleak as that of the I.C.D.C.(7). 
In the text of the reports are numerous references to difficulties. In the 1986 Report 
(p.7) it is reported that" .. some project companies continued experiencing difficulties 
due to competition in the market resulting in lower margins, exchange losses and 
inability to raise prices to meet rising costs". Later, concerning an expansion 
programme by Aberdare Oil Millers, "During implementation of the project the 
sponsors were faced with cost overruns and approached D.F.C.K. for further 
finance". (Ibid. p.9). The previous section has already introduced evidence indicating 
substantial financial preoccupation with rehabilitation, and in 1987 a further step was 
the establishment of 'Rehabilitation Advisory Services Ltd' with D.F.C.K. and 
German money. The aim of R.A.S. is to " .. offer rehabilitation services to 
non-performing companies by providing them with equity or other funding with 
equity features, and management services at a fee". (1988 Annual Report op.cit. 
p.8). Though this represents a timely determination to address a debilitating 
condition, it is unfortunate that the condition was so serious as to require such 
organised, institutional treatment. 
In the light of the ongoing situation implied by the above remarks, it is not surprising 
that dividends from the D.F.C.K. have been spasmodic and low. For example, in 
the 1986 Annual Report (p.7), " .. D.F.C.K. was able to resume payment of dividends 
to shareholders - 5 % (p.9) - after a break of 2 years". And in the 1988 Annual 
Report (p.6), "No dividend is proposed". Indeed, it would seem that in recent years 
dividends, when paid, have been more a function of realised capital gains than of 
profits from current operations, as the following analysis shows. 
Taking as an example the group Profit and Loss Account for 1986 (1986 Annual 
Report p.14) 'Income' is KShs.84.1m, of which KShs.6.3m are dividends and 
KShs.61.4m is loan interest. However, as with the I.C.D.C., this does not represent 
money actually received. As is explained (Ibid. p.18), "Credit is taken for dividends 
receivable at the date of the declaration of the dividend". Even assuming that all this 
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dividend income materialised, it still leaves the majority of D.F.C.K. investments 
non-performing. For of equity investments of KShs.75m at cost, KShs.24.8m were 
"not yielding dividends and developing as planned", and KShs.28m were "not 
yielding dividends and not developing as planned" (Ibid. p.25). With regard to 
interest, "Interest receivable and payable is included on an accrual basis" (Ibid. p.18). 
Expenditure on administration accounts for KShs.24.7m of the income, and financial 
charges, including KShs.34.9m interest to be paid, another KShs.42.5m. This leaves 
KShs.16. 9m profit before tax and 'exceptional' items. However a major 'exceptional' 
item is bad debts of KShs.25.9m, a not surprising discovery given the past as well 
as present uncertainty over interest receipts. This would put the Profit and Loss 
Account heavily into the red, were it not for a KShs.33.3m profit on the sale of 
investments. Most of this was due to the sale of the D.F.C.K. 's equity investment 
in Firestone E.A. Ltd. (Ibid. p.ll). Though this disposal of shares - with a handful 
of other smaller disposals - might be represented favourably as an indication that the 
D.F.C.K. is a revolving capital organisation with an eye on stimulating the stock 
market, a more likely explanation is that the sales were a necessary sacrifice to 
preserve ostensible viability. After all, the D.F.C.K., as a private company with 
many commercial creditors, does not - like the I.C.D.C. - have the Kenya 
Government behind it as a financial cushion. 
The group Profit and Loss Account for 1988 (p.14) shows minimal gains from the 
sale of investments, and so profit for the year, after certain other adjustments, was 
negative. As a result, there was no dividend. And it is worth reiterating that for 1988 
as for 1986 such decisions as are reached on final profits and recommended dividends 
are built on an inflow of interest and dividends that is rather speculative. 
THE ORIGIN AND REMIT OF THE I.D.B. 
The Industrial Development Bank was set up in 1973 largely at the instigation of the 
I.B.R.D., which was prepared to channel long term money into Kenya, but needed 
a banking institution through which to work. From the start the capital of the 1. D. B. 
was in the hands of Kenyan government and parastatal interests: in 1973 the I.C.D.C. 
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owned 51 % of the capital and the Treasury 49 %. This arrangement was changed in 
1976 when a capital restructuring left the I.C.D.C. with 12.75%, further tranches of 
12.75 % going to the National Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Assurance and Kenya 
Reinsurance Corp. Though this change was ostensibly to "mobilise local 
resources" (8) , apart from the capital, these institutions have been reluctant to put 
more money into the I.D.B. 
Loans and lines of credit in favour of the I.D.B. have, throughout the years of its 
existence, mainly been denominated in foreign currency. As was pointed out in 
relation to a similar situation in the D.F .C.K., though this gathers in foreign 
resources, it also means a potential exchange risk. However in 1988, for example, 
substantial funds had been received, or were due, from the I.B.R.D. - KShs.910m 
equivalent -, with lesser sums from the German Development Co.(DEG) - KShs.26m 
equivalent -, the African Development Bank - KShs.44m equivalent - and some others 
(I.D.B. Annual Report and Accounts 1987/8 p.18-21). All of this credit was 
concessionary in the context of current interest structures, and hence onward loans 
could be concessionary. Also all loans were to be guaranteed by the Kenyan 
government. 
The I.B.D. 's 'Statement of Policy and Regulations' (Ibid. p.4-5) is a fairly standard 
and uncontroversial list of assertions. The organisation, described as a "financial 
institution", is "for the purpose of furthering the economic development of Kenya by 
assisting in the promotion, establishing, expansion and modernisation of medium and 
large scale industrial enterprises, including mining, agro-industries, engineering, 
tourism, transport, shipping and such other enterprises as the Board may approve". 
It can make loans and hold equity, but not enough to have a controlling interest in a 
concern. As a corollary it may not manage enterprises itself, but will "use its best 
endeavour to ensure the acquisition of competent management". There is little of a 
political/social nature in the Statement, except for a gesture towards "special 
consideration to enterprises utilising considerable local material and labour resources, 
and to export- orientated projects". Furthermore, although "The I.D.B. will normally 
finance or otherwise assist enterprises where new productive assets are to be created", 
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and will "revolve its funds by selling its equity investments", with an eye to its own 
viability it may "purchase or acquire shares in profitable companies". Finally, ,and 
very significantly, the Bank is supposed to "seek to protect itself against exchange 
risks of foreign borrowings". 
Clearly the remit of the I.D.B. is very catholic, more or less permitting it to operate 
in the field of investment at its own discretion, avoiding - in print - the strict 
partiality and politically-motivated straitjacketing that the World Bank would have 
disliked. 
THE OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE I.D.B. 
However, despite the fact that vitually all credit to the I.D.B. came from non-Kenyan 
development agencies, the great bulk of it from the I.B.R.D., ownership, as noted, 
was vested in Kenyan financial parastatals, . and as a result the Board of Directors has 
consisted of Directors of these institutions, plus senior government officials and one 
or two others. It was to be expected, therefore, that constraints would be put on the 
organisation's independence, and that it would operate very much in accordance with 
official priorities, however pragmatic, changeable or temporary those priorities might 
be. Some evidence for this is found in the discussion below. 
In June 1988 the I.D.B. 's called-up capital was KShs.257.6m as opposed to long-term 
borrowing of KShs.903.3m (Ibid. p.ll). Consistent with this, and to be expected in 
a development institution termed a 'bank', the great bulk of I.D.B. assets were long 
and medium loans. The I.D.B. came too late on the scene to be a significant 
participant in the 'partnership with multinationals' remit that applied to the D.F.C.K. 
and the I.C.D.C., and most of its equity investments - KShs.49.2m in 1988 after 
'Provisions' (Ibid. p. 31) - consisted of minority holdings in existing multinational 
company branches or companies in which the I.C.D.C. and/or the D.F.C.K. also had 
major holdings. Indeed of its 26 separate equity holdings, 7 were in companies 
where there was I.C.D.C. participation, and in 4 there was D.F.C.K. involvement. 
Furthermore the companies held jointly with other D.F.I.s were heavily weighted to 
those that discussion in Chapter 5 showed to be having problems, for example Salt 
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Manufacturers Ltd., Kenya Cashewnuts and South Nyanza Sugar Co. It appears. 
therefore, that government pressure induced I.D.B. to buy equity in companies it 
would not on financial grounds have selected if it was independent of government 
influence. 
Indeed, as with the I.C.D.C. and the D.F.C.K., statements by the Chairman indicate 
considerable concern about non-performing companies into which the Bank has put 
money. For example, the 1985 Annual Report refers (p.7) to, " ... provisions for 
possible losses on portfolio investment due to the continued deteriorating financial and 
economic performance of some of the Bank's projects". In the 1987/8 Annual Report 
(p.7) the situation sounds to be more serious. There was " .. an increase in the 
number of non-performing loans ... The rehabilitation exercise continues, with 
packages for some projects already drawn up, while others are in the pipeline. 
Rehabilitation funds remain a constraint, but we are hopeful that soft funding will be 
found, for the companies experiencing financial difficulties, including some of those 
under receivership"(9). 
Though a later discussion will give the RBC Dominion Securities overview of the 
disabilities affecting the work and prosperity of the I.D.B. (together with the 
D.F.C.K.) some indication of I.D.B. problems from the I.D.B. itself is appropriate 
at this point. For example, there are veiled indications in the annual reports of 
project appraisal and monitoring inadequacies as well as of burgeoning administrative 
growth. The 1985 Report (p.7) observes, "It is hoped that the (Research and 
Promotion) Unit will be strengthened further .. ". And in the 1987/8 Report (p.8) is 
the announcement that, "During the period under review, the Bank found it expedient 
to reorganise the Operations Department by creating two new functional divisions 
namely:- Consultancy and Rehabilitation Division and Appraisal and Implementation 
Division" . 
However, of very great significance in the business history of the 1. D. B. has been the 
exchange rate. All its debt has been foreign, and so outgoing loans have been in 
foreign currency. Borrowers have been obliged to accept the exchange risk. and. as 
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the Kenya shilling steadily depreciated in the 80s, only those borrowers whose 
income, due to inflation, rose in line with the depreciation, were able to meet 
growing repayment obligations. For many, especially those with fundamental 
weaknesses, this was not the case. Thus, by the end of the decade the Bank was a 
very unattractive source of long term funds. Credit-worthy borrowers were 
increasingly able to get credit from N .B.F.1. s, who loaned in shillings, and, as with 
the D.F .C.K., the I.D.B. was left with the more dubious applications. It was put to 
the writer in 1990 that the only persons presently borrowing from the I.D.B. were 
those who did not intend to repay! 
THE FINANCES OF THE I.D.B. 
The observations of the last section are starkly reflected in the accounts of the I.D.B. 
In the 1987/8 Annual Report 'Income' (p.12) is put at KShs.128.8m, of which 
KSks.115.2m is 'loan interest' and KShs.4.4m is 'dividends'. Miscellaneous other 
income puts the total to KShs.186.5m. The biggest item of expenditure is 'charges 
on borrowings', in other words, predominantly outward interest, which during this 
financial year was KShs.86m. ' Administration expenses', which included an item 
defined as 'bad debts and provisions on portfolio investments' brought total 
expenditure up to KShS.175.4m. Though this produced a 'profit' of KShs.11.1 m, 
'accumulated losses brought forward' turned this into a loss of KShs.l0.2m. It is a 
little surprising, therefore, to read in the Auditors' Report (Ibid. p.IO)," .. the Bank 
is required ... to maintain a Reserve Fund out of its net profit each year ... During the 
year under review, the bank made an operating profit of KShs.11, 111 ,68l.00 out of 
which KShs.1 ,388,960.00 should have been transferred to the Reserve Fund. The 
Bank did not, however, make any such transfer nor did it maintain a Reserve Fund". 
The technical question as to whether operating profit before applying accumulated 
losses represents net profit, is quite subsumed by the fact that the interest income, 
similar to the situation in the other D.F.I.s, does not represent income actually 
received. Though this is not actually stated in the annual reports, accounting data 
elsewhere make this abundantly clear. For example 1987/8 Balance Sheet ' Assets' 
210 
(Ibid. p.11) refer to 'project debtors' of KShs.439. 7m. The table below shows how 
this figure was computed. 
TABLE 1 
I.D.B. PROJECT DEBTORS (30th June 1988)(KShs.m.) 
Arrears of capital and repayments 
Arrears of interest and charges 
Unbilled accrued interest 
SUB-TOTAL 
Less: Provision for losses on:-
Capital repayments 
Interest and charges 
TOTAL 
SOURCE: I.D.B. Annual Report for 1987/8 p.15 
361.7 
201.3 
27.9 
590.9 
38.5 
112.7 
439.7 
The figure for 'arrears of interest and charges' is over KShs.20m more than the 
figure for 1986/7, and has in fact been going up steadily for a number of years. 
Hence the 'interest' which contributes very substantially to each year's 'income' is 
a very unreliable figure. 
Even more worrying is the state of 'capital and repayment' arrears. As is clear from 
the Table, they stood at KShs.361.7m, and a mere KShs.38.5m had been allowed to 
offset them. As the Auditors' Report points out (Ibid p.10), "The arrears now 
represent 42 % of the total !oans (KShs. 751 m) and have shown significant increase 
due to some projects not servicing loans in accordance with the relevant loan 
agreements which, as indicated in my last year's report, forced the Bank to 
reschedule for some projects". And in the light of harsh experience, the KShs.78.3m 
'current maturities on portfolio loans' would probably add to the arrears! 
Rescheduling loan repayments due has been matched by some flexibility in I.D.B. 
repayments to its own creditors. With all I.B.R.D. borrowings, for example, the 
codicil appears, "The schedule of the loan repayment is subject to amendments in 
accordance with the loan agreement". (Ibid. p.18). However. despite these 
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concessions, the I.D.B. has still been faced with annual repayments to its creditors 
- KShs.130. 7m in 1987/8 (Ibid. p.1l) - and it would have been impossible to find this 
money without activating the government guarantee. 
In the circumstances it is not surprising that the I.D.B. does not easily acquire new 
tranches of long term capital. However lines of credit negotiated in the early 80s and 
not yet fully drawn still provided some funds in the late 80s, together with one or two 
new loans from institutions such as the African Development Bank. Thus during 
1987/8 KShs.90.6m - including KShs.0.8m from sales of investments (Ibid.p.13) -
became available to the I.D.B. for disposal on projects. 
THE BASIS OF THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE D.F.C.K. AND THE 
I.D.B. 
There are several similarities between the D.F.C.K. and the I.O.B. Both lend - the 
D.F.C.K. mostly, the I.D.B. wholly - in foreign exchange, both have smaller equity 
rather than loan portfolios - though the I.D.B. is much more heavily weighted 
towards loans than is the D.F.C.K. - both began life with strong extra-Kenyan 
connections. Furthermore, though the I.D.B. is a parastatal, whereas de jure the 
D.F .C.K. is not, the latter has been subject to more government influence than may 
be expected from the deployment of ownership. There is no necessity, therefore, to 
discuss for each separately the causes of their poor performance. 
In the case of the I.C.D.C. considerable obscurity in the accounts was cited as 
symptomatic of a lack of administrative rigour in the organisation. The accounts of 
the D.F .C.K. and the I.D.B., in contrast, are clear, and starkly bear witness to 
serious financial difficulties. 
Though in both institutions there was during the 1980s a drastic fall in the amount of 
new incoming money, it did not totally dry up, and certain new loan facilities were 
arranged as from 1988. However, in the case of the I.O.B. all incoming loans have 
been automatically guaranteed by the Kenya Government as a matter of course. and 
it is interesting to note that the great bulk of the new 1988 funds to the O.F.C.K .. as 
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comIng from the E.I.B., were," ... under the ACP-EEC Lome Conventions .. 
guaranteed by the Government..". (D.F.C.K. 1988 Annual Report p.2l). Thus the 
I.D.B. and - to some extent - the D.F.C.K. owe their survival to the Kenyan 
government being ready to 'pick up the tab'. Such a scenario is well-fitted to ensure 
that the staffs of these bodies do not feel it urgent to try and put their houses in order. 
Apart from this weakness, criticisms that the RBC Dominion Securities Report 
Component 3 Vol. 2 (p.2) directs at the I.C.D.C. are levelled equally at the 
D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. Such is, in particular, "the DFls' inability to successfully 
monitor too many of their assets", leading to a dearth of "timely, accurate and 
sufficient financial statements". (Ibid. p.l). As a warning, the text observes, "Until 
this problem is solved, effective assessment and portfolio decisions regarding these 
holdings is seriously impaired, if not impossible". Furthermore, as has been 
mentioned earlier, a feature that proved very damaging to the D.F.C.K. and the 
I.D.B. was that, unlike the I.C.D.C., they were (and still are) sourced largely by 
foreign money, and the shilling value of their debt liabilities went up as the Kenya 
shilling steadily depreciated through the 80s. Borrowers from the two D.F.I.s had 
to bear the exchange risk, and many found it difficult to find the money for the 
expanding interest payments and capital repayments. And those that had an 
imprudently high debt/equity ratio were of course hit especially badly. Technically, 
of course, the effects of inflation on company revenue could compensate for the 
increase in the shilling value of debt. Inflation induced by dearer imports and the 
possibility of larger export revenues from cheaper exports would lead to bigger 
incomes for borrowing companies, enabling them to service nominally expanded 
loans. This happened in some instances, especially businesses involved in tourism, 
where demand elasticities were shown to be low. However, in many other cases 
compensation was weak, due to inelastic demand, competition, and an inability to 
address the chance of selling abroad more cheaply than before (10). 
Depreciation of the shilling was felt to be right in the context of the economy as a 
whole, but it was inevitable that as a matter of course D.F.I.s and their clients would 
be affected by it. The RBC Dominion Securities Report Component 3 Vol 1 
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addressed the issue by suggesting the creation of a specialised Government Finance 
Co., for bearing the D.F.I.s' exchange risk (p.ix of Summary). The RBC observed 
that, " ... the Finco approach does not eliminate the Government's contingent liability 
with respect to the foreign currency risk exposure inherent in these loans and 
advances. It aggregates the risk faced by the D.F.I.s, permits it to be placed in the 
hands of specialised professionals, and hence makes it more subject to management". 
This is all very well, but the Report avoids confronting major problems. For 
example, (i) government is subject to an open-ended commitment, (ii) D.F.I.s can 
become lax about forex dealings if they know government is there to support them, 
(iii) in the long run there is not much specialised professionals can do. The solution 
is not so much monetary tinkering and subsidisation at the tax-payer's expense as 
sound macro-economic policies which reduce the frequency and scale of currency 
depreciation, and sound companies which can cope with the effects of occasional falls 
and/or whose income and profits rise in line with the almost inevitably accompanying 
inflation. Nevertheless, in 1990 a scheme for protecting against exchange risk was 
under consideration in Kenya (11), though the details of it had yet to be properly 
worked out. 
Though the RBC Report identified the depreciation of the shilling as a major cause 
of the poor operational and financial condition of many concerns into which the 
D.F.C.K. and/or the I.D.B. had put money, rarely did this appear to be the only 
damaging agent. The features referred to in the I.C.D.C.-related discussion, such as 
overmanning, low quality management, inadequate supply of domestic raw materials, 
run-down production facilities were equally present. And even when foreign debt 
exposure was the main feature in a company's problems, it was often linked to other 
financial weaknesses. Thus Mohan Meakin, a multinational-linked distiller, with a 
D.F.C.K. loan in D-marks, " .. is currently experiencing a working capital shortage. 
It would seem that if the Company is financially restructured, it could be a going 
concern" (RBC Report Component 3 Vo1.2 p.19). Canvas Manufacturers, the 
recipient of an I.D.B. loan, has " .. an imprudent capital structure, and excessive 
foreign currency debt exposure ... the debt/equity imbalance needs to be recti fied and 
the foreign currency-denominated debt reduced". (Ibid. p.20). In Gnanjivan Screws 
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and Fasteners, also a borrower from the I. B. D., " .. its financial expenses including 
foreign currency loan have drained its working capital to a crisis point". (Ibid. p. 21). 
With regard to the sugar refining industry - referred to earlier - into which the 
D.F.C.K. in particular was encouraged to put capital (12), a World Bank 1987 Report 
notes (p.292), "The majority of the sugar companies in Kenya have incurred huge 
trading losses .... Overall, the sugar industry in Kenya is a poor performer, plagued 
with problems ranging from inadequate supply of cane to less than satisfactory sugar 
recovery rates as well as poor management and financial condition at the factory 
level" . 
Many other examples might be given from the experience of D.F.C.K.-financed and 
I.D.B.-financed companies, but it is unnecessary to do so, as they repeat and support 
the above observations. Suggestions by the RBC in relation to certain companies that 
"D.F.C.K. should negotiate to convert its loan to equity" (Ibid. p.21) or" .. D.F.C.K. 
should negotiate to convert its D-mark loan into Kenyan shillings". (Ibid. p.20) are 
nothing more than ad hoc methods for passing the exchange risk on to third parties. 
THE D.F.C.K. AND THE I.D.B. - AN ASSESSMENT 
A quote from Grosh in the first section of this chapter pointed to the overlapping of 
functions between the different Kenyan D.F.I.s. Though at that point in the text only 
evidence from the I.C.D.C. and the D.F.C.K. was available, it is clear that the 
operations of the I.D.B. also largely duplicate the work of the others. If differences 
in the approaches to doing business had been a consequence of the differing 
circumstances surrounding the origins and the ownership profiles of the institutions. 
a situation akin to imperfect competition would perhaps have come about, and 
duplication could have been justified by each of the institutions trying to enhance its 
profile before the others. In the event, however, a number of factors, not least the 
interventionist stance of the Kenyan government, brought about a convergence, not 
only in business behaviour, but also in level of (in)efficiency. 
How significant were (and are) the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. as gap fillers in the 
• .' <") 
Kenyan financial system. and what is the overall conclUSIOn about their expenence. 
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A very important feature in relation to both of them in a country short of foreign 
exchange was the foreign source of most of the funds at their disposal. For the 
D.F.C.K. to be able to lend long in foreign currency to incoming foreign firms 
helped to attract in foreign capital and expertise until a wider spectrum of 
circumstances discouraged new incoming businesses. To go on to finance purely 
domestic concerns as well was an appropriate move, always assuming that the 
D.F.C.K. encompassed supporting services comprehensive and efficient enough to 
identify good propositions and to follow them up. Other things being equal, the role 
of the fledgeling D.F.C.K. was clearcut, and it had the potential to be a catalyst in 
the finance of development. The move of the mainstream financial system into long 
term lending might have come earlier than it did, and to have been more adventurous 
in its scope, had the D.F.C.K. become an example of success in such business (12). 
However, a number of factors intervened to impair its progress, and turn it into an 
institution on the razor edge of financial collapse. 
Firstly, as the RBC Report indicated, there have been severe management weaknesses 
in both the D.F .C.K. and the concerns linked financially to it. Secondly, as the 
earlier quote from Leys makes clear, it was obliged to finance 'marginal' projects. 
Now a 'marginal' project can mean different things. If for example, it is little more 
than a politically motivated exercise, as Leys seems to be assuming (see earlier) it 
results in a misuse of resources: if however it is thought to be marginal in an 
objective commercial sense, there is scope for a good D. F . 1. to show what can be 
done to make it successful. However, coming up against the management drawbacks 
mentioned above made success elusive. Thirdly, there was the depreciation of the 
shilling, which affected the size of many loan repayments. 
The plight of the I.D.B. has been similar to the D.F.C.K. Despite its all-embracing 
remit, it has remained principally a lending organisation, and as such in its early days 
helped - with the D.F.C.K. - to fill a gap in the financial markets, especially as its 
loans were in foreign exchange. Again, sound business operations could have turned 
it into a model for others. Unhappily, organisational weaknesses not only damaged 
its own procedures, but through a lack of disciplined control on the business 
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behaviour of its beneficiaries, affected their own efficiency in tum. And, as with the 
D.F.C.K., the depreciation of the shilling greatly added to company difficulties. As 
a result, given the I.D.B. 's low income, without the Government guaranteeing all its 
debts, it could not have survived. 
Because most of the credit the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. have been receiving has been 
'soft', they have been able to lend at below commercial bank base rate. Now there 
are strong arguments against concessional loans (see Pt.1 Chapter 3), which centre 
mainly on resource misallocation, and it is fair to assume that in the first years of the 
lives of both organisations, many borrowers with dubious projects were attracted by 
the lure of cheap money. Furthermore, as the quote from Leys in an earlier section 
about marginal projects makes clear, there was political pressure with regard to the 
disbursement of funds, and cheap credit tends to attract those who can use leverage 
to obtain the subsidy. 
A full treatment of the issue must be postponed till Part 3, but much of the above 
comment accords with the influence of features associated with the 'soft' state. Both 
the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. might have become established as sound long term 
finance organisations, in particular developing lending business towards borrowers 
whom the mainstream financial system would prefer to avoid, but who in due course 
would follow the example set, and move down the same road. Sound rehabilitation 
business, where firms are turned round and not just propped up, is a plausible part 
of the role of the two institutions. However both have become weakened by a wide 
spectrum of administrative and managerial failure at their own level, the level of the 
companies below them, and at government level. To this must be added political 
partiality and pressure. 
Because of the record of these two bodies, it is suggested that Kenyan economic 
growth has been hindered rather than helped. Resources have flowed into unviable 
projects, only to be topped up with yet more as projects had to be rehabilitated. In 
so far as firms felt they would always be propped up, there has been no incentive to 
become more efficient. Finally, the financial system might have developed faster, 
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had the D.F.C.K. and the LD.B. given a clear lead rather than an awful warning. 
NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 6 
1. The RBC Report on Kenyan D.F.I.s - commissioned in 1989 - has already 
been referred to extensively in Chapter 5. 
2. Much of the material in this section was communicated to the writer at 
interviews in April 1990. 
3.a) In all the sugar companies established after independence government was by 
far the biggest shareholder. 
3.b) In 1988 the D.F.C.K. had 156,000 shares in Panafrican paper mills. 
4. When the writer was in Kenya in 1990, it proved impossible to get any 
detailed information about S.E.F.C.O. 
5. At the end of 1988 the fund sources for S.E.F.C.O. were as follows: 
TABLE 2 
S.E.F.C.O. - SOURCES OF FUNDS (KShs.m.) 
Advances 
Government of Kenya 54.1 
Nederlandse Financierings-
Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N. V. 
TOTALS 54.1 
Facilities 
8.0 
18.5 
26.1 
(rounded) 
SOURCE: From D.F.C.K. Annual Report and Accounts for 1988 p.2l 
6. A further example of duplication is with the Kenya Tourist Development 
Corporation, since the D.F.C.K. has hotel businesses, such as Panafric Hotels Ltd .. 
in its portfolio. 
7. From various annual reports and interviews. 
218 
8. I am indebted to notes - including the quote - made by John Henley of 
Edinburgh University, for miscellaneous pieces of information in this section. 
9. Allocating money to firms for rehabilitation purposes is a perfectly legitimate 
function for a D.F.1. to perform, and in the text there are various references to the 
technical functions that support financing arrangements of this variety in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. Unfortunately in all the D.F.l.s investigated, rehabilitation exercises do 
not seem to have turned many firms around. In practice, 'rehabilitation' too often 
seems to have been a euphemism for 'subsidy'. 
10. When depreciation occurs, exporters can (i) maintain the same pnces 10 
foreign exchange and receive higher profits, or (ii) lower prices in forex terms in the 
hope of getting more sales, in which case price elasticities of demand are crucial. 
11. This was explained to the writer at I.D.B. and D.F.C.K. interviews in April 
1990. 
12. An example of this in the U. K. is 3i, referred to already in Pt. 1, Chapter 1. 
It was set up to finance small to medium firms making, for example, components, 
and such was the success of the organisation that banks, following its example, set 
up subsidiaries for the same sort of lending. 
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Chapter 7 
TIlE (ZIMBABWEAN) INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
INTRODUCTION 
In certain respects the Industrial Development Corporation in Zimbabwe is analogous 
to the Kenya I.C.D.C. Both are totally in government ownership, both are -in the 
respective countries - the principal D.F.l.s with mainly equity investments in 
manufacturing and commerce, and both substantially antedate the achievement of 
independence by Kenya and Zimbabwe. However one of the most striking 
differences is that the I.D.C. appears to be financially solvent, whereas the I.C.D.C. 
- without government subsidies - is not. Indeed in contrast to the situation in the 
I.C.D.C., the I.D.C. Chairman (Annual Report and Accounts for 1988 p.7) observed, 
"I.D.C. holds a proud record of not ever having been subsidized by Government 
during its 25 years of existence". It is a pertinent question as to why the I.D.C. 
seems to have done better than the I.C.D.C. Have many of the shortcomings that 
plague D.F.l.s and the companies linked to them in Kenya somehow been avoided in 
Zimbabwe, or can the basis of the I.D.C. 's viability be questioned and criticised? 
THE I.D.C. 's REMIT 
(a) The early years. 
The I. D. C. was established in 1963. The initial capital was fixed at Z$l Om, though 
only half of this, from a number of financial institutions in the U. K., South Africa 
and - what was then - Southern Rhodesia, and from the territory's Government, was 
taken up. 
The aim was to supplement existing capital market provisions by providing a fresh 
source of equity capital so as to "promote the accelerated development of the private 
sector". (Ibid. p.5). It was prepared to associate in new and expanded ventures with 
foreign and domestic interests, and there was some attempt to favour business that 
because of the rather higher risk or longer gestation period, would be less attractive 
to private industry alone (1). Also the I.D.C. was to provide loan capital in the 
absence of sufficient provision (2). And when the recipients of I.D.C. equity capital 
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were established, the Corporation was to sell its holdings to raise money for new 
ventures. Although the accent was on the fostering of manufacturing and commerce, 
in its early days the Corporation had interests in mining and tourism. 
Very few - if any - ventures of ethnically African origin benefitted from I.D.C. 
money. Eventually, as a gesture towards helping aspiring African businessmen, and 
also in the light of the rapidly changing political situation, the Corporation in 1979 
established a small enterprise subsidiary, the Development Finance Company (3). 
In terms of the parameters laid down in Chapter 5 of Part 1, the I. D. C., as conceived 
of in its early years, appears to represent a very standard D.F.I. It was to fill gaps 
in the capital market, and channel money to those who might have had difficulty 
raising it elsewhere. And as a revolving capital organisation, it was to help stimulate 
the development of the the stock market. However, it was in operation for less than 
three years before Rhodesia was uniterally declared to be independent, and the 
territory was soon subject to trade sanctions. Hence, though the Corporation's remit 
remained in theory as it had always been, in practice it had an expanded role 
addressing certain of the economic difficulties that resulted. In particular, it took 
over a number of firms that otherwise would have collapsed. 
(b) The independence years. 
Almost inevitably, given the predilections of the incoming Mugabe government 
towards embracing socialism, with legal independence in 1980 came a change in the 
direction of the LD.C. The 'partnership' approach to industry noted in Kenya appears 
in the Transitional Plan (p. 38): "Government intends to increase the level and control 
and participation by the State through establishment of new public enterprises, share 
participation in some existing ones, and joint ventures in key and strategic areas of 
the economy". More explicitly, at a later point in the Plan (p.73) it is observed, "The 
Zimbabwe Development Corporation (4) will promote coordinated State participation 
in the economy and will, through its subsidiary, the Industrial Development 
Corporation, which will be revamped and reorientated, accelerate State participation 
in manufacturing". 
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This commitment to government involvement in industry was further reiterated in the 
1986-90 Development Plan (p.16), though some years after independence the tone is 
softer, with an implied acceptance that government may have to be left out: "It is 
estimated that during the Plan period foreign investment will amount to about 
Z$200m (5) and most of it will be in the form of direct investment or joint venture 
with Government and local industrialists". And at the end of the decade, in the light 
of lessons to be learned from international politico/economic changes, and when a 
commitment to some variety of socialism in Zimbabwe was ceasing to be even 
rhetorically fashionable, partnership in industry was played down even more. As was 
stated in 1989 in 'The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations' (p.5): "It 
is Government policy to take part in the investment process by entering into joint 
ventures with private (local and foreign) investors in the strategic and basic 
infrastructure sectors. However, participation will not be the general rule unless 
dictated by special circumstances". 
The 'revamping' of the LD.C. after independence was quite substantial. The Smith 
government in the U.D.L period had already increased the government share in the 
organisation to 80 %, and in 1984 it was made 100%, this being considered necessary 
to "strengthen the development of public investment in the manufacturing sector". 
(LD.C. op.cit. p.6). At the same time the LD.C.'s interests in mining and tourism 
were transferred to the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation and the 
Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation. And the potential capital base was 
raised to Z$100m. 
Even more radically, "The Board took a decision in 1984 to change from a policy of 
merchant banking activities to one of permanent long-term investment in equity in 
those affiliate companies in which the Corporation had an interest" (I.O.C. Annual 
Report and Accounts 1987 p.21), though in the 1988 Report (p.6) it was noted that 
the cessation of merchant banking activities was "except to its affiliate companies". 
In other words, the LD.C. was to become a sort of investment trust cum holding 
company in relation to its equity portfolio. Thus was made explicit what in the case 
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of the I.C.D.C. of Kenya was implicit and only to be deduced from operational 
behaviour. 
Furthermore a policy intention that has been standard in many other D.F.I.s. 
including the Kenyan I.C.D.C. (see Chapter 5), and that is the attempt to satisfy 
social objectives while still remaining financially sound, was - rhetorically at any rate 
- firmly eschewed. The 1980 Annual Report (p.12), reminding the public of the 
objectives of the I.D.C. by quoting from the enabling Act, that the I.D.C. was, "to 
facilitate, promote, guide and assist in the financing of new industries and industrial 
undertakings .. and for the expansion, better organisation and modernisation of 
existing industries", added the principle that "consideration of every application and 
proposal (must be) strictly on its economic merits, irrespective of all other 
considerations whatever". Later, in the 1988 Annual Report (p.13), the Chairman 
stated, "At certain specific moments in its history, I.D.C. could have let the problem 
of meeting conflicting social and economic objectives detract it from the good 
performance of the Group, particularly during the first half of the 1980s. This was 
not allowed to happen, or at least such tendencies were checked before the rot could 
set in" . 
In these changes of direction it is a matter of debate to what extent the I.D.C. was 
any longer a truly 'development' organisation. Capital spending, as noted in 
paragraphs above, was largely to be associated with the furtherance of government 
participation in industry, both existing as well as new. Shareholdings were not to be 
liquidated to raise money for new investment, and so as a consequence the 
Corporation would be doing nothing for the stock market. And the recognition of the 
dangers of 'social' financing, together with the determination to avoid it, seems to 
have precluded any willingness to tackle 'difficult' areas of lending and equity capital 
prOVISIon. 
Later sections will consider what actually happened. 
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OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
In its operational behaviour, the I.D.C. added somewhat to the functions that it was 
supposed - in terms of the changing official conception of its purpose - to perform. 
Firstly, during the V.D.I. period - that is, from 1965-1980 - it was, as already 
mentioned, a convenient vehicle for addressing some of the effects of economic 
sanctions. As is stated in the 1988 Annual Report (p.6), "The I.D.C. engaged 
various of its subsidiaries and other phantom companies (sic) to provide services 
which had previously been provided by overseas companies before economic trade 
sanctions were imposed. It is particularly during this period that I.D.C. strengthened 
the development of private capital in the private sector to the total exclusion of black 
entrepreneurs except in the late 1970s". New industrial ventures that took root - and 
some surprising products appeared, such as locally-manufactured perfume (6) - were 
very much a hot-house development, since they were protected not only by 
locally-imposed import restrictions, but also by an international embargo on exports 
to Rhodesia. It is a continuing matter of debate whether this enforced programme of 
import substitution and diversification was in the long term interests of the economy 
(7), but the World Bank seems to be favourably impressed. For example, in a 
'country report', it observes (1985 p.47) "Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector is highly 
developed and markedly diversified, especially by African standards. It produces 
nearly all types of consumer goods as well as many producer goods". And later 
(p.49) it states with what what appears to be approval, "A remarkable feature of the 
industrialisation process under UDI was the reorientation of the industrial structure 
towards producer goods and heavy industry". Hence at official independence in 1980 
the territory had a very varied industrial base (see Pt.2 Chapter 3 for more details). 
Import substitution - which must imply further diversification - remained (and still is) 
a standard policy aim of the government in Zimbabwe. 
Secondly, the I.D.C. has from time to time been prepared to take over firms that 
would otherwise have collapsed. According to a Confederation of Zimbabwe 
Industries official, this did occur during the V.D.I. period. However the main period 
for this behaviour was during the early 1980s. Two major reasons were identified 
in the 1988 Report (p.6) as to why some firms were in such a condition that if they 
were to survive they required saving by the I.D.C.: "With an increasing number of 
sick firms going to the wall during the period of severe drought and international 
recession between 1982 and 1984 (see Pt.2 Chapter 3 for further details) and 
heightened disinvestment by foreign firms, confidence in the future of the 
manufacturing sector would have been greatly undermined without the intervention 
of the I.D.C. in rescuing ailing firms or acquiring companies of withdrawing foreign 
investors" . 
Although the text at this point goes on to a conventional justification of the policy in 
terms of employment protection, the preservation of skills and technology, and 
balance of trade equilibrium, later some apparent disquiet is evident. As the 
Chairman of the I.D.C. observed (Ibid. p.13), "Where there is a multitude of 
objectives, the usual tendency is to lose direction as a result of lack of priorities. 
Social objectives are then allowed to become an excuse for poor performance. The 
period 1982-1986 which involved extensive rescue operations of ailing companies 
could have witnessed an irreversible slide of the performance of the I. D. C. as 
Government attempts were made to prevent company closures and maintain 
employment in industry" .(8) And the May 1988 edition of 'African Business' refers 
scathingl y (p. 31) to " .. the Industrial Dev~lopment Corporation, famous for bailing 
out ailing companies". However an interesting codicil to the observations in this 
paragraph is the fact that in 1985 virtually the whole Board of Directors was changed. 
Perhaps this is connected with the determination to prevent the I.D.C. going into an 
'irreversible slide'. 
Apart from the above, the I.D.C. carried out its post-independence remit of buying 
into existing profitable and established companies, such as Almin Industries. 
Furthermore stakes in existing companies were sometimes increased, even where the 
Corporation already had a majority holding. Hence, for example, in 1982 the holding 
in G and W Industrial Materials was taken up from 70% to 91 %. However, the drive 
towards partnership with new incoming companies has not amounted to much during 
recent years, because of the collapse of interest by foreign multinationals in bringing 
new investment into Africa, and this of course includes Zimbabwe. Increases in 
I.D.C.lmultinational business cooperation have been more to do with expansion of 
existing operations than the initiation of brand new ventures. Also there has been 
some initiation of new ventures in cooperation with various local interests. 
However, overall the expansion of I.D.C. activity In industry has hardly been 
spectacular. During the year ending in June 1987 for example one new concern came 
on stream, and there was some new plant at an existing firm (1987 Annual Report 
p.8). In the year ending June 1988, nothing new got under way. There were also a 
number of feasibility studies, most of which failed to lead to anything concrete. 
Perhaps somewhat sinister has been the anecdotal but widely reported habit of the 
I.D.C. 'poaching' projects (9). This has occurred when a private sector concern 
seeks permission to go ahead with some new project that appears to have a good 
prognosis. The venture is disallowed at the Investment Centre (or prior to this by the 
more cumbersome monitoring arrangements then in place) but then the I.D.C. 
proposes a very similar project of its own (10). In general, pervasive Government 
influence in the work of the I.D.C. can be intimated from the following (Ibid. p.7): 
"Government requested the Corporation to take over the Zimbabwe Defence 
Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. as its wholly owned subsidiary". The fact that the I.D.C. 
Chairman for most of the 80s was a powerful official figure, as well as being a 
cabinet minister, could facilitate these types of operation! 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF I.D.C. COLLABORATION WITH PRIVATE 
SECTOR INTERESTS 
(a) Introduction. 
In the previous section reference was made to (i) the limited amount of new foreign 
investment coming into and (ii) the withdrawal of some private commercial interests 
from the Zimbabwe economy, in recent years. Both of these outcomes had 
implications for the I.D.C. as a major partner in industrial and commercial ventures. 
Secondly, and with obeisance to the 'rent-seeking' discussion in Part 1 Chapter J. 
must be considered what advantages government may have been prepared to bestow 
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on companies that were the result of I.D.C.lprivate sector collaboration. The 
paragraphs below discuss these two issues. 
(b) Foreign investment in abeyance. 
Though there is a dearth of detailed information and comment on overall foreign 
direct investment in Zimbabwe, Bennell has some useful observations on British 
company involvement, and, given Zimbabwe's history, this represents by far the 
major element in the total. It is interesting that Zimbabwe, by coming to official 
independence rather later than most of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, 'missed' the 
main period of hostility by the developing world towards foreign company 
investment. As Bennell points out (1989 p.3), "The strident criticisms of FDI 
(foreign direct investment) and TNCs (transnational corporations) so prevalent in 
policy-making and academic circles in the majority of SSA countries up until the 
early 1980s are .. rapidly being submerged in a tidal wave of official support for 
foreign investment". On the other hand, the disadvantage of 'late' independence was 
that while other countries were changing their official stance, Zimbabwe had to go 
through a truncated period of xenophobic muscle-flexing before pragmatism set in. 
Hence the regulations of the early 1980s giving the I.D.C. a higher profile than 
before with regard to company ownership and investment. 
Indeed there has been a substantial contraction in U.K. company interest in 
sub-Saharan Africa. As Bennell observes (Ibid. p.8), "The importance of Africa as 
a location of British overseas investment has, in global terms, declined considerably 
since the mid-1970s. In fact, net industrial investment in Africa in Africa by U.K. 
companies has become relatively inconsequential, amounting to less than 0.5 % of 
total industrial FDI in 1986 compared with around 4% in the mid-70s". Not only 
this: in addition, companies have been actively disengaging from sub-Saharan Africa. 
" .. nearly one third of the British companies who had industrial involvements in ESA 
(Eastern and Southern Africa) in the late 1970s had already disposed of these 
investments by mid-1989 .. by far the largest number of companies have withdrawn 
from Zimbabwe [37], Nigeria [23] and Zambia [17]. Zimbabwe was in the grip of 
'disinvestment fever' in 1987-8 with leading British companies selling out.. "(Ibid. 
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p.16-17) The corollary to this was the I.D.C. 's policy in the early 80s of obtaining 
- at bargain prices (11) - some of these abandoned businesses. 
There are a number of reasons for the lack of foreign interest in existing and new real 
investment in Zimbabwe (and in other African countries). First is the unsatisfactory 
- in a comparative sense - rate of return on capital. Bennell supplies a number of 
figures showing the 1988 post-tax rate of return in various industrial sectors for a 
sample of British transnationals in Zimbabwe compared with their global rates of 
return. In virtually every case the Zimbabwe outcome is inferior. A few examples 
are given below. 
TABLE 1 
SELECTED TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION 
RATES OF RETURN IN 1988( % ) 
Sector: . Zimbabwe Global 
Metal 17.9 20.1 
Electrical 18.8 24.9 
Chemical 13.7 21.2 
Textiles 11.0 11.9 
SOURCE: Bennell (op.cit.) Table 9 
Though service industries do rather better - "the RORs on non-industrial FDI in 
Africa were nearly double those from industrial FDI between 1978-1984" (op.cit. 
p.15) - the Zimbabwe government has not been keen on new foreign investment in 
that area. As is stated in 'The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations 
1989' (p.4), "foreign capital is not encouraged in the services and services-related 
sectors such as banking, retail and wholesale trading and consultancy services". 
Secondly have been (and are) the serious problems over sufficient foreign exchange. 
Indeed one aspect of this relates to the above issue concerning profitability, for only 
limited dividends may be repatriated abroad, so making effective profitability for 
foreign shareholders much lower than rate of return on capital might suggest. The 
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'Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations 1989' (p.7) explains that 50% of 
dividends from 'new', that is, after Sep. 1979, investment may be repatriated, but 
only 25 % related to 'old' investment. The remaining percentage of declared 
dividends are treated as blocked funds, and have to go into low interest government 
stock. Remittance of capital abroad from disposal of assets is subject to substantial 
deductions, as noted in the last section. 
Foreign exchange constraints have not been confined to the export of profits and 
capital, but also to the import of goods. Though funds are not meant to be issued for 
imports, especially consumer imports, if the goods in question are made locally, firms 
can normally hope for allocations for equipment, materials and components. 
However, allocations are made after various large deductions for government needs, 
and - according to the applicants - usually fall short of requirements. In general the 
foreign currency allocation system for imports has been fairly obscure, as is 
highlighted in the following: "The Green Book, a publication detailing regulations and 
guidelines on exchange control, published by the Reserve Bank, has deliberately not 
been made available to the public". (Financial Gazette 15-9-89 p.6-7). Indeed, the 
whole business has become complicated and clouded by allegations of corruption, as 
the following indicates: "(Albert Dube, Minister of Industry and Technology) ref~sed 
to answer a question when a delegate asked whether allocations were ever made on 
the strength of political recommendation" . (Ibid. p.6). And an observation by Sam 
Gozo, a local businessman (Ibid. p.7) that, "Industry in Zimbabwe has stopped 
managing business and is now managing currency" was reinforced for the writer by 
an official of the I.D.C.-held company, Berkshire International, when he explained 
that one employee's sole job was to try and secure more foreign exchange. The 
inability to secure enough foreign exchange has - according to a survey reported by 
Bennell (12) and the statements made to the writer in 1990 by financiers and 
businessmen in Zimbabwe - been the main factor undermining business, leaving firms 
undercapitalised and unable to reequip (13). 
A third fairly wide-ranging complaint made by foreign interests about doing business 
in Zimbabwe has been the level of bureaucracy (14). This was particularly 
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cumbersome in the matter of getting permission to go ahead with new investment _ 
so discouraging many from bothering - and the 'one-stop' Zimbabwe Investment 
Centre set up in 1989 was meant to streamline the process. Richard Wilde, the acting 
director, observed that its reputation would depend on its ability "to drastically reduce 
the time taken for investment decisions to be made". (Fin. Gazette 8.9.89 p.3). Not 
more than 90 days was the goal. As in the not dissimilar Kenyan context, there was 
a tendency in business circles to regard the Investment Centre as just a further level 
of bureaucracy. And with reference to the previous discussion, a complex system of 
forex rules still dogs moves towards new real investment. 
Fourthly is the matter of local borrowing. A company with more than 25 % of its 
capital in the hands of foreign shareholders is very limited as to what it can borrow 
locally. Before 1989, however, the cut-off point had been 15%. 
Fifthly, there has been (and is) a system of price controls which have been resented 
as keeping down profits and bringing in market distortions. They have also led to 
corruption, which has been per se a further cause of disquiet amongst foreign business 
interests. A celebrated instance, which led in 1989-90 to a government commission 
of enquiry, concerned Wi llowvale , a 100% I.D.C.-held importer of motor vehicles. 
Allocated only limited amounts of foreign exchange, it imported far fewer cars than 
domestic demand would warrant. Ministers and others in high places obliged 
Willowvale to dispose of many of these vehicles to themselves, which they then 
promptly resold privately at a large profit. 
Sad though the above is, other more structured methods of getting round pnce 
controls have developed. The World Bank in a 1987 Report Cp.43) observed, 
"businessmen have established superfluous distribution layers in order to boost the 
price between factory and final consumer". 
The above paragraphs have investigated foreign business operations in general In 
Zimbabwe, rather than keeping to purely I.D.C. matters. Since, however, much 
I.D.C. operational behaviour has been largely geared to partnership with 
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foreign-based concerns, the temporary change in focus is justifiable, since the scope 
and expansion of I.D.C. business interests is very much a function of foreign attitudes 
towards investment in the economy. However, it is fair to ask ifin practice concerns 
with I.D.C. involvement have been less affected by the above disabilities than totally 
independent concerns. Evidence on this is mixed. The official line is very much that 
Corporation subsidiaries and associates have had no advantages. For example. in the 
1988 Report (p.13): "The I.D.C. affiliates have to queue up for forex allocations, 
project approvals, price increase applications, and bank loans like all other industrial 
enterprises. Our affiliates are as much affected by exchange control regulations, rules 
governing the entry and exit of companies into the manufacturing sector, trade and 
industry specific policies and the high cost of commercial borrowing as every other 
enterprise in the land" (15). However the vociferousness of these assertions is a little 
suspect, and testifies to an awareness that allegations had been made to the effect that 
the I.D.C. had received favourable treatment. Since the I.D.C. Chairman, before his 
resignation at the end of the decade, had been not only a cabinet minister, but also 
in charge of forex allocations, it could be that at times I. D. C. companies were at an 
advantage in respect of foreign exchange allocations. Or such was a view from the 
C.Z.I. (But see above on Berkshire International). Nevertheless if companies 
affiliated to the I.D.C. ever were looked at in a more kindly light than others, it was 
insufficient to interest and attract foreign capital. 
(c) The protection of firms. 
The final part of the last section asked whether the disadvantages of doing business 
in Zimbabwe bore less heavily on I.D.C. affiliates than other firms. From the 
discussion it was deduced that this may have happened from time to time, but there 
is no evidence of consistent policy. Almost by default the personality link-ups and 
overlaps between I.D.C. and government must sometimes mean a balance of 
advantage to the Corporation (16). 
This sub-section asks what indulgencies may deliberately be granted to I. O. C. 
affiliates. The main ones relate to import protection and monopoly status, and as 
such are likely to apply to all companies, whether I.O.C. or not. However. from a 
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fiscal point of view, it is important for I.D.C. to be profitable so as (i) to avoid 
needing government subsidies, and (ii) as - in one sense - an investment trust. to 
make money for its one shareholder, the government: the state therefore has had good 
motives for wanting I.D.C. companies to be successful. 
Protection of industry against imports has been fairly comprehensive, and the writer 
did not become aware of any evasion of the rules, as had been the case in Kenya. 
Until the moves towards liberalisation - which in fact means a graded system of 
tariffs (17) - at the end of the 80s decade, imports were kept out quantitatively. The 
World Bank (1987 p.37) explains the situation fairly bluntly, " .. importation of goods 
that would compete with domestic production is not permitted, allowing industrial 
firms to operate within the domestic market without external competitive pressure" . 
The results of this policy are almost to be expected. Import substitution has been far 
more popular than trying to expand export markets, and the comfort of protection has 
tended to make firms unable to compete in exports. As a (U.S.) A.I.D. publication 
asserted in 1989 (p. vi), "Typically, value-added in domestic sales is 72 % higher than 
in exports". A point it had made earlier (p. v) to the effect that, "Little attention has 
been paid to R and D, industrial marketing, product diversification" - within a 
product range - "and preventive maintenance", is no doubt partly a consequence. 
Both C.Z.I. and interviewed merchant banking officials (18) felt that Zimbabwe had 
reached the limit - for the time being - of import substitution, and this was echoed in 
the 1988 I.D.C. Annual Report (p.8): "The primary phase of import substitution is 
rapidly drawing to a close, if it has not done so already". Recently there have been 
moves - such as consideration of the possibility of setting up export zones - to secure 
more exports, and there have been success stories. Berkshire International, for 
example, 37% I.D.C.-owned, increased its export earnings by over two thirds from 
1987 to 1988 (Ibid. p.21). 
With regard to Zimbabwe firms being domestic monopolies, the picture is somewhat 
clouded. As far as I.D.C. affiliates are concerned, in the 1988 Annual Report (p.13) 
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the Chairman states quite adamantly, "To date, not a single I.D.C. affiliate company 
has total monopoly in its area of production". However, this affirmation conveniently 
lacks precision, and begs the question as to quite what 'area of production' means and 
how significant the competition might be. In practice some of the most successful 
I.D.C. affiliates, such as Almin Industries, making copper tubing and related 
products, and Zimglass, making glass containers, present as monopolies. And the 
World Bank (1986 p. xiii), though - admittedly - writing about 1982, reported that 
half of manufactures were produced under monopolistic conditions, and up to four 
fifths under oligopolistic (defined here as not more than 3 firms in an industry) 
conditions. 
Indeed, according to the World Bank 1987 Report, cited earlier, the government 
actively works towards preserving domestic monopolies (p.37): "foreign exchange is 
denied to entrepreneurs wishing to start new firms that would produce goods already 
in domestic production, protecting established firms from domestic competition". It 
is, then, fair to conclude that government does try and generate industrial rents from 
the creation and perpetuation of domestic monopolies. From the point of view of 
foreign investors, a protected market would seem likely to result in profits, and from 
the point of view of government, there would be a chance of income via the I. D. C. 
from monopolistic affiliates. However, with regard to the level of profits, Bennell' s 
figures, quoted earlier, show that British transnationals could expect less from capital 
invested in Zimbabwe, than could on average be earned globally. The reason for this 
is the battery of constraints put on companies (see last sub-section), the efficiency of 
the companies themselves (see later discussion) and the price controls government 
feels obliged to impose to try and curb inflation. Monopoly power, then, keeps 
companies in the black: a cluster of constraints hold them back from reaping large 
monopoly profits, and also from remitting abroad the profits they do make. (Refer 
to Appendix 1 for an analysis of this type of scenario). 
THE FINANCES OF THE I.D.C. 
As was observed at the beginning of the chapter, one of the most striking features of 
the I.D.C., which contrasts it very strongly with the Kenyan I.C.D.C .. is its apparent 
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financial viability. In this section, the accounts of the Corporation will be 
investigated to establish the accounting basis of that viability. 
As noted earlier, when it was founded, the I.D.C. began life with an authorised 
capital of Z$10m. When government took it over, the authorised capital went to 
Z$100m, and by June 1988, the amount issued had risen to just under Z$25m (I.D.C. 
1988 Annual Report p.38). Though this represents a substantial increase, even 
allowing for inflation, the fact that it is still nowhere near the limit shows that both 
government and LD.C. have exercised caution in the matter of expanding the 
Corporation's interests. 
The nature of the funds at the disposal of the 1. D. C. gives it a useful advantage. 
Since it has never gone in for long term borrowing, there has never been an 
obligation to pay interest. Government is the one and only shareholder, and given 
its organic links, both legally and via personalities, with the I.D.C., it is impossible 
that it should demand higher dividends than the Board of Directors want to declare. 
Thus the way is open for capital to earn less than its shadow price or opportunity cost 
without the Corporation being embarrassed. 
And indeed, this is what has been happening. The table below gives the return on 
capital over a number of years, and, given that certain I.D.C. subsidiaries were 
borrowing from banks in the late 80s at concessionary rates of between 7 % and 9 % , 
and at non-concessionary rates of between 12% and 16% (Ibid. p.39), clearly the 
LD.C. 's performance has been indifferent. 
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TABLE 2 
THE PROFITABILITY OF THE I.D.C. 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Profits 
(Z$OOO) 2641 3518 2716 2274 1633 1726 2898 5694 
Shareholders' 
interest 
(Z$OOO) 37344 40652 40859 43871 46640 55170 58546 86350 
Return on 
capital 
employed at 
beginning 
of year 7.9% 9.4% 6.7% 5.6% 3.7% 3.7% 5.3% 9.6% 
SOURCE: I.D.C. Annual Report and Accounts for 1987 p.32 and Annual Report and 
Accounts for 1988 p.38 and p.33 
The dividend paid to the government has for many years been curiously static at 
Z$800th per annum. This represents a low and decreasing return on the capital the 
government has been putting into the Corporation, and an even more trivial 
percentage of 'shareholders' interest' (19) and the rather lower - in 1987 Z$47.6m 
- current value of investments. Therefore, in spite of everything, it may be concluded 
that the government has not been extracting much income from its I.D.C. parastatal. 
A further look at the profits reveals a downward trend from 1982, with an even more 
drastic decline in their real worth. However these years were times of depression and 
drought, and witnessed the I.D.C. taking over some ailing and abandoned companies. 
In recent years the financial outcome appear to have been showing a substantial 
improvement. 
However, it is now important to investigate the calculations from which profits 
figures have been derived. Unlike the I.C.D.C. in Kenya, interest and dividend 
income to the Corporation appears to be real enough: there is no mention of dividends 
being declared but 'having not been received'. Indeed, there appears to be a very 
disciplined approach to the responsibilities of affiliates, as the following indicates. 
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"Boards of affiliate companies also highlight financial objectives such as return on 
assets or capital employed, dividend payouts, gearing ratios etc. The principle of 
paying a dividend by an affiliate, no matter how small, is very important to the 
I.D.C. in fostering improved performance of the Group". (I.D.C. 1988 Report p.13). 
The table that follows shows the I.D.C. 's income over a number of years. It also 
shows expenditure, which, when deducted, leaves the profit. 
TABLE 3 
I.D.C. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Income 
(Z$th) 3132 4091 3352 3160 2668 2818 4151 NA* 
Expenses 
(Z$OOO) 490 574 635 885 1035 1092 1253 NA 
% increases 
10 expenses 17 11 39 17 6 15 
Expenses as a 
% of income 16 14 19 28 39 39 30 
SOURCE: I.D.C. Annual Report and Accounts for 1988 p.32 
* As from the 1988 Report the I.D.C. began to present its accounts in 'Group' rather 
than 'Corporation' form. Because of this, certain figures can no longer be deduced. 
Income, paralleling the trend in profits, falls in the mid-80s, before picking up again. 
However, given the rate of inflation - approximately 14 % a year on average 
(Quarterly Digest of Statistics for March 1989 Table 8.1) - real income in 1987 was 
still lower than it had been in 1981. Expenses, however, growing at about 17% a 
year on average, increased faster than the rate of inflation, and present as a growing 
proportion - until 1987 at any rate - of income. Whether the rise can be justified in 
terms of the expansion of I.D.C. activities is a research project in itself. Certainly the 
time of the quickest rate of increase coincided with the purchase of a number of 
companies in difficulties. However, as against that, a number of companies have 
become dormant, and the book value of investments rose on average from 1981 to 
1987 by only 10.5% per annum (from I.D.C. 1988 Annual Report p.32). 
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Finally, it is illuminating to look at the sources and application of funds, \\here 
certain features require comment. In 1987 - later figures are not used owing to the 
obscurity introduced by presenting the accounts from a Group rather than Corporation 
viewpoint - the sources of funds (I.D.C. Annual Report for 1987 p.31) consisted, in 
addition to the profits, of substantial loan repayments, increase in shares issued. and 
one or two miscellaneous small items, making over Z$14.5m in total. However, of 
this less than Z$6m went on new purchases of shares and new loan facilities, and so 
working capital went up by Z$8m. This appears to show a combination of investment 
caution and a lack of viable demand for capital, though it is fair to add that this gap 
between funds available and funds disbursed does not happen every year. 
Furthermore with regard to the working capital, over Z$2m was extended to the 
affiliate companies. This type of lending business would seem more suited to a 
conventional commercial bank than a concern labelled a development corporation, 
though the World Development Report of 1989 does support a the idea of aD. F. I. 
lending companies working capital, in that it keeps it in constant contact with their 
business activities. 
In conclusion, unlike the Kenya I.C.D.C., there does not seem to be any question, 
from an accounting point of view, over the I.D.C.'s financial viability. However, 
in order to fully pronounce on the integrity of this viability, it is necessary to look at 
the companies under the I. D. C. ' s auspices. 
THE BASIS OF I.D.C. VIABILITY 
(a) Introduction. 
The I.D.C. has been shown to be financially solvent, though with a relatively poor 
average rate of return on capital. The following paragraphs investigate the nature and 
state of the companies from which the I.D.C. obtains its operational income (20). 
Later there will be a sub-section on the features integral to the Corporation itself that 
influence its financial condition. 
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(b) The affiliate companies. 
In 1988, the I.D.C. listed 11 associate companies - with share ownership up to 50% 
of the capital - and 17 subsidiaries, where the I.D.C. held the majority of the capital. 
Of the latter group, 6 companies were held 100% by the I.D.C. (I.D.C. Annual 
Report for 1988 p.43). As will be seen, scrutiny of the 28 firms shows the 
Corporation's viability to rest on a shaky foundation. Indeed, it may be noted that 
in a list of 'top' companies (21) in a supplement on Zimbabwean companies (p.l) in 
the Financial Gazette of 18th Aug. 1989, no I.D.C. affiliate is included. 
Five of the I.D.C. affiliates, one associate and four subsidiaries, all with 100% 
I.D.C. ownership were listed as 'dormant'. The associate, Allied Motor Distributors, 
dated from 1954, and had been set up for the import of a variety of consumer goods. 
It had not traded for a number of years, and had been partially bought by I.D.C. for 
a consideration that was not made public. Of the subsidiaries, one was a bankrupt 
small business credit company - see next section - , a second was D.S.O. Asbestos, 
taken over in 1979 soon after its underground mining ceased to be technically viable, 
the third was Mutari Exploration, bought up in the early 80s when the original 
owners wished to opt out, and the final one was Industrial Assets Corporation, about 
which no useful information was available. 
However, apart from the above, there were five other companies which, though not 
listed as dormant, were not actually running profitable business operations. 
Communications Systems of Zimbabwe Ltd, an associate owned by the I.D.C. and 
Plessey, though set up in 1966, had never done any business till the late 1980s, when 
the Corporation decided it should make telephonic communications equipment. (This 
company was referred to in the second section of this chapter, when a prior 
independent proposal to make these types of goods had opportunely been rejected.) 
Nevertheless, as the I.D.C. 1988 Report admitted (p.22), "The company has 
experienced some delays in shipment of components for the manufacture of products 
ordered by customers". In connection with National Glass, a subsidiary set up in 
1988 to manufacture sheet glass it was remarked (Ibid. p.17), "Equipment has already 
been ordered from Rumania". In February 1990 this equipment had still not arrived. 
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perhaps understandably, considering the political upheaval in that country. The sole 
reason for buying Rumanian was the soft terms that surrounded the deal, and business 
opinion in Harare had no confidence in the quality of the goods on order. Nitro 
Nobel, a subsidiary established in 1986 in partnership with Swedish interests for the 
manufacture of explosives, had done no business by 1990. 
Zimbabwe Pencils is a more dismal example of delays. The I.D.C. 1988 Report 
(p.17) is fairly bullish: "The project to produce pencils received government approval 
in 1988. Moves to implement the project are now under way in Mutare". However 
a June 1989 Financial Statement (p.6) is more guarded: "The company was 
incorporated on 9th Nov. 1983 to conduct the business of manufacturing and 
marketing pencils. Since the date of incorporation the company has acquired land and 
buildings, and is in the process of acquiring plant and machinery". In fact, the pencil 
project has been an excellent example of the type of lack of cooperation that bedevils 
the P.T.A. While the Zimbabwe pencil project was gestating, Botswana got into 
pencil manufacture, with the ability to supply the needs of its neighbours, and given 
the agreed preferential access to the Zimbabwe market, could undercut the projected 
Zimbabwe pencil price. The impression gained from discussions at the I. D. C. was 
that the project would come to fruition by virtue of its own momentum, rather from 
conviction or necessity. 
Finally there is Zimbabwe Pulp and Paper, an associate incorporated in 1987 by the 
I.D.C. with a number of local interests. By 1990 only a handful of shares had been 
taken up, and nothing else had happened. 
It is apparent that I.D.C. income comes from a relatively small group of largely 
monopolistic companies that were (i) set up in cooperation with private sector 
business interests in pre-independence days, for example Berkshire International in 
1971, (ii) bought into when the owners wished to decamp, for example G. and W. 
Industrial Minerals (though I.D.C. had a minority holding before 1981), Willowvale 
Motor Industries, and Zimglass and (iii) companies bought into because of their 
profitability, for example Almin Metal Industries. (It must be added that it is not 
239 
always clear whether a company fits type (ii) or (iii» Also there have been occasional 
successful new projects in recent years, for example, Zimbabwe Grain Bags. 
The question of the I.D.C. 's future solvency rests largely on the continued 
profitability of these companies. There are, however, some causes for concern. 
Government policies have kept them in protected, monopolistic positions, and with 
more liberalisation, this could change. As is openly stated in the I.O.C. Annual 
Report for 1987 (p.5), "Price increases cannot be the panacea to corporate liquidity 
and viability problems in the long run. Neither can demands by firms on Government 
for more trade protection from both domestic and foreign competition as well as the 
maintenance of the status of monopoly and oligopoly in business be the answers to 
problems of long term viability and investors' confidence. Price control, protection 
of infant industries and monopoly are double-edged weapons which are now tending 
to create complacency amongst some of our affiliate companies which fail to adjust 
to changing economic circumstances when the warning signs are flashing". Another 
on-going problem hitting LD.C. affiliates, and discussed in general earlier, has been 
the inability to get enough foreign exchange to finance reequipment. 
Another cluster of problems that have affected LO.C. companies - and others of 
course - centre on manning. Until official independence in 1980, immigration of 
skilled and qualified people from Europe was encouraged. Furthermore the 
established white population enjoyed high levels of education. Hence was established 
an intellectual stratum that occupied the senior positions in economic life. In the 
early 80s many of these people left the country, so causing skill shortages. 
Government policy has been to surround the import of new relevantly skilled 
expatriates with stringent constraints, while at the same time requiring that more -
frequently less well qualified - African people be employed in senior positions. The 
result, confirmed by one industrialist, is a shortage of some types of executive 
personnel. (U.S.) A.LD. (op.cit. p.iii) sees the matter as a government policy 
shortcoming, "Manpower planning is weak in terms of skill contents .. coordination 
between manpower planning and program 'implementing needs to be strengthened". 
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Management shortcomings do not appear to be as serious as in Kenya, but an I.D.C. 
comment makes it clear that this area does require attention. " I D C eed 
... . . n s to 
evolve Group management structures with adequate support units for personnel 
training and management development, corporate finance, procurement of materials 
and services, marketing and export promotion and quality systems". (I.D.C. 1988 
Report p.14) 
In conclusion, though to some extent I.D.C. companies face the same problems as 
I.C.D.C. companies in Kenya, overall the picture is somewhat less bleak. Nearly all 
of those actually in business have been making profits, and to have been paying 
dividends. But, as the above paragraphs testify, there is hardly room for 
complacency. 
(c) Financial solvency. 
To what extent may the behaviour of the I.D.C. itself be directly contributory to its 
own financial solvency? Firstly must be considered the state of its internal 
organisation, which appears to be considerably more efficient than that of the 
I.C.D.C. in Nairobi. (If outward appearance witnesses to inner integrity, the I.D.C. 
has a lot going for it. Its premises are spacious, well-ordered, and bright, whereas 
those of the I.C.D.C. are slovenly and run-down) Nevertheless, there are 
management problems, and the I.D.C. is prepared to highlight them. One is the 
"poor conditions of service of head office management" (Ibid. p.14) which are 
applicable to the Corporation as a parastatal. The complaint is that qualified and 
experienced staff cannot be retained because of the better rewards in the private 
sector. Were the Corporation permitted to spend more on staff emoluments, 
however, expenditure, already creeping up in relation to income, could soon threaten 
viability. 
Secondly, the impression is gained that the I.D.C. is rather better at monitoring 
companies than is the Kenya I.C.D.C. To quote from the 1988 Annual Report 
(p.13): "The I.D.C. affiliates are required to observe strict financial discipline". 
Furthermore various extension services are listed as being necessary (Ibid. p.l'+). 
though it is not made clear who should pay for all this support. 
Finally, of course, the main contributions I.D.C. 's behaviour has made to its own 
continuing solvency are:- (i) buying into established companies. Indeed, by keeping 
its stakes in 'good' subsidiaries to - in most cases - 51 %, it has ensured that the 
erstwhile owners had little option but to continue running the enterprises much as 
before. This point is confirmed in the following observation from African Business 
May 1988 (p.31), "Another economist notes that even though the government has 
acquired shares in private companies, apart from appointing a few managers and 
directors, the policies of these companies have not changed much despite government 
involvement"; (ii) avoiding breaking much new ground into new ventures, with all 
the risks this entails; (iii) calling a halt to the absorption in the early to mid-80s of 
ailing and abandoned companies. In other words, the I.D.C. has 'played safe'. The 
final section in this chapter assesses the integrity of this policy. 
THE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE COMPANY (22) 
Before the late 1970s, there were no specialised credit facilities for small and 
emergent businessmen outwith the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe. However it 
became political I y important to make a gesture in this direction in 1979. The U. D. I. 
government had embarked on its short-lived policy of reforging the political profile 
of the territory under the new name of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and, as part of the 
attempt to gain support from the African population, it set up the Development 
Finance Co. for making small loans. Initially it was financed by Z$1 m capital from 
the government and a Z$1 m soft loan from the central bank. In June 1980 soon after 
official independence there was a further loan of Z$1 m from the I. D. C. 
The company had been established in a hurry without the proper assembling of an 
experienced management team and a clutch of extension workers, and so almost from 
the outset there were financial problems. Loans were concessionary, demand was 
massive, and many received money who, in the context of proper commercial 
assessment, would have been refused. Very quickly interest and repayment arrears 
mounted, and in June 1981 new loans were suspended (23). The Board of Director" 
was obliged to resign, and the I.D.C. took over the administration. The state of the 
D.F.C. was - rather guardedly - made clear in the I.D.C. 1981 Annual Report (p.6): 
"The present record of interest payments and capital repayments is not good. Some 
quite substantial sums will have to be written off as irrecoverable". 
In 1982 the company - with new directors and managers - fared better in terms of 
debt service, but large arrears remained. Under 100% I.D.C. ownership, 
considerable juggling of figures occurred in order to hide a dismal financial condition. 
For example, there was an admitted operating loss of Z$O.25m in the 1982-3 financial 
year, but, " .. following a reduction in the provision for doubtful debts, a loss of only 
Z$3307 appears in the Annual Accounts". (I.D.C. 1983 Annual Report p.IO). At 
the same time, it was determined that small business lending should be taken over by 
a totally new and independent organisation, the Small Enterprises Development 
Corporation. (See Appendix 3 for a limited investigation of S.E.D.CO.) There was 
now little for the I.D.C. to do but wind up the D.F.C. while continuing to try and 
collect some of the outstanding debts. A loss of nearly Z$O.5m in 1984 was 
admitted, and in 1985 D.F.C. assets - such as they were - were sold to S.E.D.CO. 
After this it was in liquidation, though as late as 1987 the I.D.C. was successful in 
collecting Z$192000 arrears. 
The commercial problems of successfully lending to small businessmen have been 
amply discussed in earlier pages. When to this is added what seems to be overriding 
political motivation, which relegated to a secondary position business integrity, it is 
hardly surprising that the D.F.C. failed. 
AN ASSESSMENT 
(a) General. 
As became apparent in an earlier section, the I.D.C. has under its auspices quite a 
small number of companies. In 1988 there were only 28, of which 11 were 
associates, and 17 subdiaries. The value of the stake is given below, though, given 
the inactivity of the stock market, the market share valuation can only be rather 
impressionistic. 
TABLE 4 
VALUE OF I.D.C. COMPANY ASSETS IN 1988 (Z$OOO) 
Subsidiaries: 
Ordinary shares 29644 
Loans and advances 7854 
Total 37498 
Total at cost 19074 
Associates: 
Ordinary shares 22498 
Loans and advances 277 
Total 22775 
Total at cost 11917 
OVERALL TOTALS 60273 30991 
SOURCE: I.D.C. Annual Report for 1988 p.40 
The above figures are put into perspective when - according to the published figures 
- the registered increase alone in the nominal capital of all existing companies in 
Zimbabwe was - with the usual proviso about valuation - nearly Z$460m for the first 
9 months of 1988 (Quarterly Digest op. cit. Table 26.2). Furthermore, the scope of 
the I.D.C. 's operations is much smaller than that of Kenya's I.C.D.C., which in 1988 
had equity holdings in 66 or so companies. Without taking into account the loans 
outstanding, equities at cost were worth KSh678.1m (I.C.D.C. Annual Report 
1988/89 p.29) - very broadly Z$I00m - and at a very rough current valuation 
KSh1420.2m (Ibid. p.24) - very broadly Z$250m. 
However, despite the evidence from the data, which in statistical terms presents the 
I.D.C. as a fairly modest player on the Zimbabwean industrial and commercial stage, 
its influence on development might be much greater than its size might suggest, if its 
business operations were directed accordingly. Now though Zimbabwe in recent 
years has experienced (i) an insufficiency of new real investment. especially new 
incoming investment, and (ii) some retrenchment in its financial system, especially 
with regard to capital funds provision (see Pt.2 Chapter 4), it is still - by sub-Saharan 
African standards - well-endowed with manufacturing capacity and financial services. 
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It is not, suggested, therefore, that the I.D.C. become the dominating vehicle for the 
achievement of industrial and commercial development, but that it act. in the 
terminology of the RBC Report Component 3 Vol.1 (p.iv) as a "catalyst", a 
"demonstration vehicle" and - possibly but more questionably - as an "entrepreneurial 
talent bank". How, and with particular reference to reference to the discussion in 
Part 2 Chapter 4 on the role for a Zimbabwe D.F.I., has the I.D.C. fared? Very 
significant has been the deliberate shift in gear, determined upon in the early 80s. 
towards permanent investment in companies, and the cessation of loan business, 
except to affiliates. (Although it is nowhere explicitly identified as such, this type of 
lending may safely be assumed to be of the 'rehabilitation' variety, since the 
mainstream financial sector only will lend to prosperous companies). It might be 
concluded from this that the I.D.C. has become nothing more than a holding 
company/investment trust, in which case further discussion is redundant. However, 
the word 'development' remains in the organisation's name, and jargon used in 
statements about the Corporation's future, for example "developing new investment 
in greenfield industries", "increased use of local resources, and job creation" (I.D.C. 
1988 Annual Report p.12), witness to an approach that still includes a development-
orientated constituent. 
(b) The 'development' context. 
The review of the I.D.C. 's contribution to small business finance can quickly be 
disposed of. Though this area of lending in Zimbabwe has never been properly 
addressed by the mainstream financial system, so leaving a gap in capital provision, 
the unsuccessful I.D.C. foray into it was largely determined by political necessity. 
Not designed to diversify into such work, it failed to rescue a concern that was 
dogged by political chicanery and financial decline. 
A further development-orientated shortcoming of the I.D.C. has been its failure to 
nurture the stock market. Unlike the Kenya I.C.D.C., however. where policy was 
never made explicit but to which a similar criticism can be levelled. this was an 
automatic outcome of the decision to hangon to shares rather than dispose of them. 
Of course, given the scale of I.D.C. investments in the 1980s, it is unrealistic to 
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suggest that willingness to sell equity would have massively stimulated securities 
trading and the issue of new financial paper. However, what is being noted is the 
move by the I.D.C. into more or less the status of a conservative investment trust 
rather than as an outgoing revolving capital development organisation. The gap was 
there, but the I.D.C. has shied away from filling it. 
The establishment of new partnership ventures with foreign concerns has been a 
theoretical feature of I.D.C. business expansion, but very little of this has happened 
in recent years. Before official independence in 1980, international sanctions 
precluded the overt movement of capital into the country, but the 80s and after have 
not seen any turnaround. Some of the reasons for this are outside the I.D.C. 's 
control, being more to do with government attitudes, policies and practices, and the 
general economic situation, and there is no need to repeat the earlier discussion in this 
chapter on those topics. For the rest many foreign firms are hostile to partnership 
arrangements, unprepared to see ownership diluted in exchange for advantages - or 
the intimation of advantages - which in practice have little substance. 
Finally the I.D.C. in the 1980s took the initiative in establishing new ventures with 
local capital, and occasionally with - what appears to be - fairly unenthusiastic foreign 
participation. There have been only a handful of these, all mentioned before -
National Glass, Nitro Nobel, Communications Systems of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe 
Pencils, Zimbabwe Pulp and Paper, and Zimbabwe Grain Bags. With the exception 
of the last one, all have been constrained by delays, dubious dealings and 
miscalculations. This study has been sceptical of a D.F.I. being successful In a 
supply leading role, but does not rule it out if both institution and any bodies acting 
with it are sufficiently matured and sophisticated to support such a development. 
Given the age of the I.D.C. and the relatively advanced - by African standards -
profile of the economy, I.D.C.-Ied business developments would seem plausible. But 
though there are - as annual reports amply describe - numerous projected ventures, 
feasibility studies and pre-feasibility studies, carrying through the few ideas that are 
accepted does not proceed easily. 
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(c) The I.D.C. and the 'soft' state? 
The I.D.C. has not done much for industrial development in Zimbabwe, and there has 
not been (and is not) another specialised - and active - institution in the economy 
geared to supporting general manufacturing and commercial growth with equity 
capital. To suggest that the inadequacy of the I.D.C. in relation to economic 
development is due to the 'softness' of the politico-economic system may perhaps be 
countered by the riposte that since the early 80s it has not been trying to be primarily 
a development organisation, so that its low profile in this sphere is due more to 
choice than unfavourable influences. However the shift in direction seems to be at 
least partly due - though certainly not wholly due, given the government's 
determination after independence to increase its stake in industry - to caution about 
a more positive development-related role. The developing world was seen to be full 
of insolvent development finance institutions that, burdened with the impedimenta of 
conflicting economic, social and ideological objectives, and fuelled by rashness and 
ill-considered enthusiam, had stumbled before the cold winds of economic reality and 
disordered administrative apparatuses. Zimbabwe, coming to independence 'late', 
when these realities were now clear, was not going to be distinguished by the 
spectacle of its main development corporation going in the same sad direction. Such 
an attitude is very clear from statements already quoted, as in the following from the 
I.D.C. 1988 Annual Report (p.13). "Where there is a multitude of objectives, the 
usual tendency is to lose direction as a result of lack of priorities". And, very 
positively, "such tendencies were checked before the rot could set in". 
Therefore it may be concluded that concern about the effect of features that are 
associated with the concept of the 'soft' state played a part in bringing about the 
I.D.C. 's change of direction. And indeed, the limited amount of I.D.C. activity that 
does more or less qualify as supporting economic development tends to justify the 
anxiety. The machinations behind the establishment of concerns making glass and 
communications equipment, the remarkable slowness in getting new projects off the 
ground, the miscalculations in the case of pencil production, all suggest that if the 
I.D.C. were more adventurous in going in for new projects, its integrity could soon 
be in doubt. And overshadowing the I.D.C. has been the government. with 
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questionable personnel overlaps between the two, and the inconsistent application of 
conflicting policies that in general upset company operations, and mayor may not 
favour I.D.C. affiliates. In this context are the advantages (for the companies though 
not for the economy) of monopoly status and protection, coming up against the 
disadvantages of price controls and foreign exchange shortages. Furthermore, plenty 
of evidence is available (see earlier quotes) that shows corrupt allocation procedures 
for foreign exchange. Fortunately Zimbabwe has continued to have a fairly open 
political system, so the Willowvale episode became a public scandal, but anecdotal 
evidence supports a widespread belief that profiteering of the same type occurs in the 
context of other companies as well. 
There may be overt economic and ideological reasons why foreign companies are 
reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe, but the disorder presented in the paragraph above 
compounds the basis for the reluctance. Similar constraints bear down on the real 
investment of capital funds by Zimbabwe residents. Given its low 'development' 
profile, it may be intellectually rash to try and support too positively the second part 
of the hypothesis in this study by suggesting that the I.O.C., in the light of 
experience, actually inhibits industrial growth. However, with regard to new 
investment from abroad, though 100% foreign ownership is not ruled out, the 
objective is that there will be cooperation with domestic interests. As the 1989 
publication 'The Promotion of Investment: Policy and Regulations' (p.4) makes clear, 
"the Government prefers majority Zimbabwean participation in new investment 
projects". Though the I.D.C. is not specifically mentioned, partnership with it is the 
most straightforward way by which a foreign company could obtain Zimbabwean 
participation in a new venture. However, given the I.O.C.'s 'development' record 
in the 1980s, it is questionable how keen· a foreign company would be to come to 
Zimbabwe if partnership with the I.O.C. was a condition. 
PART 2 CHAPTER 7 NOTES 
1. This latter point was put to the writer during an interview at the Confederation 
of Zimbabwe Industries in Feb. 1990. Since it refers to an era long past, a 
substantial research project would be necessary to properly investigate it. However, 
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there is no reason to doubt C.Z.1. integrity, and it does testify to a D.F.I. trying to 
behave very much in accordance with some of the parameters laid down by many 
writers on the subject. (See Chapter 5 in Part 1 for further discussion). 
2. Again it was not that the relatively sophisticated financial system in Salisbury 
never provided industry with term loans. However, it kept - understandably perhaps 
- to established and assessable borrowers. 
3. The Development Finance Company is fully discussed in a later section. 
4. The Zimbabwe Development Corporation was established by a 1984 Act of 
Parliament. It aimed to 'set the stage for a coordinated approach to public sector 
investment in the Zimbabwean economy. As the major Government holding 
Corporation, Z.D.C is peculiarly placed to identify and promote development 
opportunities in most sectors of the economy'. (Z.D.C. 1989 p.5). In practice the 
Corporation turned out to be an organisation looking for a role, and by the end of the 
decade, and having only a handful of assets, it had not made much of an impact. As 
a holding company of industrial companies it duplicated the I. D. C., and as a potential 
holder of the D. F.1. s themselves, it looked to be just an unnecessary bureaucratic 
imposition, well suited to be an employment refuge for the favoured, and a user of 
scarce resources. Its marginal significance in 1989 and 1990, when field research for 
the present study took place, disqualified it from investigation in the main text. 
5. A very optimistic estimate, as it turned out. 
6. .. as was observed by the writer in Salisbury (now Harare) in 1975. 
7. A C.Z.1. official was critical of the fact that the result had been the creation 
of a number of high cost firms. 
8. The fact that the points of view implicit in this and the previous quote differ 
need not be significant. The earlier passage comes from a ritualistic speech by the 
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President on the occasion of the Corporation's 25th anniversary and reprinted in the 
Report. 
9. Information from the C.Z.I. 
10. Supposedly the intention to produce communications apparatus in conjunction 
with Plessey (see the I.D.C. Annual Report and Accounts for 1987 p.7) was the result 
of such machinations. 
11. To quote Bennell (p.18) again," .. an increasing number (of U.K. companies) 
are prepared to accept very large discounts on their current market values in return 
for being able to remit the proceeds of disinvestments to their British shareholders". 
12. (Ibid. p.16), "Nearly 75 % of respondents ranked foreign exchange availability 
as the most serious constraint facing their companies in ESA". 
13. At an interview in Feb. 1990, a leading merchant banker observed that a lot 
of reequipping was needed in the Zimbabwe economy but was not happening due to 
forex shortages. 
14. This of course is part and parcel also of the foreign exchange problem. 
15. Replies to questions put by the writer to I.D.C. officials at interviews in Feb. 
1990 were - not surprisingly - in the same vein. 
16. One is reminded here of Adam Smith's remarks on the restraint of trade. 
17. In the publication 'Zimbabwe: a field for investment', the following (p . .+.+) 
appears, "the Government is slowly working towards a regulated and planned import 
liberalisation programme, although local industries will have to be protected". Indeed 
during 1990-91 the Open General Import Licence system was widened to a much 
larger range of products than before, and, with demand apparently greater than 
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expected, the Zimbabwe dollar fell fast. However, it was widely believed that 
government, with a budget deficit at 10% of G.D.P., was largely to blame. The 
moral is that trade liberalisation must be accompanied by macro-policy reform. 
18. Merchant banking officials and others. 
19. This consists of 'share capital', 'capital reserves' and 'retained earnings'. In 
fact in the 1988 Report the term 'shareholders' interest' is changed to the more 
practical 'capital employed'. 
20. The information about companies in the following paragraphs comes mainly 
from interviews, I.D.C. Annual Reports, and material in the Harare Company 
Register office. Frequent acknowledgement of the latter source would be tedious, and 
will not appear in the text. The details about companies held in the office consists 
of bundles of documents stuffed into files, and are frequently incomplete and obscure. 
It is believed, however, that there is sufficient data in the paragraphs that follow to 
give an accurate and useful picture of the state of companies under the I. D. C. 
umbrella. 
21. In terms of net earnings in relation to turnover. 
22. Much of the information in this section comes from anecdotal and interview 
evidence, since, given the disastrous record of this organisation, little official 
reference is made to it in print. 
23. It was remarked to the writer that the U .0.1. prime minister Ian Smith had 
not really worried if the loans turned out to be de facto grants if thereby the new 
constitution got the support of those who benefitted. 
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Chapter 8 
THE ZIMBABWE DEVEWPMENT BANK 
ORIGIN AND REMIT 
(a) Origin. 
The Zimbabwe Development Bank was founded in May 1983. A major aim behind 
its establishment was to provide a semi-official conduit for foreign development funds 
into the country, given that the LD.C., with its ownership structure and remit, had 
little appeal to outside donor agencies. A new organisation, involving a much lower 
government profile, was necessary if 'official' foreign money was to be obtained (1). 
No business was conducted until 1985 after "some concerted preparatory work" 
(Z.D.B. Annual Report 1989 p.3). By June 1989, of an authorised capital of Z$50m, 
Z$20m had been called up, with the Zimbabwe Government having subscribed 51 %. 
Other subscribers were the Reserve Bank, and a number of non-Zimbabwean 
development finance agencies, including the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation. In addition to share capital, the Z.D.B. has negotiated some lines of 
credit from abroad, generally on concessionary terms. However, to date, the great 
bulk of incoming funds has been in the form of equity. As was observed in heroic 
understatement (Ibid. p.22), "As at June 1989, the debt-to-equity ratio stood at 0.06: 1 
which compares quite favourably with the current statutory limit of 5: 1". 
Officials of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries believed that the Z. D. B., in 
line with the philosophy behind its conception, remained independent of government, 
and they pointed out that it received no government guarantees (2). It was explained 
that the foreign shareholders aim, through their representatives, to approve all loans, 
and would always block financing that had a political ambience. 
However, by virtue of the government's 51 % holding, and also - in practice - because 
of the Reserve Bank's involvement, the Z.D.B. is a parastatal, and so, despite the 
presence of a minority of directors appointed by the outside shareholders to monitor 
and guide policy, it is unrealistic to assume that the state would not be in a position 
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to exert influence over the business the Z.D.B. conducts, if it so wanted. And 
indeed, the substantial amount of money devoted to rehabilitation loans, a function 
which is not laid down in the fairly comprehensive remit, suggests that the 
government did to some extent bias Z.D.B. lending in a direction it favoured. 
(b) Official remit. 
Though the Z.D.B. is termed, per se, a 'bank', there is no indication that at the 
outset it was intended to be almost entirely - as subsequently happened - a lending 
organisation. The remit, as laid out in the Zimbabwe Development Bank Act of 
1983, and referred to in the Annual Report for 1987 (p.2) gives equal weight to 
"(providing) capital which is needed for the expansion, modernisation or creation of 
new enterprises" and "(engaging), alone or with other persons or institutions, in 
financing loans or bonds, whether medium or long term, guaranteeing loans, 
underwriting and other related activities". Furthermore, its remit in terms of fund 
disbursement and further resource generation was very wide. It was authorised to 
"mobilise internal and external resources' for economic development and .. finance 
development projects in all sectors of the economy". Thus the Z.O.B. could not only 
do everything the I.D.C. did, but also everything relevant to the more specialised 
Zimbabwean D. F. I. s that exist for tourism and mining. 
It is almost obligatory for a developing world D.F.!. to state some social goals, and 
the Z.D.B. does make some gestures in this direction. These will be looked at later. 
However, by the mid-80s, when the incubus of loss-making parastatals was making 
its presence felt (see Pt.2 Chapter 3), it was becoming virtually mandatory that new 
organisations of this legal type put viability above other considerations. Thus, in the 
1989 Report (p.3) are the words, " .. Government would prefer, and, in fact, does 
tirelessly encourage parastatals to generate adequate income to enable them to stand 
on their own feet and be less dependent on the state budget. Indeed the Bank is 
specifically required to be run on commercial lines at all times" .(3) Thus guidelines 
for Z.D.B. operations are some distance from the socialist rhetoric that accompanied 
the winning of independence: pragmatism and the necessity for avoiding causing 
irritation to foreign shareholders have precluded any references to the achievement 
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of grandiose new societal structures. 
Nevertheless, to take up the 'social' theme, supposedly priority is given to projects 
which "provide permanent employment", "promote Zimbabwean ownership and 
management", "utilise or raise the value added of local materials", "generate or save 
foreign exchange". (Ibid. p.2). Furthermore, in 1990, the Bank established a 'soft 
lending window', called the Zimbabwe Development Fund. With money from the 
existing institutional shareholders, certain other agencies, the Government and the 
Bank itself, its purpose is to provide equity for new entrepreneurs, and also technical 
support and training for them. Writing in early 1991, it is impracticable to judge on 
the experience of this subsidiary. As a 'bank', the Z.D.B. has reason for wanting to 
parallel the efforts of other domestic banks in this direction (see Pt.2 Chapter 4). 
Though as a development-orientated parastatal it could be accused of duplicating the 
work of the Small Enterprise Development Corporation, the competition may be 
considered a spur to efficiency. 
OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR 
(a) Z.D.B. business. 
1. Extension support. 
Congruent with the reported determination of foreign agency shareholders to 
supervise Z.D.B. business, a substantial apparatus for project screening, appraisal, 
analysis, monitoring and so on, plus the assistance of outside advisors and consultants 
was established (Z.D.B. 1988 Annual Report p.6). Indeed the deployment of 
arrangements is - in print - more comprehensive and impressive-sounding than that 
of any other Zimbabwe D.F.I. (4). As the 1987 Report states (p.15), "The technical 
assistance extended by external agencies during the year has enabled the Bank to fill 
in critical gaps and move faster than would otherwise have been possible in a number 
of directions. Specific mention must be made of the continued support received from 
United Nations Development Programme, the European Economic Community and 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through the German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation". And in the 1989 Annual Report (p.23) there is recognition 
of support, including Harare-based expatriate staff. from the European Development 
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Fund, and again from the U.N.D.P. and the aforementioned German agency. 
In Part 1 it was recommended that riskier forms of lending - such as are likely to be 
undertaken by D.F.I.s - legitimately qualify for extension support financed by 
exogenous agencies. From the above it appears that Z.D.B. lending was to be so 
supported. 
2. The broad features of lending. 
Despi te the term 'development' in the organisation's title, there appears to be little 
about the Z.D.B. that suggests a pioneering approach to business, though perhaps the 
establishment of the Zimbabwe Development Fund witnesses to the beginnings of a 
more adventurous role. Aside from this, applicants for loans are expected to be 
wanting at least Z$l00000, a stipulation which more or less cuts out new or small 
businesses. 
The portfolio of the Z.D.B. consists predominantly of loans to existing companies in 
the light manufacturing sector, and a number of well-known international 
conglomerates appear on the list of recipients, such as Metal Box, Blue Ribbon Foods 
and Bata Shoe Co. Other things being equal, financing companies such as these can 
be expected - relatively speaking of course - to constitute unadventurous, but safe, 
business. Furthermore, according to the 1988 Report (p.20) more than three-quarters 
of the Z.D.B. 's portfolio is in plastics, textiles and leather, metal products and food 
and beverages. Though these categories, given that in the main they cover protected 
import substitutes, should be fairly safe areas to which to make loans, official 
comment is critical. As the 1988 Report asserts (p.21), "Deliberate efforts will 
continue to be made to diversify the portfolio into other, high development value 
areas" . 
Indeed much of the Z.D.B. 's build-up of lending has led more generally to concerned 
comment. Already by 1987 (Annual Report p.13) references to rehabilitation had 
crept into official statements. To quote, "While rehabilitation work (such as has 
tended to dominate investment activity in the past few years) is important and helps 
255 
to preserve the existing jobs, increase in work opportunities can only emerge from 
expansion of established operations and the opening up of new ones". And the 1988 
Annual Report (p.21) observes, "The Bank's portfolio ... has a predominance of 
projects in the size category of $100000-$500000. This reflects the weight of 
rehabilitation type investments, which generally do not require substantial capital 
outlays" . 
A note of anxiety comes through clearly in the following quote from the 1989 Annual 
Report (p.22), "In overall terms, the majority of commitments now fall into the 
category of small to medium scale, where there is often limited in-house capacity to 
successfully implement the projects". The Report (p.39-40) goes on to classify 
commitments into "new project/new product" investment, expansion" investment and 
"replacement" investment. Of the 58 "cumulative commitments" only 13 were 
classified as 'new', the rest were 'expansion' or 'replacement'. However the 
practical distinction between these two categories is never very clearcut, and 
'expansion' can mean something as unadventurous as 'removal of production 
bottleneck and inhouse maintenance'(5). 
Indeeed, this profile of investment approvals has led to some presidential criticism. 
President Mugabe remarked (Ibid. p.3), "It is also my fervent hope that the 
Zimbabwe Development Bank will now be in a better position to render assistance to 
new projects rather than concentrate on replacement and expansion projects". 
(b) The 'social' criteria. 
As pointed out earlier, despite the accent on financial viability the Z.D.B. remit states 
normative aims, even though - in practice - the achievement of them might damage 
that viability. 
Annual Reports frequently refer to the importance of employment generation. though 
the Z.D.B. has not been markedly successful in this. In the 1987 Report it is stated 
(p.13) " .. employment generation remains a priority of great national importance and 
becomes more so with each successive year". And in the 1989 Report (p.3) the 
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President states (p.3) " ..... new projects have a greater potential for employment 
creation and will thus assist in the fight against unemployment in the country". The 
anxiety apparent in these remarks is perhaps justifiable in the light of data in the 1988 
Report, where it is claimed that Z.D.B. money - with other funding - had to date 
resulted in the creation of a trivial 415 new jobs (6). This figure is suspiciously 
exact, but apart from that, since it is a consequence of loan approvals rather than 
disbursements, it is not certain that all this new employment actually came into being. 
Nearly thirteen and a half thousand 'existing' jobs have been associated with Z.D.B. 
financing, which is to be expected in the light of the Bank's heavy commitment 
towards replacement and modernisation loans. Lack of sufficient data makes it 
impossible to judge how many of these existing jobs have been preserved due to 
successful rehabilitation exercises (7). 
Though there is nothing specific in the Z.D.B. 's remit about the desired geographic 
spread of Z.D.B.-supported projects, Harare and Bulawayo, the two main centres, 
have been the locations of most. Of 58 'cumulative approvals' in 1989 (Annual 
Report for 1989 p. 39-40), for example, 32 were in Harare and another 12 in 
BUlawayo. Location theory would tend to support this situation, but it has meant less 
development elsewhere. A remark in the 1988 Annual Report (p.23) indicates some 
official concern: "Although the geographic spread continues to be biased in favour 
of Harare and Bulawayo, it is pleasing to note that of the fifteen projects approved 
during the year 6 were from smaller centres". 
With regard to the goal of "promoting Zimbabwean ownership and management" (see 
the first section) there is no evidence to show much specifically Z.D.B .. action here, 
and in any case the phraseology is lacking in precision. To promote Zimbabwean 
management in industry has been a general government aim for the economy in 
general, but of course as with the companies connected with the I. D. C .. this does not 
- given the relatively small but generally highly-qualified population of European 
origin in the country - have to mean indigenous Zimbabwean management. as in an 
analogous sense it would in most other African countries. 
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THE FINANCES OF THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT BANK 
In the light of the above, how has the Z.D.B. fared financially? To begin with, the 
Bank, in common with the I.O.C., has, since its inception, apparently been a viable 
organisation. The following table gives some 'profit' details. 
TABLE 1 
Z.O.B. PROFITS 
Year ended 30 June 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
Net profit (Z$m) 3.3 3.1 0.6 1.5 l.4 
Return on total assets( % ) 10.0 11.0 4.0 17.0 19.0 
SOURCE: Z.O.B. Annual Report for 1989 Table 6.2 
However, the above data must be qualified. Firstly, details on Z.D.B. administrative 
and related expenditure are by custom not given in the annual reports, so it is 
impossible to gauge how the 'operating profit', a sum rather less than the 'profit' 
figures given above (see below for clarification) is arrived at. Very significantly, it 
is not stated how much interest income is received from borrowers, and how much 
- if any - remains in arrears. Secondly, the operating profit in 1989 was in fact only 
Z$2.3m, the rest of the overall profit being accounted for by an exchange gain on 
unused capital resources, from which total probably a rather low - in the light of later 
discussion - provision for doubtful debts had been subtracted. Given the secular 
depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar, an exchange gain has been a feature every year 
of the Z.O.B. 's existence. However, for this type of windfall to continue to accrue, 
there must be a steady inflow - and under use - of funds from foreign sources, and 
obviously this cannot be guaranteed. Thirdly, the percentage relationship with total 
assets gives a rather distorted picture of the financial situation, since ' total assets' 
includes an item termed 'current loan maturities', in other words, loans due to be 
repaid, but presently still outstanding. In 1989, of Z$33.4m total assets, Z$6.5m 
were these current maturities (Ibid. p.29), and they have been increasing every year, 
going up in 1988-9 by Z$2.2m. Did 'current loan maturities' not exist, then either 
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the money due would have been repaid, in which case it would have become nev,,' 
liquid or capital assets, so keeping profit to the same percentage as before, or more 
debts would have been written off, so reducing profits. Lastly, despite profit being 
in the black ever since the Z.D.B.'s inception, only for 1988 and then again for 1989 
was it considered prudent to grant - very small - dividends to shareholders. 
To turn again to 'current loan maturities', these have been steadily rising each year 
and must eventually therefore (i) have a detrimental effect on profits if they bring in 
no income and/or (ii) mean a reduction in the funds available for new loans or of 
course for reimbursing creditors. However, at the time of writing comment on this 
issue was made to sound optimistic. The 1989 Annual Report asserts (p.22), "By 
year-end only two clients were in arrears (by a total of under Z$20000) " , though, in 
the light of 'current loan maturities', this must be a fairly liberal interpretation of the 
word 'arrears'. 
Funds for new loans have been available from a variety of sources, including 
negotiated credit lines, calls on share capital, profits and loan repayments. 
Commitments to new lending bear only scant relationship to actual lending during the 
same time period, and it is not clear to what extent some agreed loans are ever 
activated. In June 1989 the loans portfolio stood at Z$14.1m (Ibid. p.29), and the 
only other major, but rather different, fund disbursement was a Z$3.5m housing 
development investment through building societies (Ibid. p.32). 
In conclusion, though Z.D.B. finances have ostensibly remained healthy, analysis 
reveals a less happy situation. Rehabilitation loans - though not necessarily a mistake 
if firms are successfully turned round (see later) - can degenerate into straight 
subsidisation, as appears to have occurred extensively in Kenya. And the build-up 
of 'current loan maturities' suggests that increasing numbers of beneficiaries find it 
difficult to pay back on time. There can be no certainty, therefore, that profits will 
remain positive. 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK OF THE Z.D.B. 
The previous sections have revealed a picture of the Z.D.B. as a rather ambiguous 
organisation. There would appear to have been an uneasy compromise not only 
between the attitudes of foreign shareholders and the goals of government, but also 
between the government's commercial and social aspirations. 
Foreign shareholders and loan providers want their money to be safe and efficiently 
used so (i) aim to exert influence through directors they appoint, (ii) oversee the 
creation of elaborate monitoring arrangements, and (iii) forbid the making of political 
loans. Although, by channelling money through a development organisation, they are 
by definition prepared to target projects that mainstream intermediaries would be 
wary of financing, the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the money advanced must 
set a limit to the level of riskiness accepted. Furthermore the elaborate extension 
arrangements are meant to identify potentially sound projects and, by supporting 
beneficiaries, to increase the likelihood of commercial viability. However 
government, while wanting financial solvency, has built social goals into the remit, 
with the result that the Z.D.B. has - in the interest of preserving jobs - become a 
vehicle for rehabilitation loans. 
Although, as was seen to be especially evident in the context of Kenyan D.F.l.s, 
rehabilitation loans can come to mean little more than subsidies to keep sick 
companies in being, such an outcome is not inevitable. Some companies may be in 
terminal decline, but others, given conducive supporting circumstances, may benefit 
from an input of capital. For the Z.D.B. to channel some of its money in this 
direction is not therefore automatically a misguided policy, especially as companies 
needing rehabilitation funds would not easily get them from mainstream financial 
intermediaries. Furthermore, the extension services provided through. and in 
association with, the Z.D.B., are there to ensure the wisest and most efficient use of 
funds by business, and this includes rehabilitation funds. However, the serious 
build-up of loan arrears suggests that much rehabilitation financing has not been 
successful. Though other types of lending may also give rise to arrears, money for 
reequipping is unlikely to be responsible (see later), so rehabilitation seems to be a 
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major culprit. Apart from extraneous macroeconomic reasons, the causes behind this 
unsatisfactory financial outcome are the government pushing the Z DB' t 'k 
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it would not otherwise undertake and/or the relative ineffectiveness of the extension 
servIces. 
So, given this burden, what has the Z.D.B. done to ensure a more or less reliable 
source of income? It seems that it has been necessary for it to cash in on the profits 
of successful firms, in other words, to extract some of their rent income. Some of 
the firms in question, mainly established multinationals, were mentioned earlier. 
Now there has been little call for long term loans in local currency by Zimbabwe 
industry, especially by successful companies. As was observed in the 1988 Annual 
Report (p.2l), "Business in local currency loans remained at a very low level. 
Established manufacturing firms generally held substantial internally generated funds 
as evidenced by the relatively high own contributions in projects financed by the Bank 
and the low level of debt in their capital structure". However, very crucially, the 
Z.D.B. is a source of foreign exchange. In a country with a foreign exchange 
scarcity, the funds derived from foreign development agencies have constituted a pool 
of currency that lies outside the official allocation arrangements. Furthermore - and 
unlike the situation in Kenya - although borrowers from the Z.D.B. bear the exchange 
risk, in recent years the Reserve Bank has been prepared to protect them against it 
on a 5-year roll-over basis. (There is a substantial interest premium for this service.) 
Successful companies in the Zimbabwean economy may not need to borrow local 
currency, but they do need foreign currency to obtain equipment and materials from 
abroad. Merchant banks having links with agents and head offices abroad can obtain 
short term forex credit for reputable borrowers, but this facility has to be backed by 
government approval, which is not necessarily forthcoming, since it would imply the 
Reserve Bank being prepared to switch local currency into foreign currency when 
repayment was due. Hence unnecessary long term borrowing from the Z.D.B. may 
come to be the only way of being able to purchase capital imports. Indeed, comment 
from officials in interviews suggested that in general companies wishing to go ahead 
with new or expansion projects were often directed to the Z.D.B., permission to go 
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ahead being dependent on using Z.D.B. facilities. And this ensures income for the 
Z.D.B. (And it clarifies a point made earlier. Companies wanting to reequip or 
expand are less likely to be the sort that run into loan repayment arrears) However 
the casualty of the pattern of Z.D.B. lending discussed in the above paragraphs has 
been the finance of totally new projects.. There is little indication in the annual 
reports of interest in such business, and indeed various intended expansion or 
replacement schemes often appear to come to nothing. Understandable caution in the 
face of projected ventures which would fail must be tempered by the protestation that 
the substantial extension support at hand is there to guide, help and monitor new 
projects such that the Bank would not lose out. Concerned official comment on the 
nature of Z. D. B. lending was quoted earlier. 
Chapter 4 identified gaps in the Zimbabwe financial markets, one of which was the 
provision of long term loans to borrowers other than sound established companies, 
where conventional banks - except of course when forex is required - will 
accommodate applicants. The Z.D.B. 's remit clearly authorises it to fill the gap, but 
it has as yet hardly done so, except in certain rather specialised ways. Indeed, in 
1990 a Reserve Bank official was moved to make the rather extreme comment to the 
effect that he wondered what the Z.D.B. was for. 
To investigate the basis of this unsatisfactory situation beyond the causes mentioned 
above is to reveal cumbersome bureaucracy. A few quotes indicate the ways in 
which this interfere with both the Bank itself and the companies it finances. Thus, 
"There have .. been delays in the implementation of projects due to shortages of 
building materials, electricity supply transformers .. " (1988 Annual Report p.21) and 
"(due to) the processing of necessary approvals by the authorities". Furthermore 
(Ibid. p.21), "The Bank will continue to review its procedures and its support services 
to clients to shorten the time it takes to get projects to implementation stage". Also 
the very fact that passages in the annual reports criticise the pattern of Z. D. B. 
lending, while members of staff in the same organisation are making the loans shows 
lack of coordination and harmony amongst the various officials. Though the features 
of Z.D.B. behaviour identified by the above remarks and quotes are not in themsehes 
aspects of the 'soft state' features, clearly they can easily give rise to practices which 
may be identified as such, and which, in that eventuality, would compound Z.D.B. 
problems. 
Also to be mentioned is government macro-policy. As observed in Chapter 7 in 
relation to the I.D.C., any shortcomings that may be ascribed to the intermediaries 
and associated agencies are enhanced by environmental weaknesses which are due 
largely to mistakes and inconsistencies in government policy. These cut down the 
incentives to go in for new projects and hence on the demand side the desire for term 
loans is reduced. 
To address these shortcomings largely means the government engineering a more 
logical, consistent environment in which companies can operate. In this context 
problems presently besetting Z.D.B.-assisted companies are much the same as those 
which affect I.D.C. associates and subsidiaries, and require the same solutions. And 
to some extent contributing to the situation is the I.D.C. itself, which has shown little 
interest in buying the equity of unknown but up-and-coming businesses. A properly 
geared firm would require to issue both debt and equity. If it cannot dispose of 
equity, then it has no opportunity to borrow from institutions such as the Z.D.B. 
NOTES PART 2 CHAPTER 8 
1. This point was made at an interview with Z.D.B. officials in 1989. 
2. It is clear from the text that follows that the C.Z.I. was probably too 
optimistic about the extent to which the Bank could avoid government pressure on the 
business it conducted. Certainly the lack of government guarantees was a constraint, 
but even so work was undertaken that gave rise to anxious comment. 
3. Admittedly this situation could have occurred anyway, whatever the 
circumstances of ownership, given that the organisation began to operate at a time 
when considerable disillusion was setting in in developing countries with the 
effectiveness of normative interference by the state in business activity. It \.I.,i 11 be 
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recalled that at the same time - the mid-1980s - the I.D.C. was setting its face against 
this sort of thing. 
4. References from page 3 of the 1989 Annual Report come from a speech of 
President Mugabe, given on the occasion of laying the foundation stone for Z.D.B. 
House. 
5. ...from the writer's survey of a number of all other Zimbabwe D.F.I.s in 
connection with this study, excepting those in agriculture (See Appendix 3). 
6. This was in relation some work Carrled out in a sub-sector entitled 'production 
of moulds for plastic extrusion'. 
7. On the basis of 415 new jobs, a rough calculation reveals that each job cost 
$100000. This looks to be very capital-intensive. See Helleiners's article referred 
to in Chapter 3 of Part 1. 
8. A Z.D.B. official implied in 1990 that some of the associated jobs were 
preserved jobs as a result of rehabilitation. 
PART 3: 
SYNTHESIS AND SUGGESTIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last few chapters have investigated in tum the experiences of the . D F I malO ... s 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe that have been concerned with the finance of secondary 
industry and commercial services. This chapter takes an overview, synthesizing the 
discussion across the institutions. The procedure in the following paragraphs will be 
first to review the extent to which the D.F.I.s can be viewed as 'gap fillers' in the 
financial systems. Deductions from the analysis will indicate what was in practice 
the nature of D. F . I. business operations, and hence will throw light on the 
institutions' financial conditions. Necessarily contributing to the discussion, and as 
a consequence also to the conclusions, are politico/ideological influences on D.F.I.s. 
Finally, in the context of the overview, the pervasive and - to anticipate - the 
crucially damaging effects of the soft state syndrome may be isolated. 
It then remains to consider how the development of Zimbabwe and Kenya has been 
affected by the D.F.I.s with which they have been endowed. Lastly there is scope 
for recommendations for D.F.I.s in developing countries in the future. 
A RESUME OF THE RATIONALE FOR D.F.I.s 
A standard policy aim of the post-independence governments of the developing world 
has been to achieve sustained economic growth, and, as an associated aim, to enable 
indigenous people - on a private and/or official basis - to participate in the business 
developments that are implicit in it. An important factor behind the establishment and 
expansion of business undertakings in any context is a sufficiency of capital funds, 
and so the obvious theoretical rationale for the establishment of D.F.I.s would seem 
to be to fill capital market gaps, in other words to supply equity and loan funds to 
those sections of economies that mainstream financial intermediaries neglect. 
An awkward but very pertinent issue that was discussed in Chapter 5 of Part 1 
questions whether specialised development finance institutions can by definition be 
financially viable. The argument suggests that if a form of financing is profitable. 
mainstream financial institutions would undertake it (1): if it is not, then dedicated 
D.F.I.s must fail. And indeed, by taking on financing work mainstream banks avoid. 
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D.F.I.s are opening themselves up to greater risks. 
However, there are ways in which the risks may be addressed. Firstly, trained 
indigenous officials, albeit advised - ideally - by others not in this category, ought to 
be able to assess local indigenous demand for funds better than conventional bankers 
steeped in European traditions. Secondly, it is quite appropriate to surround 'difficult' 
lending and investment with more extensive monitoring and extension services than 
would be normal in the context of conventional bank finance. Such support is 
expensive, and so it is proposed that much of this type of work is financed by 
government or other extraneous agency who operate through, or sometimes 
independently of but in association with, D.F.I.s. Thirdly, a D.F.I. with - typically 
- most of its funds in the form of capital, grants, or very long term loans, can often 
afford to take a longer view of a project than can a mainstream intermediary, which 
relies for resources on deposits with varying periods of time to maturity. (Not of 
course that the absence of deposits from a D.F.I. 's liabilities is necessarily 
commendable, in that deposits acquired at full cost on the market, having to be 
serviced more readily than do softer forms of finance, usefully discipline operational 
behaviour.) Assuming that a D.F.I. is successful in its prosecution of more 
'adventurous' financing than conventional banks, it becomes an example for others 
to follow (2). Ideally, a D.F.I. starts as a pioneer, becomes a model for others to 
copy, and ends by becoming one of several merchant banking- type institutions. 
Sometimes D. F. I. s are detailed as convenient channels for the inflow of funds from 
foreign official finance organisations. Foreign and international agencies typically 
prefer not to work through truly private financial intermediaries, and use official 
D.F.I.s or semi-official ones in which they may have ownership power. Also, 
D.F.I.s are more c1earcut allocators of such funds than central government, which 
can too easily or by default direct what should be earmarked development money into 
general capital or even current spending. As a consequence of the accrual to them 
of foreign funds, D.F.I.s become sources of foreign exchange for business. 
Furthermore, some foreign firms interested in establishing businesses in developing 
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countries may prefer to have local partners. Though there are other financial 
institutions which might fulfil this role, D.F.I.s are often tailored for the job. and it 
may be hoped by firms that association with them will bring government help and 
protection. The function discussed in this paragraph may be considered an extension 
of the 'gap filling' role, since the capital funds available to a country for industrial 
growth are increased. 
Parallel to, and supporting the work of D.F.I.s, a number of other factors ideally 
should be present. Firstly, given that some limited arrangements for facilitating the 
finance of economic growth may have existed before independence, such 
arrangements, if financially sound, and effective in fostering business developments, 
should be allowed to continue, and not inhibited or obstructed on the basis of some 
prejudiced politico-economic rationale. The governments in European colonial 
territories were not politically unbiassed in the area of development finance, and such 
facilities as they promoted or encouraged did little - in general - for the business 
aspirations of indigenous people (3). However it makes no commercial sense to go 
to the opposite extreme and make things difficult for the non-indigenous afterwards. 
Secondly, though linked to the first issue, the over-enthusiasm of a government 
towards some radical politico/sociological objective, where - almost inevitably - the 
role of the state is enhanced, can distort the thrust of development, causing a 
misallocation of resources and producing economic and financial tactics based more 
on emotion than commercial good sense. To recommend that governments should go 
easy in this area is no longer provocative. Many are prepared to believe that 
pervasive state interference bears much responsibility for the problems with which 
developing countries in the 1980s were beset, so there is now less faith than there was 
in the virtues of centralisation of power ideology as a panacea. 
Thirdly, governments of developing countries need to act, and be seen to be acting 
logically, efficiently, and without corruption. This is not just a question of avoiding 
setting a bad example, but of setting down macroeconomic and regulatory background 
conditions that are favourable to development and the finance of it. 
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PRE-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENT FINANCE ARRANGEMENTS IN 
KENY A AND ZIMBABWE 
For obvious historical reasons, the establishment of modern financial systems in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe - and of course most other African territories - did not get 
under way till early in the 20th century. In the main, banks in the early days kept 
to short-term business, and such long-term finance as was required came from foreign 
direct equity investment. However with time, as the approach to financial provision 
became more sophisticated, and economic growth went ahead, came a willingness to 
address the issue of local capital provision and allocation. Hence in the years prior 
to each country becoming officially independent, some facilities in this area existed. 
Thus in Kenya there was the I. D. C., whose initial aim was to provide equity finance 
for companies operating locally, and which, as a revolving capital organisation, 
contributed to the development of the stock market by in due course selling off 
holdings. Banks also became prepared to lend money for longer periods to 
established concerns. All of these arrangements very much focussed on the demand 
from European-dominated business, and - to a lesser extent - from Asian business, 
and with financing criteria based on metropolitan European standards, the institutions 
involved were not subjecting themselves to abnormal risk. Inevitably, indigenous 
small business was not accommodated, and other larger enterprise that was locally-
based found it difficult to get funds for expansion or to realise capital. The 
Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) scenario was very similar, in that indigenous business was 
not really accommodated, while the Industrial Development Corporation was in place 
to channel local money into new - in practice European-dominated or wholly owned -
ventures and as a corollary to nurture the local capital market and stock exchange. 
The history of the Rhodesian I.D.C. was soon affected by the onset of U.D.I. and 
consequent economic sanctions against the country, and it was obliged to take over 
certain concerns that otherwise might have collapsed. Otherwise, up until near the 
end of the V.D.I. period, there were no further significant moves tov .. ards the 
establishment of other D.F.I.s. in that country. 
ADDRESSING GAPS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
(a) The Kenyan I.C.D.C. and the Zimbabwean I.D.C. 
In Kenya after independence, as was discussed in Chapter 5 of Part 2, the cautious 
I.D.C. was soon transformed into the much higher profile I.C.D.C., with potential 
for a hugely expanded capital base, and a set of guidelines that to some extent showed 
it as addressing the previous relative neglect of indigenous Kenyan business interests. 
A glance back at the 'remit' section of Part 2 Chapter 5 indicates an intention to focus 
on local people who could not get capital from the mainstream system, projects that 
were 'potentially profitable' but which 'needed encouragement', profitable but risky 
(sic) projects, 'marginal' projects, and larger projects. In all of this the I.C.D.C. had 
a supportable set of objectives, though it would be hard to be optimistic about the 
likely viability of an institution that applied itself in toto to this collection of financing 
goals. However, this study has stressed the utility and importance of an intermediary 
supporting the distribution of capital funds with sufficient and substantial monitoring, 
guidance and extension work financed - to some extent at any rate - exogenously: as 
a result, the risks integral to more adventurous financing should be reduced. And 
indeed, the I.C.D.C. has not been wanting for apparatus surrounding the business of 
finance. According to 'I.C.D.C.: Role and Activities' (1990 p.9 and 10), the 
I.C.D.C. 'Project Cycle' involved (and involves) 'project identification', 'project 
preparation', 'feasibility study', 'project appraisal', 'board decision', 
'implementation', 'start-up and operations' and 'supervision and management 
guidance'. Though some of this is standard, other elements are impressive, 
particularly when as with 'feasibility', it is explained that (Ibid. p.lO), "The 
Corporation liaises with international organisations like UNDP/UNIDO, Centre for 
Industrial Development, Brussels etc, for classification on certain project parameters". 
In contrast with the Kenyan I.C.D.C., the post-independence Zimbabwean I. D.C. was 
little concerned with providing finance for indigenous African Zimbabweans who 
might be unable to get capital elsewhere. (see Part 2 Ch 7). Though the original 
enabling act which - in theory - advocated this still operated, a new and major role 
for the Corporation was to become an agent of government in the purchase and 
holding of shares in existing profitable firms. 
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Why, in this crucial aspect of their raisons d' etre, did the two corporations differ? 
Two plausible reasons may be advanced. Firstly were the political philosophies that 
supposedly motivated the leaderships. In Kenya the principles of 'African socialism' 
were never fully spelt out, and the philosophy very quickly became a justification for 
autocracy and capitalism. Marxism in Zimbabwe was taken more seriously at first. 
and saw virtue in a strong state involvement in industry, whereby industrial profits 
could be siphoned off to the government. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, 
Zimbabwe became independent sufficiently 'late' for the government to be able to 
observe the dire financial straits into which many African D.F.I.s, including the 
Kenyan I.C.D.C., had fallen. Hence the I.D.C. could avoid the adventurous 'open 
hand' policy, that had been at least partly responsible for the others' problems. 
(b) The D.F.C.K., the I.D.B. and the Z.D.B. 
The D.F.C.K. differed (and differs) from the I.C.D.C. in terms of ownership, source 
of funds and a much heavier weighting towards loans rather than equity. However 
the basic aim was to behave much as the I.C.D.C., and involve Kenyan interests and 
businessmen in the promotion of new projects. To support this were a number of 
divisions for monitoring, appraisal, and so on. Hence, in terms of the fundamental 
rationale for the establishment of D. F. I. s, the company was designed as a financial 
gap filler subject - in theory if not eventually in practice - to the prudent guidance of 
foreign shareholders. The I.D.B., coming on the scene much later, and representing 
a channel for the inflow of World Bank funds to Kenya, was given such a generalistic 
remit (Part 2 Chapter 6 p.6-7) that a specific 'gap-filling' function is not evident. The 
impression is gained that the object of the exercise was to take advantage of the fact 
that 'official' money was available from abroad: what exactly should be done with it 
was not properly thought out. 
The Z.D.B. shares with the O.F.C.K. and the 1.0.B. a substantial foreign 
involvement in ownership and provision of resources. And, like the I. D. B., its remit 
is very generalistic (see Chapter 8), though it makes some obeisance to social goals. 
And, like the 1.0.B., it has been principally a lending organisation. 
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(c) Assessment of remits. 
Earlier discussion identified gaps in the financial systems of less developed countries 
that D.F.I.s might plausibly be expected to fill. Though the remits of the five 
institutions under consideration make gestures towards filling these gaps, empirical 
evidence is a much more reliable guide as to the actual operational behaviour of the 
institutions than the interpretation of intention. 
FINANCE FOR SMALL BUSINESS 
As explained in Part 2 Chapter 1, the subject of small business finance in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe is not emphasized in this study. Thus, the work of the Small Enterprise 
Finance Corporation (in Kenya) and Kenya Industrial Estates, and the Small 
Enterprise Development Corporation (in Zimbabwe) has not been investigated in the 
main text, though the latter two do appear in Appendix 3. However, both the Kenyan 
I.C.D.C. and the Zimbabwean I.D.C. did, as noted, set up small business divisions, 
and it has been appropriate to look at the experience of these in the main text, so as 
in order to give a comprehensive picture of the two D.F.I.s' operations (4). 
The small business divisions proved to be financial disasters, with rapid and massive 
build-ups of unpaid interest and repayments. Similar reasons appear in both cases to 
account for this outcome (5). Firstly the diversification into small business lending 
was undertaken without sufficient adequately experienced and qualified staff being 
available, and hence applications could not be properly assessed and followed up. 
Secondly, and related to the first reason, were the political factors involved. The 
Zimbabwean scheme was very much a peremptory move to get funds into the hands 
of those who, at the end of the 1970s, were targetted as supporters for the short-lived 
'Rhodesia- Zimbabwe' political experiment. In Kenya a major aim was to enable 
Africans to buy up Asian business: also tribal supporters of the new independence 
government expected to be rewarded with credit (see Leys quote in Part 2 Chapter 
5). This meant that, in both countries, money often went not just to small 
businessmen, but to new businessmen, who usually had inadequate appreciation of the 
circumstances of commercial life. Fourthly, in neither country did government 
shoulder any of the financial burdens of extension. Again, early discussion stressed 
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the appropriateness of this type of support, given (i) the high cost of operating small 
business finance schemes relative to other directions of funding and (ii) the more 
extensive services that can help small businessmen. 
In Zimbabwe the I.D.C. 's small business scheme was in due course subsumed by 
S.E.D.CO, which, on the basis of a very conservative, cautious approach, managed 
to maintain in the 80s a precarious viability (6). In Kenya the I.C.D.C.s 
arrangements were kept in place, but for much of the 80s the scheme was largely 
inoperative. 
THE PROVISION OF EQUITY CAPITAL: 
(a) Introduction. 
The organisations to be considered in the context of equity are the I.C.D.C. and the 
D.F.C.K. in Kenya, and the I.D.C. in Zimbabwe: in practice the other two kept 
mainly to loans. 
(b) The disbursement of funds to domestic firms. 
1. Kenya 
Earlier investigation of the work of the I.C.D.C. and the D.F.C.K. indicated 
numerous shareholdings in domestic companies. It is not easy to unravel the history 
behind all these interests, but it is not clear that any fit into the 'small businessman 
makes good' category, in other words the successful private indigenous concern that 
wishes to realise or raise capital for further expansion. In one sense this is not 
surprising, for without the availability of small business finance - more or less true 
till after political independence - small businessmen had little opportunity to graduate 
to the position where they could plausibly approach the I.C.D.C. or the D.F.C.K. 
However, by the 80s, this might have been occurring, but the modest expansion of 
assets during this period does not indicate it. 
The involvement of the institutions in domestic companies is characterised more by 
(i) taking over moribund companies, (ii) collaborating with other official interests. 
and often at government instigation, in new projects, and (iii) buying into the local 
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branches of foreign firms. 
The moribund companIes which the I CDC t k h 
. . . . 00 over w en their owners 
abandoned them were typically saddled with debt. Plausibly, some should have been 
capable of being successfully revived. However, as Chapter 5 of Part 2 indicates, in 
general these concerns remained in the doldrums and were not profitable. 
In the earlier years a number of new concerns came on stream under I.C.D.C'! 
government or D.F.C.K.lgovernment auspices. This of course ties up with the lack 
of private entrepreneurship in medium size business, as noted above. A desire to 
keep new business developments indigenous appeared to necessitate promotions by 
the D. F. I. s, typically in collaboration with other official or semi-official interests. In 
theory, given that these were mainly protected import substitution firms, and/or 
producing goods based on local materials, prospects should have been good (7). 
However this has not been the case. 
Buying into viable foreign-based concerns has little that is 'developmental' about it, 
since it uses funds to change the ownership of existing resources rather than doing 
something new with the money. Indeed, when the recipients take their money from 
the country, potential development resources are being lost. Should the investment 
be paid for with incoming foreign funds, there is an opportunity cost, for otherwise 
new projects could have been financed. The main motives for buying into foreign 
companies were partly political and social, but also cynically commercial, in that the 
D.F.I.s - and their government - were given the chance to earn some income. 
2. Zimbabwe. 
The Zimbabean I.D.C. 's experience differed from that of the Kenyan I.C.D.C. 
Though there was a chance it may have gone down the same road, Chapter 7 of Pt. 2 
showed that an early 80s indulgence in buying up abandoned and ailing companie'-l 
was quickly brought to an end, and the Corporation became little more than a holding 
company/investment trust. Expansion was favoured only in partnership with foreign 
companies, and there was little scope for indigenous nationals to get funds. 
(c) Partnership with foreign firms. 
Not only the I.D.C. in Zimbabwe, but also the two Kenyan Corpo t' d ra IOns, were use 
as vehicles for bringing foreign investment and technology into the countries. Though 
the theory was that foreign firms would be the prime movers in the process, at times 
the Corporations have actively tried to interest firms in new projects, as with the 
production of telephone equipment in Zimbabwe (see Pt.2 Ch.7), Though in the early 
years some foreign investment in association with D.F.!. money did come to Kenya, 
by the 1980s it had all but dried up. Earlier pages have identified economic and 
bureaucratic reasons for this and the parallel lack of new money at the D. F, I. s' 
disposal further reduced opportunities for partnership. 
Equally, very little foreign investment came to Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Unlike in 
Kenya, the I.D.C. had - technically, at any rate - much uncalled capital at its 
disposal, so lack of money at the Zimbabwe end need not have been a constraint. 
D.F.I.s AND LONG TERM LENDING (8) 
The financial systems of Kenya and Zimbabwe were, by African standards, relatively 
well-developed at the time of independence, and so banks and N.B.F.r.s were known 
to lend for medium to long periods, though often on a roll-over basis. However, 
there were some associated factors which meant that specialised development banks 
could still be justified. Firstly, the writer still found considerable caution amongst 
reputable banks, especially in Kenya. One senior bank official said that he "didn't 
see why they shouldn't lend more long term money" .(9) Secondly, but of course 
very much connected with the first reason, banks of standing only loaned to those 
who, on the basis of strict European banking criteria, they regarded as the safest 
customers. Thirdly, the Kenyan and Zimbabwean development banks were prepared 
to lend for longer 'long' periods than the mainstream banks. Fourthly. most 
development bank credit was in foreign currency, but this was not necessarily true 
of mainstream banks. Though banks might obtain short term credit from abroad for 
their customers, long term credit was rarely forthcoming, particularly in the eightics, 
when western banks, chastened by the debt crisis, stopped lending long to devcloping 
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countries. Also, of course, in both countries permission had generally to be obtained 
for foreign bank credit, SInce repayment necessitated a switch into scarce foreign 
currency. 
It is tedious to rehearse again the published objectives of the credit institutions , 
especially as those of three of them, the I.C.D.C., the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.C. _ 
which are subsidiary lenders - have already been reviewed in the context of these 
institutions' main role as buyers of equity. The I.D.B. and the Z.D.B. paralleled the 
others in presenting broad development finance objectives, and both made gestures 
to social goals that did not necessarily square with the desire for profitability. 
However in practice they moved away from their natural niches as supporters of the 
gearing of companies' capital structures. The Kenyan institutions, especially the 
I.C.D.C., became burdened with rehabilitation credit, and both the D.F.C.K. and 
the I.D.B. faced mounting repayment arrears from concerns unable to repay loans due 
to their enhanced domestic value consequent on the steady devaluation of the shilling. 
The Z.D.B., supposedly firmly under the control of foreign financing agencies, in 
practice slid into giving out rehabilitation credit to firms without those firms 
necessarily becoming profitable as a result. To ensure some income for itself, it has 
provided loans to sound businesses who often have not needed to borrow but have 
needed the foreign currency the Z.D.B. has had on offer. 
THE STATE OF THE KENYAN AND ZIMBABWEAN D.F.I.s 
This study has attempted to prove that there is a place for D.F.I.s in developing 
economIes. It has also identified financing gaps in the economies of Kenya and 
Zimbabwe that D.F.I.s may plausibly fill. There are a number of D.F.I.s in 
existence in these countries, and five of them have been looked at in depth. All three 
Kenyan D.F.I.s have reached a parlous financial state, a situation which is often 
glossed over or disguised in the accounts. Though the Zimbabwe D.F.I.s have 
remained more or less viable, in the case of the I.D.C. this has been at the expense 
of virtually being no longer a 'development' institution. The Z.D.B. hovers on the 
brink of insolvency. All five D.F.l.s have under their wings companies in a state of 
disorganisation and unprofitability, into which money has sometimes fnlitkssly been 
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poured in attempts to stave off collapse. Practically this is a gross misallocation of 
resources in countries which are, by world standards, poor, and it is a shabby 
example to the business and financial communities. 
What have been the causes of this lacklustre performance? 
EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
To some extent factors that are external to the D.F.I.s and the economIc 
environments they operate in have affected performance. The oil price rises of 197.+ 
and then 1979, which caused massive borrowing by developing countries, led to the 
debt crisis of the early eighties, and world recession. This affected the sales of firms 
that had been recipients of D. F. I. money, so they could not pay dividends or 
interest, or repay capital. And governments, faced with balance of payments 
problems, cut back on what firms might have considered essential industrial input 
imports. Structural adjustment was urged on many countries in the 80s as an 
approach to their economic difficulties (10) and, amongst other measures, this 
frequently meant currency depreciation. This affected the ability of some firms in 
receipt of D.F.!. credit denominated in foreign currency to service the loans. Other 
influences have been the collapse of the East African Community, which affected 
Kenyan exports to its neighbours, and the desire of countries close to Zimbabwe to 
develop manufacturing industry and not rely so much on their more industrialised 
neighbour. As against this, more recently there has been the establishment of the 
Preferential Trading Area, which aims at freer trade throughout Eastern and Southern 
Africa. However, the long term success of the P.T.A. is uncertain, and both Kenya 
and Zimbabwe would probably do better to look to Europe and South Africa for 
markets. 
Mention must also be made of the effects of the droughts in the early eighties on both 
the Zimbabwe and Kenyan economies, and the unsuccessful coup in Kenya in 1982 
on commercial confidence there. 
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THE POLITICO-IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
Though some external economic - and other - factors certainly affected the economies 
of Kenya and Zimbabwe adversely, and, by implication, the prosperity of business 
undertakings and the D.F.I.s with which they were associated, earlier chapters amply 
bear witness to damaging internal influences on the development finance scenario. 
After independence most African countries - sooner or later - embraced some variety 
of socialist and/or nationalist ideological apparatus. In practice, as is clear from the 
discussion in Chapter 3 of Part 1, the two philosophical stances invariably tended to 
become more or less one and the same, and to mean little more than strong state 
intervention in the economy. Thus though in Kenya there was much rhetoric about 
'African' socialism, and in Zimbabwe much about Marxist socialism, in neither 
country did it all come to much, and the two countries soon became centralist 
quasi -dictatorshi ps. 
In the early years of Kenyan independence the government was at pains to mollify 
and protect foreign investors in the country by measures such as the 1964 Foreign 
Investment Protection Act, and not to suggest that 'African' socialism constituted a 
coherent operational policy with an anti-foreign flavour. Hence new foreign 
investment into Kenya continued, normally in partnership with the D.F.C.K. and the 
I.C.D.C. Later, however, foreign investment tailed off, as the increasingly assertive 
government under President Moi accumulated obstacles before existing foreign 
concerns, such as curbs on profit repatriation, restrictions on local borrowing, 
Kenyanisation regulations, forex allocation shortages in relation to essential imports, 
and much bureaucracy. Also, there has been a substantial move by the state into 
industrial ownership. As Miller (1984 p.124) observes, " .. the government has 
evolved from a minority partner in a few enterprises to a major investor". Partl y 
as a result of these developments, D.F.r. s have had little opportunity for partnership 
with new foreign entrants in the 1980s. 
The ideological stance in Zimbabwe - along, of course, with other factors such as 
recession and poor rates of profit - contributed to the loss of interest by foreign firms 
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in the country after 1980, even though the government turned out in practice to be 
more pragmatic and more amenable to foreign enterprise (see Chapter 3 Part 3) than 
had been feared. Nevertheless, the government did appear to remain - in theory at 
any rate - firmer in its goal of Zimbabweanising the economy than was the case in 
Kenya. Thus, as late as 1989, in 'The Promotion of Investment: Policy and 
Regulations' (1989 p.4) it is stated, " .. the Government prefers majority Zimbabwean 
participation in new foreign investment projects.... Whilst the Government is 
prepared to allow majority foreign ownership in high priority projects, and in some 
cases 100% ownership, it will encourage arrangements to be negotiated for the 
eventual transfer of majority ownership to Zimbabwean entities; ideally these 
arrangements would be negotiated at the outset or after a stipulated period". And 
expectedly, a number of commercial disabilities were imposed on existing firms, such 
as rules on the repatriation of profits and insufficient foreign exchange for imports. 
Not surprisingly, there was little foreign investment in the country in the 1980s, and 
D.F.I.s accordingly had little opportunity for partnership ventures. Furthermore, as 
in Kenya, the main D.F.!. felt obliged to take over the assets of existing foreign firms 
that quit the country. 
So far in this section the references to the power of the state and its ideological stance 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe have been associated with the implications for foreign 
investment. In general, however, the state in each country looked for an enhanced 
profile in industry by the deliberate buying into existing firms - largely, though not 
totally - through D.F.!.s which it owned and/or influenced (refer to above quote 
from Miller) and urging D.F.I.s into new promotions. Though, as mentioned earlier, 
the latter behaviour had something to do with substituting for a dearth of indigenous 
entrepreneurship, it also had to do with political opporunism and patronage. Also the 
revenue aspect must not be forgotten. For D.F.I.s to have holdings in profitable 
concerns would help to keep the D.F.I.s themselves viable and - ideally - to provide 
tax revenue and dividends for government. The result, as seen in earlier chapters, 
was to turn equity-holding D.F.I.s into quasi-holding companies, especially the 
Zimbabwean I. D. C., where official support for such a stance was made more or less 
explicit. Finally, a couple of blatant examples of political chicanery were mentioned 
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earlier in the 'small business' section. In the small business divisions of both the 
I.C.D.C. and the (Rhodesian) I.D.C., a strong political aspect was evident in their 
operational behaviour (see Part 2, Chs. 5 and 7). 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR D.F.I.s OF THE SOFT STATE 
(a) Introduction. 
To summarise, there is a place for specialised D.F.I.s in developing countries as 
fillers of gaps in the financial systems, though since by definition mainstream 
intermediaries have avoided the work they take on, they need to display especial 
qualities of flair, local knowledge and integrity. Furthermore certain types of 
extension support, financed by government or other agencies, are appropriate in 
relation both to the D.F.I.s themselves and to their customers. To colour D.F.I.s' 
remits and business operations with ideological and sociological goals, at one time 
believed to be not only understandable but even laudable and promoting efficiency, 
has been shown by experience to be generally inefficient. Resources are misallocated 
and obstacles may be put in the way of business which, though viable, is not 
congruent with the state's normative stance. At the very least, exceptionally high 
degrees of honesty, dedication and commitment to hard work would be necessary to 
give development finance policies affected by ideological goals a chance of 
succeeding. Needless to say, these qualities have typically been absent. 
Indeed, the whole process of development finance, whether through specialised 
intermediaries or not, has been damaged by the attributes of the 'soft' state, which 
not only bedevil the basic operational role of D.F.I.s, but also compound the 
normally detrimental effects of goals based on politico-ideological aspirations. 
'Softness' in relation to the D.F.I.s of Kenya and Zimbabwe has already been given 
some space in earlier chapters: the paragraphs below constitute a fuller treatment. The 
procedure will be to use the attributes of 'softness' as discussed in Chapter 1 of Part 
1 as pegs on which to hang the experiences of the different intermediaries. 
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(b) 'Social indiscipline and disobedience to public authority'. 
This feature was described in Part 1 Chapter 1 as meaning the lack of compulsion and 
responsibility by those at various stages in the development finance process towards 
servicing loans and equity capital. This was seen (Chapter 5 Part 2) to be particularly 
serious in the case of the Kenyan I.C.D.C., where dividends and interest due from 
subsidiaries were rarely paid, though normally included in the accounts as though 
received. Furthermore, the Small Loans Scheme proved to be a particularly blatant 
example of un serviced finance. Not only did I.C.D.C.-linked firms fail to meet 
financial obligations, but, as seen, their record in supplying timely company 
information to the I.C.D.C. was abysmal, as the R.B.C. Report noted. The I.e. D.C. 
in its tum, continually failed to service government loans, which became de facto 
grants. 
What were the reasons for this malaise? First is the fact that many firms were in 
such bad financial straits that they could not afford to meet financial obligations. 
This, however, was due partly to the poor management and the supply bottlenecks -
again often a function of poor management - on which the RBC Report commented. 
Secondly was the failure of the I.C.D.C. to chase up companies, either to obtain 
dividends and interest due and/or to get sufficient information about their operations. 
And the option of putting companies into receivership was not pursued with much 
alacrity. Behind this situation lie second layer problems, such as an insufficiency of 
suitably qualified personnel in the I.C.D.C. itself, a dearth of sound receivers, 
political aspects of I.C.D.C.-company links - for example Africans taking over Asian 
businesses, and the favouring of Kikuyu borrowers (see Pt.2 Chapter 5) - and the 
determination of the I.C.D.C. to keep some industries, in particular loss-making 
textile concerns, extant. Thirdly was the fact that government, in its turn, did not 
seem to bother to chase up the I. C. D. C. The personal links between govern men t and 
I.C.D.C. partly explain this. 
The D.F.C.K. and I.D.B. scenario has been similar, with rather better accounts 
showing more starkly the lack of financial servicing by companies linked with them: 
similar reasons lie behind their poor record. Though these two D.F.I.s were not in 
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theory meant to be so closely linked with the state as the I.C.D.C., in practice they 
have not managed to operate with much degree of independence, and so they have 
been subject to much the same shortcomings as the I.C.D.C. 
The Zimbabwean I.D.C. experience in this aspect of the 'soft' state - 'disobedience 
to public authority', which is defined as lack of responsibility in relation to loan and 
equity servicing and inefficiency in providing information by companies - has not 
been so serious as in the case of the Kenyan I.C.D.C. But the reason lies in the fact 
that the Corporation has been shunted away from too heavy involvement with 
concerns that have problems, and has come to have more in common with an 
investment trust or holding company than with a truly 'development' organisation. 
Nevertheless, as a result of its former willingness to take over collapsed or abandoned 
companies, without having the expertise to vivify them, the I.D.C. is linked to a 
number of dormant or non-performing concerns that bring it in no returns. The 
Z.D.B. in its turn has become saddled with increasing interest arrears. Though its 
extension, monitoring and follow-up procedures have been presented in the literature 
as wide-ranging and extensive, they have been unable to ensure sound business. 
(c) 'Overcentralised government, which undermines local initiatives'. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of Part 1, in developing countries, especially - as 
experience has shown - those in Africa, t~e apparatus of state power has tended to 
become monopolised by powerful family/tribal/political groupings, which avoid losing 
it by abolishing or managing democratic processes, and which justify their privileged 
statuses by appeal to various ideological principles. In Kenya there has been for 
many years a one-party system; in Zimbabwe there are opposition parties, but they 
are marginalised by the government-controlled media. Criticism has been much more 
open in Zimbabwe than in Kenya, as earlier quotes from domestic publications have 
shown, but in both countries the governments, via personnel links, dictate, and the 
fact that they are in a position to supply local finance, foreign exchange, privileges, 
and so on, have not shrunk from imposing their wills on organisations within their 
jurisdiction and influence. 
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In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, D.F.I.s, as noted in earlier chapters, have been 
obliged to go in for some new projects - and support ailing existing ones - often for 
prestige or sociological reasons. This would classify - in terms of the theory - as the 
D.F.I.s adopting a promotional or pure supply-leading role. In earlier discusion 
supply-leading was not rejected as a viable policy but it was recommended that 
considerable extension and entrepreneurial support would be necessary if such an 
approach was to be successful. Given the poor state of most Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean concerns brought into being on D.F.I. initiative, clearly the 
intermediaries have been unable properly to carry through a promotional role. 
More blatant examples of government political chicanery were the small business 
division of the I.C.D.C., already mentioned above, and similar I.D.C. arrangements 
at the end of the Rhodesian V.D.I. period. Also to be recalled has been the habit of 
the I.D.C. with regard to 'poaching' projects as a consequence of its close 
government links and exploitation of insider knowledge. The one example of an 
institution which initially appeared - from points made to the writer at interviews -
to have escaped government pressure was the Z.D.B.: further research, however, 
largely involving an analysis of the Bank's portfolio, showed this to be far from true. 
In Kenya the D.F.C.K. and I.D.B., though designed as conduits into the country for 
foreign money, have nevertheless had their business heavily influenced by 
government. 
Possibly the suggestion in the title about overcentralised government 'undermining 
local initiatives' is not significant in the case of Kenyan and Zimbabwean D.F.I.s, 
which have been mainly brought into being - in their post-independence form - by 
government promotion, pressure or suggestion, and in which senior personnel are 
appointed by, or are the same as, government officials. In these instances state 
suzereignty might be expected. However what has been lacking has been the type of 
initiative and imagination on the part of government and the D. F. I. s under them to 
try and make government-inspired D.F.1. operational remits - however ill-conceived 
_ work. What is essentially a commercial issue has been too often regarded just as 
a political and ideological matter, to be managed by politicians and administrators 
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rather than businessmen. As noted in the previous subsection, the RBC Report on 
Kenyan D.F.I.s amply elaborated on business shortcomings. Small wonder that, in 
relation to the I.D.C., government policy opted, in the mid-1980s, for a more 
cautious quasi-investment trust role. 
(d) 'Collusion of government officials and top civil servants with powerful 
individuals and groups whose conduct they are supposed to regulate'. 
The relevance to D.F .I.s of this suggestion about the 'soft' state concerns. in 
particular, the interface between officials and foreign companies. As explained, in 
both Kenya and Zimbabwe, policy was to partner foreign companies with D.F.I.s 
and/or other domestic interests. Some foreign companies - until the 1980s, when new 
foreign private investment dried up - went ~ong with, or welcomed this arrangement; 
others were turned off by it. Though the conspiratorial neo-colonialist-type link 
postulated in Chapter 3 of Part 1 hardly seems to have been present in Kenya or 
Zimbabwe, certain advantages were afforded these companies, if only because they 
tended to be the profitable concerns, capable of generating income for the D.F.l.s 
with which they were associated. Thus they could expect protection both against 
competing imports, and, more sinisterly, against the establishment of new competing 
domestic firms. However, the 'softness' of both countries is seen in the inconsistency 
of government policy towards these foreign business interests. While on the one hand 
usually - though not always in Kenya - affording them monopolistic status, they 
were in both countries hampered by curbs on local borrowing, limitations on profit 
and capital repatriation with parallel parsimonious regulations on the use of blocked 
funds, generally insufficient foreign exchange allowances for essential imports, no 
attempt - in Kenya - to address the effect of depreciation on the repayment of foreign 
exchange loans, and stipulations about personnel indigenisation. Even protection 
against competing imports was not certain, if the appropriate officials could be bribed 
by foreign exporters (see Chapter 5 for Kenyan evidence). 
Companies in which D.F.I.s had majority holdings were classified as parastatals. and. 
especially if the other holders were domestic, could be subject to considerable 
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government influence. Earlier chapters have referred to the normally disastrous 
financial state of parastatals in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. Though generally 
afforded more indulgences than potentially viable foreign-linked firms, they were 
frequently seen as providers of employment for miscellaneous people connected with 
powerful officials. Hence they became overstaffed loss-makers, helping to damage 
the financial viability of D.F.I.s with which some of them were associated. 
(e) 'Endemic corruption .... ' 
The quote in Chapter 1, Part 1 goes on to suggest that endemic corruption 'hinders 
innovation', 'prevents change', and 'inhibits eradication of corrupt behaviour'. Much 
of the discussion in the sub-sections above have implicitly hinted at these points, and 
it remains only to tie up the loose ends. 
A number of personnel link-ups between D.F.l.s, governments and companies have 
been identified in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. This can mean the creation of jobs for 
family and friends, the placing of people in responsible positions for political or 
nepotistic reasons, and the favouring of particular individuals or groups with capital 
and loans. This type of corruption adversely affects an institution's finances, and, 
as has been indicated above, brings about stagnation, since there is little incentive for 
new ideas and new methods in a company weighed down by unqualified or too many 
staff. 
Other examples of corruption noted by the writer were the Willowvale scandal in 
Zimbabwe, the poaching of projects by the I.D.C., the bribery of officials concerned 
with importing goods in Kenya, and - also in Kenya - the favouring of Kikuyu people 
with loans. Furthermore anecdotal evidence had it that in both countries that the 
examples noted by the writer could be multiplied. Clearly none of this is likely to 
engender the level of business confidence that leads to expansion and innovation in 
industry. 
Finally, as has been implied above, once government officials are integrated into the 
corruption scenario, it is difficult to eradicate it. Even in the relatively more open 
'"'18-
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society of Zimbabwe, where the Willowvale scandal was forced into the law courts. 
the progress of the case appeared to be dogged by procedural obstacles, suggesting 
that effort was being expended to protect the alleged culprits. 
D.F.I.s AS DETRIMENTAL TO DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Introduction. 
The above section has sought to show that, though there was a place for O. F. I. s in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, even though their likely viability had a good chance of being 
compromised by ideological compulsions, the appurtenances of the 'soft' state 
damaged their performance. To some extent the Zimbabwean I.O.C. salvaged its 
viability, not by efficient development-orientated behaviour, but by moving into a 
different sort of role. The Z.O.B. appeared, however, to be on the road to 
insolvency, and the Kenyan D.F.I.s were already there. More importantly, there is 
little ground for identifying economic development in both countries as due to the 
existence of the D.F.I.s. Propping up collapsing concerns has meant misallocation 
of resources, and successful companies have been so despite their O.F.I. links, except 
in so far as the links have led to government help and protection, and this in itself is 
damaging to macroeconomic efficiency. 
To go further, did the behaviour of the D.F.I.s actually inhibit development? A case 
supporting this may indeed be made. 
(b) Aspects of D.F.I. operational behaviour. 
1. D,F.I.s as a 'demonstration vehicle' (RBC Report Component 3 Vol I 1989 p.iv) 
The fundamental rationale for D.F.I.s is that they should fill gaps in a country's 
financial markets and so provide loan and equity finance in contexts mainstream 
intermediaries avoid. If D.F.I.s can make a success of what they do, others will try 
and emulate them. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe the D.F.I.s failed to provide this 
sort of example, so mainstream financial institutions have either not moved into more 
adventurous forms of business - unless pushed into it by government - or have done 
so with scant understanding of the implications of what they were doing (11). 
286 
2. Resource allocation. 
In most developing countries real resources available for economic growth fall short 
of government aspirations. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe resources have been 
directed by D. F. 1. s into ill-conceived projects and to bolstering concerns that would 
be best left to die. Not only has this meant the denial of funds to projects that might 
have done better, but it has blunted the willingness of agencies, both domestic and 
foreign, to provide more money. Furthermore, the fact of tying up capital 
indefinitely in sound companies for the s~e of profits, or in unsound companies 
where there is no way of getting the money back, has meant that existing funds do 
not constantly revolve into the nurture of new projects. 
3. Conduct. 
As suggested above, the D. F. 1. s in Kenya and Zimbabwe have been poor examples 
of successful providers of new sorts of finance, but also, by their slapdash behaviour, 
they have helped to inculcate a culture of inefficiency and dubious conduct in business 
in general. Such are personnel overlapping, employment creation, the implications 
of government/D.F.I. association, high administrative expenses, and frequent D.F.I. 
inability to properly monitor the concerns under them. Clearly the poor management 
state of so many Kenyan companies connected with D.F.1.s - as discussed in the RBC 
Report - is witness to the spread of the malaise. 
4. Financial development. 
Earlier in this chapter it was explained that successful D.F.I.s will, in a sense, work 
themselves out of a job. As well as constituting examples for others, D. F. I. s 
concerned with equity finance have a role maturing the stock market by active 
participation in it. In neither Kenya or Zimbabwe has this happened. By a deliberate 
policy of buying into sound companies and rarely disposing of their holdings. 
D.F.I.s, potentially influential players in the markets, have failed to provide a useful 
impetus to securities trading. Indeed, had such shares been left with their former 
owners, some - from time to time - might have come on the stock market, so helping 
to develop mechanisms that in the event and partly due to the D. F.1. operational 
behaviour described, atrophied. It has been noted that in both countries the number 
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of firms listed on the stock exchanges and the volume of trading has declined since 
independence. 
(c) Government influence. 
1. Introduction. 
The case that is being made out for the D. F. I. s as inhibitors of economic 
development cannot ignore government influence. Indeed it would be wrong to do 
so. To some extent the above behaviour - or non-behaviour - is due to government 
dictate, pressure or example, and there is no way of knowing what the D.F.I.s in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe would have been like, how they would have operated, and how 
effective they would have been, with different types of state apparatus, or with 
governments having more of a laissez-faire attitude. 
2. The nature of government influence. 
Government influence may be said to operate on three levels, (i) the broad political 
philosophy that defines the approach to policy, (ii) the policies themselves, which in 
practice usually owe a lot to pragmatism, and (iii) the consistency, efficiency and 
integrity with which the policies are applied and which help to set a standard for 
dealings in society in general. 
In developing countries broad political philosophies were fashionably centralist in the 
middle decades of the century, and Kenya and Zimbabwe were no exceptions to this. 
More recently, this approach has been found wanting, and is widely blamed for the 
economic malaise in which many developing countries find themselves. Whether, of 
course the philosophies themselves should be blamed rather than the consistency of 
the application of them in practice is a complex issue beyond the scope of this study. 
However the fact that they tend to modify the discipline of market forces in favour 
of broad normative goals does not bode well for efficient resource allocation. 
In Kenya and Zimbabwe actual policies, despite the rhetorical allegiance of the states 
to defined politico-ideological philosophies, were heavily weighted by opportunism. 
Thus, as noted, although nationalist and/or socialist predilections were theoretical! y 
288 
prejudicial towards foreign business involvement in the economies ' t' ~ . 
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quasi-monopolistic status to try and ensure profitability. Also of course many purely 
domestic firms above the small business level were generally monopolies. 
Finally, as noted, the application of policy was inconsistent and short on integrity. 
Foreign businesses, for example, may often have been indulged with monopolistic 
advantages, but at the same time were hampered in other ways. D.F.I.s, as part of 
the operational structure presiding over this disorder, helped fashion an environment 
where new foreign business was discouraged from setting up in the two countries, and 
where the creeping complacency of monopolistic status often led to company losses, 
and so further inhibited new investment, whether purely domestic, or foreign. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(a) Introduction. 
The purpose of this study has been to delineate how features associated with the 
concept of the 'soft' state damaged the performance of D. F. I. s in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, and rendered those intermediaries disabling rather than proactive in 
relation to economic development. It has not always been possible - nor would it 
have been very meaningful - to disentangle ' soft' state effects from ideological and 
other influences, and hence the investigation has needed to embrace these latter issues 
in order not to leave loose ends and to give a rounded picture. Furthermore it is 
clear from a cursory study of other African countries and their D.F.I.s that the 
experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe are by no means untypical. (See Appendix 3), 
The paragraphs below make recommendations as to how D.F.I.s should operate in 
order that their performance may be improved, both in terms of their own internal 
viability, and in relation to economic development in the territories in which they are 
situated. Furthermore, because of the - normally - close association between 
governments in developing countries and D.F.I.s it is appropriate to make 
recommendations to governments also, in the context of development financ~, 
• 
(b) Governments in relation to D.F.I.s 
As stated above, modern developing country governments and D. F. 1. s are usualh 
closely associated. Would it be better for domestic D.F.I.s to be totally divorced 
from this involvement? In reality this is not easy to achieve, for even when an 
institution is owned 100% by non-government bodies, whether local or foreign, 
government may exert pressure to get the institution to do business in the way it 
wants. Only a government with a dedicated laissez-faire attitude might leave a D.F.I. 
totally alone, and even now, when governments are being urged to be less 
interventionist than formerly, it is unrealistic to postulate that they would be as 
disinterested as that. Even so, other issues arise if government opts out. Firstly, a 
D.F.I. owned and also under the control of private sector industry is likely - in the 
interests of viability - to be very cautious, and/or to confine its business to directing 
capital funds wholly or mostly to its owners. This latter was true of the Industrial 
Promotion Corporation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Secondly, if international and/or 
foreign non-private sector agencies are in control of a D.F.I., then indeed they may 
have the resources to go in for more adventurous business, possibly separating the 
finance of some extension support work - as has been recommended - from the 
central capital-provision function. However, it is very unlikely that any government 
would be prepared to have nothing to do with a development finance programme that 
was being conducted on its territory. Furthermore, the operators of such a programme 
would regard it as fair for a government to be involved if money was being spent on 
measures to support the programme . 
Therefore, government association with the work of development finance institutions 
must be almost inevitable. It is not whether government is involved that matters, but 
what it does. Broadly, the role of government should be as follows. Firstly, it 
should fashion a macro-economic environment conducive to economic development. 
This point, made by Cameron, was mentioned earlier (Pt. 1 Chapter 2). Secondly, 
apart from in some circumstances providing capital funds itself for D.F.I.s, it should 
be prepared to support and perhaps lead D.F.l.s in seeking financial and other 
assistance from appropriate domestic, foreign and international agencies. Thirdly. it 
must establish proper supervisory arrangements for D.F.I.s. Fourthly, it should la! 
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down the broad parameters of development strategy, subject, of course, to good 
sense, integrity and economic realities. Fifthly, it should be prepared, in a 
disinterested fashion, to finance some aspects of extension work. This is all, except 
of course that some of the recommendations below directed specifically at D. F. I. s 
cannot be totally separated from D.F.!. cooperation with government. 
(c) D.F.1. recommendations. 
Following on from the above, what may may be recommended for D.F.I.s so that 
they have a chance of being (i) internally viable and (ii) effective 'development' 
institutions? (12). 
Firstly, D.F .I.s should identify specific financial needs that are not adequately met 
by the mainstream financial markets, and aim to fill them. All the remits of the 
D.F.l.s in this study were couched in broad terms, which denied them focus and 
permitted such non-developmental practices as buying into successful foreign firms, 
and holding on to the shares evermore. 
Secondly, the staffs of D.F.l.s should be sufficiently stocked with qualified local 
people familiar with local customs and traditions and able to operate efficiently in the 
areas of extension and monitoring. Foreign experts should be employed in at least 
an advisory, and at most a vetoing capacity. 
Thirdly, a non-open-ended arrangement should be negotiated with government or 
other appropriate agency for the finance of some supporting services, particularly 
those that may be classified as 'education'. 
Fourthly, though promotional or - what was defined earlier as - 'pure' supply-leading 
behaviour by D.F.I.s is not to be ruled out, it should be undertaken with great 
circumspection, after exhaustive project assessment. Furthermore, there needs to be 
sufficient and suitably qualified staff available to carry out this function. 
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Fifthly, equity-holding D.F.I.s should generally aim in due course to sell off holdings 
This keeps capital revolving, and lubricates the stock market. Clearly sales must be 
subject to an appropriate financial criterion. An earlier suggestion - clarified in 
Appendix 2 - was that returns from new projects due to come to fruition over a span 
of time in the near future should on average be expected to at least equal the average 
returns that over a given past period of years have accrued from the equity holding(s) 
intended to be sold off. This ensures that when they revolve capital, D.F.I.s do not 
get themselves into a financial position inferior to what has gone before. 
Sixthly, loans and interest due should never be capitalised or allowed to remaIn 
indefinitely in arrears. After sufficient leeway to address whatever problems are 
affecting debtors' finances, the indebted concerns ought without more ado to be put 
into receivership. 
Seventhly, D.F.I.s must require as a matter of course timely and adequate accounting 
and other information from companies connected with them. 
Eighthly, dormant firms under D.F.I. auspices, given that experienced consultants can 
produce no viable rehabilitation plans, should be wound up. 
Ninthly, D.F .I.s rehabilitation loans should be conditional on firm programmes for 
turning round the companies in question. Frequently, as this study has shown, such 
money has come to mean little more than subsidisation. 
Tenthly, a D.F.I. should not, in the interests of financial viability mutate into an 
intermediary that is not development orientated. Financial viability must be a result 
of sound business that has a 'development' character, and not follow from an 
institution being effectively no longer a D.F.1. The only proviso to this relates to the 
situation where a D.F.I. has been so successful that it has worked itself out of a job: 
in other words, its lending and investment activities have been emulated by other 
intermediaries. In these circumstances it may legitimately consider forging for itself 
a new role. 
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Finally, a D. F.1. with problems of financial viability - even if disguised by opaque 
accounts - should not be permitted just to soldier on. The issue of addressing the 
problems of a sick D.F.1. are large and complex, and beyond the scope of this study. 
However, it is better the matter is faced, even if it means winding up the 
organisation, rather than that the D.F.1. should get itself into ever deeper trouble. 
(d) The 'soft' state. 
The recommendations for government vis-a-vis D.F.l.s and for D.F.I.s themselves 
cannot be effective if soft state features persist. 
In Anglophone African countries true democracy in the West European sense is rare. 
Continuing governments without a long tradition of sound and honest rule are prone 
to complacency, inefficiency, arbitrariness and growing corruption as powerful 
alliances and officials develop networks of power and aggrandisemen t. D. F .1. s tend 
to become part of this system via example, influence or equation with official 
interests. Therefore renovation of government practices is a necessary prerequisite 
for D.F.1. success, something recognised by the 1.M.F. and the World Bank in a 
much wider context during the 80s, when they established the Structural Adj ustment 
loan arrangements. As is observed in 'Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth' (1989 p.6), "Ultimately, better governance requires political 
renewal. This means a concerted attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest 
levels. This can be done by setting a good example, by strengthening accountability, 
but encouraging public debate, and by nurturing a free press". And also, it might be 
said, by replacing controls with markets. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A study of this nature, while succeeding if it aptly identifies certain reasons behind 
the relative failure of so many developing world D.F.I.s, must suggest certain lines 
for further research. These follow below. 
Firstly, of course, there are large areas of D.F.I. work not fully addressed in the 
earlier chapters. Small business finance received some space. but the tourism and 
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mlnmg D.F.I.s in both Kenya and Zimbabwe have - apart from some limited 
treatment in Appendix 3 - been ignored. In fact, despite supporting the exploitation 
of home-grown products, the tourism and mining D.F.I.s in these countries have been 
financial failures (13). A comprehensive application of the 'soft state' concept to the 
operational behaviour of these organisations would be an instructive exercise. 
Secondly, a structured investigation of the criteria for providing finance, and the 
nature of the follow-up procedures of foreign, international and supranational 
finance-providing agencies is overdue. The approaches of the various organisations 
towards providing money lack consistency, as also is their control over the funds, 
once handed over. The establishment of a firm set of principles in these matters 
would help to discipline the behaviour of those in developing countries who dispose 
of the finance on offer. 
Thirdly, so far anecdotal evidence exists as to the attitude of multi-national companies 
to D.F.l.s. Under what circumstances would they accept partnership with D.F.I.s, 
and could the formula of partnership ever be so fashioned as to attract foreign firms 
back into Africa? 
ENVOI 
It is not suggested that the recommendations in the penultimate section are 
newly-minted. Much of what has been said is well understood, but for too long 
vacillating concern with sociological and political considerations, plus of course the 
features of the soft state have, in so many D.F.I.s, fudged and clouded their 
importance. The D.F.1. of the future has a place in the developing economy, but if 
it is to be effective and viable, it should combine adventurousness and vision with 
caution and intelligence. Above all, like the government under whose auspices it 
operates, it must display integrity. 
NOTES PART 3 
1. This of course relates to Patrick's demand-following hypothesis. However-
as mentioned in Chapter 5 of Part I - mainstream intermediaries fail to expand long 
19.+ 
term financing facilities, not because there is no demand, but because the quality of 
the demand is with difficulty assessed. 
2. As noted before, in the U.K. a good example of an intermediary that was 
formed to make loans that others avoided, and then, by being a success, became a 
model for others, was 3i. 
3. Admittedly a large subject is being dismissed perfunctorily here, and the 
reality was not as simplistic as the few words above suggest. 
4. It is too early to consider further the D.F.C.K. small business 'window'. 
5. The following information was gleaned from various interviews. 
6. The writer did have a couple of extensive interviews at the Zimbabwean 
SEDCO in 1990, but failed to get entry to the Kenyan KIE and SEFCO. 
7. Several European countries placed great emphasis on textile production as a 
leading sector in the early days of their industrialisation. Rather in the same vein, 
but without the same success, Kenya has seen fit to lay down - and subsequently prop 
up - a textile industry. In the 1988/89 I.C.D.C. Annual Report (p.12) it is asserted 
- via a bar chart - that the value of equity investments and medium/long loans in 
textiles exceeds all other loans and investments put together. 
8. Small business credit is excluded from the discussion. 
9. Interview at Barclays in Nairobi, April 1990. 
10. Structural adjustment also addressed the consequences of overspending and 
centralisation by developing country governments. 
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11. The post-independence crop of new financial intermediaries in Kenya. most 
of which came to grief, is an example of this. 
12. As elsewhere, the discussion is focussed on general D.F.I.s for secondary and 
tertiary industries, and avoids those that are specialised on specific types of 
production or on small business finance. 
13. The writer had a number of interviews with officials of Kenyan and 
Zimbabwean mining and tourism D.F.I.s. (See Appendix 3). 
APPENDIX 1 
RESTRICTIONS AND SURPLUSES 
INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the situation in most advanced countries, where monopolistic behaviour is 
curbed by legislation, governments in developing countries have frequently favoured 
monopolies, and have been willing to endow firms with monopolistic advantages. On 
the other hand, and in contrast to this, governments have also been prone to impose 
disabilities on enterprises, which nullify or cut away at the effects of monopoly status. 
It is suggested that this habit of operating what are clearly contradictory policies at 
one and the same time is an example of the 'soft' state. 
Additionally, even the hoped-for 'favourable' effects of monopolistic behaviour on 
economic variables such as employment, production and investment can be reduced 
or destroyed by interference in the crucial area of profit maximisation. Consideration 
of this issue follows direct! y below. 
MONOPOL Y AND SURPLUSES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A monopoly has its own exclusive market, and thus, as any basic text-book will 
illustrate, has the opportunity to generate high profits (synonymous with artificially 
induced rents of scarcity). Bagchi (1982 p.128), focussing on multinationals, 
observes, "The production of consumer durables proved ideal ... , since governments 
in the third world could easily be persuaded to impose stiff tariff and quota 
restrictions on the import of lUXUry consumer goods. The multinationals wanted to 
protect their markets in the third world, and the easiest method of doing that was to 
set up production facilities in those countries behind tariff walls. The willing 
collaboration of native capitalists in the host country afforded them the necessary 
political protection". 
Apropos of Bagchi's emphasis on multinationals, monopoly status can be (and is) 
afforded to any legal type of concern, including 100% owned indigenous companie\, 
and parastatals. Also it is not necessarily a question of concerns wanting to hang on 
to their markets in the face of competing imports, as not having to compete \\'ith an~ 
other producer, including other domestic ones. Potential new domestic firms rn,ty 
therefore be directly prohibited from becoming established. or they may be inhibitl'd 
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by, for example, not being eligible to apply for import licences in order to buy vital 
foreign equipment. The hope is that, by the supposed certainty of profits derived 
from exclusive markets, businessmen and civil servants (in state-run concerns) 
running monopolies will be encouraged to invest further. Also employment is 
protected, and all the other economic fruits of thriving industry will in due time 
benefit the countries concerned. It is also suggested that in a small market for a 
product, a monopoly is inevitable, since a multiplicity of firms in the industry would 
make it impossible for scale economies to be obtained. Harvey, though, is not happy 
with this apologia (see p.74 in main text). 
Despite the theoretical deduction that monopolies derive large profits from protected 
markets, in practice these notional surpluses do not necessarily accrue to or stay with 
the firms themselves. Devices exist whereby governments and others may 
commandeer these surpluses, the most obvious one, of course, being taxation. Now 
it is hardly to be expected that a government will not tax profits, but the level of 
taxation probably matters, and from a 'supply-side' point of view too high a level will 
inhibit further investment, or indeed will discourage the initial investment in the first 
place. Another standard means of surplus extraction is having to payout for various 
licences that are made obligatory in connection with selected activities. 
Other, less salubrious methods by which surpluses are eroded away are via bribes and 
suchlike payments. Krueger (1974) assumes that firms might be willing - under some 
circumstances - to bribe officials in order to obtain monopoly status, with the officials 
themselves having competed to obtain the positions they hold in the expectation of 
such income. Posner (1975 p.812) neatly distils Krueger's discussion into the 
following lines and also shows that there are other costs to society consequent on 
practices of this sort. He observes, "It might seem that where monopoly is obtained 
by bribery of government officials, the additional loss of monopoly with which this 
paper is concerned" - that is, the social costs of monopoly - "would be eliminated. 
since a bribe is a pure transfer. In fact, however, bribery merely shifts the monopoly 
profits from the monopoly to the officials receiving the bribe and draws real resou[(c\ 
into the activity of becoming an official who is in a position to receive these bribes" . 
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Krueger links bribery with the matter, mentioned above, of having to obtain licences. 
She refers (op.cit. p.292) to " ... means of influencing the expected allocation (of 
licences) .... including bribery, hiring relatives of officials or employing the officials 
themselves upon retirement. .. ". 
The above paragraphs on the extraction of monopoly surpluses are principally relevant 
to multinational firms with establishments in developing countries. The treatment of 
indigenous firms and/or of parastatals - and indeed even of multinationals if in 
partnership with domestic agencies such as D.F.I.s - may be less harsh than that 
experienced by totally independent foreign firms, but this is by no means certain. 
However the methods of surplus extraction may be somewhat different. For example, 
officials in parastatals are in a convenient position to extract surpluses directly 
themselves by large expense accounts and non-monetary benefits and/or to create 
unnecessary jobs for their friends and relatives. 
THE UNDERMINING OF MONOPOLY ADVANTAGES 
(a) General. 
As well as being affected by the above factors which directly erode monopoly profits, 
firms, as indicated in the 'Introduction', may also be hit by regulations which mar 
their operations, and prevent them generating the surpluses which, in the absence of 
these factors, would be notionally possible (1). In the forthcoming discussion, there 
is sometimes overlap with the arguments in the last section, for it can be a matter of 
opinion whether an imposition or restriction is to be considered as eroding monopoly 
profits or as increasing fixed costs: the immediate financial effect on the firm is the 
same in each case. If there is a distinction, it is largely to do with intention. Policies 
that aim to cash in on monopoly profits are technically distinguishable from general 
economic and social directions that adversely impinge on firms' operations. As far 
as possible, this section introduces the latter type of measure, but the delineation can 
never be perfect. 
(b) Illadequate foreign exchange allocation. 
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:rYPicall y firms lJavl' to huy materials, componcnts and flnallcial scr \'iccs froll1 abroad 
III 01 dcr to carry 011 1'1 otltlct iOIl. However ev I '" '. 
, en w Ie 1 e a It rill has hecll establ ished 
with gOVl'IIII1ll'1l1 ;'1'1'10\':11 ;1." a Illonopoly, an inadequate hHcigll exclJallge allocation 
may prcclude it importing what it needs in order t I . I 
o ac lIeve a evel of output that 
maximises profits. Figure I illustrates the situation. 
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For profit rllaxinlis;llioll the firlll would wish to produce, of the good III qucstion, 
quantity UV I, which is whcrc marginal cost equals marginal rcvClluc. fvtonopoly 
prollt would be C I P II Hi. Ilowever, unable to buy sufficient vital illlports. the firm 
can only prodllce {)()2. This reduces mOllopoly profits to C21'2FE. And from 
socicty's point of vicw (i) the higher price of OP2 redistributes illCOllIC Iroll1 buycrs 
or the good to the sdlcrs, (ii) there is loss of FHPIP2 COllslllllcrs' surplus and (iii) 
the good, at the highcr :\\'l'J;lge cost of Oe2, is produced more incniciclllly. 
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One reaction of a firm in such a situation would be to devote resources to trying to 
obtain more foreign exchange (2). This is possible if officials allocating foreign 
exchange are subject to persuasion by reasoned argument or emoluments, or if 
financial intermediaries exist from whom, at a price, exchange may be obtained (3). 
Such activity, however, raises costs. Clearly the optimum solution for the firm is to 
spend money on trying to secure more foreign exchange until the marginal increment 
of such expenditure equals the marginal accrual of profit. Nevertheless, the maximum 
profit obtained from the firm's operations will inevitably be smaller than if there was 
no foreign exchange constraint. 
In the longer term the lack of foreign exchange can prevent a firm re-equipping. This 
will result in lower profits, higher prices and lower output, as working with 
increasingly obsolete and worn-out machinery puts up variable costs, and hence both 
average and marginal costs. Once again it may be possible to secure foreign 
exchange by spending money. If this money comes from accumulated profits, the 
firm ever after loses the revenue these profits could have generated. If it is 
borrowed, future average costs are increased by the interest charged. In both cases 
future monopoly profits are reduced. 
(c) Domestic suppliers of inputs. 
Another context when restrictions are put on firms' desire to buy imports is when 
domestic producers of the inputs in question are established. If these suppliers can 
sell goods of no lower quality and at no higher prices than similar imported products, 
then the buyers will be put at no cost disadvantage if they are obliged to buy from 
them. However this is typically not the case, and the firms in question expect in their 
turn monopoly status and protection against lower priced foreign products. This 
causes buyers' average costs to be higher than they need have been, so increasing the 
prices they charge, lowering their outputs and reducing monopoly profits. It may be 
possible for buyers to 'persuade' officials to allow them to obtain from abroad some 
or all the supplies they need, but the extra eventual profits have to be set against the 
costs of the exercise. Also, of course, the resources devoted to the setting up of local 
suppliers will have been wasted (4). 
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A further problem sometimes faced by buyers who are obliged to obtain supplies of 
inputs locally is the erratic arrival of purchases. Supplying firms may themselves be 
faced with foreign exchange restrictions, so cutting their outputs. Furthermore. as 
has been noted in the main text about Kenyan and Zimbabwean companies, there may 
be management problems which disable the production process. Transport of goods 
also may be unreliable. The effect of these eventualities is to hold back production 
in the buyer companies, as shown in Figure 1, so reducing profits (5). 
(d) Employment. 
A further imposition that may be placed on firms is a set of regulations with regard 
to employment. This can cover a number of possibilities such as (i) a straightforward 
requirement to hire more people generally so as to help reduce unemployment, (ii) 
pressure to go in for labour intensive methods of production (6), (iii) the necessity to 
phase out expatriate staff plus increasingly stringent rules about bringing in new such 
people coupled with exhortation to take on more indigenous people in . staff' 
positions. (i) will certainly put up a firm's costs, and the chances are that (ii) will 
as well. (iii) need not, if expatriates are replaced by genuinely qualified and 
experienced local people. However, if expatriates give way to the less experienced, 
inefficiency creeps in and/or staff numbers increase as the expatriates are kept in 
'advisory' positions. In conclusion, with variable costs increasing, then, as in the 
other circumstances so far discussed, monopoly profits fall. 
Increases in employment in parastatals have already been referred to in an earlier 
section. In these institutions it is almost an inevitability, as officials who have the 
power to create jobs for their kin take it that government will step in with subsidies 
if losses take the place of profits (7). 
(e) Financial impositions. 
1. Local bank borrowing. 
Frequently foreign firms are not eligible to borrow from domestic commercial banks. 
or the amount to be borrowed might be limited in some way. 'Foreign' firms are 
classed in terms of the proportion of the shareholding in a company in foreign hands. 
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This provides an incentive for firms to go into partnership with local agencies who 
hold the requisite proportions. On the other hand, though, they may be inhibited 
from coming at all. The 'solution', bringing more money in from abroad, meets the 
resistence of bankers, who, since the onset of the international debt crisis. have not 
been eagar to put money into developing countries. Inevitably, if firms can obtain 
working capital from abroad, interest rates are subject to risk premiums, and the 
exchange rate uncertainty must be paid for. All this increases costs, so reducing 
monopoly profits. 
2. Repatriation of profits and capital. 
Other impositions on foreign firms may be concerned with the transfer abroad of 
profits from operations, whether to foreign shareholders or to remain undistributed. 
Frequently such money has to remain in low interest government stock until such time 
as it is allowed to be moved. Clearly this type of imposition does not affect the 
money value of such profits as a firm may be able to earn. However, in net present 
value terms the worth of the blocked profits is less than this money value, since they 
are earning less than their international opportunity cost. Even if the locally-earned 
interest rate earned by the blocked funds is not an imposed low rate, the real net 
present value of the profits is lower than the money value. For in an environment 
where eventual transfer abroad is surrounded by uncertainty, where exchange rate 
depreciation might reduce their foreign value, and where political change might result 
in the alteration of current arrangements, a high risk premium would be required to 
ensure that the actual money profits equalled their certainty equivalent. 
Effectively, therefore, monopoly profits are reduced by these controls. Also, of 
course, as in other circumstances discussed, foreign business will be discouraged from 
coming to the country concerned in the first place. 
Similar effects follow from the transfer of capital abroad. If a foreign firm wishes 
to dispose of assets, it may only be permitted to do so at a substantial discount. 
and/or be obliged to put the proceeds temporarily into blocked assets. This reduces 
the value of the capital owned by the firm, in the first instance directly, and in the 
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second instance because what is left is not earning its opportunity cost. 
With regard to having to sell at a discount, it might be suggested that if past profits 
had been disproportionately large, they could have compensated for the losses 
sustained. However, further consideration reveals that this could not happen. since 
the market value of an asset is related to the profit level: if profits had been 
inordinately large, so would notional market value, and therefore so also would be 
the money loss when selling at an artificially imposed low price. Hence, no matter 
how high the money value of a firm's monopoly profits may have been, their real 
value is much less, since they cannot make up for the capital value losses consequent 
on a government-imposed low price. 
COMMENT 
The purported situation whereby firms manage to remain in (or achieve) protected 
monopoly niches in ex-colonial territories and then generate large profits for 
themselves is, as noted earlier, designated 'neo-colonialism', and used to be much 
believed in and warned against by political leaders in developing countries and by 
some writers on development issues. Bagchi has been quoted earlier and in the main 
text, and Woddis (1967 p.56) quoted in Leys (1976 p.26) explains, " ... neo-
colonialism generally represents a new alliance, one between external imperialism, 
and sections of the local bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie". Though the theory of 
neo-colonialism is plausible, the practice is much less in evidence. Indeed, if neo-
colonialism - as a label for foreign firms extracting large profits from the territories 
they were established in - was ever likely to take off, it was soon nipped in the bud 
by politicians and other officials in developing countries, who seem to have acted not 
so much out of ideological disapproval, as from a naive belief that the fruits of 
foreign business activities in their countries could be sequestered with impunity. 
The discussion in previous sections noted the basic aspect of economic theory about 
monopolies, which is that - technically - they are in a position to make large protits. 
It also looked into a number of ways in which governments (and others) in developing 
countries have undermined and nullified the financial and economic consequences of 
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monopoly behaviour. Indeed, not only have firms in general been disappointed in the 
profits they have made, they have also been discouraged from making new 
investments. The proverb 'killing the goose that lays the golden eggs' was never 
more apt (8). Furthermore it is important to note that this scenario is relevant not 
only to foreign firms, but to domestic ones as well, including parastatals. 
Logical government behaviour would not persist In unreconcilable attitudes and 
policies, whereby ritual gestures against 'neo-colonialism' are paralleled by an 
acceptance that new businesses - even from abroad - must be encouraged, since they 
produce goods and employ a workforce, while at the same time profits are extracted 
from them and restrictions imposed on them. That this confusion occurs must be 
explained again by the existence of the 'soft' state. 
NOTES APPENDIX 1 
1. Of course, the regulations considered are normally not only applied to 
businesses classed as or regarded as monopolies. However, the Appendix focuses on 
monopolies, and it is in this specialised sense that the discussion is to be understood. 
2. As was noted in the main text, Berkshire International in Zimbabwe employed 
somebody full time in order to try and secure more foreign exchange. 
3. Again as noted in the main text, the Zimbabwe Development Bank made loans 
to firms who didn't really need to borrow but were in great need of foreign exchange. 
4. Hoechst (Kenya) was apparently hit in this way, though the initiative to 
circumvent importing restrictions seems mainly to have come from foreign sellers (see 
main text). 
5. The writer was told in the premises of Berkshire International (Zimbabwe) that 
they had a convenient foreign source of low-priced new machinery - which they 
desperately needed - but they were not allowed to buy it due to the existence of a 
. h 1 them Ho\\<'e\ er local government-sponsored company that should In t eory supp y . 
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this local company was showing itself quite unable to, literally, 'deliver the goods'. 
6. This occurred in Botswana as a result of a temporary subsidy on unskilled 
wages. 
7. See the main text about parastatals in Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
8. Admittedly the discussion in the Appendix is largely theoretical, but numerous 
practical illustrations are found in the main text about Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
APPENDIX 2 
D.F.I.s, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AND CAPITAL BUDGETING 
308 
INTRODUCTION 
The main text asserts that a financial intermediary truly committed to a philosophy 
of 'development' should revolve capital. This means that funds committed to the 
fostering of capital projects should not intentionally be kept tied up in those projects 
indefinitely, but in due course should be realised and hence become available for new 
investment. If a D.F.I. does not do this it cuts down on the funds available for 
developmemt finance, having to rely on profits and new accretions of outside money, 
and comes to look more like an investment trust or holding company than a 
'development' institution. Also the build-up and maturing of appropriate expertise 
atrophy when a D.F.I. can remain solvent by just collecting income from successful 
investments without having to address the matter of realising and re-using the funds 
invested. Obviously money passed to beneficiaries as loans should automatically 
return to the lender in accordance with the arrangements negotiated, but deliberate 
decisions have to be made to liquidate shareholdings, and it is this latter issue with 
which the appendix is principally concerned. 
THE MECHANISMS FOR SELLING SHARES 
A difficulty with regard to the sale of shares may be the lack of a mechanism for 
disposing of them. If there is a stock exchange, of course, the difficulty is that much 
less, and the main text recommended that by trading stock, a D.F.I. had the 
opportunity of assisting in the maturing of a stock exchange. Otherwise, it is 
normally possible to trade in a more ad hoc fashion via banks and other 'mainstream' 
financial institutions, and when this sort of business increases, it eventually prompts 
the establishment of embryonic stock exchange facilities. 
Of course, many 'ordinary' people will be bypassed by arrangements of these types, 
due to (i) perceived risk of buying a few shares in perhaps just one specific company 
and (ii) the sophistication and logistical problems of coping with stock market 
facilities almost inevitably located in a country's capital city. Established ways round 
this are the creation of investment trusts, and unit trusts. Investment trusts still imply 
the use of stock exchange facilities, whereas unit trusts do not, and indeed units in 
particular may be made available over the counters of post offices and bank branches 
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to small savers living far from the capital of a territory A 0 F I 
. " . may set up an 
investment trust or a unit trust as a subsidiary (1), and there is no logical necessity 
for such an institution to confine itself to equities originating from its parent. 
Alternatively a trust may exist quite independently, and this may be preferable, for 
it can less easily be subject to D.F.I. influence and pressure. 
D.F.I.s AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
The necessity for aD. F. I. to be a revolving capital organisation, and hence to be a 
seller of income-generating shares, suggests a conflict of goals. For whereas a D. F. I. 
should be financially viable (2), the sale of profitable investments would seem to 
jeopardise this requirement. How can these two conflicting recommendations be 
reconciled? 
Clearly a D.F.I. should not, as a matter of policy, be a profit-maximising 
organisation in a neo-classical sense. This would probably mean the perpetual 
holding on to shares in the most prosperous companies, which, as has been pointed 
out, compromises the 'development' philosophy. True, a successful profit 
maximisation policy would maximise the funds available for further investment, but 
tactics would require that these funds be not necessarily re-invested in line with 
develop men t -orien tated criteria (3). 
The theory that seems more applicable to D.F.I.s is that of 'satisficing behaviour', 
a set of ideas popularised by Simon (1964). Formulated with private enterprise 
companies in mind, the theory postulates that an organisation has a number of goals 
in its line of vision, typically related to 'production', 'inventory', 'sales', 
'share-of-the-market' and 'profit', and since it is unrealistic to expect to ' maximise' 
in all of them, the organisation aims to 'satisfice', that is, to achieve a satisfactory 
level of multiple goal performance. As Koutsoyiannis (1979 p.388) explains. "The 
profit goal is set by the top management so as to satisfy the demands of shareholders 
and the expectations of bankers and other finance institutions: and also to create funds 
with which they can accomplish their own goals and projects, or satisfy the other 
goals of the firm". 
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In relation to D.F.I.s, a satisfactory level of profit is certainly necessary in order to 
be able to pay dividends to shareholders and service loans from financial institutions 
(4). The other goals mentioned above are not so obviously applicable, but a number 
of development finance goals exist, of which - in line with the thrust of this appendix 
- a recommended one is the liquidation of equity holdings in order to raise money for 
new investment. 'Satisficing' in this context would imply disposal in accordance with 
a defined criterion that did not aim to maximise anything but produced a satisfactory 
though sound result in terms both of the D.F.1. itself and the pursuance of economic 
growth (5). 
The only difference between D.F.I. satisficing and commercial company satisficing 
is that for aD. F. I. satisficing should be a deliberate policy aim, whereas for a 
commercial company it is more a second best solution in a situation where it is not 
practicable to maximise profits. However this is a philosophic matter which need not 
be pursued further. 
A CRITERION FOR THE DISPOSAL OF SHARES(6) 
Clearly there is little to be gained by selling off income-generating equities in a 
context where there are no opportunities for further apt and judicious investment. 
However such a situation should not normally pertain over long periods in an 
economy where there there is a prospect of economic growth and the higher living 
standards that people expect to go with it. Indeed, if a D. F. 1. is not becoming 
involved with the finance of development there is little point in it having been 
established in the first place. 
An active D.F.I. in an economy where government presides over or has attempted 
to fashion economic conditions that are not inimicable to capital investment can expect 
over time and with varying degrees of urgency to be faced with a range of different 
types of demand for the finance it has available. Much of this demand will 
immediately be seen to be related to unviable projects, and can be rejected. Other 
ideas for using capital funds may hold out more promise, and perhaps can be 
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developed into sound proposals with the aid of D.F.I. advice and assistance. To 
some extent the D.F.I. may usefully seek out uses for its funds. perhaps explaining 
to local firms how injections of equity could enable them to expand, and encouraging 
them to go ahead. Also there may be applications for partnership arrangements from 
established multinational firms: normally the potential viability of this type of 
proposal will not need so much investigation. 
Money is allocated as either equity or debt: at this point in the discussion, the analysis 
focuses on equity. Later there are some remarks on debt. In line with standard 
business finance procedures the various possibilities for investment can be listed in 
order in relation to their expected internal rates of return. These rates of return will 
be computed from the expected values of the investments, which are derived from the 
probabilities of different outcomes, taking into account macroeconomic circumstances. 
local conditions, and so on. In order for some new investments to be undertaken with 
money obtained from a realised shareholding, the average IRR, weighted in 
accordance with the amount of funds put into each investment, should be expected to 
be at least as high as the yield from the old investment. Alternatively the sum of the 
net present values of the new investments, discounted at the old investment yield rate, 
should be, at the very worst, zero. These procedures allow for the fact that, in a 
developing context, where indigenous people are to be encouraged to build up 
successful firms, a good-looking project that appears to have promise should not 
necessarily have to earn the going rate, as long as returns from other new investments 
cross-subsidize it. 
Given the conditions outlined above, a D.F.I. may go ahead and sell off a profitable 
investment, in the plausible expectation that it will not as a consequence lose out. 
There is no need to labour the point, amply dealt with in the text, as to why aD. F. I. 
is necessary as an investment vehicle for certain varieties of new project. It has been 
postulated that the peculiar circumstances of development finance justify supporting 
assistance from agencies separate from the D.F.I., so nurturing the viability of 
projects with financial help and perhaps also expertise the D. F. I. does not provide 
itself. 'Mainstream' financial intermediaries would not have these advantages (7). 
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Also, as noted above, D.F.1. would not normally aim to be a profit maximiser. 
The concept of 'risk', or - more correctly - 'uncertainty' (Knight 1921), since the 
estimate of probabilities for outcomes of new investments cannot be objectively 
calculated, has not been brought into the above discussion. However, plausibly the 
average level of uncertainty can be postulated as higher in ventures financed by 
D.F.l.s as opposed to ventures financed by 'mainstream' intermediaries. Graphically 
this would show in a 'flattish' normal distribution for the probability-determined 
expected pay-offs from a project, and a high coefficient of variation. A standard 
reply to the anxieties that such a situation would generate in the minds of financiers 
would be to argue that projects where returns were at the left comer of the normal 
distribution should be balanced by projects where returns were at the right-hand 
comer. However, more positively, the purpose of the extension and other help -
referred to above - applied to the business of development finance, is principally so 
to hone, tailor and buttress a new venture that the uncertainty of outcome is reduced. 
In other words, the normal distribution graph is made 'tighter'. 
In general, the above has been written with equity finance in mind, since the purpose 
of the appendix is to discuss the appropriate context for liquidating profitable equity 
holdings. In contrast, there is little problem over a rule for debt financing. Obviously 
money available from a maturing loan or, given a change of policy, from the sale of 
shares will - if applied as credit - be allocated only to borrowers expected to be able 
to pay the relevant rate of interest, and to meet capital repayments at the due times. 
Supporting assistance should, as with equity finance, be employed to identify and 
assist ventures that have hold out promise of success. 
Finally, a word of caution. Financing decisions by development finance institutions 
must be a matter not only of applying mathematically-based criteria, but also of using 
judgement, as long, of course, as 'judgement' does not become a convenient excuse 
for partiality and sloppiness. For example, in some contexts a D. F. I. would do better 
to put all its funds in government stock: this, however, would destroy the raison 
d' etre for the organisation's establishment, so would not be a tenable policy. however 
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safe from a financial angle. However, there is no reason why residual funds available 
from the sale of equity or from loan repayments for which a timely investment 
destination is not available should not temporarily be lodged in safe securities. 
Another issue concerns the recommendation that funds from the sale of shares and put 
into new equity investments should earn an average return that is not inferior to that 
on the liquidated holding, rather than that each separate new investment should yield 
this return. Now this could suggest that money might legitimately be put into projects 
with abysmal prospects, as long as projects with good prognoses, and financed at the 
same time, were expected to compensate. Clearly such a policy is not what the 
recommendation means to validate. Any project that is to be financed by D. F. I. 
funds should have promise, even though in some instances the expected return is 
relatively low. 
Though the above criterion is suggested as a way of ensuring D. F. I. viability, it has 
to be admitted that - given the economic circumstances and investment conditions in 
many developing country contexts - it may lead to stagnation. D.F.I.s have an excuse 
for keeping funds in safe investments, and may only go in for new investments when 
sound foreign partnership arrangements become available. Something of this kind 
seems to have happened in Malawi. (See Appendix 3). 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of the overall study, a very apt criticism of the discussion in the 
sections above is that - in so far as it prescribes how persons involved in the process 
of development finance should behave - it assumes integrity and disinterested logical 
consistency. Unfortunately, of course, this has typically not been the case. 
Ideologically-motivated policy, merging into soft state features, have so often 
weakened the ability of the D.F.!. as an objective concept to operate even in the 
precariously viable way suggested. Part 2 of the main text amply demonstrates the 
reality rather than the ideal. 
TECHNICAL NOTE 
The following lines case in mathematical terms the conditions - explained above -
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under which a D.F.I. may appropriately sell off shares in a ~ . perlormmg company and 
invest in new equity. 
New investment may be made if: 
1. current NPV of investment to be liquidated ~ 0 and 
2. sum of alternative investments have an expected NPV ~ current NPY. 
k* is the capital realised from selling existing investment(s) Where (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
Max. k = 
subject to 
P is the amount of money invested in each new project 
c is the yield from each new investment 
L P- ~ k* 
t.:1 " 
P ~ 0 
NOTES APPENDIX 2 
1. In Kenya, the I.C.D.C. set up an investment trust (See Pt. 2 Chapter 5), as 
did also the Botswana Development Corporation. 
2. In all D.F.I. remits that the writer has seen, the requirement to be financially 
viable is stated as a matter of course. 
3. In the long term, a successful D.F.I. might be regarded as a total social 
benefit maximiser, but such complex considerations are outside the scope of the 
present study. 
4. Satisficing behaviour appears to be applicable to the policies of aD. F. I. 
established to lend to African-owned businesses in KwaZulu. Harvey explained to 
the writer that the aim was for the institution to remain solvent and make a low return 
on capital. 
5. A theory which seems - perhaps unfortunately - to apply quite frequently to 
D.F.I.s in developing countries is Williamson's model of managerial discretion 
(Williamson 1963). As Koutsoyiannis (op.cit p.17!) states, "Williamson argues that 
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managers have discretion in pursuing policies which maximise their own utility rather 
than attempting the maximisation of profits which maximises the utility of owner-
shareholders. Profit acts as a constraint to this managerial behaviour.. It. She later 
lists as variables in the managerial utility function accoutrements such as It salary. 
security, power, status, prestige and professional excellence". With many developing 
country D.F.I.s, profit has often not been a constraint on managerial utility, since 
governments have too readily covered losses and not insisted on loan servicing. So 
the opportunities for gathering advantages and perks have been that much greater. 
Burgeoning administrative costs, and the oft-noted multiplication of staff in parastatals 
- which include many D.F.I.s - testify to what has been happening. 
It may fairly be concluded that the soft state is well suited to breeding a high degree 
of managerial utility in organisations, particularly those in the public sector. 
6. R.L. Kitchen in 'Finance for the Developing Countries' (Wiley 1986) writes 
extensively about capital market theory and risk in Chapter 2. However this material 
does not dwell specifically on D.F.I.s. The present writer's much more limited 
treatment aims to focus just on one aspect of D.F.I. capital budgeting, and does not 
elaborate into the effects of inflation and changing interest rates. 
7. There is no contradiction here. If a 'mainstream' institution was enabled to 
branch out into development finance by being afforded extraneous extension help. it 
would be classed as aD. F . I. 
APPENDIX 3 
SOME COMMENT ON OTHER D.F.I.s IN KENYA, ZIMBABWE AND 
ELSEWHERE 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapters in the main text investigated the major 'general' D.F.I.s in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe. Other D.F.I.s in those countries were omitted, as also by definition were 
the numerous parallel institutions elsewhere in Anglophone Africa. The following 
paragraphs briefly review a number of these other organisations - and also one from 
the Far East - so as to intimate that the experiences of the I.C.D.C., the D.F.C.K. 
and the I.D.B. in Kenya, and the I.D.C. and Z.D.B. in Zimbabwe, are not untypical. 
Furthermore, though specialised small business financing intermediaries were not 
discussed in the main text, this is not the case in the sections that follow, and certain 
examples of this type of institution are reviewed. 
In some instances the discussion is of events that took place up to a decade ago. 
However, as illustrations of the variety of D.F.I. experience that have contributed to 
the post-independence history of developing countries, it is believed that the 
investigations are valuable and instructive. 
KENYA 
(a) Kenya Industrial Estates. 
K.I.E., a small business organisation, was originally linked to I.C.D.C., but became 
a separate organisation in 1976. Despite the rather unusual name, indicative of the 
remit of the organisation to manage and construct industrial estates, rural development 
centres and industrial promotion areas, it has been active in lending and providing 
technical assistance to small entrepreneurs. 
J. Levitsky (1986) looked into the institution on behalf of the World Bank 1986, and 
painted a fairly dismal picture. He noted (p.31) that in 1981 81 % of loan repayments 
were in arrears, and he expected that 55 % of loans made would never be repaid. 
There had been some improvement by 1984. Of 692 loans on K.l. E. books, 58 
borrowers had failed completely, and 151 were having serious problems wlth their 
businesses. The rest had no or only 'minor' problems (p.48). Though this information 
is from some years back, anecdotal evidence available to the writer in 1990 suggested 
that K.I.E. had continued to fail to become a financially viable organisation. 
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A brief glance at an organisation's experience cannot expect to account for its 
difficulties. However it is plausible that the type of company problems identified by 
the RBC Report for the I.C.D.C., the D.F.C.K. and the I.D.B. would equally be true 
of K.I.E. Administrative costs of the organisation were also reputed to be excessively 
high relative to income, perhaps understandable in the light of the technical help _ 
without government financial support - given to small businessmen. 
(b) The Kenya Tourist Development Corporation. 
This organisation, set up in 1965, and 100% owned by government, aimed to provide 
equity and loans to enable Kenyans to get into the potentially lucrative tourist 
business. And in subsequent years the Corporation took on more of an entrepreneurial 
role itself by buying majority holdings in formerly European-owned hotels. 
As with the I.C.D.C. there is some obscurity in the accounts, and it is not clear how 
much 'dividend receivable' and 'interest receivable' - as the annual accounts would 
have it - are synonymous with the actual receipt of money. The Auditor in the 1987/8 
Annual Report (p.12) implicitly looks into this when he remarks on the growing 
amount of - mainly interest - indebtedness to the Government. He observes, "The 
Corporation's indebtedness to Government continues to rise and I have still not 
received satisfactory explanations as to why the Corporation has not remitted these 
funds to Government. The Corporation has only explained that it failed to remit the 
funds to Government because the Corporation's loanees had defaulted in their loan 
repayments to it". 
And there are other ways in which the figures in the Accounts may have been 
massaged to give a more favourable overall impression. As the Auditor remarks (Ibid. 
p.12) " ... the estimated loans not fully recoverable as at 30th June, 1988, amounted 
to KSh.1488m. The Corporation, however, only made a provision for bad debts in 
these accounts of KShs. 813678400". Had full provision been made, of course, the 
so-called surplus for the year would have been turned into a loss. 
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Analysis of the accounts from earlier years reveals malaise similar to the abo\"e 
situation, and it is safe to conclude that the K T D C l'S not I fi . 
. . . . proper y a manclally 
viable organisation. And the cause is fairly clear A substant'al b f . 
. 1 num er 0 tounst 
facilities in which the Corporation holds equity and/or to which it has made loans are 
loss-makers. Management problems identified by the RBC Report no doubt have 
much to do with this state of affairs, plus also the clear ineffectiveness of the 
Corporation in chasing up bad debts. 
Back in 1975 (p.132) Leys was writing, "The extent of the K.T.D.C.'s investments 
were not known, its administration having fallen on evil days". It is a moot point 
whether, by the end of the 1980s decade, things were much better. 
ZIMBABWE 
(a) Small Enterprises Development Corporation. 
1. Structure, remit and finance 
S.E.D.CO. came into operation in 1984 to assist small business in all areas, except 
for agriculture, with finance and various varieties of 'extension' help. A small 
enterprise was one defined as "having fixed assets not exceeding Z$500000 and/or 
a permanent labour force not exceeding 50 persons" (S.E.D.CO. circa 1989). All 
legal types of business were to be helped, though, with some ritualistic obeisance to 
Zimbabwe's early socialist aspirations, S.E.D.CO. "gives priority and preference to 
cooperatives" (Ibid). However, with reference to this aim, the writer was informed 
that financing cooperatives did not happen much, because they were subject to 
management problems and internal squabbles (1). And indeed, the 'ownership profile 
of approved loans' in the S.E.D.CO. Annual Report 1989 (p.21) is given as l.5% of 
the total for cooperatives, as opposed to 75.3% for sole proprietorships. 
The bulk of the funds for disbursement by S.E.D.CO. have come from government 
as a 'capital grant'. There was also, at the end of the 1980s a loan facility from the 
World Bank via the Zimbabwe Government. Virtually all S.E.D.CO. financing has 
been in the form of loans, and in 1990 16 % interest for rural projects and 18 o/r for 
urban and peri-urban projects were charged. There is clearly an element of 
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cross-subsidy here, as rural loans would normally be more costly to manage than 
urban loans. However, of more significance was their relationship with the 
commercial bank base lending rate on commercial and industrial loans, which during 
the same period was 14.75 %. Given the especial difficulties associated with small 
business finance, and the volume of extension work S.E.D.CO. purported to be 
undertaking, the extra income from a 16% rate or an 18% rate as compared with 
14.75 % would - even if paid on the nail - hardly seem adequate to meet the likely 
extra expenses. S.E.D.CO. 's big advantage in relation to mainstream commercial 
banks was, of course, that most of its funds for disposal - except for the 9.75 % 
World Bank money - were, in practice, 'free' of servicing. Hence S.E.D.CO. has 
been in a position to conduct highly concessionary lending operations, while still 
having a large margin over borrowing costs. 
2. Experience. 
Despite a certain professionalism intimated by the writer when looking into the 
operations of S.E.D.CO., and a financial record which appears to be sounder than 
that of many other small business agencies, there are severe problems recognised not 
just by disinterested observers but by the staff of the organisation. 
Investigation of the accounts reveals that they would never have been able to deliver 
a financial surplus from operations had there not been a regular government grant to 
cover administrative expenses. This grant covered the cost of a number of short 
courses for S.E.D.CO. clients, so technically was for extension work as well as pure 
administration. The arrangement had been negotiated at S.E.D.CO. 's inception, and 
was due to end in 1990 when S.E.D.CO. was supposed to be 'on its feet'. However 
it was accepted in 1989 that S.E.D.CO. would not in practice be able imminently to 
dispense with the subsidy, largely because - as it was put to the writer - government 
had failed to supply the Corporation with anything like the amount of capital funds 
initially promised. Now this explanation is plausible if it is assumed that (i) viable but 
unsatisfied lending opportunities existed, and (ii) administration was subject to scale 
economies and would not absorb the income from more loans. There seems some , 
truth in (i), for though 70% of all project applications were. in the late 80s. rejc(ted. 
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not all the remaining 30% could be funded. With regard to (ii) although the cost of 
some categories of pure administration might experience scale economies, other 
expenses in the areas of extension, education, and monitoring might well go up more 
than proportionately, for at the margin loan management costs probably increase. 
And staff problems could only exacerbate the rise in costs as higher salaries would 
need to be paid to attract more qualified people. As the Chairman pointed out in the 
1989 Annual Report (p.7), " .. as long as a situation exists where highly trained and 
expert staff are on a salary structure which is below that of the private sector and 
other parastatals there is no way that they can be retained in the long 
term .... Presently the staff complement is only 48% of actual requirement". 
It was felt at S.E.D.CO. that government should continue to help out with 
administrative expenses. If a division - albeit imperfect - can be made between pure 
administration and extension costs - there is a case - argued in the main text - for a 
government taking on the finance of extension in areas of problematic lending, and 
this would seem to apply in the case of S.E.D.CO. All intermediaries have to face 
administrative costs, but small business lending in particular needs substantial 
supporting services. 
In the year ended 30th June 1989 government grants stood at Z$1.66m, and the net 
surplus at Z$0.12m (Ibid. p.25). Had government only been financing extension and 
not general administration as well, it is likely, therefore that the accounts would have 
been in the red. So even if the government relents, and in subsequent years only 
reduces, but does not abolish its grant, the viability of S.E.D.CO. is in question. 
However the situation will be much less serious than if government cuts off funds 
completely. 
A further basis for anxiety over the finances concerns the fact that - as with some 
Kenyan institutions it is not clear to what extent - in the Balance Sheet of the annual 
accounts - 'interest receivable' and 'current loan maturities' identifies money actually 
received. And disquiet was expressed to the writer that repayment arrears in 1990 
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were runnmg at 15.8 % of disbursements: the proportion had been up to ~8 o/c . 
Anything above 10% was thought unacceptable. The remark in the 1988 Annual 
Report (p.8), "During the year, plans were drawn up to strengthen the Debt Reco\'erv 
Unit", may be indicative of increasing worry over arrears. 
3. Conclusion. 
Small business finance is a difficult area to exploit, but, in comparison with many 
schemes, such as the arrangements run by the I. D. C. in Zimbabwe and the I. C. D. C. 
in Kenya, which were virtually destroyed by mountains of bad debt and the factors 
that led to it, S.E.D.CO. has been fairly successful. Loans have been made, 
businesses have been established, and repayments have come in. However, it has been 
operating on quite a small scale, and is questionably viable. Tricky problems have to 
be addressed if it is to prosper. 
(b) The Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation. 
The Z.M.D.C. was founded in 1982 to invest in the mining industry as it stood and 
to adopt a promotional role towards exploration and the establishment of new 
ventures. Assets acquired in the early years involved the take-over or acquisition of 
majority holdings in going concerns such as Mhangura Copper Mines Ltd. and Sabi 
Consolidated Gold Mines, or un viable undertakings - often where the owners wished 
to leave the country. As the Annual Economic Review 1986 (p.51) observes, " .. the 
Government has often offered direct assistance to mines faced with closure, in some 
instances this has entailed take-over of such companies to safeguard employment". 
The performance of the Z.M.D.C. has been unsatisfactory, partly a reflection of and 
perhaps also partly a cause of the relative stagnation in the mining industry. For 
example, from 1980 to early 1989, the volume of most minerals mined was on a 
downward trend. Only coal, and to a lesser extent gold went up (Quarterly Digest 
March 1989 p.45)(2). Funds for use by the Corporation have been obtained fairly 
painlessly via a series of 'capital grants' from Government and unsecured interest-free 
Government loans. And - very indulgently on the part of the Govern ment -. "The 
repayment of these loans is still subject to negotiation with the Government of 
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Zimbabwe and is dependent on the viability of the projects being developed" 
(Z.M.D.C. Annual Report 1989 p.23). 
Even so, the Z.M.D.C. has found it difficult to be financially viable. Though, "The 
Corporation eliminated a loss of Z$1.34m the previous year and made a profit of 
Z$1.78m"(Ibid. p.4) - that is from June 30th 1988 to June 30th 1989 - this was 
largely due to "a substantial grant from government of Z$1.35m" (Ibid. p.7). To the 
extent that indifferent Z.M.D.C. performance can be attributed to the condition of its 
subsidiaries, the Z.M.D.C. Chairman speaks of "equipment breakdowns and poor 
availability of LHD machines" (Ibid. p.4), "undercapitalisation of the Corporation and 
its subsidiary companies coupled with antiquated plant and machinery" (Ibid. p.6). 
In the Corporation itself, as with S.E.D.CO., there was the problem of "recruitment 
and retention of qualified personnel ... due mainly to uncompetitive salaries and 
benefits" (Ibid. p.6). 
From the above cursory survey of the Z.M.D.C. it seems it has been unable to 
nurture Zimbabwean mining into a vigorously growing industry, but, kept afloat by 
subsidies, it has presided over a steady decline. 
(c) The Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation. 
This organisation dates from 1984 when it took over the assets of the Zimbabwe 
Tourist Board. The Z.M.D.C. is qualitatively different from the other corporations 
surveyed in that it was not conceived as primarily an asset-holding institution. A 
major part of its business has been tourist promotion and publicity, and the physical 
facilities acquired have been more to do with government-inspired social necessity 
than commercial planning. As is stated in the 1986 Annual Economic Review (p.57), 
"Since Z.T.D.C.'s inception, it has been involved in the acquisition of hotels 
threatened with closure and those that are seen as ultimately leading to sound financial 
contribution to the parastatal itself. By 1986, a total of 4 hotels were under the 
Corporation's control". 
The Corporation's funds have come from substantial capl'tal t t' G gran s rom overnment. 
and besides the hotel purchases it has made a number of 'd I ' I . eve opment oans 10 the 
tourist industry. Reputedly the repayment record has been poor Th oct . f 
. e pr uctlOn 0 
annual reports has been spasmodic, so making it difficult to properly judge Z.T.D.C. 
performance. Indeed, in the first Annual Report (1984/5 p.12) the auditors were 
complaining of "absence of details" and "inadequate controls ... over recoverable 
expenditure". So, "Because of the significance of the above we are unable to express 
an opinion on the financial statements at 30 June 1985 or the loss for the year then 
ended" . 
There are few grounds for believing that the Z.T.D.C. is free of the shortcomings 
typical of many other development corporations. 
BOTSWANA - THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANK 
(a) Structure, remit and allocations. 
This organisation dates from 1966. The capital structure is rather unconventional, in 
that the Bank has operated from a foundation of 'unrecallable capital', which consists 
predominantly of funds from the Botswana Government - validating the fact that 
nearly all directors are government appointees - but which also includes donations 
from non-Botswana agencies, such as Oxfam and the U.K. Freedom from Hunger 
Campaign. The unusual status of the capital obviates the necessity for regarding it as 
a collection of shares properly requiring dividend returns, and smooths the passage 
of government subsidies into the organisation. For example, in the Annual Report for 
1986/7 (p.22) it is stated, "The Government has further invested 4.0m Pula in the 
capital of the Bank raising the total unrecallable capital from 9.2m Pula to i3.2m 
Pula during the year". Additionally, the Bank has borrowed money, again the great 
bulk coming from the Government. Smaller loans from external sources have often 
been on highly concessional terms (3). 
Nearly all N.D.B. disbursements have been as credit rather than equity finance. Also 
the Bank has had a bias towards the finance of agriculture and activities supporting 
agriCUlture, and in proportional terms the emphasis on these categoncs of 
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beneficiaries has tended to increase over the years However' t ' h' , 
. 1 S remIt aut onscs It 
to allocate money to secondary and tertiary industry and h al't-
, ence qu lIes It tor 
inclusion in a study where the investigation of agn'cultural fi " h . Inance IS, In t e maIn. 
avoided. In terms of average size of loan, and in line with definitions f D F I ' o .,.s In 
other countries, the N.D.B. has operated as a small business intermediary, 
The table below illustrates these features. 
TABLE 1 
LOANS APPROVED BY SECTORS (AMOUNTS IN 1000 PULA) 
1980 1982 1984/5 1986/7 
NO. AM. NO. AM. NO. AM. NO. AM. 
AGRIC. 2583 5173 3860 8378 2725 7125 1019 9694 
COM/IND 218 4143 325 3925 381 2673 273 4359 
SOURCE: National Development Bank Annual Report 1986/7 Table 2 
At the official exchange rate in 1986 of 1.9 pula per U.S. dollar (African Economic 
and Financial Data 1989 p.24), the average approved agricultural loan at that time 
was circa $18000, and the average approved commercial or industrial loan circa 
$30000. Furthermore the agricultural figure, even taking inflation into account, was 
a big increase on previous years' experience. Despite the relative average smallness 
of these loans, in 1986/7 a subsidiary division was established to assist persons who 
wanted loans of not more than 10000 pula (or $190(0). 
(b) Financial outtum. 
The accounts of the N.D.B. make for fairly depressing reading. 
To consider first the 'income and expenditure account', for the year ended 31 st 
March 1984 there was a deficit of 0.3m Pula, following on a supposed surplus of 
0.2m Pula for the 15 month period preceding that (N. D. B. Annual Report 1 ~83/4 
p.27). However these figures emerge from calculations based on 'interest earned' -
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as opposed to 'received' - of 3.75m Pula for 1983/4 and 3.5m Pula for the earlier 
period. Furthermore the amount of 'bad debts written off, at 6.25m. Pula for the 
first 15 months and zero for the following year seem optimistically trivial. 
The general situation appears to have deteriorated further a few years later, for the 
deficits in 1986 and 1987 respectively were nearly 2m Pula and 314m Pula 
respectively (N.D.B. Annual Report for 1986/87 p.25). Again, there was considerable 
'interest earned' in the'calculations, and no money allowed for writing off bad debts. 
The 'balance sheet' records as assets 'repayments of advances due within one year' , 
but there is no indication as to how much money actually accrued. Though the figures 
in question are arrived at after some provision for 'doubtful' debts, the provision is 
sufficiently optimistic as to prompt comment from the auditors. In the 1983/4 Report 
Deloitte, Haskins and Sells observe (p.25), "The bank has made a provision for 
doubtful debts of 5 % of the total outstanding advances .... We are unable to establish 
whether the provision ... .is adequate or not and accordingly are unable to express an 
opinion thereon". And indeed, in the 1986/7 Annual Report it is stated (p. 19), "Since 
the beginning of the now six years lasting drought situation, the arrears on 
outstanding loans have grown at a very alarming rate". Over the years the very 
substantial 'loans' from government plus increases in the unrecallable capital (both 
referred to above) are what appear to have enabled the N.D.B. to survive. 
(c) Assessment. 
Like that of so many D.F.I.s, the record of the N.D.B. has been poor. It is not 
possible to comment on the reasons for this too authoritatively without depth research, 
but certain clear factors emerge from the annual reports. 
Firstly, of course, as was made abundantly clear in the main text, viable lending on 
a small scale basis is notoriously difficult to achieve. And agricultural lending 
subsumes further problems not followed up in the main text. However in earlier pages 
monitoring, extension and other support have been emphasized as of overwhelming 
importance if a D.F.I. undertaking problematic lending is to have a chance of being 
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viable, and this is especially true of small business finance. Although it may be 
assumed that the N.D.B. - from the designation of various mana . 1 . 1-gers - lnVO yes Itse t 
with work of these kinds, there is no description or elaboration in the annual reports 
of what is done. Though it cannot fairly be intimated from this that th NOB . e . . . IS 
necessarily weak on support services, it is true that those D.F.I.s which regard them 
as important tend to write a lot about them. And it is certainly apparent that no 
extraneous agency such as the Government pays for or independently provides 
relevant assistance to the central financing function. 
Secondly, the N.D.B. has fallen into the McKinnon-designated trap (see Part 1 
Chapter 2) of operating an interest rate structure that is out of touch with commercial 
reality. A paragraph, quoted in full, from the 1983/4 Annual Report (p. 11) makes 
this embarrassingly clear. 
"The Bank's approach to financing of commercial and industrial sectors corresponds 
with the Government's strategies and policies i.e. to promote employment creation 
undertakings, accelerate rural development, diversify economy's industrial base and 
encourage local ownership and management of the business sector. To support these 
policies the Bank placed emphasis on locally-owned and rurally based projects 
through its interest rate structure, by charging relatively lower rates to the projects 
that met these criteria. Productive enterprises in the industrial sector were also 
charged the minimum interest rate instead of the higher rates charged to trading 
enterprises. Loan appraisal techniques continued to emphasise labour intensive 
techniques in order to maximise employment creation". 
As an almost text-book illustration of financial repression, these lines are without 
parallel in all the D.F.I. annual reports consulted in connection with the study. Such 
a political and social role for interest rates - plus the accompanying 'social' 
aspirations - are well fitted to deny money to the efficient and nurture high (0st 
enterprise. Although adjustments were made to interest rate tactics later in the 1980s 
(4), the N.D.B. was weighed down at this time by an albatross that could hardly fail 
to prejudice its solvency. 
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TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA 
(a) Introduction. 
In the absence of up-to-date and sufficient information, the lines that follow do not 
attempt for Tanzanian and Zambian D.F.I.s even the limited survey that has been 
effected in relation to other D.F.I.s in this Appendix. Rather, the aim is to make a 
few comments which illustrate the - typically - chequered careers of developing 
country D.F.I.s, so as to support the conclusions that were arrived at from the depth 
D.F.I. analyses in the main text. 
(b) The Tanzania Investment Bank (T. I. B.). 
The Tanzania Investment Bank was set up in 1970 to make loans and equity 
investments - though in practice nearly all its allocations came to be loans - in the 
whole spectrum of productive activities. The entire share capital was subscribed by 
the Tanzania Government, and Tanzanian financial parastatals, though the Bank 
subsequently obtained some loans from agencies such as the African Development 
Bank and the International Development Association. 
What is apparent from the Annual Reports of the T.LB. is a great dearth of 
information, so rendering it impossible to to make an adequate assessment of the 
organisation's experience; however there are clues enough to breed suspicion. 
(Perhaps if independent auditors had been authorised to check the accounts rather than 
the Tanzania Audit Corporation, a public body, greater openness would have been 
encouraged). Thus, although, for the year ended 30th June 1984, there was 
purportedly a profit (T.I.B. Annual Report 1983/4 p.13), so enabling the organisation 
to pay a 10% dividend on the 100m Tanzanian shillings capital of its shareholders. 
the integrity of this 'profit' is much in doubt. For example, as in so many D. F. I. 
annual reports investigated, the substantial 'current loan maturities' in the balance 
sheet (Ibid. p.12) does not carry with it any indication as to whether the money was 
actually received, and if in fact much was not, the quite modest expense 'provision 
for bad and doubtful loans and investments' (Ibid. p.13) to be set against income is 
far too optimistic. However there is no independent discussion as to the extent of bad 
debts. Similarly the question as to whether the very large income figure 'intere\t and 
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commitment fees on portfolio loans' (p.13) actually accrued is left obscure. A 
charitable inclination to give the T. 1. B. the benefit of the doubt in these matters is. 
though, pulled up short by an item 'grants' which appears in the 'consolidation of 
assets and liabilities' table. No comment is afforded to 'grants' which in value are six 
times the paid-up share capital, and in 1984 equal to more than three-quarters the size 
of all loans from outside agencies. It is to the existence of these 'grants' - presumably 
from Government - that the emergence of 'profit' can almost certainly be attributed. 
(c) The Tanganyika Development Finance Company (T.D.F.C.). 
The Tanganyika Development Finance Company dates from 1962, with share capital 
owned by the government, and British, Dutch and German development agencies. 
Though mainly participating in companies' equity, it also put money into loans and 
income notes. The influence of the foreign participants, who supplied many of the 
directors, may have helped to make the accounts more transparent than those of the 
T.I.B., for the minimal profit in 1980 appeared to be genuine. However, the 
T.D.F.C. has received some government indulgences. For example (T.D.F.C. Annual 
Report and Accounts 1980 p.28), "The Tanzania Government ... exempted the 
company from the dividend provisions of the Companies Act 1972", and "Payment 
of dividends to non-resident shareholders is subject to exchange control approval and 
the allocation of foreign exchange". Also, the level of administrative expenses must 
have given some cause for concern. In 1980 they used up nearly a third of the 
Corporation's net income (Ibid. p.20). 
(d) The Development Bank of Zambia. 
This was established in 1974. The overwhelming majority of shares were subscribed 
by the Zambian Government and Zambian parastatals, with a minority of 'Class B' 
shares divided amongst a numerous cohort of extra-Zambian development agencies 
and banks. Thus, with a very minimal stake in the organisation, each foreign 
shareholding body is unlikely to have had the same influence and interest in the 
organisation as it would have if heavily committed. And indeed, in general, all or 
nearly all directors appear to be Zambian. A number of loans have been negotiated 
with domestic and extra-Zambian agencies, and most D.B.Z. allocations have been 
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in the form of loans, though it may make equity investments. 
The main feature of the annual accounts of the D.B.Z. is, like those of the T.I.B., 
a chronic lack of information. With regard to capital disbursements. though the broad 
overall industrial allocation of funds is charted, and new approvals described as, for 
example, 'Installation of an Ice-Making Plant' (Development Bank of Zambia Annual 
Report 1984 p.lO), there is no indication of the legal status and associated ownership 
of the concerns with which the Bank is involved. Furthermore though - at least in the 
earlier 1980s - 'profits' were presented as having been made, there are grounds for 
scepticism. First of all 'income' - from which profit after expenses is a residual -
included 'interest receivable', (Ibid. p.17) but as with so many other D. F. I. s, it is not 
clear that the interest was actually 'received'. Secondly, in the 'charges' (this seems 
to be a synonym for 'expenses') no provision at all is made for bad debts. And it 
seems unlikely that Zambian business has been so credit-worthy that all debt servicing 
liabilities are met in due time in totality. Furthermore, elsewhere in the accounts, 
there is no mention of loan repayments, either receivable, late or received. Since 
there is no 'consolidation of assets and liabilities' table, as there is with the T. I. B., 
the issue cannot be pursued further. 
In conclusion, there is little justification for believing in the financial viability of the 
D.B.Z. from the accounts as presented. 
AN INDONESIAN EXAMPLE OF SMALL BUSINESS LENDING 
To confirm the fact that problems related to the finance of small business are not 
confined to Anglophone Africa, there follow now some remarks on a scheme for 
providing concessional credit to small scale enterprise in Indonesia. 
KIKlKMKP (Small Investment Credit/Small Permanent Working Capital Credit) was 
introduced in 1973 and aimed to provide medium term credit for investment and 
working capital in virtually all sectors of the economy, with regulations favouring 
. . ' t of the civil service indigenous borrowers. A rule making people 10 certaIn sec ors . 
. ..' bi d signed to prevent officials with inelIgIble as apphcants for loans was presuma Y e 
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influence commandeering funds. 
Bolnick (1982) usefully reviews the operation of the scheme, but his fairly up-beat 
assessment is not fully supported by the facts. From his reporting it seems clear that 
the scheme saddled itself at the outset with the type of constraint often fitted to lead 
to problems. Thus (p.67), "The interest charges, maturity limits, collatoral 
requirements and self-finance shares are set to provide highly preferential treatment 
for S.S.E." i.e. small-scale enterprise "customers. Furthermore, the regulations 
specify that applications are to be approved in terms of 'feasibility' rather than by 
traditional commercial criteria". It is not made clear, however, what are the criteria 
for 'feasibility'. Also, in order to cushion the commercial banks operating the 
scheme, "the burden of financing these preferential loan terms is shifted away from 
the handling banks to Bank Indonesia via a system of liquidity credits and risk 
coverage .. ". (Ibid. p.67-8) Thus although the standard anxieties facing financiers 
about to lend on a small-scale basis were expected to be present in relation to the 
Indonesian scheme, the operators of it were conveniently able to shrug them off by 
tapping the resources of the central bank. Such an arrangement is hardly designed to 
enhance informed responsibility on the part of the lenders. 
In due course it is stated, " ... by far the majority of ... credit goes to existing 
business ... This is to be expected, given the fact that most businesses are existing 
businesses, and that neophytes are difficult to appraise until after they have proved 
their entrepreneurial abilities". (Ibid. p.76). The scheme's policy here is 
understandable, though clearly new businessmen were not meant to be ruled out, as 
there was no statutory lower limit to the size of loan disbursed. But even so, "Bank 
Rukyat Indonesia, which handles just under 50% of KIK credit, has a repayment rate 
of only about 50% .. ". (Ibid. p.76). This is rather weakly excused in the following 
manner, " ... many Indonesian SSE" i.e. small-scale entrepreneurs, "are not 
accustomed to meeting rigid payment deadlines, so a lot of brief arrears may exist 
without implying any problem with the loan". (Ibid. p.76). Further comment by 
Bolnick on the difficulties of collecting and interpreting data may identify true 
obstacles to properly assessing the scheme's performance, but from the limited 
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evidence it seems that the sceme has not been immune to the problems faced by 
analogous arrangements elsewhere. 
MALAWI - A SUCCESS STORY? 
(a) Introduction. 
So far in this appendix, the D.F.I.s considered have shown up indifferently. Like the 
Kenyan and Zimbabwean D.F.I.s investigated fully in the main text. success and 
financial viability have eluded them, or have at best been ambiguous. However, 
although this type of record is typical of developing countries, it is not inevitable. 
Certain D.F.I.s in Malawi do appear to have fared well, though it must be accepted 
that the cursory glance a few paragraphs in an appendix afford can hardly analyse in 
depth what has been going on. 
(b) The Investment and Development Bank of Malawi (Indebank). 
Indebank was established in 1972 "to make a contribution to the advancement of 
productive business enterprises which in turn contribute to economic and social 
progress in accordance with the developmental goals set and pursued by the 
Government" (Indebank Annual Report and Accounts 1987 p.4). Indebank may 
allocate its funds to beneficiaries in equity or loan form, and has taken equity stakes 
in half its 80 or so (in 1991) company interests. The destination of funds covers the 
whole range of industry from agriculture to services. 
McKendry (1991 p.7) states, "The Investment and Development Bank of Malawi 
('Indebank') has had a particularly strong trading record in recent years. Its profit 
before tax trebled in real terms between the years 1987 and 1989, reaching Kwacha 
('K') 4.9m in the year ending December 1989; dividend income (K3.1m in 1989) 
made a significant contribution to the profit. This performance represented a pre-tax 
return on capital employed of 22 % which suggests that Indebank has a reasonably 
sound portfolio". 
This refreshingly bullish assessment demands explanation. Certainly much of the 
business into which Indebank loans have gone comprises productive activities that 
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would seem appropriate in a developing country context, such as basic manufacturing 
based on local raw materials, for example tea processing. Also Malawi still has some 
way to go in the import substitution of fairly straightforward products, such as plastic 
containers. However, for such ventures to be viable also demands efficient 
management, something that the RBC Dominion Securities Report found not to be 
true of Kenyan companies, to the subsequent detriment of the D.F.I.s that supported 
them. Conceivably a sentence in the aforementioned Annual Report (p.4) throws a 
very illuminating ray of light on the situation in relation to Indebank. "Indebank 
achieves its objectives by obtaining overseas resources to supplement local resources 
for investments made preferably but not entirely in limited liability companies and 
corporations". In other words, the Bank likes to put money into established going 
concerns that are actively investing. And having foreign currency to allocate it is an 
attractive source of funds for companies that may find it difficult to obtain sufficient 
foreign exchange through other channels. 
Though Indebank, by pursuing such a policy, could be accused of 'playing safe', 
nevertheless the consistent and successful operation of the policy over a period of 
years requires efficient and intelligent Indebank management, and a management, 
moreover, not swayed by the pressures and bad example of partial politicians and 
their cronies. Though it is rather naive to be too dogmatic about the Bank's efficiency 
and integrity without depth research, McKendry (op.cit. p.4) is complementary. He 
states, "Research has confirmed that both organisations" - that is, including the 
Malawi Development Corporation - "are professionally managed", many of the 
investment officers having been "educated at Western business schools and 
universities" . 
Circumstances of Also seemingly of very great significance are the ownership 
Indebank. Most of the capital is in the hands of four foreign and supranational 
agencies, the C.D.C., the Dutch F.M.O., the Germam D.E.G., and the I.F.C., and 
these appoint the great majority of the directors. Certain of these agencies also 
provide lines of credit, as does the I.B.R.D., and against the intluence of these 
powerful bodies, it is plausible that the predilections of local officials for 
33.+ 
self-aggrandisement and the furtherance of pet schemes would not, in a countrv that 
has largely escaped the disadvantages of xenophobic ideological pressures. get very 
far. 
(c) The Malawi Development Corporation. 
This was set up soon after the achievement of independence in 1964 for investment 
in the whole range of productive activities, and unlike Indebank is owned 100% by 
the Malawi government. As well as the K20m capital, the M.D.C. has obtained 
further funds by borrowing, but since the bulk of this debt is due to the Malawi 
Government and the Import and Export Company of Malawi, in which the M.D.C. 
has an overwhelming majority interest, it may be assumed that timeous repayment 
need not be a problem. For, since all M.D.C. investments are equity, loan repayment 
could require the liquidation of assets. And though, liThe financial strategy of 
M.D.C. includes such measures as revolving funds realised from the sale of equity 
.. ". (M.D.C. Annual Report 1987 p.7), this does not seem to have happened much. 
McKendry (op.cit. p.7) observes, "The performance of the Malawi Development 
Corporation ('M.D.C. ') is not quite so strong;" - that is, as Indebank - " ... but their 
performance is still much healthier than that of many other D.F.l.s". Indeed, there 
have been years when the M.D.C. has made operating losses, for example 1983 and 
1984, but these outturns did not develop into a trend, and McKendry's latter remark 
remains starkly true. How may M.D.C. experience be explained? 
McKendry's remarks about good management are meant to apply to the M. D.C. as 
well as Indebank, and good management is partly the basis of the policies that 
evidence shows the Corporation to have pursued. For most M.D.C. investments are 
majority or minority holdings in active firms with foreign company partners. Hardly 
any companies held by the corporation are dormant, suggesting that hostile ideological 
rhetoric in Malawi less readily frightened expatriate entrepreneurs away 
country, so prompting take-over of the businesses they left behind. 
from the 
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Furthermore, investment has always been careful - and l' ndeed , 
according to 
commentators, perhaps too cautious. For example, in 1987, 23 years after the 
Corporation's inception, it had holdings in only 19 companies (M DC' 
. . . Op.CH. 
p.36-39). As a corollary of this policy, it has avoided more adventurous types of 
investment, such as bringing on more Malawian businessmen. The following quote 
(Ibid. p.7) seems more a ritualistic gesture in this direction rather than an operational 
policy. "M.D.C. will step up its support for capable local entrepreneurs and every 
effort will be made to stimulate and develop local entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills" . 
Nevertheless, M.D.C. investments have not been immune from the type of 
shortcoming apparent in many Kenyan companies. In consequence, the M.D.C. 1987 
Report (p.6) referred to the" ... manifold measures undertaken in 1984 to improve 
management performance, especially in subsidiary companies". Gratifyingly, the 
'manifold measures' appear to have worked, for company profits and dividends to the 
M.D.C. went up thereafter. 
CONCLUSION 
The above paragraphs have reviewed, with varying degrees of depth, some of the 
experiences of twelve development finance institutions (or arrangements). Except for 
the two Malawian organisations, the financial viability of all is (or was) in doubt. The 
apparent solvency of the Indebank and the M.D.C. appear to be at least partly due 
to a shrewd determination to restrict business to alliances with successful foreign 
companies rather than supporting and nurturing domestic entrepreneurship. Though 
this type of policy means there is a good chance of profits, some would argue that 
important aspects of national 'development' were being ignored. On the other hand 
it testifies to a government willing to create an economic backdrop where foreign 
capital is prepared (or perhaps has been prepared) to come to the country. 
In a study which has as its principal aim the distillation of the effects of the 'soft 
state' on the structures and operations of D.F.I.s, and through them on economic 
growth, the limited treatments in this appendix obviously do scant justice to the issue. 
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However certain points do emerge. In particular there is the frequent vague and 
dubious presentation of financial data in the accounts, and also at times the convenient 
omission of information. Also evident is the occasional concern about the standard 
of management in the businesses of financial beneficiaries, and even in the D. F. I. s 
themselves. The bad loan repayment record is more frequently referred to, with the 
implication that this shortcoming is not easily followed up. Finally there are the 
biassed regulations for allocating funds, with the possibility - not of course stated -
that the bias might merge with politically-motivated and personal favouritism. As a 
consequence, there must be some doubt as to whether economic development has 
been much helped by D.F.I. activity in the various countries considered. 
The broad conclusion from the discussion in this appendix is that the malaise 
identified as affecting the main 'general' D.F.I.s in Kenya and Zimbabwe exists also 
in other developing countries. 
NOTES APPENDIX 3 
1. Interview in 1990 with a senior official of S. E. D. CO. 
2. With a base year of 1980, the volume indices in Jan 1989 were as in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
MINERAL PRODUCTION IN ZIMBABWE 
Asbestos 67.8 Iron ore 73.0 
Gold 118.5 Silver 38.2 
Chrome ore 104.0 Cobalt 62.6 
Coal 146.1 Tin metal 84.8 
Copper 52.7 Other 82.9 
All minerals 94.5 Nickel 81.8 
SOURCE: (Zimbabwe) Quarterly Digest of Statistics March 1989 
Some 25 year U.K. Exchequer low cost housing loans have been at 6.118% 3. 
(N.D.B. Annual Report for 1986/7 p.27). 
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4. The 1986/7 Annual Report observes (p.9), " .. all new loans up to 10000 Pula 
would be charged 10% interest and become part of the (new) Small Business Fund". 
At this time the Botswana discount rate was 9%, so 10% on small business loans was 
wildl y concessionary. 
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